‘It Should Always Be a Give-and-Take’

The Transformation of West German Music Diplomacy in the 1960s

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1 West German Music Diplomacy in the Early 1960s

In 1962, the West German Ministry of Economic Cooperation, the Goethe Institute Munich and the German Academic Exchange Service collaborated on a documentary film that captured a diplomatic tour of the Tübingen Student Orchestra to Lagos/Nigeria. First screened at the 1963 Berlinale film festival, the film Doppelkonzert openly portrayed the difficulties of musical diplomacy in the 1960s. Claiming to present the ‘best’ of German music to young Nigerian audiences, West German cultural institutes sought to spark interest in and sympathy for German culture and West German politics. As the documentary’s speaker admitted, however, the Goethe Institute’s initial attempts to win the hearts of young Nigerians through European classical music failed. The documentary unabashedly shows the uninvolved faces of audience members who appear to be thoroughly bored while listening to Bach. Indeed, the speaker seems disillusioned, claiming that ‘for the students at Queens College, the concert provides at least a pleasant break from their classes.’

Considering that it would have been in the interest of the German Academic Exchange Service and the Goethe Institute to represent their cultural programs as being highly successful, the documentary’s scepticism regarding the potential of West German music diplomacy is indeed remarkable.

The tour of the Tübingen student orchestra illustrates the impasse of West German music diplomacy in the early 1960s. By presenting the ‘best’ and ‘most beautiful’ aspects of German high culture to foreign audiences, German cultural institutes had hoped to evoke admiration or at least sympathy among local audiences, regardless of these audiences’ cultural backgrounds. In the early 1960s, however, this unidirectional strategy of music diplomacy often failed
to impress audiences abroad. When West German cultural diplomacy programs were launched in the late 1950s and early 1960s, they were largely based on what Danielle Fosler-Lussier, in her analysis of U.S. cultural diplomacy, has described as a strategy of ‘cultural infiltration’. This mode of cultural diplomacy was anchored in a universalist ideology, accentuating a shared developmental goal to which all cultures aspired, but that ostensibly less-developed cultures were still far from having reached. Accordingly, cultural diplomacy not only revolved around the notion that nations were best represented by their greatest historical and cultural achievements. But, it also hinged upon the idea that, by exporting and sharing these achievements with seemingly less-developed nations and communities, Western cultures could motivate these societies to pattern themselves after ostensibly advanced, Western role models. As Nigeria had gained independence from Great Britain in 1960, it had become crucial to Western Cold War containment policy. Evoking sympathy for West Germany among young Nigerians was therefore part and parcel of Western attempts to build an ideological bulwark against the Soviet Union.

This article seeks to outline significant changes in West German music diplomacy in the 1960s. It describes the 1960s as a crucial time period during which new modes of cultural diplomacy were being probed and implemented. Music was at the forefront of these changes. I argue that the changes that took place in West German cultural diplomacy during the 1960s involved the scale, the diversity, the mediation, and the messages (and thus the politics) of West German music diplomacy. As West German music diplomacy turned into a global, large-scale program, its generic range likewise increased significantly. By the mid-1960s, the Goethe Institute’s music programs included cabaret, various subgenres of jazz, and, by the early 1970s, also progressive rock. Besides these changes in geographical scale and musical genre, the modes of music diplomacy changed significantly during this time period. In the early 1960s, West German music diplomacy consisted largely in performing European classical music (with some exceptions) abroad. During the mid-1960s, several initiatives emphasised a more process-oriented approach to music diplomacy, based on the notion of interpersonal and cultural exchange. This process-oriented approach was implemented in person-to-person diplomacy and ‘educational aid’ through music (musikalische ‘Bildungshilfe’). Although powerful voices within the Goethe Institute and the Foreign Office did not consider the practice of cultural exchange a genuine goal of cultural diplomacy—seeing it as a mere strategy designed to evoke sympathy with local populations—cultural exchange programs did shape the overall landscape of West German music diplomacy. Finally, the mediation of musical diplomacy through media technology changed significantly during this time period. By the late 1960s, the Goethe Institute was much more aware of how its programs would be channelled by the media. It therefore began to design programs that would be picked up, mediated, and thus amplified, both in Germany and abroad.

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2 Music Diplomacy and the Notion of ‘High Culture’

The shift in U.S. cultural diplomacy from ‘cultural infiltration’ to ‘cultural exchange’ preceded similar changes in West German music diplomacy. As Penny Von Eschen and Danielle Fosler-Lussier have observed, the U.S. State Department’s music diplomacy was crucial to this shift in the U.S. In the late 1950s, the State Department already supported numerous workshops by American conductors and composers as William Strickland who worked with orchestras around the world, demonstrating that music pedagogy could indeed be a valuable aspect of public diplomacy. In 1956, the State Department sponsored a tour by Dizzy Gillespie and a number of other musicians to the Middle East, Turkey, and Eastern Europe. Besides being significant as a first attempt to involve African American cultural ambassadors in U.S. music diplomacy programs, this tour heralded the transformation of transatlantic diplomatic strategies. In addition to performing a version of the history of African American music, U.S. musicians spontaneously played with local musicians and befriended local audience members. In his reports on Dizzy Gillespie’s tour, the jazz historian and consultant of the U.S. State Department Marshall Stearns celebrated the musicians not only for their musical performances, but also for their great effort to personally connect with local audiences. Dizzy Gillespie, for instance, was celebrated for playing with a local flutist and snake charmer.

After the public success of this first jazz tour that was sponsored by the State Department, U.S. jazz musicians, who were now frequently sent abroad as cultural ambassadors, went a step further in their attempts to ignite cultural exchange with local audiences. They began to incorporate musical traditions of host cultures into their programs, thus seeking to flatter their audiences by sonically referencing their cultural traditions. On his 1958 tour through Poland, Dave Brubeck wrote and performed a song with the Polish title ‘Dziekuje’ (transl. ‘thank you’). In Germany, he played the tune ‘Brandenburg Gate’, and his trip to Calcutta inspired his ‘Calcutta Blues’. Joya Sherrill similarly sang a version of the traditional Russian song ‘Katyusha’ when she visited the Soviet Union. Jazz musicians also expanded their efforts to perform with local musicians from their host countries. The most prominent examples were the sessions of jazz musicians with Ravi Shankar and with the King of Thailand Bhumibol Adulyadej (who plays the saxophone). This strategy of musical flattery was part of a larger shift in American cultural diplomacy from cultural infiltration to cultural exchange that took place in the late 1950s.

By the early 1960s, other Western nations responded to these diplomatic practices. The development of West German music diplomacy in the early 1960s is a case in point. The rather

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9 Dunkel, “Jazz—Made in Germany”, 147–154.
meagre beginnings of West German cultural diplomacy between 1955 and 1959 had still taken place in newly founded cultural institutes under the auspices of the German embassies. As the West German government recognised the increasing significance of cultural diplomacy, it decided to incorporate these institutes into the Goethe Institute. Initially founded as a German language institute and funded by its students’ tuition fees, the Goethe Institute was going through a period of rapid growth in the late 1950s and early 1960s. By 1962, it had developed into a well-established, globally operating organization with more than eighty branch offices whose functions included both German language education and cultural diplomacy. Propelled by the West German economic boom, the public investment into the Goethe Institute grew exponentially in the early 1960s as West German cultural institutes were integrated into the Goethe Institute.

Music became an increasingly significant factor in the Goethe Institute’s growth. Until the early 1960s, the rather small-scale events in West German music diplomacy were largely limited to concerts of classical music (mostly chamber music) and what was considered German folk music (‘Volksmusik’). The Goethe Institute organised several tours of well-known and lesser-known musicians and chamber music ensembles in 1961, but rarely invested in shows by celebrity musicians. Violinist Edith Peinemann (b. 1937, accompanied by pianist Gernot Kahl 1933–2000) and cellist Ludwig Hölscher (1907–1996, accompanied by Friedrich Wilhelm Schnurr, b. 1929) toured South and Central America. Karl Wolfram (1913–1989) toured through Brazil with a program of German songs. The Stross-Quartett, named after its founder Wilhelm Stross (1907–1966), performed in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Cyprus, and Greece. And the Conrad Hansen Trio (named after the pianist Conrad Hansen (1906–2002) was invited by the Goethe Institute in Tampere.10 The Goethe Institute also subsidised performances by the Zsigmondi/Niessen Duet11 (North and Central America), the Nicolet/Picht-Axenfeld Duet12 (Spain), and the Raba Trio13 (Spain). Some musicians selected by the Goethe Institute had already been successful during the era of National Socialism. Ludwig Hölscher, for instance, had been a member of the NSDAP since 1937.14 This selection of professional, but not quite famous musicians is typical of the early years of West German music diplomacy. The ensembles mostly selected pieces from the tradition of European classical music to which they sometimes added compositions from contemporary composers. Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, and Brahms tended to predominate in these concerts.15

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11 Violinist Dénes Zsigmondi (1922–2014) and pianist Anneliese Niessen (Zsigmondi’s wife, life data unknown).
12 Swiss flautist Aurèle Nicolet (1926–2016) and the German pianist Edith Picht-Axenfeld (1914–2001).
13 Founded by violinist Jost Raba (1900–2000).
One of the popular highlights in 1961 was the 'Tour through Asia' ('Asientournee') of the baroque chamber orchestra Deutsche Bachsolisten. According to the Goethe Institute, who funded this tour, the musicians reached 12,000 people in Turkey, the Middle East, and South East Asia. In the same year, the chamber music ensemble Münchner Nonett attracted a similarly large amount of people when the Goethe Institute sent them on a tour through Africa and Southern Europe. In addition to works by Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven, the ensemble played pieces by Werner Egk (1901–1983) and Harald Genzmer (1909–2007). Although the Goethe Institute's quarterly report said that young audiences were especially fascinated by these ensembles, the 1962 documentary film on the Tübingen student orchestra demonstrates that the Goethe Institute's self-evaluations of their tours' success in these years should be taken with a grain of salt. While not all of the musicians who received support from the Goethe Institute were German citizens (Dénes Zsigmondi, for instance, was a Hungarian citizen), most of them were closely tied to German music institutions.

Apart from these concerts by touring, professional musicians and ensembles from Germany, West German music diplomacy in the early 1960s occasionally included collaborations of German musicians with musicians from host countries. One remarkable project took place at the Goethe Institute in Vietnam, where a group of Vietnamese music students performed works by Händel, Weber, Beethoven, Pugnani/Kreisler, and Fauré under the direction of the German conductor and educator Otto Söllner. Söllner had been the head conductor at the opera house in Trier until 1960 before he decided to settle down in Vietnam, where he had been sent for a guest performance. While in Vietnam, Söllner founded both a symphony orchestra and the National Conservatory of Hue. Educating young Vietnamese students in the European classical music tradition, his conservatory cooperated with the Goethe Institute in Saigon despite strong political tensions between various Cold War actors in Vietnam.\(^\text{16}\) Similar events with local musicians performing works in the European classical music tradition took place at the Goethe Institutes in Madras, Tokyo, and at other institutions. In Madras, performances were initiated by the German instructor Dr. Werwie, who was also a member of the Madras Musical Association.\(^\text{17}\) In Tokyo, Japanese musicians performed works by Mozart, Schubert, and Schönberg under the auspices of the Goethe-Institute.\(^\text{18}\)

While local musicians playing classical music were welcomed in Goethe Institutes, very few events celebrated local music traditions. This tended to be true even for collaborations of the Goethe Institute with other Western institutions such as American Universities, the British

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Council, Instituts français or the U.S. State Department. In March 1962, the Goethe Institute in Beirut cooperated with the Belgian NGO Jeunesses Musicales\(^{19}\), the U.S. State Department, and the American University of Beirut in staging a sixteen-day ‘Musikwoche’. The event comprised a guest performance by the Stross-Quartett of works by Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven, as well as lectures by Hans Heinz Stuckenschmidt (1901–1988) on ‘The Development of the Sonata from Haydn to Beethoven’ and on ‘Music Criticism, Musical Life, and Musical Education in the Federal Republic of Germany,’ among other events. Stuckenschmidt subsequently went on to discuss his lecture on Lebanese television. The Viennese classical musical tradition was additionally celebrated in an exhibition on ‘The Trinity Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven’. In addition, the music week included performances by pianist Detlef Kraus (1919–2008) and flautist Kurt Redel (1918–2013) who was accompanied on the piano by Adele Lorenz. While Kraus played pieces by Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven, the latter duet performed works by Bach, Debussy, Ravel, Cesar Bresgen (1913–1988), Günter Bialas (1907–1995), and Jacques Pillois (1877–1935), in addition to Mozart and Beethoven. While local musicians (such as the Lebanese pianist Diana Taky Deen) equally participated in the concert, their performances were limited to the European classical music tradition (she performed works by Beethoven only). The Aspen Trio from the U.S. concluded a ‘Musikwoche’ that, rather than creating a dialogue with local music cultures, exclusively celebrated the German-centric canon of European classical music.

By the early 1960s, however, an increasing number of people within German cultural life recognised the limits of music diplomacy programs that relied exclusively on the tradition of European classical music. Their arguments for a more diverse music diplomacy were both ideological and pragmatic in nature. Some participants in the music diplomacy programs openly objected to the notion of Western cultural superiority which was a premise for the strategy of cultural infiltration through European classical music. After his tour through the Middle East, the young cellist Gerhard Mantel (1930–2012), for instance, demanded that the Goethe Institute’s music programs take into account that ‘a given culture is never better than another culture, it is only different. […] the notion of German or a larger occidental culture as one that is superior to the cultures of developing countries hinders any fruitful encounter.’\(^{20}\) Mantel furthermore noticed a lack of communication between musicians and audiences that he attributed to the audiences’ inability to decipher the ‘musical symbols’ of Western classical music. Mantel’s essay, which, in an abridged version, appeared in the Goethe Institute’s quarterly report,  

\(^{19}\) Jeunesses Musicales was founded in 1945 as a diplomatic development initiative whose mission included the global music education of young people. Launched in Brussels with the support of the Belgian government, it has grown into a large NGO with member organisations in 45 countries. See ‘JM International’, accessed 7 November 2017, www.jmi.net.

questioned the notion that the tradition of European classical music marked the peak of musical achievements in the history of mankind—an idea that strongly informed the Goethe Institute's diplomatic practices.

Regardless of whether or not they shared Mantel’s insight into the relativity of cultural value, local directors of Goethe Institutes were forced to respond to changing demands by local audiences. Since German language courses depended on a high visibility within host cultures, the interest of audiences was particularly important for directors of local Goethe Institutes. By the early 1960s, many directors of Goethe Institutes reported that local audiences demanded what was usually referred as ‘modern music’. Such demand for ‘modern music’ is indeed hardly surprising, considering the heavy emphasis of the Goethe Institutes’ programming on baroque, classical, and romantic music. In trying to respond to this demand, many Goethe Institutes began to invite young composers of contemporary Western art music (Karlheinz Stockhausen became a favourite with Goethe Institutes). In South and Central America, the Goethe Institute answered the demand for more ‘modern’ music by sending Alfons (1932–2010) and Aloys Kontarsky (1931–2017) to Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala, where they performed works by Stravinsky, Boulez, Stockhausen, and Zimmermann. Throughout the early and mid-1960s, the Goethe Institute sent at least one avant-garde ensemble to South America every year. In 1962, the Goethe Institute in Athens launched a ‘Studio für Neue Musik’ under the direction of the German composer Günther Becker (1924–2007) and the Greek musicologist and composer Giannis Papaioannou (1910–1989). The ‘Studio’ organised performances of works by modernist and contemporary composers of classical music, mostly from French and German speaking countries. The composers selected for these concerts included Schönberg, Webern, Berg, and Debussy, but also works by such active composers as Hindemith, Milhaud, Jolivet, and Henze. While the popular success of such initiatives as the Athens ‘Studio’ remains difficult to measure, part of their significance lay in the institutional platform they provided to German and Greek avant-garde composers like Becker and Papaioannou.

These examples demonstrate the widespread notion that West German music diplomacy had to be limited to spreading the European tradition and practice of classical music, from the beginnings to the present. The Goethe Institute’s rhetoric of ‘progressiveness’ in 1962 and 1963 largely referred to the necessity of opening up towards new forms of what was considered musical high culture. This included avant-garde musicians in the New Music scene. Even folk music events were rare in the Goethe-Institute’s cultural programming. In September 1963, the Jodler- und Schuhplattlergruppe ‘Gebrüder Rehm’ toured Eastern Africa with lectures on and performances of traditional Bavarian dances and yodelling. The Goethe Institute’s report emphasised the historical authenticity of these folk music and dance performances—

underscoring their informational value. Although at the beginning of the Goethe Institute’s process of opening up for contemporary music, jazz musicians were not included, the demand for contemporary music was a door opener for jazz. Up until 1963, however, West German music diplomacy remained, by and large, limited to the presentation of European classical music both by German and non-German performers.

3 Serious Popular Music: Jazz as Mediator between ‘High’ and ‘Popular’ Culture

In 1963, the Goethe Institute’s quarterly report announced an ‘experiment.’ In addition to sending the chamber music ensemble Studio für Frühe Musik on an extensive tour through the Middle East and Asia, the Goethe Institute announced that it was planning to fund a tour by West German jazz musicians. The ‘Asientournee’ (Asian tour), as it was called in the West German jazz press, would take the Albert Mangelsdorff Quintet to Turkey, Iraq, India, East Pakistan, West Pakistan, Vietnam, Ceylon, Malaya, the Philippines, Japan, and Hong Kong. The German impresario Joachim Ernst Berendt (1922–2000), already well-known as a jazz writer and a radio moderator for South West Broadcasting (Südwestfunk), was going to accompany the band as a consultant, moderator, and lecturer. Around the same time, the Goethe Institute agreed to support concerts in Italy by the Klaus Doldinger Quartet, and planned a 1964 tour of the Pepsi Auer Quintet to Syria, Libanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, and North Africa. The Goethe Institute was initially reluctant in its promotion of these jazz concerts. While classical music ensembles were usually celebrated in the Goethe Institute’s reports, the Institute distanced itself from the Mangelsdorff Quintet’s tour. ‘Since this first tour of a jazz ensemble that was selected by the programming office is an experiment,’ the quarterly reports said almost apologetically, ‘[the headquarters in Munich are] very curious about the reaction of the audience.’ The future of West German jazz diplomacy, the Goethe Institute implied, lay in the popular success of these first jazz concerts.

Before the Mangelsdorff Quintet began their first extensive jazz tour in early 1964, however, another event already evidenced the great potential of West German jazz diplomacy. In November 1963, the Goethe Institute in Paris organised a jazz concert by up-and-coming West German jazz musicians at the Salle Pleyel. Preceding the first tour by a West German jazz

25 From 1961 to 1969, the members of the Mangelsdorff Quintet were Albert Mangelsdorff (trombone, 1928–2005), Günter Kronberg (alto sax, baritone sax 1926–1977), Heinz Sauer (tenor sax, soprano, b. 1932), Günter Lenz (bass, b. 1938), and Ralf Hübner (drums, b. 1939).
27 Named after piano and vibraphone player Pepsi Auer (1928–2013).
29 ‘Da es sich bei dieser ersten Tournee eines von der Programmabteilung entsandten Jazzensembles um ein Experiment handelt, ist man in München sehr gespannt auf die Reaktion des Publikums.’
ensemble for the Goethe Institute, this event marks the beginning of West German jazz diplomacy. The concert at the Salle Pleyel—one of Paris’s most prestigious concert halls where many of the most significant U.S. jazz musicians had already performed—turned out to be a huge success. The concert hall, with 2,500 seats, was sold out. People had to be turned away, and the audience applauded enthusiastically after three hours of ‘German jazz.’ The concert was called ‘Jazz – Made in Germany’. It included performances by the Hessian Radio Jazz Ensemble, the Joki Freund Quintet, the Klaus Doldinger Quartet, the Fritz Hartschuh Quartet, and the Albert Mangelsdorff Quintet. The title was derived from a record by the Klaus Doldinger Quartet, which had been released earlier in 1963. By applying the phrase ‘made in Germany’ to jazz, the Goethe-Institute tied West German jazz to the West German economic boom of the late 1950s and early 1960s, thus casting the renewed economic and political strength of West Germany not as a threat to France, but as a benevolent cultural achievement. The success of the Paris concert heralded the large jazz diplomacy program of the 1960s and ‘70s when jazz became not only integral to West German musical diplomacy, but it also paved the way for other popular genres, such as jazz rock, progressive rock (in the late 1960s and early 1970s), and later also rock, pop, Neue Deutsche Welle, punk, reggae, electronic music, and hip hop.

Considering the conservative programming of Goethe Institutes up until 1962, the embrace of jazz in 1963 seems to be a radical shift in the Institute’s cultural diplomacy. What are the reasons for the Goethe-Institute’s turn towards jazz? For one, individual directors of Goethe Institutes were still quite independent in 1963. Although the German Foreign Office (‘Auswärtiges Amt’) increasingly intervened in the Goethe Institutes’ cultural programming, individual Goethe Institutes in 1963 were still able to launch their own programs. It was not until 1969 that the first outline agreement (‘Rahmenvertrag’) between the Goethe Institute and the Foreign Office took effect. Individual Goethe Institutes were therefore relatively free in their cultural programming. Conflicts with the German Foreign Office tended to emerge after the events had already taken place.

This is particularly significant in the case of the Paris Goethe Institute where in 1962 the new director Christian Schmitt was initially allowed to launch a program that in many ways conflicted with the cultural diplomacy (as ‘high’ cultural diplomacy) that was envisioned by the German foreign office. The question of how West Germany was represented in France was regarded as a priority by the German Foreign Office. Not only was France economically important to West Germany, but the German-French relationship was also regarded as a cornerstone in West Germany’s effort to build peaceful relations with other European nations after World War II. Moreover, the German-French friendship was politically, culturally, and ideologically crucial to Western Cold War efforts. The Foreign Office and the German Embassy in Paris

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30 Walter Jakob ‘Joki’ Freund (1926–1212), Klaus Doldinger (b. 1936), Fritz Hartschuh (b. 1930).
31 On the Salle Pleyel concert, see Dunkel, “Jazz—Made in Germany”, 153–158.
therefore carefully watched and tried to influence the activities at the Paris Goethe Institute. The German-French Cultural Agreement (‘Deutsch-französisches Kulturabkommen’) of 23 October 1954 marked the first step for West German cultural diplomacy in France. Throughout the 1950s, however, cultural exchanges between France and Germany were still characterised by a strong imbalance. While France maintained seventeen Instituts français and Centres culturels in the FDR, the Bonn Republic only tentatively began to launch a cultural program in France. The first German cultural institutes resulted from local initiatives in Lille (founded in 1956) and Marseille (founded in 1960). Both institutes were integrated into the Goethe Institute in 1962. In Paris, West German cultural programs were particularly scarce. In 1960, the first German language courses were launched by the Paris Goethe Institute. Although it did not mention the word 'culture,’ the Élysée Treaty that Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle signed on 22 January 1963 further intensified educational, military, political, economic, and cultural collaborations between France and Germany, increasing the Bonn Republic’s need for a strong cultural presence in the French capital.

For the Goethe Institute Paris, a new era had already begun prior to the signing of the Élysée Treaty. On 10 April 1962, the Goethe Institute moved to a larger building at 22, Rue de Vaugirard. The rooms had been bought by the West German Foreign Office. The fact that the West German ambassador Herbert Blankenhorn gave an inaugural speech and ‘handed the rooms over’ to the head of the Goethe Institute’s Department of Culture (Kulturabteilung) Eckart Peterich demonstrates the Foreign Office’s great investment into the Goethe Institute. In August 1962, the Goethe Institute appointed Christian Schmitt as the new director of the Paris Goethe Institute. His appointment was initiated by Dieter Sattler, the head of the cultural department of the Foreign Office. Schmitt replaced the former director, Ottmar Willeke, whom the West German ambassador to France, Herbert Blankenhorn, considered intellectually incapable of running such a program. Willeke was now supposed to dedicate himself exclusively to the Institute’s increasing language education program. The Foreign Office wanted Schmitt to launch a cultural program on an interim basis until the new director of the Goethe-Haus at Avenue d’Iéna (which would not open until October 1965) would be appointed.

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time of his appointment, Schmitt was in his early 40s, had completed a doctorate in Roman philology, and had successfully directed both the Goethe-Institute (from 1954 to 1959) and the West German Cultural Institute in Trieste (since 1958). The latter was incorporated into the Goethe Institute in 1961. He therefore seemed to be well-equipped to launch a new cultural program in Paris that ‘would satisfy the most fastidious tastes’ of Paris audiences, as Blankenhorn put it. In addition to launching a cultural program of the Goethe Institute in Paris, Schmitt was responsible for the coordination of West German cultural diplomacy throughout France, including at the Goethe Institutes in Lille, Marseille, and the newly founded Goethe Institutes in Toulouse (1962) and Nancy (1963).

Since the French government had pressed the German government into intensifying the West German cultural representation in France, it was particularly important for the Paris Goethe Institute to attract large audiences. To this end, Christian Schmitt designed a highly variegated program that in some ways pioneered new forms of West German cultural diplomacy. Schmitt replaced the practice of displaying what was considered ‘best’ and ‘most beautiful’ about Germany with an emphasis on contemporary West German culture, contemporary art and music, open dialogue, and discussion. While critical voices were highlighted rather than hushed, Schmitt’s cultural programming involved lively exchanges between French audiences and young representatives of contemporary West German culture who were often critical of the conservative West German government. Schmitt’s program included a lecture by the young German intellectual Hans Magnus Enzensberger about ‘Politics and Crime’, for instance, that inverted notions of social failure and success and thus called into question the West German political establishment. Schmitt moreover screened films that had recently been awarded at the Oberhausen short film festival. The most spectacular event, however, was the ‘Jazz – Made in Germany’ concert at the Salle Pleyel. It caught the attention not only of French and German jazz magazines, but also of such major German newspapers as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

What is more, the promotion of the concert included an appearance by the Mangelsdorff Quintet on French television and thus led to one of the first TV appearances of musicians that had been supported by the Goethe Institute. The Goethe Institute’s Quarterly Report concluded that especially young audiences were ‘fascinated’ (‘begeistert’) by Schmitt’s cultural programming.

41 See Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Politik und Verbrechen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978).
42 Wittek, Und das in Goethes Namen, 240.
Schmitt’s time at the Goethe Institute Paris ended abruptly in 1965. According Bernhard Wittek, this had to do with a lecture by Rudolf Augstein that Schmitt initiated and organised at the renowned Institut de Science Politique in late 1964. In his lecture, Augstein heavily criticised the French government, claiming that it was trying to subvert the German government and to overthrow the German foreign minister, Gerhard Schröder. The fact that 600 people attended the lecture and that it was covered prominently by mainstream French and German media made it impossible for the French and German governments to play down the significance of the event. The lecture therefore caused a great diplomatic scandal between France and West Germany, eventually resulting in what was probably a disciplinary transfer of Schmitt to Mexico.

During his time at the Paris Goethe Institute, however, Schmitt had demonstrated what West German cultural programming could look like. He thus helped to pave the way for a new type of West German cultural diplomacy that shifted towards cultural dialogue and tentatively began to include popular genres in addition to traditional ‘high culture.’ The emphasis of cultural diplomacy turned towards a new generation of cultural ambassadors, many of whom were in their thirties, representing a new, young, and vivid West Germany that seemed ready for the challenges of the present rather than being preoccupied with preserving the dubious glory of its past.

4 Music Diplomacy Between Educational Aid and Prestige

In 1965, the Goethe Institute’s new general director Werner Ross described significant changes in West German musical diplomacy in the Goethe Institute’s yearbook:

‘Even in the African Bush do they know that we are one of the great, musical nations. We do not need to export Bach, Beethoven, and Brahms. They have already ‘arrived’. The questions we need to ask are: how does this great tradition live on today? How do we rate our accomplishments in modern music? Still remarkable. In Jazz? Small, and yet, maybe one or two things are presentable. In the exploration of Old Music? Excellent. In the old German domain of the song? Deplorably small, compared to, say, the charm of French chansons. How do we rate our interpreters (conductors, pianists, and so forth), our instruments, and our reproductions? What is the value of our pedagogy? […] How can we manage to render European music accessible to Arabic and Japanese ears? How can we, in turn, pave the way to Europe for Arabic and Japanese music? In other words: as soon as we leave behind the old, narrow notion of culture as a repertoire that can


45 According to the Goethe Institute’s former press relations officer Bernard Wittek, Schmitt never admitted that his transfer to Mexico resulted from disciplinary punishment, although some sources indicate that it did. See Wittek, Und das in Goethes Namen, 247–248.
be performed and presented, and translate it into life, function, mediation, exchange, an abundance of new opportunities for how it can operate arise amidst an abundance of new questions.\(^{46}\)

Werner Ross’s essay demonstrates some of the contradictions that marked the shift in West German cultural diplomacy during the mid-1960s. For one, it accounts for the fact that jazz diplomacy changed in scale and character after 1963, when the West German jazz program, comprising various subgenres of jazz from Dixieland to avant-garde Free Jazz, was extended significantly.\(^{47}\) Ross’s essay secondly offers some of the reasons why West German music diplomacy opened up to new genres of music in the early 1960s—although this process of opening up was slow-paced. In addition to launching a jazz program, the Goethe Institute for the first time supported a tour by a West German cabaret group in 1963, when Helen Vita, Heinz Greul, and Heinz Brüning performed in Italy and France. Due to their great success, the group was sent on a second tour through Scandinavia in the fall of 1963.\(^{48}\)

Ross’s essay, however, remained ambivalent about the notion that the Goethe-Institute’s cultural programs had to open up to popular culture. On the one hand, Ross describes the concept of culture as high culture as flawed and outdated. He seems to embrace the idea that culture is fundamentally non-hierarchical and that cultural diplomacy should be an exchange of ‘life’—recalling Raymond Williams’s re-definition of culture as a ‘way of life’ in the 1950s.\(^{49}\) While Ross seems to confirm this vision of culture by mentioning jazz and songs, his rhetoric, on the other hand, is so steeped in imperialist discourses, it belies his professed open-mindedness. The ‘African bush’, for instance, is a syncretic term that denies the cultural complexity and variety of the African continent, echoing colonialist notions of African backwardness. What is more, while Ross enumerates musical genres that are not classical music, he still believes that


\[\text{Werner Ross’s essay demonstrates some of the contradictions that marked the shift in West German cultural diplomacy during the mid-1960s. For one, it accounts for the fact that jazz diplomacy changed in scale and character after 1963, when the West German jazz program, comprising various subgenres of jazz from Dixieland to avant-garde Free Jazz, was extended significantly.} \]

\[\text{Ross’s essay secondly offers some of the reasons why West German music diplomacy opened up to new genres of music in the early 1960s—although this process of opening up was slow-paced. In addition to launching a jazz program, the Goethe Institute for the first time supported a tour by a West German cabaret group in 1963, when Helen Vita, Heinz Greul, and Heinz Brüning performed in Italy and France. Due to their great success, the group was sent on a second tour through Scandinavia in the fall of 1963.} \]

\[\text{Ross’s essay, however, remained ambivalent about the notion that the Goethe-Institute’s cultural programs had to open up to popular culture. On the one hand, Ross describes the concept of culture as high culture as flawed and outdated. He seems to embrace the idea that culture is fundamentally non-hierarchical and that cultural diplomacy should be an exchange of ‘life’—recalling Raymond Williams’s re-definition of culture as a ‘way of life’ in the 1950s.} \]

\[\text{While Ross seems to confirm this vision of culture by mentioning jazz and songs, his rhetoric, on the other hand, is so steeped in imperialist discourses, it belies his professed open-mindedness. The ‘African bush’, for instance, is a syncretic term that denies the cultural complexity and variety of the African continent, echoing colonialist notions of African backwardness. What is more, while Ross enumerates musical genres that are not classical music, he still believes that} \]

\[\text{‘Kulturelle Nachrichten aus der Programmbteilung’, \textit{Vierteljahresbericht des Goethe-Instituts} 3, no. 4 (1963), 35.} \]

\[\text{In the 1950s, Raymond Williams influentially re-defined culture as a ‘way of life’. Raymond Williams, \textit{Culture and Society} (New York: Doubleday, 1960), vi.} \]
Germans are not only better at playing classical rather than popular music, but that it is possible to rate their contributions to world culture according to a tacit but universally applicable set of criteria. Ross is nowhere close to translating the logic of his notion that culture is ‘life’ to his aesthetic judgments.

The contradictions of Ross’s essay corresponded to the contradictory practice of cultural and musical diplomacy during this time period. This is evident in the tension between the notion that the Goethe Institute had to invest into quality rather than quantity, on the one hand, and the call for musical ‘Bildungshilfe’ (educational aid), a concept that gained prominence in the mid-1960s, on the other. While one of the main targets of U.S. musical diplomacy were populations of nations that seemed to drift towards communism, West German music diplomacy sought to use music in order to rebuild the reputation of West Germany around the world, including in Western nations. In 1966, the Goethe Institute still organised the majority of its concerts in non-communist European countries. 403 concerts took place in non-communist Europe, compared to 296 in Asia, 150 in Africa, and 227 in South, Central, and North America.\textsuperscript{50} Even outside the West, one of the goals of West German cultural programs was to impress Western diplomats.

According to the cultural programming office (‘Programmabteilung’), offering concerts for free by first-rate artists in such ‘developed’ countries as the United States, Japan, or in Western Europe was a questionable endeavour. Since audiences would think less of concerts that were offered for free, the Goethe Institutes should leave such events in the hands of concert agencies. Cultural programs in ‘developed’ nations rather had to become more ‘experimental’ and ‘extraordinary’, showcasing ‘new and the newest’ examples of West German contemporary art, as the Goethe Institute’s yearbook put it.\textsuperscript{51} In the late 1960s, the Goethe Institute’s cultural programming included tours by the so-called German All Stars, a group of renowned German jazz musicians that the Goethe institute had especially assembled for jazz tours. The Goethe Institute could thus offer events that were exceptional, unique, and had a long-term impact, as the German All Stars went on to record the music they had performed on their tours for the Goethe Institute.

Some voices in the Goethe Institute, however, accentuated that local populations had to be targeted differently, especially in less developed countries, where avant-garde art was considered less appropriate. Here, the Goethe Institute’s strategy began to include what the head of the music programming office, Johannes Hömberg, referred to as a musical contribution to ‘Bildungshilfe.’ In his annual report for the Goethe Institute’s yearbook, he argued:

‘Concerts by German traveling musicians are good, extraordinary concerts by outstanding musicians are even better; it would be best, however (since it would have the strongest long-term impact), if some artists or ensembles did not “travel through” cities, but if they stayed for longer in


one city […] in order to […] give introductory, advanced, and master classes on their instruments, to teach in groups, to hold lectures, and to work with the astonishingly numerous local amateur and professional orchestras. Three weeks of intense “educational aid” are certainly more important than three years of concerts with audiences that tend to consist of Europeans anyway.\textsuperscript{52}

The emergence of the notion of music diplomacy as ‘Bildungshilfe’ entailed new requirements for musicians who became cultural ambassadors. Musicians would have to be selected according to their diplomatic skills in intercultural, peer-to-peer encounters. For musicians on an ‘educational aid’ program for the Goethe Institute, it was not enough to be outstanding in their fields, but they also had to be convincing teachers.

This turn towards intercultural exchange was true for all genres. At the Goethe Institute Madrid, students premiered their own compositions that were inspired by Stockhausen, whom the Institute had invited two years before.\textsuperscript{53} In the following years, Goethe Institutes in Spain and Italy commissioned compositions to young local composers that were then premiered at the Goethe Institutes.\textsuperscript{54} In Early Music, members of the ensemble Studio der Frühen Musik from Munich taught a three-week course in Brazil where they ‘familiarised a large group of Brazilians with Early European Music’, as Hömberg put it.\textsuperscript{55} In the European tradition of classical music, violinist Wilhelm Stross taught the musicians of an orchestra in Bangkok. In Addis Abeba, the Chamber Orchestra Tübingen performed with the String Orchestra of the Ethiopian Police under the direction of the African American conductor George Byrd.\textsuperscript{56} In Canada, The Reger Quartet participated in a four-month music camp, and in Yaoundé, the Berlin jazz group Spree City Stompers spontaneously performed with a local percussion group.\textsuperscript{57} That jazz programs worked particularly well in many African cities was partly due to the notion that the music was originally African. Jazz was in itself an emblem of non-hierarchical, musical and cultural

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\textsuperscript{53} ‘Kulturelle Nachrichten aus Spanien und Portugal’, Vierteljahresbericht 3, no. 2 (1963), 42.

\textsuperscript{54} Jahrbuch 1966 des Goethe-Instituts, 81.

\textsuperscript{55} ‘[…] eine große Gruppe interessierter Brasilianer mit der Frühen Europäischen Musik bekannt machen.’ Hömberg, ‘Musikreferat: Größere Ensembles, Bildungshilfe, Ostkontakte’, 50.

\textsuperscript{56} Jahrbuch 1965 des Goethe-Instituts, 81.

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exchange. Jazz tours were similarly well-received in South America, where the Klaus Doldinger Quartet performed bossa nova with local musicians.\textsuperscript{58}

The new emphasis on pedagogy and exchange entailed that the Goethe Institute had to match German musicians with the interests of local populations. Goethe Institutes therefore increasingly cooperated with local associations. A 1965 show by the Gunter Hampel Quartet\textsuperscript{59} in Saloniki, for instance, resulted from a cooperation between the local student association and the Goethe Institute. The 1965 performance by the Pepsi Auer Quintet in Madrid was likewise co-organised by the local branch of Jeunesses Musicales, Juventudes Musicales de Madrid.\textsuperscript{60} Although in theory, ‘Bildungshilfe’ implied a top-down approach—professional German musicians teaching local musicians—this was not necessarily the case. Especially jazz musicians reported that they learned much on their tours for the Goethe Institute.\textsuperscript{61}

The Institute’s new emphasis on educational aid, however, did not entail a complete break with previous strategies of cultural presentation. The two forms rather coexisted during the 1960s. If Hömberg was enthusiastic about the musical contribution to educational aid, his supervisor within the Goethe Institute, the head of the cultural programming department Karl-Ernst Hüdepohl, for instance, underscored the importance of traditional programs based on cultural presentations. At a September 1968 conference in Munich, Hüdepohl proposed five measures that the heads of Goethe Institutes were asked to apply to their cultural programming: (1) The concentration on few, but ‘competitive’ events; (2) a tighter regional coordination, especially in Europe; (3) the development of potential sources of income (including entrance fees for concerts); (4) collaborative events with partner organisations in host countries; (5) and the bundling of individual events to create fewer, but larger (and thus more visible) events.\textsuperscript{62}

While what Danielle Fosler-Lussier calls the ‘mediation of prestige’\textsuperscript{63} was central to Hüdepohl’s vision for West German cultural diplomacy, educational aid was conspicuously missing on Hüdepohl’s list.

While individual voices in the Goethe Institute genuinely embraced Bildungshilfe and cultural exchange, the idea that cultural exchange should be a genuine goal of cultural diplomacy was still discarded by influential voices in the Goethe Institute and the West German Foreign Office. When it came to ‘developing countries’, cultural exchange was regarded as a strategy rather than as a genuine goal, a way to make local audiences feel better about their own culture. In 1971, the Goethe Institute published ‘Ten Theses on Cultural Work in Developing Countries’

\textsuperscript{58} Hömberg, ‘Musikreferat: Größere Ensembles, Bildungshilfe, Ostkontakte’, 50–51.
\textsuperscript{59} Gunter Hampel (b. 1937) is a German free jazz musician and multi-instrumentalist.
\textsuperscript{60} Jahrbuch 1965 des Goethe-Instituts, 92.
\textsuperscript{61} See Albert Mangelsdorff, ‘Jazz für den Fernen Osten’, Jazz Podium (July 1964), 159. See the interview with Klaus Doldinger in Maren Niemeyer, Planet Goethe: 60 Jahre Goethe-Institut (Germany: DW-TV and Goethe-Institut München, 2011), DVD.
\textsuperscript{63} Fosler-Lussier, Music in America’s Cold War Diplomacy, 23.
in the Institute’s official yearbook. The seventh thesis stated that, ‘in the current state of the world, acculturation is almost completely a one-sided assimilation of occidental elements on part of the Third World. Nonetheless (or perhaps because of this), one cannot do without the benevolent fiction of cultural exchange.’64 Such condescending statements regarding the cultures of ‘developing countries’ in official documents by the Goethe Institute demonstrate that West German cultural diplomacy was nowhere close to leaving behind the fetters of its imperialistic past.

While the Goethe Institute maintained educational programs, it was the ‘quality rather than quantity’ rhetoric that dominated West German music diplomacy in the late 1960s. As popular tastes changed, however, genres that were considered less valuable (such as rock and pop) could hardly be prevented from entering cultural diplomacy programs. In the early 1970s, such jazz rock ensembles as the Pike Kriegel Jazz Quartet were funded by the Goethe Institute.65 Kriegel’s band toured South and Central America before playing at the Newport Jazz Festival in 1971. In 1972, the Goethe Institute for the first time funded a kraut rock band, the ‘Pop-Ensemble “Out of Focus”’, as the band was referred to in the yearbook.66 Up until the late 1970s, however, popular music concerts were extremely rare in the Institute’s cultural programming, and jazz, as an ostensibly ‘serious’ genre of popular music, remained the only non-classical genre that could be considered a pillar of West German music diplomacy. Since jazz had already been received within an art music discourse, it was possible to argue that jazz music matched perfectly the criteria of West German musical diplomacy in the mid- to late-1960s, despite the prejudices that undoubtedly existed, especially in the German Foreign Office. If the criteria for music diplomacy in the late 1960s were high quality, popularity, and the potential for ‘cultural exchange’ (even if many considered this cultural exchange useful fiction rather than a desirable reality), jazz music could potentially fulfil all three criteria. In West German music diplomacy programs, the success of jazz diplomacy thus helped to pave the way for other popular genres.

65 The Quartet was named after guitarist Volker Kriegel (1943–2003) and vibraphonist David Samuel ‘Dave’ Pike (1938–2015).