ΠΡΑΟΤΗΣ AS AN EMOTION IN ARISTOTLE'S *RHETORIC*

Having begun his analysis of the several emotions in the *Rhetoric* with anger or ὀργή, Aristotle turns next to a discussion of the emotion that he considers the opposite of ὀργή, namely πραότης. As Aristotle puts it (2. 3, 1380 a 6–12):

> Since being angry (τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι) is the opposite of τῷ πραΰνεσθαι, and ὀργή the opposite of πραότης, we must now consider in what state people are πρᾶοι, and toward whom they are πρᾶοι, and by means of what they become πρᾶοι (πραΰνονται). Let, then, πράϋνσις be a settling down and quieting of ὀργή. If, then, people are angry at those who slight them, and a slight is a voluntary thing, it is clear that people are πρᾶοι in turn toward those who do no such thing or do such things involuntarily or who seem to be such.

What does πρᾶος mean in this context?

Commentators and translators more or less universally take it to mean something like 'calm' or 'tranquil'. Thus, W. Rhys Roberts[1] renders the above: "Since growing calm is the opposite of growing angry, and calmness the opposite of anger, we must ascertain in what frames of mind men are calm, towards whom they feel calm, and by what means they are made so. Growing calm may be defined as a settling down or quieting of anger", etc. So too, Isis Borges da Fonseca entitles the chapter, "Da Calma", and renders the opening: "Como estar calmo é o contrário de estar encolerizado, e a cólera se contrapõe à calma, deve-se examinar em que estado de ânimo as pessoas sâo calmas", etc.[2] Franz Sieveke[3] translates: "Da nun die Erregung des Zornes der Besänftigung entgegengesetzt ist und der Zorn der Sanftmut", etc. Antonio Tovar[4] provides as a title for the section, "De la calma o serenidad", and renders the opening: "Puesto que a enojarse es contrario aplacarse y la ira es contraria de la calma, corresponde tratar en qué disposición están los no airados y respecto de quiénes lo son y por qué causa". H. C. Lawson-Tancred,[5] in the Penguin

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[1] W. Rhys Roberts (tr.), "Rhetoric", in: J. Barnes (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle* II, Bollingen Series 71. 2 (Princeton 1984) 2152–2269.

[2] I. B. B. da Fonseca (tr.), *Retórica das Paixões: Aristóteles* (São Paulo 2000).

[3] F. G. Sieveke (tr.), *Aristoteles: Rhetorik* (München 1980 [^{3}1989]) 91.

[4] A. Tovar (tr.), *Aristoteles: Rhetorica* (Madrid 1953) 101.

[5] H. C. Lawson-Tancred (tr.), *Aristotle: The Art of Rhetoric* (Harmondsworth 1991) 147.

translation, has: "Now since being angry is the opposite of *being calm*, and anger the opposite of *calmness*, we must grasp in what condition men are calm", etc., and continues a little further: "*Let calming, then, be a suspension or placation of anger*" (emphasis in original). And Adolf Stahr[6] offers: "Das Zürnen ist der milden Stimmung und der Zorn der Milde entgegengesetzt", etc.

Edward Cope,[7] in his seminal commentary on the *Rhetoric*, introduces the section under discussion with the words: "Analysis of πραότης, patience", and remarks that "πραότης then, *here*, as a πάθος – in the *Ethics* it is a ἕξις or virtue – is this instinctive *affection*, feeling, emotion, in a mild, calm, subdued state (opposed to ὀργή an emotion in a state of excitement); placidity of temper". Most recently, George Kennedy[8] entitles the chapter under discussion "Πραότης, or Calmness", and translates: "Since becoming calm is the opposite of becoming angry, and anger the opposite of calmness...", etc.

Calmness, however, or mildness, gentleness, patience, good temper, to cite the list of equivalents provided by Grimaldi[9] in his epigraph to this chapter, is problematic as an emotion. Kennedy,[10] in his head-note on πραότης, defends its status as a πάθος by disputing the rendering as 'calmness', despite his own translation:

> Aristotle regards πραότης as the emotion opposite to anger. It is often translated "mildness", which seems rather a trait of character or absence of an emotion, while Aristotle views it as a positive attitude toward others and experience, involving an emotional change toward a tolerant understanding: in colloquial English, "calming down" is perhaps the closest translation, but there is no single English word that quite captures the meaning. The appearance of mildness, gentleness, patience, tractability, good temper are all aspects of it.

The variety of terms to which Kennedy resorts reflects his honest recognition that 'calming down' will not do in a good many of the illustrations of πραότης that Aristotle provides; but even if it fits more or most of them, it is not clear that the process of becoming calm is a πάθος in Aristotle's sense of

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[6] A. Stahr (tr.), *Aristoteles: Drei Bücher der Rhetorik* (Stuttgart 1862) 125.

[7] E. M. Cope, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, rev. and ed. by J. E. Sandys, II (Cambridge 1877) 32.

[8] G. A. Kennedy, *Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* (New York – Oxford 1991).

[9] W. M. A. Grimaldi (ed.), *Aristotle, Rhetoric II: A Commentary* (New York 1988).

[10] Kennedy (above n. 8) 130.

the term, any more than the process of growing angry is one, as opposed to anger or ὀργή. Aristotle defines ὀργή as "a desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge" (for the rest of the definition, see below); this scarcely describes "an emotional change".

Cope states the case against πραότης as an emotion most clearly in his final comments on the section, and it is worth citing his words *in extenso*: [11]

> I have already hinted a doubt in the notes on the preceding chapter whether πραότης is properly ranked amongst the πάθη. I think that it can be made plainly to appear that it is not. It is introduced no doubt for the purpose of giving the opposite side to the topics of anger, because the student of *Rhetoric* is in every case required to be acquainted with both sides of a question. And this purpose it may answer very well without being a real opposite of ὀργή or indeed a πάθος at all. If we compare πραότης with the other πάθη analysed in this second book, we find that it differs from all of them in this respect – that the rest are emotions, instinctive and *active*, and tend to some positive result; whereas πραότης is inactive and leads to nothing but the allaying, subduing, lowering, of the angry passion... It seems plain therefore that it is in reality, what it is stated to be in the *Ethics*, a ἕξις, not a πάθος, of the *temper*... It is accordingly represented in the *Ethics* as a virtue, the mean between irascibility and insensibility... The true πάθος is the ὀργή, the instinctive capacity of angry feeling.

Grimaldi,[12] in his commentary, sees no difficulty in taking mildness as the opposite of anger, and, as an opposite, identifying it as an emotion: "its opposition is of the same character as the opposition found between pity and indignation, fear and confidence, shame and shamelessness, kindness and unkindness... The opposition A. speaks about in all the above is contrary opposition, i. e., two positive terms denoting extremes of difference within the same genus".[13]

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[11] Cope (above n. 7) 42.

[12] Grimaldi (above n. 9) 49.

[13] Grimaldi adds: "There would be no reason to question this save that St. Thomas Aquinas in his extended study of the emotions ... remarks (*Summa Theologiae* I a II ae, q. 23, art. 3 q. 46, art. 1), that anger alone of the emotions has no contrary". Grimaldi goes on to concede Thomas' point, insofar as "In the other emotions the contrary is usually a possibility toward which a person can move... But this is not true of anger. In anger the move toward the contrary is effectively blocked since the evil which causes the anger is actually present in the individual... The only alternatives open to him are to accept this evil and so experience the concomitant pain and distress, or to reject the evil and so become angry" (p. 49–50). If I understand Grimaldi's argument here (I am not certain that I do), then the opposite of anger proves not to be an emotion after all.

Now, calmness, insofar as it is the negation or elimination of anger, is in fact not comparable to the opposition between pity and indignation, on which Aristotle particularly insists. Aristotle defines 'being indignant' (τὸ νεμεσᾶν) as "feeling pain at someone who appears to be succeeding undeservedly" (*Rhet.* 2. 9, 1387 a 8–9). Pity, in turn, is defined as "a kind of pain in the case of an apparent destructive or painful harm in one not deserving to encounter it, which one might expect oneself, or one of one's own, to suffer, and this when it seems near" (2. 8, 1385 b 13–16). Reduced to basics, the contrast is between pain at undeserved good fortune and pain at undeserved misfortune (2. 9, 1386 b 9–12). Both emotions, Aristotle specifies, are characteristic of good men, since people ought not to fare ill or well undeservingly. Aristotle notes, however, that some take φθόνος, commonly rendered as 'envy', as the opposite of pity, on the view that φθόνος "is related to and is indeed the same thing as τὸ νεμεσᾶν" (2. 9, 1386 b 16–17). The Stoics, indeed, characterized pity simply as pain at another's ill fortune, and envy pain at another's good fortune (e. g., Andronic. *Περὶ παθῶν* 2 p. 12 Kreuttner = *SVF* 3. 414; cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 3. 21, *Or.* 1. 185, 2. 206, 216). But in fact, Aristotle says, they are different: although φθόνος too is "a disturbing pain arising from the well-being" of another (2. 9, 1386 b 18–19; cf. 2. 10, 1387 b 22–24), it arises not because the other person is undeserving, but simply because he is our equal or similar (2. 9, 1386 b 19–20), and yet has gained an advantage over us.

Whether we take indignation or envy as the opposite of pity, the opposed pair have independent definitions; neither is described simply the absence or abatement of pity. They are incompatible with pity because the eliciting circumstances are mutually exclusive: someone is either suffering or prospering, not both simultaneously. So too of the contrast between fear and confidence or θάρσος. Fear, according to Aristotle, is "a kind of pain or disturbance deriving from an impression (φαντασία) of a future evil that is destructive or painful" (2. 5, 1382 a 21–23), whereas confidence arises when there is hope accompanied by an impression of imminent safety, and frightening things are either non-existent or remote. The things that inspire confidence (τὰ θαρραλέα) also include the prospect of amelioration and assistance, and the knowledge that one has neither wronged another nor been wronged, and that any rivals we may have are either weak or friendly, or that we have more or stronger allies on our side (2. 5, 1383 a 16–25). Here again, the contrasting emotions are conceived as responses to opposite kinds of stimuli: fear is aroused by things that portend harm, whereas confidence derives from what presages security. Of course, these are normally mutually exclusive, but while the absence of what is

frightening is a condition for confidence, confidence is not simply reducible to the suspension of fear (people with no experience of danger are ἀπαθεῖς (1383 a 28) in the sense, presumably, that they are not given to fear). The case of love and hatred, to which we shall return below, is also analogous.

Neither kindness nor unkindness is an emotion for Aristotle; the chapter in question (7), as I have argued elsewhere,[14] in fact treats rather gratitude (χάριν ἔχειν) and ingratitude (ἀχαριστία). Here, indeed, it may be doubted whether Aristotle thinks of thanklessness as a full-fledged emotion. Rendering people ungrateful (ἀχάριστοι) involves convincing them that the service they received was not a genuine favor or χάρις (1385 a 33 – b 2), and depends essentially on negative arguments. Aristotle does not describe a set of graceless acts that would elicit the contrary of gratitude, although one could perhaps fill out Aristotle's account by suggesting that a positive feeling of ingratitude is aroused by a false or pretended service that was in fact undertaken for selfish reasons. Again, Aristotle seems to treat shamelessness simply as the absence of shame: "Let shame be a pain or disturbance concerning bad things that appear to lead to a loss of reputation (ἀδοξία)..., while shamelessness is a contempt (ὀλιγωρία) and indifference (ἀπάθεια) concerning these same things" (1383 b 12–15). Aristotle goes on to indicate in some detail the kinds of circumstances that induce shame, and then concludes briskly (1385 a 14–15): "so much for shame; as for shamelessness, clearly we can deal with it on the basis of what is opposite". Once more, it is possible to imagine an opposite emotion to shame that has a more positive content: if shame results from the kinds of evils that bring about infamy, its contrary might be a πάθος resulting from those goods that are conducive to a superior reputation or δόξα (nothing prevents there being more than one opposite to a given term: cf. *Topics* 2. 7, 113 a 14–15: "It is clear from what has been said that there may be several opposites to a single thing"). In this case, one might label the emotion opposite to shame pride, as do some modern theorists of the emotions (e. g. Nathanson: "Shame, of course, is the polar opposite of pride";[15] cf. also Lewis;[16] Ben-

[14] D. Konstan, "The Emotion in Aristotle Rhetoric 2. 7: Gratitude, not Kindness", in: D. Mirhady (ed.), *The Influences of Aristotle's Rhetoric*, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 12 (New Brunswick, NJ 2003).

[15] D. L. Nathanson, *Shame and Pride: Affect, Sex, and the Birth of the Self* (New York 1992) 86.

[16] M. Lewis, "Self-Conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt", in: M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones (edd.), *Handbook of Emotions* (New York ²2000) 623–636.

Ze'ev;[17] Manstead and Fischer[18]). Why Aristotle does not include a discussion of pride or self-satisfaction among the πάθη he examines in the *Rhetoric* is too large a question to treat thoroughly in the present investigation; his discussion of ἀναισχυντία, at all events, is meager and negative.[19]

Aristotle's account of πραότης, however, is neither. On the contrary, πραότης on its own receives more discussion than gratitude and ingratitude combined, and more than is devoted to some other major passions such as envy and emulation (ζῆλος). Granted, Aristotle begins by considering ways to counter anger by redescribing the nature of the offense that has aroused it. Anger, for Aristotle, is a response to a slight or put-down (ὀλιγωρία), and only that; as he defines it, ὀργή is "a desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge, on account of a perceived slight on the part of people who are not fit to slight one or one's own" (2. 2, 1378 a 31–33). This is a very restricted conception of the stimulus to anger, not only in comparison with the range of 'anger' in English, but also in comparison with Greek usage in respect to ὀργή, which is also a typical response to injustice, irrespective of whether belittlement was involved (see below). Nevertheless, it is clearly Aristotle's view in the *Rhetoric*, and the relevant one regarding his notion of πραότης. Thus, diminishing or eliminating anger involves demonstrating that a supposed slight was not such in fact, for example, by showing that it was involuntary or unintended, or that the agents of it say or do the same things in respect to themselves ("for no one is believed to slight himself", 1380 a 13–14), or that they have confessed and are sorry. The strategy is not dissimilar to that which Aristotle recommends in regard to diminishing gratitude by redescribing the nature of the service in such a way as to show that it was selfishly motivated, unintentional, or the like, and hence not a true favor. Aristotle goes on to say that we are πρᾶοι toward those who humble themselves before us and do not contradict us, for by this "they are seen to concede that they are our inferiors, and those who are inferior feel fear, and no one who feels fear offers a slight" (1380 a 23–24). The context here is perhaps ambiguous: is Aristotle referring to apologetic behavior subsequent to some ostensible belittlement, in which the self-abasement of the offender is designed to prove that no offense could have been intended? Or

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[17] A. Ben-Ze'ev, *The Subtlety of Emotions* (Cambridge, Mass. 2000) 491, 512.

[18] A. S. R. Manstead, A. H. Fischer, "Social Appraisal: The Social World as Object of and Influence on Appraisal Processes", in: K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, T. Johnstone (edd.), *Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research* (Oxford – New York 2001) 231.

[19] For a fuller discussion of Aristotle's conception of shame and shamelessness, see D. Konstan, "Shame in Ancient Greek", *Social Research* 70 (2003): 4, 601–630.

does he mean that a humble attitude elicits πραότης in general, irrespective of whether there has been an offense? Probably the former, since Aristotle adds that anger is allayed toward those who humble themselves, citing in evidence the fact that dogs do not bite those who sit down, though perhaps here one is not obliged to think of an abatement of a prior belligerence.

But Aristotle then affirms that people who are serious or eager about something are πρᾶοι toward those who are similarly disposed, for they believe that they themselves are being taken seriously and not being treated with contempt (1380 a 26–27); this does not obviously refer to a case in which an offender exhibits some form of contrition, but rather to respectful comportment in and of itself. So too, we are πρᾶοι toward those who have obliged us, or begged and pleaded with us, since they are humbler; or again, toward those who are never arrogant or insulting toward people like ourselves (1380 a 27–31). In these instances, we are πρᾶοι just because of the consideration, or rather the deference, of others, and not necessarily because of some supposed appeasement. Πραότης, it would appear, is elicited by reverence or other behavior that elevates our standing or esteem.[20]

Such an account of πραότης is not wholly surprising in the context of Aristotle's analysis of anger. If anger is a response to a slight, as Aristotle holds, and if, moreover a slight is the activity of a belief or δόξα about a thing's seeming to be worthless (1378 b 11), then the opposite of anger should or at least could be a response to the activity of a δόξα about a thing's (or a person's) seeming to be of great value. Πραότης, then, might be defined as "a desire, accompanied by pleasure, to treat someone kindly, on account of a perceived gesture of respect". It would derive from the sense of an increase in one's status, as opposed to its diminishment, as in the case of ὀργή. As an emotion, we might perhaps think of it as the favorably disposed elation that comes with an enhanced sense of worth.

A πάθος of this sort as the opposite of anger would be the counterpart of pride as the opposite of shame: a positive emotion deriving from an amelioration of one's reputation or status. The difference between the two would be analogous to that between ὀργή and αἰσχύνη: the one is triggered by a deliberate insult, the other by an evil or misfortune. Πραότης would differ also from affection or φιλία, which Aristotle treats next in order, in the same

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[20] An anonymous Byzantine commentator, or rather scholiast, notes that we become πρᾶοι in respect to one who, we learn, intended the opposite of a slight because "he did it not for contempt but for my esteem" (διὰ δόξαν ἐμήν): Anonymus, *In Aristotelis artem rhetoricam commentarium*. Ed. H. Rabe, CAG 21. 2 (Berlin 1896) 93. 32–33.

way that anger differs from hatred or μῖσος. Affection, as defined in the *Rhetoric*, consists in wishing good things for another's sake and acting, to the best of one's ability, to obtain them for the other (2. 4, 1380 b 35 – 1381 a 1). It is an altruistic emotion, stimulated by an appreciation of others' character (or charm or usefulness), rather than by their obsequiousness or signs of admiration or regard. Πραότης thus occupies a distinct niche in Aristotle's system of the πάθη (once we appreciate that the subject of chapter 7 of the *Rhetoric* is gratitude rather than benevolence, it is clear that there is little overlap between it and πραότης either).

At this point in his exposition of πραότης, Aristotle reaffirms that "in general, one must investigate what makes us πρᾶοι (τὰ πραῦνοντα) from their opposites" (1380 a 31), that is, the things conducive to anger (Kassel, for no very good reason, marks this comment as a later addition by Aristotle), and he proceeds to enumerate the kinds of people with whom we are disinclined to grow angry, such as those we fear or before whom we feel ashamed, or those who feel shame before us, and also the states of mind in which we are prone to πραότης, such as when we are at play or are successful or have recently avenged ourselves on someone else. Nor do we get angry, Aristotle says, at those who are ignorant or insensible of our revenge, such as the dead. Aristotle concludes by reasserting that to render people πρᾶοι (καταπραῦνειν) one must make those with whom they are angry appear frightening or deserving of their shame or ingratiating (κεχαρισμένοι) or unwilling or remorseful in regard to what was done (1380 b 31–34).

Clearly, Aristotle's focus is on ὀργή, and his treatment of πραότης is largely conceived as a means of checking anger in others. A show of deference can have that effect, but so too can a menacing posture: as Aristotle says, "it is impossible to be frightened and angry at the same time" (1380 a 33–34). The primacy of anger is not surprising in a treatise on rhetoric, since this was the emotion that pleaders sought chiefly to arouse against their opponents, just as they solicited the pity of the jurors for themselves and their clients. As Danielle Allen puts it,[21] "The language of anger and pity defined the contours of the competition between prosecutor and defendant" (e. g. Lys. 32. 19, Dem. 21. 127). Allen adds: "Other emotional concepts could be used to flesh out the core ideas of 'anger' and of 'pity' in the process of trying to establish desert. The ideologies of hate, envy, and fear ... could be grafted onto the ideology of anger".[22] But anger, or rather ὀργή,

[21] D. Allen, *The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens* (Princeton 2000) 148.

[22] *Ibid.*, 149.

was crucial, and speakers naturally tried to direct it away from themselves in the same measure as they attempted to elicit pity for their side. Hence the importance of techniques of anger management.

Aristotle's definition of ὀργή in the *Rhetoric* is, as indicated above, rather more narrow than what may be observed in ordinary Greek. Whereas Aristotle represents anger exclusively as a response to a slight or ὀλιγωρία, in forensic contexts orators often treat anger as a reaction to a perceived injustice, irrespective of whether it affects themselves in particular. Indeed, the Stoic Chrysippus seems to have held that ὀργή is "the desire to take vengeance against one who is believed to have committed a wrong contrary to one's deserts" (*SVF* 3. 395 = Stob. 2. 91. 10; cf. Diog. La. 7. 113; cf. also Posidon. fr. 155 Edelstein–Kidd = Lact. *De ira dei* 17. 13). As William Harris[23] remarks, "'Injustice' has replaced 'slight'" in this account. I have argued elsewhere[24] that Aristotle has transferred some of the features characteristic of ὀργή in popular usage to his own conception of indignation or τὸ νεμεσᾶν. It may also be that, as the antithesis of ὀργή in the restricted sense, Aristotle's notion of πραότης too differs from that which was current in the fifth and fourth centuries BC.

In fact, Aristotle himself, as Cope points out, offers a different account of πραότης in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where it is treated as the mean between the excess of ὀργιλότης or irascibility and the deficiency of ἀοργησία, insensibility to insult (2. 7, 1108 a 4–9; 4. 5, 1125 b 26 – 26 b 10), although in fact, Aristotle concedes, the mean state has not a proper name of its own, and Aristotle imports πραότης as something of a makeshift (1125 b 27–28); he also affirms that πραότης is closer to the deficiency than the excess, and hence may serve as anger's opposite. In these contexts, where Aristotle is speaking also of such mean states as courage (ἀνδρεία), liberality (ἐλευθεριότης), and highmindedness (μεγαλοψυχία), πραότης assumes the character of a disposition rather than a πάθος: "The person who is πρᾶος tends to be unperturbed and is not led by emotion but rather as reason directs" (1125 b 33–35). So too, in the *Topics* (4. 5, 125 b 20–27), Aristotle asserts that one must not classify a disposition (ἕξις) under the genus represented by a capacity (δύναμις), and gives as examples of this error the subsumption of πραότης under the category of mastering anger or of courage under the mastery of fears: "for

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[23] W. V. Harris, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, Mass. 2001) 61.

[24] D. Konstan, "Aristotle on the Tragic Emotions", in: V. Pedrick, S. Oberhelman (edd.), *Of Constant Sorrow. The Soul of Tragedy: Memorial Volume for Charles Segal* (Chicago, forthcoming).

a courageous or πρᾶος person is called ἀπαθής, whereas one who has mastery does experience (πάσχειν) the emotion but is not led by it". Aristotle adds that if a courageous or πρᾶος person were to experience the relevant πάθος, he would likely not be dominated by it. However, this is not what is meant by being courageous or πρᾶος, but rather being entirely insensible with respect to such things, that is, to fear or anger.

No doubt Aristotle was led to treat πραότης as an emotion in the *Rhetoric* at least in part by his habit of thinking in terms of paired opposites. His definition of the πάθη, for example, runs: "Let the emotions be all those things on account of which people change and differ in regard to their judgments, and upon which attend pain and pleasure, for example anger, pity, fear, and all other such things and their opposites" (2. 1, 1378 a 20–23). The contrast between pain and pleasure cannot be the basis of these oppositions, as the case of pity and indignation shows, since both of these emotions, which Aristotle insists are opposites, are said to be accompanied by pain. Besides the idea of opposites, however, Aristotle's system of the emotions is particularly attentive to the matter of status. Fear, shame, pity and indignation, emulousness and envy, all center on the individual's relative position or reputation in society. Jon Elster[25] describes the world evoked by Aristotle's account of the emotions as "intensely confrontational, intensely competitive, and intensely public; in fact, much of it involves confrontations and competitions before a public. It is a world in which everybody knows that they are constantly being judged, nobody hides that they are acting like judges, and nobody hides that they seek to be judged positively". Anger, in particular, was functional in this environment, "insofar as the individual citizen who was sensitive to his honor and guarded it with anger was also guarding his personal independence, greatness, and equality".[26] If anger was a response to a loss of face or δόξα as the result of an affront, then πραότης as an emotion was elicited by behavior that enhanced public respect and esteem. Not every slight, however, results in anger. As we have seen, Aristotle specifies in his definition of ὀργή that it arises "on account of a perceived slight on the part of people who are not fit to slight one or one's own". People do not necessarily react with anger when they are slighted by those who are stronger or better placed in society, in part because of fear. If this can be shown to have been the context of an ostensible impertinence, then one's self-esteem will prove not to have been damaged and the emotion

[25] J. Elster, *Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions* (Cambridge 1999) 75.

[26] Allen (above n. 21) 129.

of πραότης – the feeling of being placated in respect to an imagined attack on one's status – may ensue.

Aristotle's account of πραότης as an emotion, assuming that it works something like the way I have described it, is not wholly free of contradiction. Within the space of a short chapter, Aristotle sometimes speaks as though πραότης were simply the absence or abatement of ὀργή, a neutral state of calm free of pain or pleasure and not a πάθος in its own right. In this, Aristotle was in accord with contemporary usage. Jacqueline de Romilly[27] notes that πραότης enjoyed a particular vogue in the fourth century BC, and adds that it would eventually "lead to Polybian φιλανθρωπία and to Roman *clementia*". Indeed, Demosthenes and others had already associated πρᾶος with φιλάνθρωπος and such terms as ἐπιεικής, as indicating a patient and gentle disposition (e. g., Dem. 8. 33). But does Aristotle's account of πραότης as an emotion, as I have reconstructed it, that is, as a disposition accompanied by pleasure to treat kindly those who have shown one deference or respect, find any confirmation in the literature of his time? Is there, indeed, any evidence that such a πάθος – the active emotion associated with a gesture of placation or appeasement – for which Aristotle appropriated the term πραότης, was recognized at all (perhaps identified by other words)?

Such evidence as there is, is exiguous. In the sixth oration in the corpus of Lysias, the speaker argues that Andocides, accused of sacrilege and having surrendered himself to the verdict of the court, is now behaving like a citizen with full rights, "as though it were not because of your πραότης and want of time that he has not paid the penalty you set" (34). Πραότης here could well mean 'gentleness', as Stephen Todd[28] renders it. But might the author be intimating that the Athenians have responded to Andocides' implied humility and for that reason have adopted a generous attitude toward him? In another speech dubiously attributed to Lysias (20. 21), the speaker notes that some of the guilty have fled, while fear has induced others not to remain in Athens but rather to serve as soldiers, "so that they might render you more πρᾶοι or influence these men [i. e., the prosecutors]". The speaker adds that Polystratus, the defendant, submitted to a trial at once, though he was innocent of wrongdoing. Being πρᾶος here is not a matter of a permanent disposition, but rather a response to ingratiating behavior; by implication, the jurors ought properly to feel this way toward Polystratus himself, because of his humble behavior in presenting himself before the court, and not in fact toward the others. In the *Memorabilia* of

[27] J. de Romilly, "Fairness and Kindness in Thucydides", *Phoenix* 28 (1974) 100.
[28] S. C. Todd (tr.), *Lysias* (Austin 2000) 71.

Xenophon (2. 3. 16), Socrates urges reconciliation with one's brother: "Do not shrink back, my good man, but try to render the man πρᾶος (κατα-πραΰνειν), and very soon he will heed you; don't you see how concerned for honor and magnanimous he is?" A few other passages are perhaps subject to a similar interpretation (e. g., Plat. *Euthd.* 288 B, *Rep.* 572 A, Hdt. 2. 121 δ). But the passages I have examined do not demonstrate conclusively, so far as I can judge, that πραότης is understood as an emotion elicited by deference and appeasement.

Aristotle's system of the emotions invites, I believe, or at least allows a place for a positive πάθος opposed to anger that takes the form of a pleasurable response to a gesture that enhances one's self-esteem. I think that there are hints of such a meaning in Aristotle's exceptional treatment of πραότης, which is conditioned by his definition of ὀργή. But even if the analysis I have proposed is not quite Aristotle's, I venture to hope that it is at least Aristotelian.[29] Why Aristotle did not develop such an account further is a question for future investigation.[30]

David Konstan
Brown University, Providence

В посвященный эмоциям обзор во II книге "Риторики" Аристотель включил раздел о πραότης. Это психологическое состояние он описывает как противоположность гневу. Обычное понимание πραότης как 'спокойствие' (или как 'обретение спокойствия') вызывает недоумение: каким образом 'спокойствие' можно считать эмоцией? Автор статьи стремится показать, что πραότης подразумевает состояние, проистекающее из возросшего самоуважения, когда разгневанное лицо получило подобающее удовлетворение. Подобное эмоциональное состояние – это скорее уверенность в себе и сопутствующая ей доброжелательность, нежели простое спокойствие.

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[29] Compare M. Heath, "Aristotle and the Pleasures of Tragedy", in: O. Andersen, J. Haarberg (edd.), *Making Sense of Aristotle: Essays in Poetics* (London 2001) 7–23, who offers an Aristotelian explanation of why the painful emotions of tragedy yield pleasure, although he concedes that it may not be Aristotle's own.

[30] I am grateful to William Fortenbaugh, who read this paper in an earlier draft and provided much-needed encouragement.