

# HYPERBOREUS

STUDIA CLASSICA

ναυσι δ' οὔτε πεζὸς ἰὼν κεν εὐροῖς  
ἔς Ἑπερβορέων ἀγῶνα θαυμαστὰν ὁδόν

(Pind. *Pyth.* 10. 29–30)

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Статьи на иностранных языках сопровождаются резюме на русском

\* Summary in English

## ON THE MEANING OF ΑΥΛΩΔΙΑ, ΑΥΛΩΔΙΟΣ\*

Although the question of ἀυλωδία and ἀυλωδός was thoroughly examined at the end of the nineteenth century, new epigraphical material, publications of vase paintings, and availability of search engines such as TLG call for its reexamination in light of new evidence.

Aulodia seems to be the least popular solo musical competition at the Greek festivals. It is rarely mentioned in agonistic catalogues: according to the TLG (which is far from comprehensive for epigraphy, but still can be statistically significant), the item αυλωδ- occurs only 8 times in Classical inscriptions, whereas αυλητ- occurs 339 times, κιθαριστ- 104 times, and κιθαρωδ- 63 times. The same is true for Greek literary sources: the TLG mentions αυληται (all cases) 801 times, κιθαρωδοι 535 times, κιθαρισται 266 times, but αυλωδοι only 18 times.

It is reported (Paus. 10. 7. 4–6) that at the Pythian Games, the most ancient and the most important of ἀγῶνες μουσικοί, the competition in aulodia took place only once, in 586 BC; at the following festival it was removed by the Amphictyons.<sup>1</sup>

Aulodia was part of the famous Attic Panathenaia, where, one assumes, the official musical (as well as athletic and equestrian) contests were introduced around 566 BC.<sup>2</sup> There is no literary evidence

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\* A shorter version of this paper was read at the Colloquium Balticum VII in Tartu, 18–20 November 2007, and at the Department of Classical Philology of St Petersburg University in November 2007, and I am grateful to the participants in discussions on both occasions. I also thank the museums for the photographs and permissions to publish them, A. Enbekova, A. Kirichenko and A. Verlinsky for their help supplying literature, the *Fondation Hardt pour l'études d'antiquité classique* for the opportunity to work there from 29 September to 18 October 2008, C. M. Lucarini for facilitating my contacts with the museums and N. Tchernetska for improving the English of this paper.

<sup>1</sup> This evidence is the most detailed and refers to the documents and thus deserves confidence, though the other sources do not mention rejection of the aulodia: Strab. 9. 3. 10, p. 421 C (προσέθεσαν δὲ τοῖς κιθαρωδοῖς ἀυλητάς τε καὶ κιθαριστάς χωρὶς ᾠδῆς), Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 674 D (παραδεξάμενοι γὰρ ἐπὶ τρισὶ τοῖς καθεστῶσιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἀυλητῇ Πυθικῶ καὶ κιθαριστῇ καὶ κιθαρωδῶ...), and *Sch. Pind. Pyth.* hyp. d (ἔθετο δὲ ἀγῶνα κιθαρωδικὸν ὡσπερ καὶ πρότερον, προσέθηκε δὲ ἀυλητὴν καὶ ἀυλωδόν).

<sup>2</sup> See J. A. Davison, “Notes on the Panathenaia”, *JHS* 78 (1958) 26–29. Despite Plutarch’s evidence (*Per.* 13. 11), there is no doubt that in Pericles’ time the musical

for the Panathenaic aulodic competitions before the fourth century BC, but vase-painting proves their existence for the sixth and the fifth century.<sup>3</sup>

The main argument is provided by the so-called pseudo-Panathenaic amphorae. In addition to prize amphorae with the official inscription ΤΟΝ ΑΘΕΝΕΘΕΝ ΑΘΛΟΝ and pictures of armed Athena on side A and of athletic competitions on side B, there are smaller not-inscribed black-figured amphorae of the same shape and with the same kind of decoration. Though their actual purpose is not determined,<sup>4</sup> their images are acknowledged to provide legitimate evidence for the depicted Panathenaic competitions for the period in which they were made.<sup>5</sup> The contests of ἀὐλοφοί are most probably shown on four pseudo-Panathenaic amphorae, which date from the sixth to the beginning of the fifth century BC:

1. London, The British Museum B 141 (fig. 1).<sup>6</sup>

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contests were not introduced, but only reorganized, see E. N. Gardiner, *Greek Athletic Sports and Festivals* (London 1910) 230–231; E. Preuner, “Amphiarraia und Panathenaia”, *Hermes* 57 (1922) 94–95, 98–99; Davison, *op. cit.*, 36–41; M. F. Vos, “Aulodic and Auletic Contests”, in: H. A. G. Brijder, A. A. Dukker, C. W. Neeft (eds.), *Enthousiasmos: Essays on Greek and Related Pottery Presented to J. M. Hemelrijk* (Amsterdam 1986) 127–128; H. Kotsidu, *Die musischen Agone der Panathenäen in archaischer und klassischer Zeit*. Diss. (München 1991) 31–34; H. A. Shapiro, “Mousikoi Agones: Music and Poetry at the Panathenaia”, in: J. Neils (ed.), *Goddess and Polis: The Panathenaic Festival in Ancient Athens* (Princeton 1992) 57, 61–62.

<sup>3</sup> I owe my list of Attic vases depicting aulodes to the following publications: D. von Bothmer, “Attic Black Figured Pelikai”, *JHS* 71 (1951) 42–44; Davison (n. 2) 42; idem, “Addenda to ‘Notes on the Panathenaia’”, *JHS* 82 (1962) 141–142; K. Schauenburg, “Herakles Musikos”, *Jahrb. DAI* 94 (1979) 66 n. 71, 67 n. 77; Vos (n. 2) 130; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. pp. 293–315; Shapiro (n. 2) 53–75.

<sup>4</sup> There is evidence, at least for the fourth century BC, that the prizes for the victors of the musical (unlike athletic) contests at the Panathenaia were not olive oil, but silver and gold: *Ath. Pol.* 60, confirmed by *IG II–III*<sup>2</sup> 2311 (see below n. 42 and p. 16) On the prizes for musicians cf. Gardiner (n. 2) 231; Preuner (n. 2) 95–98; Davison (n. 2) 37 f.; Vos (n. 2) 124; Kotsidu (n. 2) 90–103; Shapiro (n. 2) 58–60.

<sup>5</sup> R. R. Heinze, “Panathenaische Amphora des akademischen Kunstmuseums zu Bonn”, *Bonner Studien. Aufsätze aus der Altertumswissenschaft. Reinhard Kekulé zur Erinnerung an seine Lehrthätigkeit in Bonn gewidmet von seinen Schülern* (Bonn 1890) 246–247; Preuner (n. 2) 95; W. Zschietzschmann, “Homer und die attische Bildkunst um 560”, *Jahrb. DAI* 46 (1931) 58; Davison (n. 2) 26.

<sup>6</sup> A. B. Cook, “On the Thymele in Greek Theatres”, *CIR* 9 (1895) 372; *CVA Great Britain* 1 (*Brit. Mus.* 1) III H e, pl. 6. 1; Zschietzschmann (n. 5) 55 fig. 8 (B); A. G. Beck, *Album of Greek Education* (Sydney 1975) pl. 44. 236; L. Polacco (ed.), *Il teatro antico di Siracusa, pars altera* (Padua 1990) fig. 161; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. P 1; Shapiro (n. 2) 62 fig. 40 (side B); *Beazley Archive Databases* (<http://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk/databases/pottery.htm>) no. 4092. Ca. 560–520 BC.

2. New York, The Metropolitan Museum of Art 1989.281.89 (fig. 2).<sup>7</sup>
3. Bonn, Akademisches Kunstmuseum 43 (fig. 3).<sup>8</sup>
4. Fr. Athens, Acropolis 1060 (fig. 4).<sup>9</sup>

In addition, there are Attic vases of other shapes that also represent two figures on a platform (βῆμα), one playing a double aulos and the other probably singing,<sup>10</sup> in the most cases in the presence of an audience (judges, managers of an agon, teachers, other competitors, simply listeners), in the Classical period accompanied as well by Nikai. The series lasts into the end of the fifth century BC:<sup>11</sup>

5. Rf. belly-amphora, Basel BS 491 (fig. 5).<sup>12</sup>

<sup>7</sup> D. von Bothmer, “Notes on the Princeton Painter”, *Antike Kunst* 30 (1987) 65 pl. 9. 2; Shapiro (n. 2) 63 cat. 18; *Beazley Archive Databases* (n. 6) no. 42 104. The Princeton Painter, ca. 540 BC.

<sup>8</sup> A. Greifenhagen, “Attische schwarzfigurige Vasen im Akademischen Kunstmuseum zu Bonn”, *Arch. Anz.* 50 (1935) 443–444, fig. 31–32; Heinze (n. 5) 240–247; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. P 3. Ca. 540 BC.

<sup>9</sup> B. Graef, F. Langlotz, *Die antiken Vasen von der Akropolis zu Athen I* (Berlin 1925) pl. 62; Beazley, *ABV* 396, 12; Vos (n. 2) no. 43; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. P 9. The Eucharides Painter, ca. 500 BC.

<sup>10</sup> It is not obvious how to paint the process of singing (which makes it difficult to distinguish the images of citharodes from that of citharists: J. Roulez, *Choix de Vases Peints du Musée d’Antiquités de Leyde* [Gand 1854] 78; Kotsidu [n. 2] 106; Shapiro [n. 2] 58). On no. 19 of the list three circular marks in purple, probably indicating sounds of music, proceed from the mouth of a singer (similar on a hydria, the British Museum E 171). A convention employed sometimes in vase-painting was to depict a singer with his head thrown back and mouth open (Kotsidu, *ibid.*; Shapiro, *ibid.*), but it is surprisingly seldom applied while depicting aulodes (see no. 9) – perhaps because the presence of an accompanist should itself indicate a singer. According to a supposition of D. Shabalin (Д. С. Шабалин, “Музыкальное мышление античности” [“The Musical Thought of Antiquity”], *Познавая историю музыки прошлого* [Владивосток 2007] 137), the raised chin of singers on ancient Greek and Egyptian pictures indicates the larynx raised upwards and thus testifies the rendering of high pitches which, he implies, were dominating in music. Still we should weigh, whether it was just an iconographical convention for singing and inspiration in general.

<sup>11</sup> I do not include the neck amphora with twisted handles, the British Museum E 270, by the Kleophrades Painter (Beazley, *ARV*<sup>2</sup> 183, 15), with a lone figure of a rhapsode reciting hexameters on side A and an aulete on side B, though it has been argued, albeit inconclusively, that the both sides together represent an aulodic performance: *CVA Great Britain 4* (*Brit. Mus.* 3) III I c, pl. 8, 2 a–d and p. 5 (“flute-player accompanying the poet”); Schauenburg (n. 3) 67 n. 78 (“Auf der Londoner Amphora ARV<sup>2</sup> 183, 15 sind Sänger und Aulet auf A und B verteilt”); H. A. Shapiro, “Hipparchos and the Rhapsodes”, in: C. Dougherty, L. Kurke (eds.), *Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece: Cult, Performance, Politics* (Cambridge 1993) 95–97. *Contra* Vos (n. 2) 122–123 (and 129 no. 9); Kotsidu (n. 2) 112 (and cat. V 39).

<sup>12</sup> K. Schauenburg, “Eine neue Amphora des Andokidesmalers”, *Jahrb. DAI* 76 (1961) 50 fig. 2; Vos (n. 2) no. 33; *CVA Switzerland 7* (Basel 3) pls. I 2. 6; II 2; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 34; Shapiro (n. 2) 67 fig. 45. The Andocides Painter, ca. 525–520 BC.

6. Bf. pyxis of Nicosthenic shape, Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum, Antikensammlung IV 1870 (fig. 6).<sup>13</sup>
7. Bf. belly-amphora, Munich, Staatliche Antikensammlungen 1411 (fig. 7).<sup>14</sup>
8. Bf. pelike, Gela 124/B (fig. 8).<sup>15</sup>
9. Bf. neck-pelike, New York, The Metropolitan Museum of Art 07.286.72 (fig. 9).<sup>16</sup>
10. Bf. pelike, Palermo N.I. 1961 (fig. 10).<sup>17</sup>
11. Bf. alabastron, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University, Arthur M. Sackler Museum 1977.216.2397 (fig. 11).<sup>18</sup>
12. Bf. lekythos, Syracuse 20 903 (fig. 12).<sup>19</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Former Hofmuseum 318. E. Buschor, "Skythes und Epilykos", *Jahrb. DAI* 30 (1915) 39 fig. 2; Beazley, *ABV* 671; *Proceedings of the 12<sup>th</sup> International Congress of Classical Archaeology, Athens, 4–10 September 1983 / Πρακτικά του XII διεθνούς συνεδρίου κλασικής αρχαιολογίας, Αθήνα, 4–10 Σεπτεμβρίου 1983*, B (Αθήνα 1988) pl. 28. 1–2; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 6; Shapiro (n. 2) 54 fig. 32 b; *Beazley Archive Databases* (n. 6) no. 306 451. 530–520 BC.

<sup>14</sup> Beazley, "Groups of Mid-Sixth-Century Black-Figure", *ABS* 32 (1931–32) 14, no. 40; idem, *ABF* 311, 2; *CVA Deutschland* 3 (*München* 1) pl. 41. 3; E. Böhr, *Der Schaukelmaler* (Mainz 1982) pl. 183 b; Vos (n. 2) no. 35; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 7. The Painter of Munich 1410, ca. 520 BC. It can be doubted if an aulodic performance is depicted, for there is no bema and so the figure (its upper part missing) confronting the aulete may turn out to be a judge. But the central position of two figures, assumingly of an aulete and an aulode (and not of only one figure, that of an aulete), flanked by two listeners on each side, backs up the hypothesis of an aulodic contest.

<sup>15</sup> O. Benndorf, *Griechische und sizilische Vasenbilder*, Hf. 1 (Berlin 1869) pl. 43. 4 a–b; Bothmer (n. 3) 44 no. 63; J.-C. Poursat, "Les représentations de dance armée dans la céramique attique", *BCH* 92 (1968) 573 no. 16, 571 fig. 25; *CVA Italia* 56 (*Gela* 4) pls. 5. 2; 8. 1, 2; Vos (n. 2) no. 42; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 25. The Eucharides Painter, ca. 500–480 BC.

<sup>16</sup> G. M. A. Richter, *The Metropolitan Museum of Art: Handbook of the Greek Collections* (Cambridge, Mass. 1953) 62, pl. 43 d; G. M. A. Richter, M. J. Milne, *Shapes and Names of Athenian Vases* (New York 1935) fig. 32; Bothmer (n. 3) 46 no. 5, pl. 22 b (side B); M. Wegner, *Griechenland: Musikgeschichte in Bildern. II. Musik des Altertums* (Leipzig 1963) 70–71 fig. 42; *Aspects of Ancient Greece: an exhibition organized by the Allentown Art Museum with the cooperation of Gloria Ferrari Pinney and Brunilde Sismondo Ridgway ... Allentown Art Museum, September 16 through December 30, 1979* (Allentown 1979) no. 27 with fig.; Vos (n. 2) no. 39; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 22; Shapiro (n. 2) 52 cat. 19. Ca. 575–500 BC.

<sup>17</sup> Former Palermo 156. Mentioned by Bothmer (n. 3) 42 no. 3; Vos (n. 2) no. 40; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 23. 550–500 BC.

<sup>18</sup> *CVA USA* 8 (*Fogg Museum*) pl. 21, 3 a, c; Vos (n. 2) no. 37; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 29; Shapiro (n. 2) 71, fig. 49b. Ca. 500 BC.

<sup>19</sup> *Monumenti Antichi* 17 (1906) 67–68 fig. 40; E. Haspels, *Attic Black-figured Lekythoi* (Paris 1936) [henceforth *ABL*] 208, 73; Vos (n. 2) no. 41 (*ABV* 208, 73 is indicated by Vos erroneously); Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 11. The Gela Painter, 525–500 BC.

13. Bf. lekythos, once Athens, market (*non vidi*).<sup>20</sup>  
 14. Bf. lekythos, once New York, Parke-Bernet Galleries (fig. 13).<sup>21</sup>  
 15. Bf. lekythos, Athens, Agora (*non vidi*).<sup>22</sup>  
 16–17. Bf. Nolan amphora, London, The British Museum B 188 [sides A and B] (figs. 14, 15).<sup>23</sup>  
 18. Rf. cup fr., Rome, Villa Giulia.<sup>24</sup>  
 19. Rf. pelike, London, The British Museum E 354 (fig. 16).<sup>25</sup>  
 20. Rf. pelike, Leiden RO II 60 (fig. 17).<sup>26</sup>  
 21. Rf. calyx-crater, Larisa, Archaeological Museum 86/101 (fig. 18).<sup>27</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Unpublished; Haspels, *ABL* 252, 61; Vos (n. 2) no. 44; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 17. The Theseus Painter (after 500 BC).

<sup>21</sup> *Parke-Bernet Galleries, Antiquities, Public Auction: Friday, January 24, 1969* (New York 1969) 69, lot 215. Ca. 500 BC.

<sup>22</sup> Mentioned by Schauenburg, (n. 3) 66 n. 71: “Sehr schlecht erhalten eine Lekythos im Agoramuseum, auf der zwei nach r. bewegte Mantelfiguren auf hoher Basis zwischen zwei sitzenden Figuren erscheinen, einer mit Stab, der andere mit Instrument (?)”.

<sup>23</sup> Cook (n. 6) 372; Gardiner (n. 2) 231, fig. 32 (side A); S. Bleeker Luce, Jr., “The Origin of the Shape of the ‘Nolan’ amphora”, *AJA* 20 (1916) 453, 457 fig. 11 (side A); *CVA Great Britain 4 (Brit. Mus. 3) III H e*, pl. 45. 10 a, b; Haspels, *ABL* 219, 64; Vos (n. 2) no. 38; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 15. The Edinburgh Painter, ca. 500–480 BC.

<sup>24</sup> Beazley, *ARV*<sup>2</sup> 432, 50; Vos (n. 2) no. 45; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 51; D. Buitron-Oliver, *Douris, A Master-Painter of Athenian Red-Figure* (Mainz 1995) pl. 60 no. 91; *Beazley Archive Databases* (n. 6) no. 205 094. The Douris Painter, 500–450 BC.

<sup>25</sup> Schauenburg (n. 12) 69 fig. 25; Beazley, *ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1119, 5; D. M. Bailey, *A Catalogue of the Lamps in the British Museum I* (London 1975) pl. 139 a; Vos (n. 2) no. 49; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 90; T. Mannack, *The Late Mannerists in Athenian Vase-Painting* (Oxford 2001) 39 and pl. 41 a; *Beazley Archive Databases* (n. 6) no. 214 813. The Painter of Oxford 529, 450–425 BC.

<sup>26</sup> L. J. F. Janssen, *De Grieksche, Romeinsche en Etrurische Monumenten van het Museum van Oudheden te Leyden* (Leiden 1843–1848) 185 no. II 1874; C. Leemans, “Het Muzykexamen; eene grieksche beschilderde vaas”, *Caecilia, muzikaal Tijdschrift* 3 (1847); Roulez (n. 10) pl. 18; J. H. Holwerda, *Catalogus van het Rijksmuseum van Oudheden te Leiden. Afdeling Griekenland en Italië, eerste deel, Vaatwerk* ([Leiden] 1905) 108–109, XVIII no. 42; Beazley, *ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1084, 16; *CVA Netherlands 5 (Leiden 3)* pls. 135. 1, 136. 1–5; T. H. Carpenter et al., *Beazley Addenda* (Oxford <sup>2</sup>1989) [henceforth *Add*<sup>2</sup>] 327; Vos (n. 2) no. 46 and p. 123 fig. 1; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 82. The Cassel Painter, ca. 450–440 BC.

<sup>27</sup> Shapiro (n. 2) 61 and fig. 39 b; M. A. Τιβεριος, “Ενας κρατηρος του ζωγράφου του Μονοχου 2335”, in: idem, *Περικλεια Παναθηναϊα* (Αθηνά 1989) 81–134, summary in English 135–142, fig. 2, 11, 12, 13; Kotsidou (n. 2) 118. The Painter of Munich 2335, ca. 440–430 BC. Since only the legs of two figures on a bema are preserved, this could as well be a synaulia, but aulodia is more probable, given that the representations of synaulia are very rare (see below n. 145).

22. Rf. hydria fr., Athens, Agora P 7912 (fig. 19).<sup>28</sup>  
 23. Rf. column-crater, Baranello 86 (fig. 20).<sup>29</sup>  
 24. Rf. calyx-crater, Bologna PU 286 (fig. 21).<sup>30</sup>  
 25. Rf. bell-crater, Oxford, Ashmolean Museum 1960.1220 (fig. 22).<sup>31</sup>  
 26. Rf. column-crater, Ferrara 2813 (fig. 23).<sup>32</sup>  
 27. Rf. column-crater, Ferrara 2996 (fig. 24).<sup>33</sup>

Such common details as the platform, festal garments, and listeners make it quite probable that a musical contest is depicted,<sup>34</sup> still it cannot be taken for granted that they indicate anything more than a public performance; in fact, only judges and Nikai are obvious signs that a competition is taking place,<sup>35</sup> but the judges themselves are not quite clearly distin-

<sup>28</sup> Beazley, *ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1150, 30; Vos (n. 2) no. 50; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 94; M. B. Moore, *Attic Red-figured and White-ground Pottery*, The Athenian Agora 30 (Princeton 1997) pl. 7. 15; *Beazley Archive Databases* (n. 6) no. 215 241. The Kleophon Painter, 450–400 BC.

<sup>29</sup> G. Dareggi, *Ceramica Attica nel Museo di Baranello*, Materiali del Museo di Baranello 2 (Comune di Baranello 1974) 22–23 no. 19, pl. 28; eadem, *Ceramica greca e italiota nel Museo di Baranello* (London 1977) 28 no. 22, pl. XI a, b; Vos (n. 2) no. 47; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 88; C. Thöne, *Ikongraphische Studien zu Nike im 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr.: Untersuchungen zur Wirkungsweise und Wesenart* (Heidelberg 1999) cat. Cc 30. The Orestos Painter, ca. 460–425 BC.

<sup>30</sup> G. B. Passeri, *Picturae Etruscorum in vasculis I* (Romae 1767) pl. 7; *Antiquités Etrusques et Romaines*, gravées par F. A. David, avec leurs explications par d'Hancarville, II (Paris 1785) pl. 35; F. Inghirami, *Pitture di vasi fittili* (Fiesole 1835–1837) pl. 361, 362; Th. Panofka, *Bilder antiken Lebens* (Berlin 1843) pl. IV 9; G. Pellegrini, *Catalogo dei vasi antichi dipinti delle collezioni Palagi ed Universitaria* (Bologna 1900) 46–48 no. 286, fig. 34; Beazley, *ARV* 793, 13; *ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1158 (III); T. B. L. Webster, *Potter and Patron in Classical Athens* (London 1972) 133; Vos (n. 2) no. 51; *Add*<sup>2</sup> 337, 1158; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 95; *Beazley Archive Databases* (n. 6) no. 215 331. Near the Dinos Painter, 450–400 BC.

<sup>31</sup> *The Ashmolean Museum, University of Oxford, Report of the Visitors* (1960) pl. 4, b; Beazley, *ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1186, 24 bis; Vos (n. 2) no. 52 and p. 125 fig. 2; *Add*<sup>2</sup> 341; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 99; Thöne (n. 29) cat. Cc 29; Sh. D. Bundrick, *Music and Image in Classical Athens* (Cambridge 2005) 171 fig. 100; *Beazley Archive Databases* (n. 6) no. 215 713. The Kadmos Painter, 430–420 BC.

<sup>32</sup> S. Aurigemma, *La necropoli di Spina in Valle Trebbe* (Rome 1960) pl. 225; Beazley, *ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1104, 8; *CVA Italia* 37 (Ferrara 1) pl. 38. 3; Vos (n. 2) no. 48; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 86. The Orpheus Painter, 450–400 BC.

<sup>33</sup> F. Berti, D. Restani (eds.), *Lo specchio della musica: Iconografia musicale nella ceramica attica di Spina* (Bologna 1988) no. 19 with fig.; Kotsidu (n. 2) cat. V 87.

<sup>34</sup> In any case, an agonistic form of performance seems dominating and thus the most probable for ancient Greek artists. On agonistic spirit in Ancient Greece see, e. g., A. Zäicev, *Das griechische Wunder. Die Entstehung der griechischen Zivilisation*, *Xenia* 30 (Konstanz 1993).

<sup>35</sup> Vos (n. 2) 124. Some scholars consider the bema to be a decisive proof of representing a contest: Roulez (n. 10) 78; Kotsidu (n. 2) 105 (“Die Angabe des Bemas

guishable from the public.<sup>36</sup> In some cases, a private occasion can be supposed: on no. 7 the bema is absent; on no. 6 most probably school events are depicted. But if indeed a public festival is represented, it is presumably the Panathenaic contest, since Attic vase-painters were unlikely to show any other aulodic competition.

On some pictures (nos. 12, 14, 19, 21, 25, 27), the musicians are placed by the columns, which should indicate an indoor performance;<sup>37</sup> since this element appears in the most cases (but no. 12 and 14) in the second part of the fifth century, the columns are sometimes considered to represent the Periclean Odeion where the Panathenaic musical contests were held at that time (Plut. *Per.* 11).<sup>38</sup>

Evidence from vase-paintings seems to be either earlier than 470 or later than 450 BC. This led some scholars to postulate the hiatus in the musical<sup>39</sup> or just aulodic<sup>40</sup> contests at the Panathenaia in the Early Classical

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bildet den einzigen gesicherten Hinweis darauf, daß das Vasenbild die Abhaltung eines öffentlichen musischen Agons zeigt”), though the performers at a concert (see below n. 58, 71, 72, 73, and Athen. 12. 54, 538 b) would surely stand on it, too.

<sup>36</sup> Kotsidu (n. 2) 107–108; see E. Reisch, “Agonothetes”, *RE* I (1894) 870–877; H. Schween, *Die Epistaten des Agons und der Palästra in Literatur und Kunst* (Kiel 1911) 29 f., 40 ff., 51 f., 57 f. Such features usually attributed to judges, as being adult (bearded), wearing long mantle, wreath or taenia, sitting on a δίφρος or κλισμός, holding or linking on a staff, are in fact not restrictive and are shared by other characters (staffs, as fashion accessories, are sometimes hold even by aulodes [nos. 5, 7, 15?]).

<sup>37</sup> *Contra* Kotsidu (n. 2) 108: “Die abgebildeten Säulen versetzen den agonistischen Vortrag in einen nicht näher bestimmbar architektonischen Zusammenhang, etwa vor einer Säulenhalle oder einer Gebäudefront, nichts deutet auf den Darstellungen jedoch darauf hin, daß der Wettkampf im Inneren eines Gebäudes stattfindet... Im Gegensatz dazu erhellt aus der Darstellung der schwarzfigurigen Lekythos des Gelamalers in Syrakus [no. 12 in the list above. – N. A.] mit den im Hintergrund abgebildeten Säulen, daß das Geschehen vor einer Säulenhalle zu denken ist”. But what other means did a vase-painter have at his disposal to represent a scene *inside* a building? The perspective, influenced by major painting, is traced only sporadically on some vases of the Late Classical period and is alien to vase-painting in general, for its aim is to emphasize the surface of a vessel rather than indicate the depth of field. And it is hardly possible to imagine the columns placed in the foreground, hiding the musicians behind them (evidently this would not be the case even in a concert-hall). – K. Schauenburg ([n. 3] 66) supposed that the columns could indicate a sacred area: “Säulen sind natürlich, vor allem nach Errichtung des Odeions im 5. Jahrhundert, kein absolut zwingender Beweis, daß die musikalische Darbietung in einem Heiligtum vonstatten geht, machen es jedoch wahrscheinlich”.

<sup>38</sup> R. Meinel, *Das Odeion. Untersuchungen an überdachten antiken Theatergebäuden* (Frankfurt/M. 1980) 29; 139; Shapiro (n. 2) 200 n. 53. On the Odeion see Davison (n. 2) 33–36; *contra* Kotsidu (n. 2) 130–170, esp. 141–154, with literature.

<sup>39</sup> Davison (n. 2) 38, 41; idem (n. 3) 141.

<sup>40</sup> M. F. Vos, *CVA Netherlands 5 (Leiden 3)* p. 33; eadem (n. 2) 123, 127–128; Kotsidu (n. 2) 125. According to Vos and Kotsidu, the lacuna in other musical

period that made their re-introducing by Pericles necessary. The suspension of aulodia is possible, “but given the accidents of preservation of Attic vases, such inferences based solely on the absence of representations in a given period are unwarranted”.<sup>41</sup>

It is only from the first half of the fourth century BC that we have at last a list of prizes, albeit incomplete, at the Panathenaia,<sup>42</sup> which mentions ἀνδράσιν ἀλφδοῖς in line 12 of the text preserved.

Approximately to the same period belongs the only mention of aulodia in Greek literature of Classical time,<sup>43</sup> that of Plato *Leg.* 700 d–e: those notorious new musicians who have no idea περὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς Μούσης καὶ τὸ νόμιμον confuse in their compositions the things that should never be mixed, in particular καὶ ἀλφδίας δὴ ταῖς κιθαρωδίας μιμούμενοι. Thus we are brought to the notice that singing to the aulos and singing to the cithara were appreciated as two quite different arts, requiring different skills and producing different effects, and hence justifiably bearing two different names, ἀλφδία and κιθαρωδία.<sup>44</sup>

The epigraphical evidence from the fourth century mentions two further festivals with aulodic competitions. First, the decree of Eretria<sup>45</sup> of 340 BC introducing the Artemisia establishes among others the prizes ἀλφδοῖ παιδί ... δευτέροι ... τρίτοι. Second, there is an ἀνήρ ἀλφδό(ς) in a catalogue of victors at the Amphiarraia in Oropos.<sup>46</sup>

A remarkable feature of the agonistic documents mentioned above is an indication of age groups, namely ἀνδρῶν and παίδων. Since no women

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competitions is not attested by vase-paintings; see also D. Schafer, “Musical Victories in Early Classical Vase Paintings” (abstract of paper), *AJA* 95 (1991) 333–334.

<sup>41</sup> Shapiro (n. 2) 200 n. 34. – Cf. the date of no. 18.

<sup>42</sup> *SIG<sup>3</sup>* 1055 = *Michel* 880 = *IG* II 965 = *IG* II–III<sup>2</sup> 2311. H. Kotsidu ([n. 2] 24) adduces the date of 366–338 BC. See H. W. Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians* (London 1977) 35; A. W. Johnston, “IG II<sup>2</sup> 2311 and the Number of Panathenaic Amphorae”, *ABS* 82 (1987) 125–129.

<sup>43</sup> As a matter of fact, one more reference dates back to the fifth century BC: according to Clem Al. *Strom.* 1. 3. 24. 3, there was a satyr play named Ἀλφδοί by Iophon, son of Sophocles (see E. Diehl, “Iophon 2”, *RE* 9 [1916] 1899).

<sup>44</sup> H. Guhrauer, *Zur Geschichte der Aulodik bei den Griechen*, Programm des Gymnasiums Waldenburg im Schlesien (Waldenburg 1879) 4: “Wie wir also heut zu Tage etwa Opersängern oder Liedersängern, so ungefähr scheiden die Griechen Auloden und Kitharoden”.

<sup>45</sup> *Eph. Arch.* (1902) 101–102 = *IG* XII 9, 189 = *SGDI* 5315 = *LGS* II 88, lines 15–16.

<sup>46</sup> *Arch. Eph.* (1923) 46–49 no. 125 = *Michel* 889 = *IG* VII 414, line 5; E. Preuner, “Griechische Siegerlisten. I. Siegerliste von Oropos”, *MDAI Ath.* 28 (1903) 338–346 (*Michel* – ca. 325, *Preuner* – 366–338 BC).

were allowed to perform in the sacred competitions, an interest in the peculiar high timbre of the boys' voices seems natural. The inscription from Eretria, which is preserved almost completely, mentions boy aulodes (though there is no such category for men performers), thus providing the parallel that makes possible a restoration of ἀλφῶδος παῖς in line 3–4 of Oropian catalogue.<sup>47</sup>

As for the Panathenaic list, the mention of an aulodic contest for men would not necessarily imply the existence of this contest for children (as the same Eretrian document shows), but it still seems possible to supply a mention of a boys' aulodic competition somewhere in the damaged lines of the inscription.<sup>48</sup> In any case, one would assume the broadest possible program for the famous Panathenaia.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, the supposition of boy aulodes at this festival is supported by vase-painting.

There seems to be evidence for children's competitions, though not quite irrefutable, even for the Archaic period. It has been argued by R. R. Heinze long ago, that a performance of ἀλφῶδος παῖς is depicted on no. 3, because the two performers are shown beardless in contrast to the bearded listeners.<sup>50</sup> More examples for the youthful musicians opposed to the bearded audience could be given (nos. 2, 16, 17; aulode only nos. 12, 14). But this contrast cannot be considered a safe proof, because the beardless young men could well have competed in the adult age group; nor can the smaller size of the both musicians, for it is often caused by their standing on the bema (nos. 1, 2, 3, 8, 12, 14, 16, 17). It is more tempting to interpret in the same vein no. 9, where the beardless singer is definitely shorter than the bearded aulete. Still it should be noted that on no. 8 all figures are bearded, but the vase-painter did not manage a single scale, so that the figure of a singer is smaller than that of an aulete, and both seem shorter than a seated judge. Thus, we cannot conclude with confidence about the contest

<sup>47</sup> Preuner (n. 46) 339.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 341; Preuner (n. 2) 91–92 (at the beginning); Johnston (n. 42) 126. 127 (between the bottom of A.I 22 and the top of B.I 4). Parke ([n. 42] 35) supposed that the prizes for children were not mentioned in the list because boys could be awarded nothing more valuable than plain olive crowns.

<sup>49</sup> Preuner (n. 46) 341. Moreover, it seems probable that the similarities of the programs of these three festivals, including the definition of age groups, are accounted by the circumstance that the Oropian and the Eretrian games followed the glorious Attic Panathenaia, see: Н. А. Алмазова, “Детские музыкальные состязания в эллинистическую эпоху” (N. Almazova, “The Children Musical Competitions in the Hellenistic Period”), *Cathedra Petropolitana*, *Philologia Classica* VI (St. Petersburg 2004) 175–176, cf. Preuner (n. 2) 83 f., 89–93.

<sup>50</sup> Heinze (n. 5) 245.

αὐλοδῶν παίδων at the Panathenaia in the Archaic period, though it looks probable.

Yet in the Classical period the images of boy aulodes are quite unmistakable and quite popular (nos. 18,<sup>51</sup> 19, 20, 21,<sup>52</sup> 22, 23, 24, 26, 27). Their predominance<sup>53</sup> even let M. Vos believe that aulodic competitions were revised by Pericles, so that from his time onwards only small boys could participate in them,<sup>54</sup> but it would look very odd and contradict the epigraphical evidence. The reasons for the painters' partiality to the children contests are to be sought in the demands of their own art, not that of the singers. First, the youthful appearance is typical for the characters of High Classical art: even the gods grow younger,<sup>55</sup> and so do the contestants, both athletes and musicians.<sup>56</sup> Second, depicting children was a novelty mastered by the vase-painters of the fifth century. For the inventors of such a composition the figures of boys would look advantageous and add variety to a scene; for their followers it became an iconographical convention. The Panathenaic aulodic contests of the Classical time were surely not reduced to boys' ones, but the existence of the children competitions in this period cannot be doubted.

Meanwhile, the excavations of the twentieth century have enriched us with one more agonistic inscription dealing with the age groups for aulodes, which dates approximately from the third century BC: it is a catalogue of victors at the Great Erethimia in Rhodes,<sup>57</sup> where in lines B 10 and 12 [αὐλοδοῦς παίδων] and [αὐλοδοῦς ἀνδρῶν] are restored.

In the Hellenistic period, it seems that the aulodia was still considered an important part of program in the case of most representative and impressive musical performances, such as the famous wedding in Susa held by Alexander the Great in 324 BC. Artists from all over Greece assembled to the party, and all the popular ἀκροάματα, including two αὐλοδοί, were produced (Athen. 12. 54, 538 b). An aulode took also part at least at two of

<sup>51</sup> The cup by Douris is the only evident example (though the upper part of the both figures is missing) dating from the first half of the fifth century BC.

<sup>52</sup> Τιβεριοῦς (n. 27) 137: "...two musicians of apparently different ages... On the basis of other similar scenes, we can be sure that the younger figure is singing while the elder plays the double flute".

<sup>53</sup> It may look like *all* the extant Classical vases have boy singers (Vos [n. 2] 127, Shapiro [n. 2] 60), but I doubt if no. 25 depicts a boy, cf. Buxton (n. 31) 170 and n. 155.

<sup>54</sup> Vos (n. 2) 128.

<sup>55</sup> See, e. g., J. Boardman, *Athenian Red Figure Vase Painters. The Archaic Period* (London 1975, repr. 1997) 223.

<sup>56</sup> Shapiro (n. 2) 58, 200 n. 52.

<sup>57</sup> *BCH* 99 (1975) 102.

the four Pythaiads sent to Delphi by the Athenians supported by their guild of τεχνῖται who tried to do their best in performing a splendid concert in 128/7<sup>58</sup> and a musical competition in 97 BC.<sup>59</sup>

Changes in public taste for musical contests can be judged by the Museia in Thespieae, a festival well attested by numerous documents for a long period of time. The aulodia was in program already in the third century BC, as appears from a decree giving a new status of ἀγῶν θυμελικός at the Museia as στεφανίτης ἰσοπύθιος.<sup>60</sup> After that, the aulodia is mentioned in the catalogues of victors from the first century BC,<sup>61</sup> but is completely absent in the documents from the Roman Imperial period (II–III AD).<sup>62</sup>

The competitions of ἀύλωδοί at the Amphiarraia in Oropos attested for the fourth century (see above) did not last till the first century BC: no mention of them is found in the catalogues of that time.<sup>63</sup> But in the same century aulodes competed at a number of other festivals: the Charitesia in Orchomenos,<sup>64</sup> the Ptoia in Acraephia,<sup>65</sup> the Sarapieia in Tanagra.<sup>66</sup> A musician from a catalogue of Soteria in Acraephia could have been either an aulete or an aulode.<sup>67</sup>

In the most cases, the competitions that include aulodia are Boeotian:<sup>68</sup> it seems that mainly there the interest in aulodia was still preserved in the first

<sup>58</sup> *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 698 A = *FD* III 2, 47 line 23 (line 20 ἀκροάματα τὰ συναυξήσαντα τὰς τοῦ θεοῦ ἀμέρας).

<sup>59</sup> *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 711 L = *FD* III 2, 48 line 31 (lines 29–30 τοὺς συναγωνιζαμένους τὸν θυμελικὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ τὸν σκανικὸν ἐν ταῖς τοῦ θεοῦ ἀμέραις).

<sup>60</sup> The response of the Athenians accepting the new status of the festival: *BCH* 19 (1895) 322–326 no. 2 col. b line 7 = *IG* VII 1735 b; the response of the Isthmian-Nemean guild of the artists of Dionysos: *BCH* 19 (1895) 313–322 no. 1 line 19 = *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 457 = *Michel* 1012.

<sup>61</sup> *BCH* 19 (1895) 332–333 no. 6 line 13 = *Michel* 891; *BCH* 19 (1895) 333–334 no. 7 line 8 = *IG* VII 1762; *BCH* 19 (1895) 337–339 no. 12 line 25; *BCH* 19 (1895) 340 no. 13 line 21 = E. Reisch, *De musicis Graecorum certaminibus capita quattuor* (Vindobonae 1885) Appendix [henceforth: Reisch] IV = *Michel* 892 = *IG* VII 1760.

<sup>62</sup> *BCH* 19 (1895) 340–341 no. 15 = *IG* VII 1773; *BCH* 19 (1895) 341–343 no. 16 = *SEG* III 334; *BCH* 19 (1895) 343–345 no. 17; 345–346 no. 18 = *IG* VII 1776; *Arch. Eph.* (1917) 167.

<sup>63</sup> See *IG* VII 416 = Reisch IX; *IG* VII 419 = Reisch VIII; *IG* VII 420 = Reisch VII.

<sup>64</sup> *IG* VII 3195 = Reisch I = *Michel* 894; *IG* VII 3196 = Reisch II; *IG* VII 3197 = Reisch III.

<sup>65</sup> *BCH* 44 (1920) 251–252, no. 10.

<sup>66</sup> *SEG* XIX (1963) 335 (improving *IG* VII 540; *BCH* 2 [1878] 590 no. 22; Reisch XII; *Michel* 890; *Arch. Eph.* [1956] 36).

<sup>67</sup> Σ]ωσιμένης Σωσικ|λέους? *IG* VII 2727 line 16 = Reisch XIV–XV; I. E. Στεφανίς, *Διονυσιακοὶ τεχνῖται. Συμβολὲς στὴν προσωπογραφία τοῦ θεατροῦ καὶ τῆς μουσικῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων Ἑλλήνων* (Ἡρακλεῖο 1988) no. 2353.

<sup>68</sup> The supposition made by the first editors (*JHS* 7 [1886] 148 f. = *Michel* 901) that an aulode was mentioned in a catalogue of Heraia on Samos (II BC) has proved erroneous, cf. *ZPE* 1 (1967) 230.

century BC. It should not surprise, as Boeotia was for a long time famous for its school of aulos-playing and its liking for aulos music.<sup>69</sup> An attempt was made to restore a mention of aulodes in two more inscriptions related to some unknown (perhaps Theban) festivals,<sup>70</sup> although these inscriptions may be dating from the Imperial age and thus be unparalleled for the contests in aulodia.

Finally, we have some evidence for performances of ἀὐλοῦδοί outside the competitions, all of them dating from the second century BC: in Iasos,<sup>71</sup> Kyrene,<sup>72</sup> and, most probably, on Delos.<sup>73</sup>

It is significant that all the epigraphical sources relating to the aulodic performances do not postdate the first century BC. It does not mean, of course, that people stopped singing to the aulos after that, but I am inclined to think that by that time aulodia, that is, a solo singing of a νόμος to an aulos accompaniment, gradually ceased to be a part of official musical competitions.

The unpopularity of aulodia as compared with other kinds of performance is proved not only by the scanty evidence. The existing list of prizes at the Panathenaia shows that aulodia was estimated lower than other categories:<sup>74</sup> five prizes, the first of them a golden wreath worth 1000 drachmae and 500 drachmae in silver, the rest 1200, 600, 400 and 300 dr., were established for citharodes; three prizes, the first of them a wreath of 500 dr. and 300 dr., the third 100 dr., for citharists; and only two, a wreath of 300 dr. and 100 dr., for aulodes.<sup>75</sup> Similar is the relative value of the more modest prizes at the

<sup>69</sup> See, e. g., Plut. *Pelop.* 19; *Alcib.* 2, 6; *Sch. Aristoph. Ach.* 862 a. Guhrauer ([n. 44] 15) calls Boeotia “ein Eldorado jeglicher Art Aulos-Musik”.

<sup>70</sup> *IG VII 2448 = MDAI Ath.* 3 (1878) 142 = Reisch XI; *IG VII 2449 = MDAI Ath.* 3 (1878) 143.

<sup>71</sup> *LBW 256 = IK 28.1 164* line 12 (190–180 BC).

<sup>72</sup> *ASAA 39/40 = N. S. 23/24* (1961–1962) 273 no. 103 line 21 = *SEG XX* (1964) 716.

<sup>73</sup> ἀὐ[λω]δός: *IG XI 133* line 78 (170 BC), see E. Capps, “Studies in Greek Agonistic Inscriptions”, *TAPhA* 31 (1900) 121; idem, “Athenikon 2”, *RE Suppl.* I (1903) 221 (“anstatt κομφιδός ist ἀὐ[λω]δός zu lesen”).

<sup>74</sup> See above n. 42. H. Kotsidu ([n. 2] 88, 102) interprets *IG II<sup>2</sup> 2311* not as referring to some particular Panathenaic festival, but as a permanent list of prizes.

<sup>75</sup> The lines concerning auletes are not completely preserved, it can only be seen that the prizes were no less than two. Strange enough is therefore H. A. Shapiro’s assertion ([n. 2] 58) that “the contest for solo flute was the least prestigious [sc. among the musical events at the Panathenaia. – N. A.], with the smallest prizes”. His impression of auletics being less popular than aulodia in Athens (intended to explain the absence of age groups for auletes in *IG II<sup>2</sup> 2311*) is based as well, and mainly, on the asserted less numerous representations of auletic contests in vase painting compared to that of aulodic ones (*ibid.*, 61). Still the evidence for auletes and aulodes seems at least commensurable: H. Kotsidu ([n. 2] 293–315) adduces 22 reliable cases for aulodic contests and 21 for auletic ones, not counting the pictures of lone auletes and some other disputable cases.

Artemisia in Eretria:<sup>76</sup> 200, 150 and 100 dr. for citharodes; 120, 50 and 20 dr. for rhapsodes; 110, 70 and 55 dr. for citharists; 50, 30 and 20 dr. for aulodes (the latter surpassing only parodes, with their 50 and 10 dr.).

The preference for stringed instruments over wind-instruments was a frequent subject of ancient philosophical considerations,<sup>77</sup> e. g. as formulated by Olympiodorus (*In Plat. Alcib.* 66 Westerink):

διὰ πολλὰς δὲ αἰτίας οὐκ ἐπετήδευον τὸν ἀυλὸν· πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκστατικὸς οὗτος καὶ μάλλον ἐνθουσιαστικὸς καὶ οὐ παιδευτικὸς. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ κιθαρίζειν δυνατὸν καὶ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀυλεῖν οὐδαμῶς· οὐ μόνον δὲ αὐτὸς οὐ δύναται λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ἢ ᾄδειν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἄλλου ᾄδοντος ἀκούειν, θορυβώδης γὰρ οὗτος...

They [sc. the Athenians] did not practice aulos because of many reasons, mainly since it excites and enrages rather than educates. The playing of cithara can be accompanied by words, but not the playing of aulos; not only the performer cannot sing or use words himself, but cannot hear anyone else singing, as aulos is too noisy.

Further, the analysis of vocal genres in the *Problems* of Pseudo-Aristotle (19. 43, 922 a) gives an additional reason for such a low estimation of aulode's efforts (although it is argued there, quite on the contrary, that a combination of a voice with an aulos is more agreeable than with a lyre, because both aulos and voice are wind-instruments and so fit better together):<sup>78</sup>

ἔτι ὁ μὲν ἀυλὸς πολλὰ τῷ αὐτοῦ ἤχῳ καὶ τῇ ὁμοιότητι συγκρῦπτει τῶν τοῦ ᾠδοῦ ἀμαρτημάτων, οἱ δὲ τῆς λύρας φθόγγοι ὄντες ψιλοὶ καὶ ἀμικτότεροι τῇ φωνῇ, καθ' ἑαυτοὺς θεωρούμενοι καὶ ὄντες αὐτοῖς συμφανῆ ποιούσι τὴν τῆς ᾠδῆς ἀμαρτίαν, καθάπερ κανόνες ὄντες αὐτῶν.

In addition to this, the *aulos* by its own sound and its similarity (to the voice) masks many of the mistakes *of the singer*, while the *sounds* of the lyre, being isolated and not blending so well with the voice, being noticed separately and actually being separate *for them* [sc. the audience], make a mistake in the song obvious, acting as *their* criteria.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>76</sup> See above n. 45.

<sup>77</sup> The most famous passages are perhaps Plat. *Rep.* 399 d–e and Aristot. *Pol.* 1341 a.

<sup>78</sup> Transl. by W. S. Hett: Aristotle, *Problems. Books I–XXI*, LCL 316 (Cambridge, Mass. – London 1993), with my alterations in italics.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Plut. *De recta ratione audiendi* 41 C: ὡς γὰρ τῶν ὑπ' ἀυλοῖς ᾄδόντων αἱ πολλὰ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἀμαρτίαι διαφεύγουσιν, οὕτω περιττὴ καὶ σοβαρὰ λέξις ἀντιλάμπει τῷ ἀκροατῇ πρὸς τὸ δηλούμενον. Athen. 4. 79, 176 e: ... καὶ οὐ λέγω περὶ κιθαρωφῶδιαν μόνην, ἧς καὶ ὁ εὐτελέστατος παρ' ἡμῖν ιδιώτης προσέτι τε καὶ

That aulodia demanded less skill from a singer, is shown also in a remark of Cicero (*Pro Mur.* 29): ...*aiunt in Graecis artificibus eos auloedos esse, qui citharoedi fieri non potuerint...*

According to Pausanias (10. 7. 4–6), the reason why the competitions in aulodia were withdrawn from the Pythian Games was the mournful character of singing to the aulos, which was acknowledged unsuitable for the festival. But this evidence is hardly true.<sup>80</sup> It should be noticed that Pausanias found it necessary to explain what aulodia had been like at the time considered: ἡ γὰρ ἀλφωδία μέλη τε ἦν ἀλῶν τὰ σκυθρωπότατα καὶ ἐλεγεία προσδόμενα τοῖς ἀλῶσις. This statement implies that Pausanias' readers either were familiar with a different meaning of the word or did not understand it at all. There is more information that funeral music was associated with singing to the pipes,<sup>81</sup> but it does not mean, of course, the obligatory threnodic character of aulodia as a whole: we are each time told about an ancient period or a particular case.<sup>82</sup>

At any rate, whatever reason the Amphycions had for removing this kind of competitions from the Pythian games, their decision itself could not but contribute to the subsequent absence of aulodia from many other festivals, especially from the ἀγῶνες ἰσοπύθιοι.<sup>83</sup>

Pseudo-Plutarch supplies us with the ancient views<sup>84</sup> on the history of aulodia. Music for wind-instruments turns out (*De mus.* 1132 E–F) to be the

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ἀναλφάβητος οὕτως ἐστὶ συνήθης ὡς τάχιστα ἐλέγχειν τὰ παρὰ τὰς κρούσεις ἀμαρτήματα γινόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἀλῶν εἰσι μουσικώτατοι ...

<sup>80</sup> The evidence of Pausanias is convincingly discounted by E. L. Bowie, “Early Greek Elegy, Symposium and Public Festival”, *JHS* 106 (1986) 23.

<sup>81</sup> See: E. Reiner, *Die rituelle Totenklage bei den Griechen* (Tübingen 1938) 67–70; for the connection of elegiac poetry (accompanied by the aulos) with a lament for the dead, D. L. Page, “The Elegiacs in Euripides’ *Andromache*”, in: *Greek Poetry and Life* (Oxford 1936) 206–211, 214–217.

<sup>82</sup> See Bowie (n. 80) 22–27; M. M. Позднев, “Об одном мотиве застольной поэзии: Theogn. 1041 sq.” (M. Pozdnev, “One Subject of Sympotic Poetry: Theogn. 1041 sq.”), *Tradita non explorata*, *Philologia classica VII* (St. Petersburg 2007) 27–30. H. A. Shapiro notes that aulos-playing was not associated with the funeral rites at Athens, proceeding from the absence of auletes in their representations (Shapiro [n. 2] 64, see: idem, “The Iconography of Mourning in Athenian Art”, *AJA* 95 [1991] 629–636, esp. 633–634 n. 28).

<sup>83</sup> Guhrer (n. 44) 14. Still, as we have seen, being an ἀγῶν ἰσοπύθιος did not prevent the Museia in Thespieae from including a competition of aulodes in program (see above n. 60 and 61).

<sup>84</sup> Among his sources (for the speech of Lysias) are Glaucus of Rhegium (1132 E, the later fifth century BC), Heraclides Ponticus (1131 F, the fourth century BC), and some local documents, such as ἡ ἐν Σικυῶνι ἀναγραφή (1132 A, 1134 B). See R. Westphal (ed.), *Plutarch über die Musik* (Breslau 1865) 25, 66–73; *Plutarque. De la*

oldest one, first performed by Hyagnis, then by his son Marsyas, and then by Olympos. Orpheus the citharode still had no predecessors to imitate, οὐδείς γάρ πω γεγένητο, εἰ μὴ οἱ τῶν ἀλφῶδικῶν ποιηταί. Since no other ἀλφῶδικῶν ποιηταί are mentioned, one would conclude that the three mythical auletes named above are meant to have composed both music and poetry.<sup>85</sup> But the merit of organizing music into νόμοι is ascribed to the musicians of the next generation who can claim more historical credibility: the citharodic νόμοι were created by Terpan-dros earlier (1132 D) than the aulodic ones by Clonas, his younger contemporary (1133 A); both πρῶτοι εὐρεταί are one generation older than Archilochos (1132 E; 1133 A) and so can be dated to the first half of the seventh century BC.<sup>86</sup> Clonas is said to be a native of either Tegea (according to the Arcadian version) or Thebae (according to the Boeotian one). There existed also an opposite tradition, which named Ardalos from Troezen<sup>87</sup> as an inventor of aulodic νόμοι (1133 A).<sup>88</sup> In the next generation, Clonas was followed by Polymnestos from Colophon (1132 C).

The only genre of aulodic performance mentioned in our sources is a νόμος.<sup>89</sup> As far as we know, it was a kind of technically specialized music

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*Musique*. Édition critique et explicative par H. Weil et Th. Reinach (Paris 1900) IV–XIII; 6 n. 19–20; 8 n. 22–24; 10 n. 25–34; 14 n. 35–40; 15 n. 37; 17 n. 41; 40 n. 100; Fr. Lasserre, *Plutarque. De la Musique*. Texte, trad., comm., précédés d’une étude sur l’éducation musicale dans la Grèce antique (Lausanne 1954) 101–102; 154 n. 4; 155–156 n. 4; A. Barker, *Greek Musical Writings*. I. *The Musician and his Art* (Cambridge 1984) 205; 207 n. 8–10. 13; 209 n. 27. 29; 211 n. 42.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Suid. ο 219: Ὀλυμπος, Μάϊονος, Μυσός, ἀλφητῆς καὶ ποιητῆς μελῶν καὶ ἐλεγείων. The same three musicians are meant by τοὺς πρώτους ποιήσαντας ἀλφῶδιαν above in 1133 E. This led R. Westphal (*op. cit.*, p. 5 line 8, and p. 74–75) to read ἀλφητικὴν instead of ἀλφῶδιαν and ἀλφητικῶν instead of ἀλφῶδικῶν in these passages. See also Th. Bergk, *Poetae lyriici Graeci* III (Leipzig 1867) 3–5. To keep the MSS reading, one should accept that in these two cases ἀλφῶδια is different from the aulodic νόμοι invented later by Clonas.

<sup>86</sup> Terpan-dros is named the first winner at the Carneia, in Ol. 26 (676/673 BC): Athen. 14. 37, 635 e. *Marmor Parium* ep. 34 (IG XII, 5, 444 line 49 b) dates him to 645/644 BC, and Eusebius (*Chron. can.*) to 635 BC.

<sup>87</sup> This Ardalos, called son of Hephaestus, the inventor of aulos and the founder of the cult of Muses Ardalides (Paus. 2. 31. 3), is distinguished from the younger, but still mythical Ardalos in Plut. *VII sap. conv.* 4, 149 F–150 A: ἦν δὲ Τροϊζήνιος ὁ Ἄρδαλος, ἀλφῶδός καὶ ἱερεὺς τῶν Ἄρδαλείων Μουσῶν, ὃς ὁ παλαιὸς Ἄρδαλος ἰδρύσατο ὁ Τροϊζήνιος. See Weil–Reinach (n. 84) 22 n. 53; K. Wernicke, “Ardalides”, *RE* 2 (1895) 610–611.

<sup>88</sup> Thus, most of the artists of this early period are of Peloponnesian origin, as well as the Arcadian Echembrotos, the only Pythian winner in aulodia (Paus. 10. 7. 4, 6). This makes H. Guhrauer ([n. 44] 8) suppose that aulodia was at first developed in the Peloponnesus. The controversial evidence can reflect the old rivalry between Boeotia and Arcadia, the two centres of wind music (Weil–Reinach [n. 84] 21–22 n. 51).

<sup>89</sup> Guhrauer (n. 44) 12, 14.

with determinate rules, performed by a solo virtuoso.<sup>90</sup> Pseudo-Plutarch<sup>91</sup> gives the only list of aulodic νόμοι we have:<sup>92</sup>

Οἱ δὲ νόμοι οἱ κατὰ τούτους,<sup>93</sup> ἀγαθὲ Ὀνησίκρατες, ἀλφωδικοί ἦσαν Ἀπόθετος, Ἐλεγχοί, Κωμάρχιοι, Σχοινίων, Κηπίων τε καὶ †Δεῖος καὶ Τριμερῆς· ὑστέρω δὲ χρόνω καὶ τὰ Πολυμνήστεια καλούμενα ἐξευρέθη (1132 D).

Ἐλεγχος Franke | Κηπίων Τενέδιος Amyot Κηπίων τε καὶ Λεῖος Wyttenbach Κηπίων τε καὶ Λύδιος Salmasius Κηπίων τε καὶ Τεῖος Burette Κηπίων Ἐπικῆδειος Westphal Κηπίων καὶ Ἐπικῆδειος Weil-Reinach Κήδειος Lasserre | Τριμερῆς Xylander coll. 1134 B: τριμελής codd. | πολυμνάστεια codd., corr. Herwerden coll. Aristoph. *Equ.* 1287

γεγονέναι δὲ καὶ Πολύμνηστον ποιητὴν, Μέλητος τοῦ Κολοφωνίου υἱόν, ὃν [Πολύμνηστόν] \*\*\* τε καὶ Πολυμνήστην νόμους ποιῆσαι (1133 A).

[Πολύμνηστόν] del. Pohlenz, qui etiam <ἄλλους> τε καὶ Πολυμνηστίους νόμους

Unfortunately, for us these names are hardly anything more than *nomina nuda*. Various attempts of explaining them remain inconclusive.<sup>94</sup> A. Barker<sup>95</sup> takes the most skeptical view and argues that the lists of νόμοι known to us were created by the fifth-century BC classifiers proceeding from the alleged strict ‘laws’ that existed in music of old times.<sup>96</sup> They extracted their terminology from the hints in surviving

<sup>90</sup> See, e. g., W. Vetter, “Nomos 2”, *RE* XVII (1936) 840, 841; Barker (n. 84) 249, 255.

<sup>91</sup> Quoted from: Plutarchus, *Moralia* VI, 3. Ed. K. Ziegler, M. Pohlenz (Lipsiae: Teubner 1959).

<sup>92</sup> Pseudo-Plutarch (*De mus.*) is the only author who uses the adjective ἀλφωδικός and who distinguishes the aulodic νόμοι from the auletic ones.

<sup>93</sup> Probably τούτους should mean Κλονῶν καὶ Πολύμνηστον mentioned above (Pseudo-Plutarch is not aware of the exact authorship of each νόμος, cf. Weil – Reinach [n. 84] 23 n. 55), whereas τὰ Πολυμνήστεια καλούμενα are those ascribed to Polymnestos erroneously; cf. Westphal (n. 84) 73 ad pag. 5, 18; Barker (n. 84) 209 n. 21.

<sup>94</sup> For details, see H. Reimann, *Studien zur griechischen Musik-Geschichte. A. Der Νόμος*, Progr. des Gymn. Ratibor (Leipzig 1882) 2–3, 6; Weil – Reinach (n. 84) 17 n. 41, 18 n. 42, 22–23 n. 54, 27 n. 63; Lasserre (n. 84) 23–25; 156 n. 4; C. Del Grande, *La metrica greca*, Enciclopedia Classica, sezione II, vol. V, tomo II (Torino 1960) 425; L. Gamberini, *Plutarco “Della musica”*, *Historiae musicae cultores* 32 (Firenze 1979) 167; Barker (n. 84) 252.

<sup>95</sup> Barker (n. 84) 249–255.

<sup>96</sup> E. g., Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1133 B. According to Barker, this impression could be inferred “from remarks made by poets transitional between the old and the new, such

Archaic pieces that could allude to various features: pitch, meter, tuning-scheme, number of sections, regional style, occasion, subject matter, etc., so the typology turned out to be rather chaotic and the sense of some included terms even was not fully understood. Then this scheme of classification was extrapolated backwards to the previous period. Meanwhile, no such carefully distinguished types of compositions were in use in the seventh and the sixth century. Still “something corresponding to these rules and distinctions” (p. 249) should have existed; various kinds of musical solo at the Archaic competitions are likely to have developed into some important forms that became classic and to have provided great influence on music of later times. The existence of some rules, especially regulating structure and subject, is quite probable for competition pieces, all the more for pieces performed during festivals, which are actually cult events.<sup>97</sup> But the trouble is that the νόμοι ἀλφῳδικοί, mentioned by a single author and lacking comments, are especially obscure for us.

The scholars of the nineteenth century asserted that most of the νόμοι ἀλφῳδικοί named by Pseudo-Plutarch were called ἀλφῳτικοί elsewhere, and even discussed if each aulodic νόμος corresponded to, or was at the same time, an auletic one.<sup>98</sup> But the confusion is in fact not so great. Κηπίων is mentioned in Pseudo-Plutarch both among νόμοι ἀλφῳδικοί and κιθαρωδικοί (*De mus.* 1132 D, 1133 C, cf. Poll. 4. 65, Hesych. κ 714), so he would have meant that the aulodic νόμος existed together with the corresponding citharodic one (and was perhaps created on the basis of it). The evidence is varied about νόμος ὄρθιος, which is called citharodic (Hdt. 1. 24; *Sch. Aristoph. Ach.* 1042, *Eq.* 1278 a, 1279 a, *Ran.* 1282, *Eccl.* 741; Poll. 4. 65; Phot. *Lex.* α 1303; Suid. εἰ 146, λ 753, ν 478, ο 574, 575, 585) as well as auletic (*Sch. Aristoph. Ach.* 16; Poll. 4. 73; Suid. ο 573); if this name indicates classification by pitch, it could really refer to various high-pitched genres.<sup>99</sup> According to some of Pseudo-Plutarch’s sources, the poets associated with Polymnestes – i. e. authors of aulodia? – composed it too (1134 B), but it is nowhere called ἀλφῳδικός, and Pseudo-Plutarch hesitates if Polymnestes used it (1134 D); which is more, ὄρθιος may be opposed to the aulodic νόμοι in this passage.<sup>100</sup> The only evident

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as Pindar and Pratinas <...>, from the apparently systematic simplicity of surviving examples of the ancient music (e. g. <Ps.-Plut.> 1137 a – 1138 a, 1143 b), and from the plain fact that the structurally and harmonically ‘free’ forms of contemporary composers, beginning with Phrynis, were still felt to be audacious novelties” (*ibid.*, 250).

<sup>97</sup> Barker (n. 84) 254–255. Such rules are preserved, e. g., for an auletic (Poll. 4. 84) and a citharistic (Strab. 9. 3. 10, p. 421–422 C) νόμος Πυθικός.

<sup>98</sup> Guhrauer (n. 44) 10–12; K. von Jan, “Auletischer und aulodischer Nomos”, *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie* 119 (1879) 580–581.

<sup>99</sup> Barker (n. 84) 252.

<sup>100</sup> Καὶ Πολύμνηστος δ’ ἀλφῳδικοὺς νόμους ἐποίησεν· εἰ δὲ τῷ Ὀρθίῳ νόμῳ <έν> τῇ μελοποιίᾳ κέχρηται, καθάπερ οἱ ἄρμονικοὶ φασιν, οὐκ ἔχομεν [δ’] ἀκριβῶς εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ εἰρήκασιν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τι περὶ τούτου.

divergence from the information provided by Pseudo-Plutarch concerns νόμος ἀπόθετος and σχοινίων: Polydeuces calls them ἀύλητικοί two times (Poll. 4. 65, 78–79). However, this is the only term he applies to the νόμοι dealing with an aulos (see also 4. 82, 84), not opposing the auletic and aulodic ones.<sup>101</sup> Further, ἀπόθετος and σχοινίων are the only names known to him among those enumerated by Pseudo-Plutarch, and on this occasion both authors seem to have used the same source, namely the one that named Clonas, the aulodic poet, as the inventor of exactly these two νόμοι.<sup>102</sup> Whereas Pseudo-Plutarch goes into details concerning different νόμοι, Polydeuces does not show deep understanding of the matter.<sup>103</sup> Most probably he did not intend to elucidate the difference between vocal and instrumental νόμοι, but used the word ἀύλητικοί in the meaning ‘dealing with aulos’. Therefore his evidence should not prove the existence of the auletic νόμος ἀπόθετος and νόμος σχοινίων.

Aulodia is associated with elegies in our sources: Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1132 B, 1134 A (see below p. 26); Paus. 10. 7. 5 (see above p. 18). E. L. Bowie,<sup>104</sup> in his neat analysis of circumstances in which elegiac poetry could be performed, supposed that the genre sung by the aulodes at the public festivals was narrative poetry in elegiac meter, longer than any surviving specimen of elegy (about 1000 verses or more), dealing with local history, such as foundation of cities and their ancient or recent achievements, and perhaps including mythological subjects as well. As possible examples he gives Mimnermos’ *Smyrneis*, Tyrtaeus’ *Politeia/Eunomia*, Semonides’ ἄρχαιολογία of the Samians, Xenophanes’ poem(s) on foundation of Colophon and colonisation of Elea, Panyassis’ Ionian history, Simonides’ *Salamis*, and Ion’s *Χίου κτίσις*. Such a kind of poetry would emulate poems on local history in hexameters, so Bowie suggests that narrative elegy could be distinguished by “emphasis on personal views and recollections” (p. 33) characteristic of its sympotic variant. But he states that this genre did not postdate the middle of the fifth century BC, for it could not stand the competition with history in prose. Thus we are again left in the dark as to the contents of aulodia in later times.

Therefore, the information we have is far from sufficient to make an idea about the performance of an aulode in detail.

<sup>101</sup> He does oppose citharistic νόμοι to citharodic, though not quite clearly: those created by Terpanndros (4. 65) are referred to as citharodic (4. 66), whereas the instrumental ones are attested as τῶν ψιλῶν κιθαριστῶν (4. 66) and κιθαριστήριοι (4. 84).

<sup>102</sup> Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1133 A: περὶ δὲ Κλονᾶ ὅτι τὸν Ἀπόθετον νόμον καὶ Σχοινίωνα πεποιηκῶς εἶη μνημονεύουσιν οἱ ἀναγεγραφότες; Poll. 4. 65: σφάλονται δ’ οἱ καὶ ἀπόθετον προστιθέντες αὐτῷ [sc. Τερπάνδρῳ] καὶ σχοινίωνα· οὗτοι γὰρ ἀύλητικοί; 4. 79: καὶ Κλονᾶ δὲ νόμοι ἀύλητικοὶ ἀπόθετός τε καὶ σχοινίων. Cf. Westphal (n. 84) 71; Weil – Reinach (n. 84) VIII; 17 n. 41; 21 n. 51.

<sup>103</sup> Guhrauer (n. 44) 9–10.

<sup>104</sup> Bowie (n. 80) 27–35.

The term ἀλφῶδός meant evidently a singer. For his performance he needed a second person to accompany him on an aulos, but it was the singer who would get the credit for the performance and would be crowned, as clearly explained in Athenaeus (14. 14, 621 b):

ψάλλει δ' ἀντῶ [sc. τῶ ἰλαρωδῶ] ἄρρηγν ἢ θήλεια, ὡς καὶ τῶ ἀλφῶδῶ.  
δίδοται δὲ ὁ στέφανος τῶ ἰλαρωδῶ καὶ τῶ ἀλφῶδῶ, οὐ τῶ ψάλτη  
οὐδὲ τῶ ἀλφητῆ.

He (sc. the hilarode) is accompanied on a stringed instrument by a man or a woman, just like an aulode. And the crown is given to the hilarode and the aulode, not to the cithara-player or to the aulos-player.

At the end of the nineteenth century Karl von Jan<sup>105</sup> claimed that in earlier times only one musician, who alternated singing and playing, took part in the performance. But this idea could not be sustained, as von Jan himself was forced to admit<sup>106</sup> in the course of discussion<sup>107</sup> raised by his publication.<sup>108</sup> *Communis opinio* was expressed in 1900 by J. Frei: “Aulodum fuisse cantorem ... cui tibicen concinuit ... inter homines doctos nunc constat”.<sup>109</sup>

Von Jan's main argument, that no evidence of accompanying auletes was known, is now refuted by the vase-paintings listed above.

Polydeuces (Poll. 4. 83) makes ἀλφῶδία an example of εἶδος προσαυλήσεως, that is, an art where the aulete acted as an accompanying musician (according to Polydeuces' sources, the same could be his role in a συναυλία, understood as playing the cithara to the aulos accompaniment).<sup>110</sup>

When other artistic activities of an ἀλφῶδός are mentioned, it is mostly singing. Phrynus, the famous citharode of the fifth century BC, is said to have been active as an aulode before his teacher Aristocleides

<sup>105</sup> Von Jan (n. 98) 577–592 (a review of Guhrauer [n. 44]).

<sup>106</sup> K. von Jan, Rec.: “Reimann, Studien zur griechischen Musik-Geschichte...” [n. 94], *Philologische Rundschau* 3 (1883) 437.

<sup>107</sup> H. Guhrauer, “Zur Geschichte der Aulosmusik. Eine Entgegnung”, *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie* 121 (1880) 689–705; Reimann (n. 94) 13.

<sup>108</sup> Still one should agree with von Jan ([n. 98] 581–584), that a passage in Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1144 E (ὕποκρίνειε γὰρ ἂν τις ἀκούων ἀλφητοῦ, πότερόν ποτε συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ ἀλοῖ ἢ οὐ, καὶ πότερον ἢ διάλεκτος σαφῆς ἢ τοῦναντίον) has nothing to do with aulodia, pace Guhrauer ([n. 44] 1–3).

<sup>109</sup> J. Frei, *De certaminibus thymelicis*. Diss. (Basileae 1900) 33. Misinterpretations are rare and, it seems, inadvertent, see Webster (n. 30) 160, 165 and, recently, Bundrick (n. 31) 239.

<sup>110</sup> Poll. 4. 83: Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ συναυλία τις ἐκαλεῖτο· συμφωνία τις αὐτῆ τῶν ἐν Παναθηναίοις συναυλοῦντων. οἱ δὲ τὴν συναυλίαν εἶδος προσαυλήσεως οἶονται ὡς τὴν ἀλφῶδιαν. καὶ μὴν ἰαμβοὶ γε καὶ παριαμβίδες νόμοι κιθαριστήριον, οἷς καὶ προσηγύλου. Cf. n. 144 below.

taught him to play the cithara.<sup>111</sup> A certain Rhodippos won the victories as an aulode<sup>112</sup> and as a leader of a men chorus.<sup>113</sup> Pythocles, the priest of a Dionysian artistic guild in the third century BC,<sup>114</sup> acted as a leader or a member of the men chorus<sup>115</sup> and was glorified as a singer in a badly preserved poetical inscription on the base of his statue;<sup>116</sup> in the same poem he is thought to be called ἀὐλω]δός (line 9) and κωμω]δός or ῥαψω]δός (line 10). Such combinations of activities correspond well to the statement of Athenaeus: an aulode did not have to play an aulos.

It is of interest if the comparative importance of the both performers of aulodia was reflected in their representations in vase-painting. Their arrangement seems not significant, for there are examples of every possible scheme. In many cases, the singer and the aulete face each other, the aulode standing either to the left (nos. 1, 2) or to the right (nos. 3, 6, 7, 12, 14, 16, 19, 24, 27). They can also be placed one behind the other (no. 15<sup>117</sup>), always turned to the right,<sup>118</sup> the aulode first (in the Classical period: nos. 18, 20, 21?, 22, 23, 25, 26) or next (in the Archaic period: nos. 4, 8, 9, 11<sup>119</sup>). The least common is the position side by side (nos. 5, 10, 17). But I do not think that the arrangement of the musicians in vase-painting can tell us something about their actual position in the course of performance. Though it need not have been regulated officially, the most suitable position would be side by side (or half-turned to each other, cf. no. 24), so

<sup>111</sup> *Sch. Aristoph. Nub.* 971 a = Suid. φ 761: παραλαβὼν δὲ τὸν Φρῶνιν ἀὐλωδοῦντα κιθαρίζειν ἐδίδασκεν (this is the only case where the verb ἀὐλωδέω is used, and, remarkably, as a participle). See W. Riemschneider, "Phrynis", *RE* 20 (1941) 925–928.

<sup>112</sup> *IG VII* 3197 = Reisch III lines 13–14; *BCH* 44 (1920) 251 no. 10 lines 19–20; *Arch. Eph.* (1917) 167 lines 13–14.

<sup>113</sup> *IG VII* 3197 = Reisch III lines 44–45 (ἄνδρας ἡγεμόνας at the Homoloia).

<sup>114</sup> G. Nachtergaele, *Les Galates en Grèce et les Sôtéria de Delphes* (Bruxelles 1977), attachment: Corpus des actes relatifs aux Sôtéria de Delphes, p. 391 ff. [henceforth: Nachtergaele] no. 3 = *FD III* 1, 477 line 3; no. 4 = *SIG<sup>3</sup>* 489 lines 7–8; no. 5 lines 8–9 = *SEG* 18 (1962) 235. Cf. Nachtergaele p. 317–323.

<sup>115</sup> Nachtergaele no. 3 lines 14–15; no. 8 = *SGDI* 2564 lines 29–30.

<sup>116</sup> Nachtergaele no. 15 bis = *IG IV* 682: line 9 ἐγ κυκλίοισι χοροῖσιν; line 15 τὸν ἄοιδόν.

<sup>117</sup> Only some details of this representation are known to me (cf. n. 22).

<sup>118</sup> Citharodes and citharists are also represented turned to the right: the cithara was held in the left hand, so the opposite view would make the face of the musician partly hidden by his instrument (Kotsidu [n. 2] 109–111). As for the aulos-players and singers, the same convention could be explained as an adoption from representations of cithara-players, which are more numerous, to those of other musicians. One can also think of a different artistic convention: in duels, the winners are usually placed on the left side and turned to the right.

<sup>119</sup> On nos. 4 and 11, the heads of the musicians are missing, but, as the folds of their garments show, the figures standing in front have their arms raised up and thus prove to be auletes.

that the performers could face the audience and at the same time exchange glances to synchronise. Still the conventions of vase-painting would prevent exactly this way of placing figures, for the profile view was the only possible in the early period and remained the most common even after the painters mastered frontal and three-quarter views. The few attempts of “approximation to life” made the figure at the background look almost indiscernible and so proved unsuccessful. Consequently, the musicians standing side by side could be depicted either as facing the same direction<sup>120</sup> or turned one to another.

As for the costumes, the singer is always wrapped in a long mantle, his arms hidden; the accompanist usually wears a chiton and mantle or just a mantle<sup>121</sup> (both have their dress embroidered on nos. 5, 16, but not the aulete on no. 17 – perhaps in order to make both figures more discernible). Both can have wreaths (nos. 8, 16, 17, 19, 23, 24, 25) or taeniae (nos. 12, 13, 20, 26, 27; an aulode only on no. 3; on no. 6 the aulode wears a taenia and the aulete, it seems, a wreath); so can the judges and the listeners. At first sight, an aulode’s dress does not look more ornate than that of an aulete. But, as M. Vos observed,<sup>122</sup> the accompanying auletes (in all cases except those not counted by Vos: no. 1, one of the earliest, and no. 14) do not wear special festal garments worn by their solo-playing colleagues: a long not girdled heavy tunic (no. 14) or a long chiton with an ependytes (no. 1).<sup>123</sup> This is the only way in which their secondary role is emphasized.

No satisfactory answer can be given to the question of the authorship of aulodia: was it a singer, an aulete, or someone else who composed the text and the music? Presumably, all these variants were possible. One should be cautious while ascribing to the ancient public modern views that the composer should at any rate be taken into account in a competition and be crowned as a victor. We know that only the singers, ἀλφῶδοί, are mentioned in agonistic catalogues. In Pseudo-Plutarch Clonas, the creator of aulodic νόμοι, is called ὁ πρῶτος συστησάμενος τοὺς ἀλφῶδικοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ προσόδια, ἐλεγείων τε καὶ ἐπῶν ποιητής (*De mus.* 1132 B), ὁ τῶν ἀλφῶδικῶν νόμων ποιητής (1133 A), but he is nowhere attested as ἀλφῶδός or ἀλφητής, so we can only guess if he competed at all. In some other cases Pseudo-Plutarch does provide information about the activities of his πρῶτοι εὔρεται as performers.<sup>124</sup> But the explanation for the absence of

<sup>120</sup> Wegner (n. 16) 70 and Kotsidu (n. 2) 111 also interpret placing figures one after another as a way to show them standing side by side.

<sup>121</sup> Vos (n. 2) 127; Kotsidu (n. 2) 128.

<sup>122</sup> Vos (n. 2) 128.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 126.

<sup>124</sup> *De mus.* 1132 E: ἔοικε δὲ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην τὴν κιθαρωδικὴν ὁ Τέρπανδρος διενηνοχέναι· τὰ Πύθια γὰρ τετράκις ἐξῆς νενικηκῶς ἀναγέγραπται. 1134 A:

such data on Clonas or Polymnestos can be that his sources were dealing only with the Pythian victories, which were not attainable for aulodes.

Suid. α 2657: Ἀντιγενίδης Σατύρου, Θηβαῖος, μουσικός, ἀλφωδὸς Φιλοξένου – might look like evidence for a cooperation of a composer with an aulode. But Philoxenos was a famous dithyrambic poet,<sup>125</sup> his works were performed by a chorus, and Antigenides is known as an aulete,<sup>126</sup> so the word ἀλφωδός is used here erroneously instead of ἀλλητής. The reasons for such a mistake will be examined further.

Yet there appear to be mentions of two composers of aulodia who were auletes at the same time, as could be inferred from a passage of Pseudo-Plutarch (*De mus.* 1133 F–1134 B):

Καὶ ἄλλος δ' ἐστὶν ἀρχαῖος νόμος καλούμενος Κραδίας, ὃν φησὶν Ἴππωναξ Μίμνερμον ἀλλῆσαι. ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ ἐλεγεία μεμελοποιημένα οἱ ἀλφωδοὶ ᾄδον· τοῦτο δὲ δηλοῖ ἢ τῶν Παναθηναίων <ἀνα>γραφῆ ἢ περὶ τοῦ μουσικοῦ ἀγῶνος. γέγονε δὲ καὶ Σακάδας <ὁ> Ἀργεῖος ποιητῆς μελῶν τε καὶ ἐλεγείων μεμελοποιημένων· ὁ δ' αὐτὸς καὶ ἀλλητής ἀγαθὸς καὶ τὰ Πύθια τρεῖς νενικηκῶς ἀναγέγραπται· τούτου καὶ Πίνδαρος μνημονεύει· τόνων γοῦν τριῶν ὄντων κατὰ Πολύμνηστον καὶ Σακάδαν, τοῦ τε Δωρίου καὶ Φρυγίου καὶ Λυδίου, ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰρημένων τόνων στροφὴν ποιήσαντά φασι τὸν Σακάδαν διδάξαι ἄδειν τὸν χορὸν Δωριστὶ μὲν τὴν πρώτην, Φρυγιστὶ δὲ τὴν δευτέρα, Λυδιστὶ δὲ τὴν τρίτην· καλεῖσθαι δὲ Τριμερῆ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον διὰ τὴν μεταβολήν. ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐν Σικυῶνι ἀναγραφῇ τῇ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Κλονᾶς εὐρετῆς ἀναγέγραπται τοῦ Τριμεροῦς νόμου.

Κραδίης Weil–Reinach ex Hesychio | παρ' ἀθηναίων αA<sup>1</sup>εοπ<sup>1</sup>π<sup>2</sup> | γραφῆ codd.: corr. Cobet | ὁ add. Westphal | μελῶν] ἐπῶν Weil–Reinach | ἀλλητής Wyttenbach: ποιητῆς codd. | τριμελῆ ... τριμελοῦς Xylander Burette Weil–Reinach, cf. 1132 D

There is one more ancient *nomos* named Cradias, Hipponax says that Mimnermos had performed it on an aulos. For at first the aulodes sang elegies set to the music, as it is attested by the Panathenaic document about the musical contest. Sacadas from Argos also was the author of melic poetry

γέγονε δὲ καὶ Σακάδας <ὁ> Ἀργεῖος ποιητῆς μελῶν τε καὶ ἐλεγείων μεμελοποιημένων· ὁ δ' αὐτὸς καὶ ἀλλητής ἀγαθὸς καὶ τὰ Πύθια τρεῖς νενικηκῶς ἀναγέγραπται.

<sup>125</sup> Suid. φ 393; cf. διθυραμβοποιός Suid. α 2862, δ 1178, εἰ 291, θ 475, κ 2647, σ 1192; see P. Maas, “Philoxenos 23”, *RE* 20 (1941) 192–194.

<sup>126</sup> M. Dinse, *De Antigenida Thebano musico* (Berlin 1856) esp. 39; K. von Jan, “Antigenidas 3”, *RE* 1 (1894) 2400–2401; Guhrauer (n. 44) 11 n. 4.

and of elegies set to the music; there is evidence that he was a good aulete as well and has won the Pythian games three times. Pindar mentions him also: as at the time of Polymnestos and Sacadas there had been three systems of tuning, the Doric, the Phrygian, and the Lydian ones, it is said that Sacadas has composed a strophe in each of the systems named and has taught the chorus to sing the first in the Doric system, the second in the Phrygian, the third in the Lydian, so the *nomos* was called Tripartite because of the modulation. And in the Sicyonian document concerning the poets and composers it is Clonias who is called the author of the Tripartite *nomos*.

In this passage, Pseudo-Plutarch finishes, with the νόμος Κραδίας, the enumeration of the auletic, not the aulodic νόμοι, but after the mention of Mimnermos he gives a sudden passing reference to the repertoire of ἀλφῶδοί.<sup>127</sup> We need to supplement a missing link in his argument. The readers of *Περὶ μουσικῆς* would know Mimnermos mostly as an elegiac poet; but here he is said to have performed solo as an aulete.<sup>128</sup> Hence an explanation that in Mimnermos' times elegies were set to music and sung to the aulos (implicitly: *so that the poet had to master this instrument in order to accompany them and could even become a virtuoso*). Next, the author recalls a similar case: Sacadas, the famous aulos-player, who is referred to (Poll. 4. 79, 84; Paus. 2. 22. 8) as an inventor of the auletic νόμος Πυθικός, was at the same time a composer of poetry set to the music.<sup>129</sup> In particular, we are told that he had created an aulodic (cf. Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1132 D) νόμος Τριμερής for a chorus. This is the only passage that allows us to connect the term ἀλφῶδια with chorus music, but unfortunately Pseudo-Plutarch's information is suspicious.<sup>130</sup>

<sup>127</sup> This even made some editors transpose the whole passage ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ – τοῦ Τριμεροῦς νόμου: see Westphal (n. 84) 7 ad loc. (to 1134 C) and Weil – Reinach (n. 84) 24 n. 57 ad loc. (to 1133 B).

<sup>128</sup> Further references to Mimnermos as ἀλφητής: Hermesianax fr. VII. 35–40 ap. Athen. 13. 71, 598 a and Strab. 14. 1. 28, p. 643 C.

<sup>129</sup> Judging by this passage, one could suspect an author of aulodia in any aulete said to have composed melic or elegiac verse, e. g. Suid. τ 1205: Τυρταίος, Ἀρχεμβρότου, Λάκων ἢ Μιλήσιος, ἐλεγειοποιὸς καὶ ἀλφητής. Cf. the hypothesis of E. L. Bowie, above p. 22.

<sup>130</sup> The performers of all kinds of agonistic νόμοι are elsewhere considered soloists: see, e. g., H. Guhrauer, “Der pythische Nomos”, *Jahrbücher für Classische Philologie*, Supplbd. VIII (1875/76) 326 f.; E. Hiller, “Sakadas der Aulet”, *RhM* 31 (1876) 86 f.; von Jan (n. 106) 439 f.; H. W. Smyth, *Greek Melic Poets* (New York 1963 [1906]) xxi, lxii n. 1; W. Schmid, O. Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, Teil I, Bd. I (München 1929) 331 and n. 2; Vetter (n. 90) 840, 841; Barker (n. 84) 214 n. 63, 251, 253; cf. Reimann (n. 94) 1–8; W. Vetter, “Musikalische Sinndeutung des antiken Nomos”, *Zeitschrift für Musikwissenschaft* 17 (1935) 291. Besides, such a modulation is improbable for the Archaic period, see Weil – Reinach (n. 84) 26 n. 62; Barker, *ibid.*, 251; cf. Vetter, “Musikalische Sinndeutung des antiken Nomos”, 297; Lasserre (n. 84) 23, 159 n. 3.

Thus we are facing a terminological problem. Singing to the aulos accompaniment was quite common in various genres, such as elegiac poetry sung at symposia, chorus performances, and vocal parts of both the actors and the chorus in drama. So was it possible to use the word ἀὐλωδία in any of these cases? Was the term ἀὐλωδός ever applied to the symposiasts singing to the pipes at a feast? Was a solo monody of an actor in drama considered a kind of ἀὐλωδία?<sup>131</sup> Could a performance of a chorus accompanied by an aulete, either in a dramatic or a dithyrambic contest, be called ἀὐλωδία, and a member (or at least the leader) of a chorus, ἀὐλωδός? Since all these artists were singing to an aulos, we find it possible;<sup>132</sup> so could the ancient Greeks, still the lack of such evidence should itself be regarded as significant. The words ἀὐλωδία and ἀὐλωδός seem to have been used until the turn of the first century AD mainly, if not solely, as *termini technici* referring to the performance of a νόμος at the musical competitions.

However, the situation changed when the aulodic contests disappeared from the festivals. The words ἀὐλωδός and ἀὐλωδία were, of course, etymologically transparent and so could not become entirely obscure. But their meaning as technical terms was being gradually forgotten by those who had no special interest in musical contests of older times.

As a result, in some Greek texts beginning from the end of the first or the turn of the second century AD, we find these words applied to *instrumental* wind music.

Plutarch (not Pseudo-Plutarch) seems to be the first evidence surviving to use ἀὐλωδός instead of ἀὐλητής (*Quaest. conv.* 7. 5, 704 C–D).<sup>133</sup>

Ἐν Πυθίοις Καλλίστρατος, τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων ἐπιμελητής, ἀὐλωδόν τινα πολίτην καὶ φίλον ὑστερήσαντα τῆς ἀπογραφῆς τοῦ μὲν ἀγῶνος εἶρξε κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐστιῶν δ' ἡμᾶς παρήγαγεν εἰς τὸ συμπόσιον ἐσθῆτι καὶ στεφάνοις, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀγῶνι, μετὰ τοῦ χοροῦ κεκοσμημένον ἐκπρεπῶς.

At the time of the Pythian Games, Callistratus, who was a director of the Amphictyons, had, in accordance with the rule, disqualified for late

<sup>131</sup> Guhrer (n. 44) 16: “handelte es sich da nicht bei allen den arienartigen Monodien einzelner Schauspieler um das, was wir als ἀὐλωδία definiert haben, um kunstmässigen Solo-Gesang zum Aulos? Sicherlich”.

<sup>132</sup> E. g., all the musicians mentioned in the inscriptions as leading singers (ἀίδοντος τοῦ δεῖνα) in a competition of men choruses (P. Amandry, Th. Spyropoulos, “Monuments chorégyques d’Orchomène de Béotie”, *BCH* 98 [1974] 185–209, nos. 5–9, 11–17, 19–20, Orchomenos, the end of the third century BC) are referred to as ἀὐλωδοί by Stephanis (Στηφανίς [n. 67] nos. 43, 140, 142, 310, 436, 1030, 1499, 1944, 2615).

<sup>133</sup> As noted already by Guhrer (n. 44) 14 n. 1.

registration a certain flute-player who was a fellow citizen and friend of his. But when he gave a dinner for us, he brought the man before the party, with his dancing group, splendidly arrayed as for a contest, in costume and garlands.<sup>134</sup>

This statement, if taken literally, would have proved the reestablishment of aulodic contests at the Pythian games, but it contradicts the information of Pausanias 10. 7. 4–6 (see above p. 5) as well as the impression of the decline of ἀύλωδία given by the epigraphical evidence. It is most probable that an aulete is meant here, namely a χοροούλης. The auletes performing together with a chorus are known to have played the first parts<sup>135</sup> from about the second half of the fourth century BC:<sup>136</sup> they are mentioned in agonistic context as the winners μετὰ χοροῦ<sup>137</sup> (exactly as Plutarch puts it), and even the contest itself is referred to as a competition of auletes instead of choruses.<sup>138</sup>

The use of ἀύλωδός by Plutarch could be explained if the whole performance of an aulete with a chorus were called ἀύλωδία: in this case, naming of a chief musician in this genre as ἀύλωδός seems explicable. The same assumption would be valid for Antigenides being called ἀύλωδός in Suid. α 2657 (see above p. 26 though Antigenides dates back to an earlier period, 400–370 BC), but it does not help in other cases of the confusion.

<sup>134</sup> Transl. by E. L. Minar, Jr.: Plutarch, *Moralia* IX, LCL 425 (Cambridge, Mass. – London 1961).

<sup>135</sup> The analysis of the Athenian choregic monuments of the fifth and the fourth centuries BC shows that the name of an aulete, at first not included in the inscriptions at all, finally replaces the name of a διδάσκαλος: cf. Reisch (n. 61) 27–42.

<sup>136</sup> The increasing role of an instrumentalist is indicated even earlier, towards the end of the fifth century, by Ps.-Plut. *De mus.* 1141 C–D: ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀύλητικὴ ἀπὸ ἀπλουστέρως εἰς ποικιλοτέρως μεταβέβηκε μουσικὴν· τὸ γὰρ παλαιὸν ἕως εἰς Μελανιπίδην τὸν τῶν διθυράμβων ποιητὴν συμβεβήκει τοὺς ἀύλητάς παρὰ τῶν ποιητῶν λαμβάνειν τοὺς μισθοὺς πρωταγωνιστοῦσης δηλονότι τῆς ποιήσεως, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διεφθάρη.

<sup>137</sup> Athen. 12. 54, 538 f (324 BC); *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 648 B (ca. 200–194 BC); *BCH* 9 (1885) 147–149 lines 70–71 (172 BC).

<sup>138</sup> E. g., *I Priene* 19<sub>54</sub>; 53<sub>70</sub>; 54<sub>65</sub> ἀύλητῶν τῷ ἀγῶνι τῷ παιδικῷ; *SGDI* 2566<sub>17</sub> διδάσκαλοι ἀύλητῶν; Dem. 21, 156 τραγωδοῖς κεχορήγηκέ ποθ' οὔτος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀύληταῖς ἀνδράσιν; *CIG* 3089<sub>7-8, 11</sub> παίδων ἀύλητῶν χορηγός, ἀύλητῶν ἀνδρῶν χορηγός; *CIG* 3090<sub>2-4</sub> χορηγοὶ ... ἀύλητῶν παίδων; A. Brinck, *Inscriptiones Graecae ad choregiam pertinentes*, Dissertationes Philologicae Halenses 7 (Halle 1885) nos. 101, 102 ἐχορήγουν παίδων ἀύληταῖς... ἀνδρῶν ἀύληταῖς. See Brinck, *ibid.*, 75 sqq.; Reisch (n. 61) p. 59 n. 1; p. 101; idem, “Χορικοὶ ἀγῶνες”, *RE* 3 (1899) 2435–2436; Frei (n. 109) 67; E. Bethe, “Thymeliker und Skeniker”, *Hermes* 36 (1901) 598; L. Robert, *Etudes epigraphiques et philologiques* (Paris 1938) 31–35; H. A. Алмазова, *Античная музыкальная эпиграфика*. Дисс. [рук.] (N. Almazova, *Ancient Musical Epigraphics*. Diss. [ms.] (СПб. 1998) 71–75; eadem (n. 49) 173–174.

Several authors have left evidence about the use of music to deal with animals.<sup>139</sup> According to Claudius Aelianus (*De nat. anim.* 12. 46),<sup>140</sup> the Etruscans used aulos music as a means of capturing wild boars and stags:

τὰ μὲν δίκτυα περιβάλλουσι καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ θήρατρα, ὅσα ἐλλοχῶ τὰ ζῶα· ἔστηκε δὲ ἀνὴρ αὐλῶν τεχνίτης, καὶ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα πειρᾶται τοῦ μέλους ὑποχαλᾶν, καὶ ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστι τῆς μούσης σύντονον ἔῃ, πᾶν δὲ ὅ τι γλύκιστον αὐλωδίας τοῦτο ᾄδει...

They set the nets and other hunting gear that ensnare the animals in a circle, and a man proficient on the pipes stands there and tries his utmost to play a rather soft tune, avoiding any shriller note, but playing the sweetest melodies possible.<sup>141</sup>

There is no doubt that αὐλωδία performed by only one person (called ἀνὴρ αὐλῶν τεχνίτης) is here nothing but playing an aulos.<sup>142</sup> The same should be the case of Clemens Alexandrinus (*Paedagogus* 2. 4. 41. 2) who is blaming mainly the pagan *instrumental* music. Besides the hunters' experience he mentions music for mating horses which hardly included poetry (note the word ἐπαυλεῖται<sup>143</sup>):

Καὶ γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀποπεμπτέα τὰ ὄργανα ταῦτα [sc. σῦριγξ καὶ αὐλός] νηφαλίου συμποσίου, θηρίοις μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις κατάλληλα καὶ ἀνθρώπων τοῖς ἀλογωτέροις. Τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἐλάφους ταῖς σῦριγξι κηλεῖσθαι παρειλήφραμεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς ποδάγρας πρὸς τῶν κυνηγῶν θηρευομένας ἄγεσθαι τῷ μέλει, ταῖς δὲ ἵπποις μινυμέναις οἶον ὑμέναιος ἐπαυλεῖται νόμος αὐλωδίας· ἰππόθορον τοῦτον κεκλήκασι ν οἱ μουσικοί.

These instruments should indeed be ousted from a sober feast, for they befit animals more than men, and only those less rational among men. We are told that stags at a hunt are bewitched by syringes and taken to the nets by the melody, and that a kind of conjugal *nomos* is played on an aulos to

<sup>139</sup> Cf. Aristot. *Hist. anim.* 611 b 26; Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 704 F, *Coniug. praec.* 138 B; Ael. *De nat. anim.* 15. 25.

<sup>140</sup> The same passage occurs two times in the excerption made for Constantine Porphyrogenetos: S. Lambros (ed.), *Excerptorum Constantini de natura animalium libri duo: Aristophanis historiae animalium epitome subiectis Aeliani Timothei aliorumque eclogis*, Supplementum Aristotelicum I, 1 (Berolini 1885) 2. 565 and (abridged) 2. 496.

<sup>141</sup> Transl. by A. F. Scholfield: Aelian, *On the Characteristics of Animals* III, LCL 449 (London – Cambridge, Mass. 1972) 73.

<sup>142</sup> Cf. *Excerpt. Const. de nat. anim.* 2. 496: συναγωνίζεται δὲ τῇ θήρᾳ ταύτῃ καὶ αὐλός. αὐλεῖ γὰρ ἀνὴρ τεχνίτης καὶ etc.

<sup>143</sup> Cf. Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 704 F.

mares while they are being covered – the musicians call it ‘The Stallion’s Leap’.

A further confusion concerns the explanation of the word ξυναυλία:

*Sch. Lucian.* 78. 3. 1: ἡ σύμφωνος ἀύλησις ἢ ἀπὸ β’ ἀλωδῶν περαιομένη.

*Phot. Lex.* ξ 311 = *Suid.* ξ 116: ἀύλησις τις σύμφωνος, ὑπὸ δύο περαιομένη ἀλωδία.

In all other rather numerous sources, ξυναυλία points to instrumental music only: either playing a cithara accompanied by an aulos,<sup>144</sup> or, like in the present cases, a duet of pipes.<sup>145</sup> In fact, the given glosses themselves show that ἀλωδία is used as a synonym for ἀύλησις, and ἀλωδῶν for ἀύλητων, as is clearly seen when one compares some other glosses s. v. συναυλία / ξυναυλία: *Sch. Aristoph. Eq.* 9 a<sup>146</sup> ὅταν δύο ἀύληται τὸ αὐτὸ ἀλῶσιν; 9 d ὅταν δύο ἀύληται συνάδωσιν; *Hesych.* ξ 125 τὴν ὑπὸ δύο ἐπιτελουμένην ἀύλησιν; ὅταν δύο ἀλῶσι, and even the next wording in the same glossary *Suid.* ξ 117: ὅταν δύο ἀύληται τὸ αὐτὸ λέγωσιν.

Likewise, the word ἀλωδός is used instead of ἀύλητής in *Scholia* to Aristophanes: Chairis, one of the poet’s targets, is once called (*Sch. Aristoph. Ach.* 16 a) κιθαρωδὸς καὶ ἀλωδὸς φαῦλος. Meanwhile, it is clear from the other passages of *Scholia*,<sup>147</sup> not to speak of Aristophanes’ own verses,<sup>148</sup> that Chairis was an aulete; moreover, the author of the same *scholion* to *Ach.* 16 did not hesitate to explain ὁ ὄρθιος performed by Chairis as ἀύλητικὸς νόμος.

The development of the meaning ‘aulos musik’ for ἀλωδία and ‘one who plays an aulos’ for ἀλωδός was most probably a part of a broader

<sup>144</sup> *Sch. Aristoph. Eq.* 9; *Poll.* 4. 83 (see above n. 110); *Athen.* 14. 9, 618 a; *Suid.* ξ 117.

<sup>145</sup> Cf. Attic Classical vase-paintings depicting a duet of auletes in an agonistic context: a neck-amphora Naples SA 225 (*Jahrb. DAI* 76 [1961] 68, fig. 24; *Beazley, ARV<sup>2</sup>* 553, 32, ca. 460 BC), and a pelike London 1910.6–15.1 (*JHS* 41 [1921] pl. 7, V 4; *Beazley, ARV<sup>2</sup>* 1123, 2, ca. 430–420 BC); see *Shapiro* (n. 2) 60.

<sup>146</sup> The flogged slaves in *Eq.* 8–10 are surely imitating an instrumental νόμος of Olympos with their μυμῦ μυμῦ.

<sup>147</sup> *Sch. Aristoph. Ach.* 866 a: Χαίρις δὲ ἀύλητής Θηβαῖος ἄμουσος. *Sch. Aristoph. Pax* 951 b: ὁ Χαίρις ἀύλητής ἐπὶ ταῖς θυσίαις; *Sch. Aristoph. Av.* 858 ἦν δὲ ὁ Χαίρις οὗτος κιθαρωδὸς ψυχρὸς καὶ γέγονεν ἀύλητής. Some scholiasts prove informed of a namesake musician who was a citharode (*sch. Pax* 951, *sch. Av.* 958).

<sup>148</sup> *Aristoph. Ach.* 866: the auletes are called Χαίριδῆς βομβαύλιοι; *Pax* 951–952: Χαίρις ... πρόσεισιν ἀλῆσων; *Av.* 858: συναυλείτω δὲ Χαίρις ῥῶδᾶ.

process of using the words originally dealing with singing (with a stem φδ- or αδ-) for instrumental sounds.<sup>149</sup> As for the confusion to the opposite, no

<sup>149</sup> E. g., *Sch. Aristoph. Eq.* 9 d: ὅταν δύο ἀύληται συνᾶδωσιν; *Sch. Pind. Ol.* 5. 44 f.: Λυδίοις ἀπύων ἐν ἀύλοις; βοῶν. ἄδων; *Ael. De nat. anim.* 12. 44: κατὰδουσιν αὐτοὺς ὀργάνῳ τινί; *ibid.*: ἔοικεν ὑμέναιον ἄδειν τὸ αὐλημα (cf. ἄδει 12. 46: above p. 30); Themist. *Ἐπερ τοῦ λέγειν* 325 a: τοῖς ἀύληταις, ὅτι ἐν κοινῷ ἄδουσιν; Joh. Chrysost. *Synopsis* 56. 357: ἐν ἀύλοις καὶ κινύραις ἄδειν; Joh. Malalas, *Chron.* 458: ἀύλοὶ ἄδοντες μέλη μουσικά; Anon. in *Aristot. Rhet.* p. 217. 20 Rabe, CAG 21/2: ὁ ἀύλητής ἐκεῖνος ἄδων; Eustrat. *In Aristot. Eth. Nic.* I p. 61, 26–27 Heylbut, CAG 20: ἀύλους τέλος ὄντας τοῦ ἀύλοποιοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἄδειν αὐτῷ χρησιμεύοντας; Eustath. *Comm. ad Hom. Il.* 4. 272: τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν τραγικὴν ὄρχησιν ἄδόμενον αὐλημα. The stem μελωδ- in Classical texts refers either to singing (e. g., *Aristoph. Av.* 226: {ΠΙ.} Οὕποψ μελωδεῖν αὖ παρασκευάζεται. {ΕΠΙ.} Ἐποποποῖ ποποῖ, ποποποποῖ ποποῖ; *Aristot. Pol.* 1339 b: τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ... καὶ ψιλὴν οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελωδίας) or to the music as a whole (e. g., *Ps.-Aristot. Probl.* 919 a: τῆς μὲν [sc. φωνῆς] ἄδομένης τῆς δὲ ἀύλουμένης ὥσπερ μίαν ἄμφω ἄδουσιν· διὸ μόνη [sc. διὰ πασῶν συμφωνία] μελωδεῖται; cf. *Plat. Leg.* 655 d 8: τὰ ῥηθέντα ἢ μελωδηθέντα ἢ καὶ ὀπωσοῦν χορευθέντα), but later besides that we find as well the cases referring clearly to the instrumental music (e. g., *Ps.-Plut. De fluv.* 1. 2: πρὸς μελωδιαν ἀύλων; *Ps.-Plut. De Hom.* 2. 148: Οὐκ ἄδηλον δὲ ὅτι διττὴ ἐστὶν ἢ μελωδία, ἢ μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, ἢ δὲ ἐν ὀργάνοις, τοῖς τε ἐμπνευστοῖς τοῖς τε ἐντατοῖς; *Cass. Dio* 47. 43. 2: <διὰ> σαλπύγγων μελωδοῦντες; *Sext. Emp. Math.* 6. 32: οἱ τε δελφῖνες ... ἀύλων μελωδίας τερπόμενοι; *Ael. Var. hist.* 2. 44: μελωδοῦσι σάλπιγγες; *Arrian. BC* 1. 12. 106: σαλπυγκτῶν τε ἄπειρον ἦν πλῆθος, παρὰ μέρος ὑγρότατα καὶ πένθημα μελωδοῦντων; *Heliodor. Aeth.* 10. 41. 3: ἀύλων τε καὶ συρίγγων μελωδίας; *Hist. Alex. Magni Rec.* α 1. 46 a. 1: τῆς ἀύλομελωδίας ἔμπειρος ἄνθρωπος; *ibid.*, 11: ἡ Ἀμφίονος λύρα μελωδοῦσα ἐτέλεσε τὰ τεύχη; *Greg. Nyss. In inscr. Psalm.* 5. 74: ψαλμὸς μὲν γάρ ἐστὶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὀργάνου τοῦ μουσικοῦ μελωδία, ἢ δὲ ἢ διὰ στόματος γινομένη τοῦ μέλους μετὰ τῶν ῥημάτων ἐκφώνησις; *ibid.*, 75: ὅταν διὰ μόνων τῶν μουσικῶν ὀργάνων ἢ μελωδία γένηται; *Euseb. Comm. in Psalm.* 23. 1233: τῇ γὰρ πνευματικῇ κιθάρα τὴν θεῖαν ἀνακρουόμεθα μελωδιαν; *ibid.*, 24. 68: μελωδήσατε τῷ Θεῷ ἡμῶν διὰ λύρας ... μελωδήσατε τῷ Θεῷ ἡμῶν ἐν κιθάρα; *Basiliius, Homil. super Psalm.* 29. 321: Ἔστι δὲ ὁ ἀύλος ὄργανον μουσικὸν πνεύματι συνεργῶ πρὸς τὴν μελωδιαν χρώμενον [cf. *ibid.*, 436: Ἔστι δὲ τὸ ψαλτήριον ὄργανον μουσικὸν, ἐναρμονίως τοὺς φθόγγους ἀποδιδὸν πρὸς τὴν ἐκ φωνῆς μελωδιαν]; *Origen. Selecta in Psalmos* 12. 1073 διὰ τοῦ μουσικοῦ ὀργάνου μελωδηθέντας; *Joh. Chrysost. De decem milium talentorum debitore* 51. 19: ἐπὶ τῆς κιθάρας οὐκ ἄρκει μόνον ἀπὸ μίας νευρᾶς τὴν μελωδιαν ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ πάσας ἐπιέναι δεῖ; *idem, In Psalmum* 145 55. 525: Τότε γὰρ καὶ τερπνότερα καὶ δοκιμωτέρα ἀπὸ τῆς λύρας ἀναπέμπεται μελωδία; *Contra theatra* 56. 543: μετὰ ταῦτα ἀκουσμάτων, ἢ διὰ τῶν συρίγγων, ἢ διὰ τῶν ἀύλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων μελωδία; *Mich. Psell. Poemata* 53. 506–508: ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν χεῖρ ἢ δεξιὰ κατέκρουε τῷ πλήκτρῳ, / ἢ δ' ἄλλη χεῖρ ταῖς ἐπαφαῖς στρέφουσα τοὺς κολάβους / ποιᾶν τινα τὴν τῶν χορδῶν ἐποίει μελωδιαν; *Theodoretus, Interpretatio in Psalmos* 80. 1520: Διαφόροις ὀργάνοις κεχρημένοι τὴν θεῖαν ἀνεκρούοντο μελωδιαν). This can perhaps be considered even a universal semantic development: cf., e. g., Latin *fidicen, tibicen*.

cases of using ἀλφῳτῆς as well as ἀλφῳσις or ἀλφῳμα when speaking precisely of singing to the aulos<sup>150</sup> are known to me.<sup>151</sup>

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Хотя значение слов ἀλφῳδία и ἀλφῳδός подробно рассматривалось в работах конца XIX в., новые эпиграфические находки, публикации изображений на вазах, а также возможность использовать TLG позволяют вновь вернуться к этому вопросу. Упоминаний об авлодии в наших источниках значительно меньше, чем о других видах сольного музицирования (кифародии, авлетике, кифаристике). Впервые авлодия засвидетельствована на играх VI в. до н. э. Изображения авлодов встречаются в аттической вазовой живописи с середины VI до конца V в. Вплоть до рубежа эр слово ἀλφῳδός представлено исключительно в эпиграфических памятниках IV–I вв., связанных с мусическими публичными выступлениями, а слово ἀλφῳδία встречается лишь однажды, у Платона (*Leg.* 700 d). Начиная с I в. н. э. авлоды и авлодия исчезают из документов (а значит – и из программы) мусических игр, так что источники оказываются, наоборот, только литературными.

Наши сведения об истории авлодии и о выступлениях авлодов позволяют утверждать, что авлод – это певец, которому требовались услуги авлета-аккомпаниатора (последний не считался участником состязаний), но недостаточно, чтобы составить четкое представление о подробностях. Названия авлодических номов практически не дают никакой информации о содержании выступлений. Можно указать случаи, когда авторы авлодии, вероятно, выступали и как авлеты, но нет возможности судить о том, какова была обычная практика. Надписи IV–III вв. говорят о разделении состязаний авлодов на возрастные классы ἀνδρῳν и παίδῳν; так же можно интерпретировать ряд изображений на вазах VI–V вв. Среди известных нам игр, включавших авлодию в программу, преобладают беотийские. Как малое число упоминаний, так и прямые свидетельства доказывают, что авлодия ценилась ниже, чем прочие виды сольных выступлений.

Представляется, что вплоть до рубежа эр слова ἀλφῳδία и ἀλφῳδός использовались преимущественно, или даже исключительно, как *termini*

<sup>150</sup> On ἀλφῳτικός probably used by Polydeuces to mean all possible kinds of aulos musik, both the vocal and the instrumental ones, see above p. 21 f.

<sup>151</sup> Understanding of ἀλφῳδία in a broad meaning as ‘aulos music’ is probable in the remaining three cases not mentioned above: Ael. Arist. *Eiς Ἀθηνῶν* 14; Clem. Al. *Strom.* 3. 11. 80. 2–4; Poll. 4. 57.

*technici*, относившиеся к исполнению солистом-певцом авлодического нома на мусических играх. К другим разновидностям пения под авл (симпосиасты на пиру, хоры, вокальные партии в драме) они, видимо, не применялись ни в это время, ни впоследствии. Однако ситуация изменилась с исчезновением авлодии из программы празднеств. Оба слова, этимологически прозрачные, не могли, конечно, стать совершенно непонятными, но их терминологическое значение (во всяком случае, при отсутствии специального интереса к музыкальной агонистике прошлого) постепенно забывалось. С конца I в н. э. в наших источниках встречается употребление этих слов применительно к *инструментальной* музыке для авла ( $\alpha\upsilon\lambda\omega\delta\acute{o}\varsigma = \alpha\upsilon\lambda\eta\tau\acute{\eta}\varsigma$ ,  $\alpha\upsilon\lambda\omega\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha = \alpha\upsilon\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$  или  $\alpha\upsilon\lambda\eta\mu\alpha$ ). Такое развитие можно связывать с более широким процессом (возможно – даже семантической универсалией): с применением к игре на музыкальных инструментах слов, связанных изначально с пением.

## SOCRATES'S AVOWAL OF KNOWLEDGE REVISITED

The sense in which Socrates avows or disavows knowledge has been much debated in treatments of Plato's epistemology over the last couple of decades. This paper aims to outline a possible interpretation that scholars of Socrates have yet to elaborate fully; it seeks to shed light especially on the Socratic method of enquiry and on the nature of Socratic knowledge at 29 b in Plato's *Apology*, i. e. its shareability and the content- and context-dependent nature of his claim to it.

### Introduction

Socrates's avowals have attracted a range of interpretations, including the theses that [1] Socrates's disavowal of knowledge is best understood as an expedient inviting his interlocutors to search with him jointly for the truth; [2] Socrates's repeated disavowal of knowledge should be taken seriously, and his avowals of knowledge regarded as exceptional; somewhere in between, [3] in avowing and disavowing knowledge, Socrates uses two senses of the word 'know'; [4] Socrates sometimes avows knowledge in Plato's earlier dialogues, but hardly at all in the middle or later dialogues, suggesting that we can read Plato's thought as developmentalist or revisionist in epistemic terms; and [5] there may be some reason that Socrates is inconsistent in his avowals and disavowals, e. g. he has some pedagogical purposes in mind. All of these interpretations have their own weaknesses – referring to the numbering above, I introduce my grounds for reservations at selected points in the body of my discussion. While engaging with these central readings, this essay primarily develops an independent line of argument concerned with the grounds for considering Socrates's avowals qualified.

### 1. The disavowal and avowal of knowledge

Plato's *Apology*, in common with other early Platonic dialogues, impressively describes what may be termed the negative side of Socrates's epistemic state, namely his disavowal of knowledge.<sup>1</sup> Socrates calls the

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<sup>1</sup> It may be worth noting, with M. C. Stokes (ed.), *Plato, Apology* (Warminster 1997) 99, 195, that the *Apology* begins and ends with a statement of the negativity

pronouncement of the Delphic oracle that none is wiser than he an enigma, since he does not acknowledge himself to be wise in any matter, great or small (21 b). But Socrates does admit some light and shade in the question of his wisdom or ignorance; he is wiser at least than a politician who had professed knowledge, but who on examination turned out to know nothing fine and good (21 d 3–8).<sup>2</sup>

Some understand Socrates's disclaimer of knowledge as a mere tactic, encouraging his interlocutor to seek out the truth (interpretation [1]).<sup>3</sup> Socrates, however, appears sincere in insisting upon his lack of knowledge at 23 a 3–7. In gesturing towards divine wisdom here, Socrates defers, in whatever human wisdom he may be supposed to have, to a greater authority.

But what if we still refuse to take this Socratic formulation at face value? The passage at 23 a cannot provide in its own right a full guarantee that Socrates is genuine in positing his own ignorance, as he does over the course of the *Apology*. That is, his explanation might again be taken to be question-begging in that it could be construed as merely a further expedient to secure some objective. We could doubt Socrates's genuineness in disavowing knowledge indefinitely in this way – always supposing that he has some reason to conceal a positive epistemic state.

My claim is that, in assessing the sincerity attaching to Socrates's statements, we should consider the immediate discursive context of the *Apology*, where Socrates is standing trial. This means giving due weight to a series of statements he makes in court. The courtroom context is not one where Socrates can say things lightly, both because of the gravity of the charges against him, and because he expects that the jury's verdict will conform to general standards of truth and justice (18 a 3–6). Importantly, Socrates claims at the beginning of the *Apology* that the case presented by his accusers is quite devoid of truth, whereas his will de-

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of Socratic cognition (... οὐκ οἶδα, 17 a 1–2; ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ, 42 a 3–5). This is especially striking when one considers the natural tendency of trials to urge their defendants to make positive statements. On the *Apology* as a historical document, see Guthrie's careful treatment (W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* IV [Cambridge 1975] 72–80). Guthrie attempts to reconstruct the historical Socrates, whose professions of ignorance he does not judge to be in any serious sense deceitful or “insincere” (*ibid.*, III [Cambridge 1969] 447). My concern is not with determining the pronouncements of a historical Socrates, but with considering the totality and the possible consistency of the statements regarding knowledge expressed by “Socrates” in Plato's *Apology*. My reference to the *Apology* is from the new *Oxford Classical Text (Platonis Opera* I [Oxford 1995]) edited by E. A. Duke et al.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. n. 24.

<sup>3</sup> N. Gully, *The Philosophy of Socrates* (New York 1968) 64–69.

live up to the bystanders the truth in its entirety (17 b 7–8).<sup>4</sup> Socrates's positioning of his denials of knowledge within the context of an evidently serious appeal to truth gives us good reason for supposing his disavowals to be literal.

Moreover, the characteristic procedure of Socratic dialogue itself provides a basis for acquitting Socrates of mere rhetoric in his disclaimers of knowledge. Let us accept the position suspicious of Socrates that it is not enough for him to keep pressing the truth of his assertions. In that case, the validity of both sides' arguments will depend on their having a solid foundation in fact (17 b 2, ἔργω; 32 a 5, ἔργα etc.). We must then examine how Socrates seeks to establish his proofs. He characteristically proceeds through refutation of the claims of his accusers, rather than through positive statements in their own right. This procedure describes the typical Socratic elenchus, a mode of argument which, I shall suggest, bears an essential relation to Socrates's epistemological claims. In court, Socrates tries to refute the problematic points of each charge in turn, just as he does in his ordinary discourse. Socrates takes care not to make one-sided statements, but rather, in response to persistent accusations, demands from his bystanders there and then a discussion of whether these are based on facts (19 d 1–7). Socrates's cross-examination of one of his accusers, Meletus, in dealing with the later allegations, offers an example of his argumentative style (24 c 10 – 28 a 2). Opening his defence in a style of homespun diction, after his accusers had warned the audience of the delusive persuasiveness of his skilful speech, Socrates bases his whole argument on a method of elenctic disproof which resorts to counter-evidence at every opportunity (cf. 19 d 1–2, 20 e 5 – 21 a 9, 24 a 7–8, 31 c 2–3, 32 a 4–5, 32 d 1, 32 e 1, 33 d – 34 a, etc.). Insofar as Socrates seems to depend for his argument on the consent he gains from the audience, we cannot then regard his repeated use of the word 'truth' as groundless.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> This strong contrast between Socrates and his accusers in terms of truthfulness is made in especially concentrated and vigorous fashion in the Προοίμιον (17 a 1 – 18 a 6), which ends with the phrases τᾶληθῆ λέγειν (cf. J. Burnet [ed.], *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito* [Oxford 1924] 153), and from then on appears repeatedly in the *Apology*. On the truthfulness of the case for Socrates, see 17 b 4–5, 8, 18 a 6, 20 d 5–6, 22 b 6, 24 a 5–8, 28 a 7, d 6, 29 a 2, d 8 – e 3, 31 c 2, e 2, 32 a 8, 33 c 2, 9, 34 b 6, 39 b 5, 41 c 9 etc. On the falsity of the indictment, see 17 a 3–5, b 7, 18 a 8, b 2, 20 e 3, 26 a 1, 27 e 5, 30 b 6, 33 b 8, 34 b 5, etc.

<sup>5</sup> Socrates seems to pay special attention to his prosecutors' reactions over the course of his speech (e. g. 27 c 10). In contrast, his prosecutors submit neither evidence nor witnesses whose testimony may be confirmed by both sides, even

We can take his disavowals at face value, however, and be no further forward in understanding them. Socrates's *acknowledgment* of his lack of knowledge suggests that a certain cognitive state should be attributed to him.<sup>6</sup> In practice, however, Socrates expresses a number of positive views, particularly with regard to morals.<sup>7</sup> The question then becomes: does Socrates, in expressing some positive views, make some profession tantamount to an avowal of knowledge?

As commentary has acknowledged,<sup>8</sup> Socrates makes assertions of knowledge a number of times in the *Apology*, especially perhaps in spheres other than moral philosophy.<sup>9</sup> While not exactly numerous, these assertions are more than enough for us to show that Socrates avows knowledge at certain junctures. With regard to the possibility of moral knowledge, on the other hand, Socrates in Plato's early dialogues seems to lay down a stringent condition: in order for a person to avow knowledge of something, he needs to answer the Socratic question what it is.<sup>10</sup> When examining his interlocutors, however, Socrates does not need to be able to answer this definitional question himself in order to

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when Socrates encourages them to do so (cf. 31 b 8 – c 1, 34 a 3–7). The accusers' one-sided allegations turn out to lack substantial support and also to be riven with self-contradiction, e. g. Meletus (Μέλητος) – good and patriotic as he purports to be – turns out never to have cared (οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν, cf. 24 c 4–9, d 9–10, 25 c 1–4, 26 a 9 – b 2) about the education of the young.

<sup>6</sup> On a potential problem in claiming to recognise one's own ignorance, see n. 28.

<sup>7</sup> Socrates claims never to have yielded to anyone in anything contrary to justice (33 a) and intends never to do so (32 a, cf. 37 a, b). He posits that the greatest good for a human being consists in holding daily discussions about virtue and other topics; the unexamined life is not worth living (38 a). For Socrates, it is shameful to concern oneself with the acquisition of as much money, repute and honour as possible, instead of fixing one's mind on prudence, truth and the best possible condition of one's soul (29 e).

<sup>8</sup> J. H. Leshner, "Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge", *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 25 (1987) 280; C. D. C. Reeve, *Socrates in the Apology* (Indianapolis 1989) 54–55; H. Benson, *Socratic Wisdom* (Oxford 2000) 222–226, etc.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. 21 b 5, 22 b 8, d 1, 24 a 6, 25 d 9 – e 4 (in the form of a rhetorical question), 37 b 7, d 6. What I am stressing here as "morals" are subjects which Socrates takes up as central issues in Plato's early dialogues (justice, temperance, courage, piety and wisdom). Despite the implication of several passages like *Euthphr.* 7 b–c or *Phdr.* 263 a–b, however, it is problematic – or at least difficult – stringently to demarcate the realm of morals and that of other topics (cf. *La.* 187 e – 188 a, *Grg.* 490 b – 491 a, 497 b–c; note the usage of τὰ μικρά for both 'the petty trifles' and 'the lesser mysteries'). At this point in our treatment of the *Apology*, what should be noted is how often Socrates avows knowledge. For qualifications of Socrates's claim to knowledge, see also 18 d 1, 20 e 8, etc.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *La.* 190 c 6, *Euthphr.* 5 c 4 – d 1, *Hp. Ma.* 286 c 8 – d 2.

expose his partner's avowal of knowledge as deluded. Thus Socrates's procedure entails no affirmation of positive knowledge. Even in the case of the oracle's endorsement of his wisdom, the conclusion advanced by Socrates was that the name "Socrates" was "additionally" used by the god to represent *anyone*, using the person Socrates as an example, *who recognises his own lack of knowledge* (23 a–b). Since Socrates in his interpretation of the oracle estimates human wisdom to be worth little or nothing, the context in which such wisdom is best deployed is one in which the subject of "knowledge" accepts its finitude or inadequacy.

This representation of Socratic ignorance follows the interpretation that attributes to Socrates a thoroughly negative epistemic attitude. Irwin, for instance, argues that Socrates disclaims all knowledge, appealing to a clear distinction between knowledge and the true belief which admits of positive conviction.<sup>11</sup> However, this line of interpretation appears irreconcilable with Socrates's definitive statement that he *knows* that "to do injustice, that is, to disobey the superior, god or man, is bad and shameful" (29 b 6–7).<sup>12</sup> The gravity of his insistence is unmissable. The word οἶδα here falls with especial emphasis at the end of a periodic sentence, insisting upon Socrates's claim to knowledge. Further, this avowal of knowledge is all the more striking, since it contrasts with Socrates's immediately preceding disclaimer of knowledge of life after death. Here, Socrates says that many people fear death wrongly, thinking that they know what they do not know; in summary this attitude is based on a blameworthy ignorance (ἀμαθία ... ἐπινειδιστος, 29 a–b), which has the same structure as that previously diagnosed in the politician by Socrates.<sup>13</sup> While the English 'ignorance' may not convey the exact nuance of this Socratic use of the Greek ἀμαθία, Socrates's intention is clear: to point up people's *delusion* or *false conceit of knowledge*. Having traced the root of the fear of death in

<sup>11</sup> T. Irwin, *Plato's Moral Theory* (Oxford 1977) 58 suggests that Socrates "exceptionally" claims knowledge at *Ap.* 29 b 6–7 (interpretation [2]). However, Irwin deals with 29 b a bit differently in *Plato's Ethics* (Oxford 1995) 27–29, where he sees οἶδα in question as Socrates's conviction, *not* knowledge. On this change, cf. G. Fine, "Nozick's Socrates", *Phronesis* 41 (1996) 234–235 n. 6.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. E. de Strycker, S. R. Slings, *Plato's Apology of Socrates* (Leiden 1994) 327 and οὐκ οἶδα in my n. 1.

<sup>13</sup> On such delusion, often described as a peculiar type of ignorance by Plato, see *Lg.* 863 c. This type of cognitive state, distinguished from the empty form of not knowing, and often paraphrased as ἀμαθία, recurs throughout Plato's works, cf. *Ap.* 21 c–d, 22 b–e, 23 c–d, 29 a–b, e, 41 b, *Alc.* I. 117 d – 118 b, *Chrm.* 166 d 1–2, 167 a 4–5, *Ly.* 218 a–b, *Men.* 84 a–c, *Smp.* 204 a, *Phdr.* 275 b, *Tht.* 210 c, *Sph.* 229 c, *Plt.* 302 a–b, *Phlb.* 48 c – 49 a, *Lg.* 732 a–b, etc.

this way, he does not regard the knowledge expressed at 29 b as liable to such delusion.<sup>14</sup> The knowledge at 29 b, rather, works as a guide for him in decision-making (29 b 8 – c 1).<sup>15</sup>

## 2. Knowledge at 29 b

At this point, it is necessary to seek further to characterise the nature of the knowledge that Socrates seems to claim. Vlastos distinguishes between two conceptions of knowledge: strong and weak (interpretation [3]).<sup>16</sup> For Vlastos, the criterion distinguishing these different kinds of knowledge concerns the certainty with which they may be held. Strong knowledge is attributed only to the god and carries with it infallible certainty. Weak knowledge may, on the other hand, be arrived at through the Socratic method of elenchus, and remains fallible and uncertain. Agreements which have survived thousands of interrogatory and testing processes of elenchus may well be overturned at the next challenge. Indeed, the introduction of two types of knowledge seems

<sup>14</sup> This line of argument concurs with R. Kraut, *Socrates and the State* (Princeton 1984) 275: “in the *Apology* he [Socrates] confidently and deliberately claims to know” at 29 b. Benson (n. 8) 238 confusingly describes Socrates’s assertion as a “misstatement made in the heat of the moment”, while also drawing attention to “a certain amount of deliberateness” in Socrates’s statement at 29 b (*ibid.*, 236).

<sup>15</sup> Socrates relates knowledge of such a kind at 37 b 7, with an emphatic form: εὖ οἶδα. This is possibly the passage to which Cicero refers by his term ‘ante’ at *Tusculanae disputationes* I 99, where Cicero highlights a knowledge on Socrates’s part that would allow him to choose between 1) pursuing an examined life even at risk of death, and 2) abandoning philosophy and begging for his life. Cicero had previously been summarizing 40 c – 42 a of Plato’s *Apology*. 29 b is another candidate for Cicero’s reference.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. G. Vlastos, *Socratic Studies* (Cambridge 1994) 39–66; idem, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge”, *Philosophical Quarterly* 35 (1985) 1–31. The introduction of determinately two different sorts of knowledge has no firm basis in Plato’s texts and further risks too much schematization, in a context where it is otherwise only natural to assume a range of differences in knowledge’s content as I will discuss in the body of this chapter.

I agree with T. C. Brickhouse & N. D. Smith, *Plato’s Socrates* (Oxford 1994) 38–45 that Socrates is interested in knowledge-how (or why) rather than knowledge-that: there is textual evidence for this distinction in ὅπως ἔχει at 509 a 5 in the *Gorgias*; and indeed other references, such as *Chrm.* 166 d 6 ὅπη ἔχει, *Euthd.* 278 b 5 τὰ πράγματα ... πῆ ἔχει, *Euthphr.* 4 a 12, e 5 ὅπη ἔχει, *Men.* 84 b 10 ὅπη ἔχει, *Cra.* 420 b 5 ὅπη ἔχει ... τὰ πράγματα etc., back up a distinction for Socrates in kinds of knowledge. But in my argument, this distinction between *knowledge-how* and *knowledge-that* is assimilated to the suggestion that the *content* of a knowledge-claim is of greater epistemological moment than the meaning of the word ‘knowledge’ that conveys it.

reasonable given that Socrates both denies and claims some knowledge. We are now in a position to enquire whether the avowal at 29 b, which Socrates notably contrasts with people's delusion or false conceit of knowledge, ἀμαθία, merely represents an assertion of this *fallible, uncertain* cognition.

For Socrates, any assertion of knowledge obliges speakers uncomplacently to articulate their thinking and to defend themselves in public. Knowledge must be capable of being shared and tested in the context of a dialogue between two interlocutors.<sup>17</sup> To take the case of the knowledge asserted at 29 b, it is presumably crucial for Socrates's statement – “for one to do injustice, that is, to disobey his superior, god or man, is bad and shameful” – that it is clear and readily shareable with his accusers. In a pragmatic sense, the statement is shared in that it forms the foundation for the trial in which Socrates is being accused of impiety. Socrates appears to treat the content of his statement about injustice as uncontroversial in the courtroom context of his speech.

If so, is the claim of knowledge at 29 b by Socrates context-dependent? We may well say yes, so long as the question turns upon whether Socrates *claims* knowledge or not. By and large, the situations in which we claim to know something place large restrictions upon the nature of our claims. Within ordinary language, it is unusual for the content of our statements to be simply that *we know* something; this is only usually the case in junctures, such as Socrates's in the *Apology*, where a person's claims to knowledge are doubted. In other words, certain discursive contexts (say, when we are embattled) remove from us the precondition that our statements are the object of previous consent. Sometimes, when consent to specific assertions turns out to be controversial, the status of knowledge itself needs re-examining.<sup>18</sup> This is *a fortiori* the case with Socrates, who is notably cautious and uncomplacent in argument. Socrates open-mindedly examines any issue from first principles when facing a proponent of an opposite value-judgment, who might contest a basic statement like 29 b.<sup>19</sup> It should be noted here, though, that Socrates's willingness to examine without prejudice the

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *Chrm.* 166 c 7– d 4.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *Euthphr.* 7 b–d. Usually, though, knowledge-claims about assertions, i. e. that in asserting x, we also assert “I know x”, are not something that need remarking on in Socrates's dialogues.

<sup>19</sup> Socrates professes amazement when Thrasymachus counts injustice as a kind of excellence and wisdom and justice as defects (cf. *R. I.*, 348 c – 349 a). Although to some degree, Socrates understands Thrasymachus's contention that profit may flow from wrongdoing, Thrasymachus's strong position that injustice “is fine (καλόν) and strong” makes it difficult for Socrates to determine the

truth of any statement does not in itself undermine his conviction that previously built-up beliefs will again be accredited. Cross-examination and dialogue may bring about agreement between opposite positions. In principle, Socrates can commit himself to a certain content even while it is temporarily suspended under elenctic examination.<sup>20</sup>

In this way, we can begin to appreciate that the attribution to Socrates of a total absence of belief is unsustainable in the light of his philosophical method. It would seem plausible thus far to equate any belief that Socrates might hold in the course of an elenctic dialogue with Vlastos's weak knowledge, characteristic of humans, not the gods. But the fact that Socrates may profess a form of "knowledge" admitting of a weaker degree of certainty says nothing of the strength that may attach to his convictions etc. of this kind; Socrates makes an evidently moral decision to lead his life in accordance with beliefs, judgments, interpretations, and not exclusively with knowledge. For example, he declares that he will never abandon positions he has taken up or has found assigned to him by his superior and which he *believes* (ἡγησάμενος) best (28 d). Socrates expresses this commitment to the consequences of his beliefs even in the face of death or any major uncertainty. The contrast here is between the certainty attaching to Socrates's interpretation (ᾧήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον) of his philosophical task (28 e) and the opacity of what follows death; the former certainty obliges Socrates to direct his life as he does.<sup>21</sup> His life is based upon the principle that a philosophical life in which one constantly examines oneself and others is enjoined by divine command.<sup>22</sup>

Given Socrates's commitment to the philosophical life, what he is contrasting with *divine knowledge* in terms of the defining criterion of certainty must be *the whole range of human beliefs*, including but not

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starting-point of any consensual discussion. This does not, however, deter Socrates from initiating a process of elenchus with his interlocutor.

<sup>20</sup> This principle depends on a distinction between the examination of a certain proposition and its endorsement as a position. See e. g. Socrates in Plato's *Grg.* 472 d – 475 e.

<sup>21</sup> At the end of section 1 of this paper, we have seen the similar contrast between the certainty attaching to Socrates's knowledge and the opacity of what follows death at 29 a–b. As far as the strength or certainty is concerned, I think there is no clear distinction between knowledge and belief.

<sup>22</sup> Note that these convictions of Socrates will hardly be verifiable. Neither will they be shared with his accusers. In my view, the absence of *shareability* in this sense determines Socrates's caution in avoiding the word 'know' here. But Socrates's cognitive terms – such as belief or conviction – may well admit of such strength as to be unwavering for Socrates. For Socrates's positive convictions, see further 30 a 6 (οἴομαι), 35 d 7 (νομίζω), etc. See n. 23.

limited to knowledge. Conversely, if we focus only on the conditions of knowledge (like Vlastos's two senses of knowledge), we miss the importance of other forms of human cognition that can make a Socratic life steadfast.<sup>23</sup>

When Socrates makes definite assertions as to the value of living life in a particular way, he does not make any explicit distinction between what he claims to know and what he strongly believes. The problem of *knowledge* in these contexts necessarily concerns Socrates's affirmation to that effect – that is, that he knows. How do these assertions or denials proceed? Socrates makes a firm denial of the knowledge attributed to a caricatured version of himself in Aristophanes's play (19 c–d). He also disowns the form of pedagogical knowledge peddled by Sophists for cash (19 e – 20 e). Neither does Socrates profess the technical knowledge of craftsmen he met (22 c–e).<sup>24</sup> Whatever form of knowledge Socrates lays claim to, it differs from the supposed knowledge of these practitioners in content, scope, practicality and level of

<sup>23</sup> D. Wolfsdorf, "Socrates' Avowals of Knowledge", *Phronesis* 49 (2004) 89, 139–140 (cf. Benson [n. 8] 84 n. 115, 227 n. 17), correctly points out that the passage at 508 e 6 – 509 b 1 in Plato's *Gorgias* – on the matters bound with chains of iron and adamant, i. e. on the thesis that doing injustice is worse than suffering it – only insists on Socrates's *belief* that moral matters stand a certain way; that is, *contra* Vlastos, *Socratic Studies* (n.16) 59 n. 47, and "Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge" (n. 16) 21 n. 48, he does not avow ethical knowledge here. Thus, however certain a proposition seems to Socrates, he is well aware (as in this passage) of its disputable character when faced with those unsympathetic to him.

<sup>24</sup> Socrates disqualifies notable politicians and poets from almost any knowledge (21 c – 22 c). On the other hand, Socrates finds some knowledge in craftsmen, as expected (22 c–e); indeed, they are held to "know many fine things" (πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους) of which he himself is ignorant (ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην). In this respect, they are wiser than Socrates (μου ταύτη σοφώτεροι ἦσαν), without ceasing to be vulnerable to the error of poets when they claim wisdom in "other, supremely important matters" (τὰλλα τὰ μέγιστα). These statements offer another basis on which to take especial care in defining the content and context of Socrates's knowledge-claims; even the "ταύτη" above may suggest large divergences between forms of knowledge held by different parties. Woodruff (P. Woodruff, "Plato's early theory of knowledge", in: S. Everson [ed.], *Companions to Ancient Thought 1. Epistemology* [Cambridge 1990] 60–84) equates Socrates's avowal and disavowal of knowledge with a distinction between non-technical and technical knowledge. This seems inadequate; even if restricted to the field of non-technical knowledge or to ordinary language understandings, Socrates may avow some knowledge, as in the *Apology* (cf. also *Euthd.* 293 b–c, 296 e – 297 a, *Ion* 532 d–e), but disavow other knowledge (unless he is claiming to be a polymath). This makes it difficult to uphold Woodruff's distinction, especially when we come to consider Socrates's avowal, rather than disavowal, of knowledge. On a possible knowledge on Socrates's part, see also my nn. 35, 36, 56.

generality. Socrates's disavowal of knowledge, then, may not amount to a sweeping renunciation of any knowledge involved, e. g. in pragmatic or technical activities. If Socrates hedges his disavowal of knowledge in these terms, we may expect that he possesses some knowledge *on certain subjects* or will claim some knowledge *in a given respect*.<sup>25</sup>

Socrates's position may be compared with a sceptic's more general disclaimer of knowledge. A sceptic like Arcesilaus would hesitate even to disavow knowledge for the same reason that he would be cautious about claiming it – he is reluctant to commit himself to any truth claim.<sup>26</sup> If so, a person's definite *disavowal* of knowledge may well be regarded as a sign that he is ready, in principle, to avow some other knowledge – in other words, that he credits the possibility of other determinate knowledges. As we saw previously, Socrates's position is not thoroughly sceptical;<sup>27</sup> even in the realm of morals, he is prepared definitely to disclaim some ethical knowledge. Given that his disavowals are not sweeping, it is reasonable to attribute to him a version of the *qualified* position suggested above: that he avows some knowledge in proportion to the strength of his other denials. Acceptance of this picture of Socrates as differentiated from a certain kind of sceptic leads to a re-examination of the question of what exactly Socrates means by saying that human wisdom, including his, is worth little or nothing. Does this apparently categorical statement about human cognition not conflict with the avowal of knowledge at 29 b describing his fortitude and way of life?

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<sup>25</sup> Wolfsdorf (n. 23) 75–142 attempts to look beyond Socrates's evident inconsistencies to get at the core of what Socrates – and behind him, Plato – really believe about knowledge (interpretation [5]). But in Plato's *Gorgias* Socrates explicitly posits the consistency of an individual's belief-set as pertinent to the truthfulness or veridical nature of their assertions. Indeed, Socrates goes so far as to say that consistency is a distinctive feature of φιλοσοφία (482 a–c). It thus becomes problematic for Wolfsdorf to attribute Socrates's deliberate shifts of positions to a “dramaturgical” strategy on Plato's part, since by Socrates's own lights they would tend to make him unreliable, or a liar. For Wolfsdorf, Socrates changes his positions so frequently because he wants to stimulate his interlocutors to independent thought. The pedagogue Socrates, on this view, conceals his views from his interlocutors in order to educate them. But Socrates rather represents himself in his dialogues as a participant with his interlocutors in a search for truth, someone not already apprised of conclusions. If Socrates is genuinely using dialogues to get at the truth, it would seem reasonable for him to stick with roughly consistent positions approximating his current grasp on the matter while making adjustments e. g. for his interlocutor.

<sup>26</sup> Cic. *Ac.* I, 44–45, cf. Woodruff (n. 24) 62.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. nn. 7–9.

Socrates disclaims knowledge of the fine and good (21 b 4–5), and is well aware that he amounts to little or nothing in terms of wisdom (cf. 23 b 2).<sup>28</sup> However, these statements in themselves do not necessarily disbar specific or partial knowledge. One plausible reading would be as follows: because Socrates occupies a standpoint from which he can compare human and divine knowledge, he might well see that the difference is so great that he can declare the former practically nugatory. The wide gap between divine knowledge and characteristic human modes of cognition will prompt him to confess his ignorance without hesitation.<sup>29</sup> The possibility is, therefore, that his confession of ignorance is made with reference to some degree of partial knowledge which Socrates can claim, which is however patently incomplete or ungodlike. The knowledge attested at 29 b does not represent a goal in the quest for moral judgment, but rather the starting-point of a process of serious enquiry, for example, concerning the nature of justice. If this line of thought is possible, we may take Socrates's avowal and disavowal of knowledge consistently: that is to say, as content-dependent (and of course, context-dependent, cf. pp. 41–42) rather than general.<sup>30</sup> While Socrates cannot assert a synoptic and complete knowledge that will definitively answer the question what justice is (cf. *R. I.*, 354 b–c), at 29 b he avows knowledge relative to the question of justice or injustice. When Socrates thinks of a wise soul in relation to some important

<sup>28</sup> These passages (21 b 4–5, 23 b 2–4, 22 c 9 – d 1) might be thought problematic, in that if we provisionally take Socrates to be asserting “I know that I know nothing”, that would lead to the appearance of a logical paradox. On this point, some take the first “know” to refer to the comparatively weaker form of cognition than knowledge (Stokes [n. 1] 19, 53; H. Tredennick, H. Tarrant, *The Last Days of Socrates* [Harmondsworth 1993] 42, 44), while others suggest a strong epistemic claim as knowledge must be understood (Brickhouse & Smith [n. 16] 33 n. 11, Woodruff [n. 24] 62 n. 3). In my view, choosing the weaker interpretation of cognition in the principal clause would implausibly undermine Socrates's unwavering awareness of his own ignorance. As far as the strength of the first “know”, I agree with Brickhouse & Smith and Woodruff. As far as the possible logical paradox is concerned, on the other hand, I agree with M. F. Burnyeat, “Antipater and Self-Refutation: Elusive Arguments in Cicero's *Academica*”, in: B. Inwood, J. Mansfeld (eds.), *Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero's Academic Books* (Leiden 1997) 291, that in the *Apology* what Socrates declares is more nuanced than “I know that I know nothing”. Cf. pp. 43–44.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Vlastos, *Socratic Studies* (n. 16) 62; idem, “Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge” (n. 16) 28; idem, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (Cambridge 1991) 221 n. 76; idem, “Happiness and Virtue in Socrates' Moral Theory”, *Topoi* 4 (1985) 19 n. 69; I. Park, “Inner Action”, *Bulletin of Kansai Philosophical Association* 24 (1989) 81, Kraut (n. 14) 272–274.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Park (n. 29) 81; Nozick (n. 46) 143–145. Cf. also Guthrie (n. 1) 88.

matter, he accesses some concept of the former knowledge, and so is compelled to profess his ignorance. It could be tentatively concluded that for Socrates to avow partial knowledge is one thing and to claim complete or synoptic knowledge quite another. In other words, the assertion of knowledge at 29 b is far from answering the question what justice is.<sup>31</sup>

In conclusion, I will briefly summarise the chief points made in this section. Vlastos's weak knowledge characterised as *fallible* and *uncertain* does not explain 29 b well. This is because the knowledge in question rather seems strong and secure especially because of the striking contrast between Socrates's avowal of knowledge at 29 b and people's *delusion*, ἀμαθία. Further, Vlastos's two senses of knowledge say nothing of Socrates's strong conviction. What should be compared with divine knowledge in the light of certainty in Vlastos's sense is probably the whole range of human cognition, not restrictively human knowledge (*pace* Vlastos). This is because Socrates appeals to both knowledge and beliefs to lead his unwavering philosophical life. (We should take both knowledge and beliefs as they are in the texts: it is unnecessary to assimilate some beliefs with knowledge, or some knowledge with beliefs.) My alternative interpretation is that Socrates can avow or dis-

<sup>31</sup> It would be natural at this point to open out the argument into a consideration of the so-called Socratic fallacy, referring to Socrates's supposed insistence on the priority of the definition of objects to any attestation of knowledge concerning them. Let me just say for now that I do not judge Socrates's reasoning to be fallacious. As I understand it, Socrates does not demand for objects of knowledge to be defined in anything other than a context-dependent way (cf. A. Nehamas, "Socratic Intellectualism", *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 2 [1986] 285–293 and idem, *The Art of Living* [Berkeley etc. 1998] 217–218 n. 61); indeed, he tends to ask his interlocutors to define terms about which they have previously professed some especial competence e. g. as a teacher. Moreover, it is often indicated that the priority of definition at 6 d–e in the *Euthyphro* may represent for Socrates a sufficient, or completely satisfactory, rather than a necessary condition for the judging of examples (*pace* P. T. Geach, "Plato's *Euthyphro*: Analysis and Commentary", *Monist* 50 [1966] 370–372. On how to read this passage of *Euthyphro*, I agree with Nehamas, "Socratic Intellectualism", 275–293, and Brickhouse & Smith [n. 16] esp. p. 49. Incidentally Benson [n. 8] 120 n. 33 puts aside Nehamas's interpretation): cf. G. X. Santas, "The Socratic Fallacy", *Journal of History of Philosophy* 10 (1972) 136; idem, *Socrates* (London 1979) 116; Kraut (n. 14) 209 n. 38; Vlastos, "Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge" (n. 16) 23 n. 54; idem, "Is the 'Socratic Fallacy' Socratic?", *Ancient Philosophy* 10 (1990) 7; J. Beversluis, "Does Socrates Commit the Socratic Fallacy?", *American Philosophical Quarterly* 24 (1987) 211–223; M. McPherran, *The Religion of Socrates* (Pennsylvania 1996) 180 n. 11; Ch. Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogues* (Cambridge 1996) 157, 181–182. Cf. Benson (n. 8) 144–147.

avow knowledge in a *content- and context dependent* manner. For example, Socrates avows knowledge at 29 b, but he might well refrain from claiming it at certain junctures, e. g. in front of Thrasymachus, who would contest 29 b. Finally we saw that Socrates's disavowal of knowledge is not sweeping. Thus it can reasonably be expected that he claims some qualified knowledge, e. g. on a certain subject or in a given respect. Then the problem would be how we should interpret the seemingly categorical disavowals of knowledge that Socrates sometimes made. Actually this is where we should appeal to the distinction between human and divine *knowledge*, not regarding certainty/uncertainty as Vlastos did. Since Socrates occupies a standpoint from which he can compare human and divine knowledge, he can declare his partial knowledge practically nugatory. However, this is compatible with Socrates having some knowledge.

### 3. The scope of Socratic knowledge

Socrates sets great store by the elenchus as a method of arriving at truths upon which he and his interlocutors can agree. The elenchus in itself, as he understands it, partakes of the character of a search for truth. Socrates expresses delight with his encounter with Callicles, comparing him to an excellent touchstone (*Grg.* 486 e 5–6). Why is Socrates so sure about the truth-value of an agreement? Generally, agreements seem subject to instability: they depend on whether the interlocutors are skilled, whether the procedure of a dialogue is suitably carried out, etc. Socrates pays close attention to these issues in attributing truth to agreement.<sup>32</sup> Callicles is praised for those qualities that are conducive to his reliability as a discussant: knowledge, goodwill and frankness (487 a 2–3 ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὐνοίαν καὶ παρρησίαν). These three credentials are taken to be necessary for the elenchus to orient itself effectively towards the truth. Socrates thus addresses Callicles (487 e 6–7): “In reality, then, agreement between you and me

<sup>32</sup> Socrates sometimes doubts his own qualifications as a searcher for truth (*Chrm.* 175 e 5 – 176 a 1, *R. I.* 336 e 10) and frequently refers to the tentativeness of his conclusions (*Grg.* 480 a 1, 480 b 3, 480 e 3–4 etc.). The elenchus affords its participants freedom to take back their assent to any previous proposition (*Chrm.* 164 d, 165 a–b, *Grg.* 462 c 4, 464 a 1, 506 a 4–5, cf. ἀναθέσθαι at 461 d 3 and 462 a 3. Cf. I. Park, “Rhetoric, Persuasion, and Dialectic”, *Journal of Classical Studies* 47 [1999] 105–106; Vlastos, *Socratic Studies* [n. 16] 17 n. 51; idem, “The Socratic Elenchus”, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1 [1983] 44–45 n. 47 contra T. Irwin, *Plato's Moral Theory* [n. 11] 39).

(ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ σὴ ὁμολογία) will then obtain the goal of the truth (τέλος ... τῆς ἀληθείας)”.

On the other hand, Socrates converses with anyone, young or old (*Ap.* 30 a 3, 9) who is willing (*Ap.* 33 a 7, b 3). He even indicates that the solution of the matter under examination will be a common good for *all* (cf. *Chrm.* 166 d 5, *Grg.* 505 e 6). Socrates would seem to postulate that no controversy over truth obtains among people at the deepest level.<sup>33</sup> When Polus, in the *Gorgias*, laughs in Socrates’s face, Socrates returns to first principles in the belief that his views and those of his interlocutor will ultimately be found to coincide:

For I think that you and I – and also the other people – believe that doing injustice is worse than suffering it, and that not paying justice is worse than paying it (*Grg.* 474 b 2–5).

In highlighting such passages, Vlastos suggests that some version of the theory of recollection might be supposed in the Socratic elenchus, though in the end these represent distinct methods for Vlastos.<sup>34</sup> In the present case, Socrates attributes to Polus beliefs that are the opposite of Polus’s current assertions on the basis that these beliefs are implicitly entailed by other of Polus’s beliefs. In my view, a similarly structured assertion is made by Socrates in the *Apology*, a work generally held to be no chronologically closer to the *Meno* than the *Gorgias*.<sup>35</sup> When

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Woodruff (n. 24) 79–80.

<sup>34</sup> Throughout his Socratic studies, Vlastos understands the elenchus, in its proper usage, as a procedure used by Socrates to refute his interlocutors’ statements or to correct such in the light of his interlocutors’ other beliefs. It is not until the introduction of a positive theory of recollection that Socrates finds a method capable of adducing proofs. Socrates’s attestation of having proved the truth in the *Gorgias* is thus extraordinary for Vlastos, meriting close examination. Vlastos provocatively refuses to accept the famous passages of geometrical demonstration in the *Meno* as examples of the elenchus: *Socratic Studies* (n. 16) 5 and “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge” (n. 16) 32; for Vlastos, Plato retrenches from the elenchus when the theory of recollection is introduced. This developmental line of reading has attracted the support of a number of scholars, from whom I dissent. Cf. also Vlastos (n. 29) 118–119; idem, “Elenchus and Mathematics: A Turning-Point in Plato’s Philosophical Development”, *AJPh* 109 (1988) 373.

<sup>35</sup> I elsewhere suggest my grounds for reservation from scholars who distinguish Plato’s earlier and middle dialogues according to the strictness with which they apply the priority of knowledge-what, representatively found clearly in Kraut (n. 14) 274–277 (interpretation [4]), and also in Vlastos “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge” (n. 16) 26 n. 65; idem, *Socratic Studies* (n. 16) 71 n. 14; Beversluis (n. 31) 218, 221 n. 4, etc. This interpretation both over-schematizes Plato and finds some difficulties in the texts: in the *Meno*, Socrates may possess some knowledge

Meletus's criticisms of Socrates converge in an accusation that Socrates does not admit the existence of god at all, Socrates says (*Ap.* 26 e 6–7):

You are not credible, Meletus, and that, it seems to me, not even to yourself.

Again Socrates denies that Meletus can plausibly hold views contrary to his own.

In either case, Socrates's comment seems to suggest that people can hold some ideas latently which contradict their own statements (cf. *Grg.* 495 e 1–2).<sup>36</sup> On this point, Vlastos attributes the following assumption to Socrates: anyone who ever has a false belief will always have at the same time true beliefs entailing its negation<sup>37</sup> (I call this Vlastos's assumption A). Thus anyone who bears false ideas will tacitly accept the negation of their original opinion.<sup>38</sup> I agree with Vlastos that Socrates's elenctic procedures are predicated on Socrates subscribing to his assumption A. Even when Socrates initially seems to dismiss an inter-

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as implied at 75 d 5–7 (προομολογῆ, ἐρωτῶν in my reading, following R. S. Bluck and E. S. Thompson respectively), 85 d 9–10, 98 b 1–5 etc.

<sup>36</sup> Another early passage with possible affinities with the so-called theory of recollection is the miscommunication between Socrates and Gorgias at 459 c – 460 a in Plato's *Gorgias* – miscommunication because Socrates's formulation here, in a wording possibly reminiscent of recollection, i. e. προεπιστάμενον (459 e 1–2), προειδῆ (459 e 7), does not for a moment consider that Gorgias could teach his pupils the nature of e. g. the good, bad, beautiful, ugly, just, unjust etc.; Gorgias himself maintains that his pupils will pick these up as readily as they absorb his lessons in rhetoric (460 a 3–4). In asking how Gorgias's pupils could come to knowledge of these subjects, Socrates appears to rule out a normal learning process of knowledge passing from a teacher to a pupil, instead apparently resting on an idea of introspection closer to recollection. If we limit ourselves, however, to observing the content- and context-dependent nature of Socrates's assertions of knowledge, we will not have to reckon with the same difficulties as developmentalist accounts.

<sup>37</sup> Perhaps worrying over whether the beliefs in question can be accounted 'true', Vlastos drops the predicative adjective 'true' (*Socratic Studies* [n. 16] 56 and "Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge" [n. 16] 18), adopting elsewhere the expression 'true beliefs' (Vlastos, *Socratic Studies* [n. 16] 25; [n. 32] 52; *Socrates* [n. 29] 114; [n. 34] 369).

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Vlastos, *Socratic Studies* (n. 16) 23–24; idem (n. 32) 51. On tacit (covert) beliefs, Vlastos has recourse to this example: one can tacitly believe that triangles' interior angles sum to two right angles without necessarily having formed (in childhood, for instance) any explicit (overt) idea on the matter. Vlastos describes Socrates's belief concerning the implicit relationship of negation between people's false and true opinions as constituting a "tremendous assumption" on Socrates's part (Vlastos, *Socratic Studies* [n. 16] 25; [n. 32] 52).

locutor's case out of hand like those passages above, which are unusual,<sup>39</sup> he remains concerned to evaluate which side of the argument – his or his opponent's – appears more persuasive to both parties: “Then you'll answer?” (*Grg.* 474 c 1) “Enquire, then, along with me, gentlemen ...” (*Ap.* 27 a 9). In these cases, his expectation is that his interlocutor's stated view will fail to be reasonable in that it will prove inconsistent with his other avowed beliefs. In teasing these out, Socrates can thus obtain a series of agreements on a number of successive matters (*Grg.* 474 c – 475 e, *Ap.* 27 a – 28 a). Socrates needs to turn his interlocutors into witnesses of the successive phases of his arguments' proof so long as their assent remains essential to him in the establishment of the truth.<sup>40</sup> Socrates's deployment of the elenchus as an effective method of ascertaining truth would seem to depend on his endowing his interlocutors with some knowledge or understanding, in the sense that they are discerning enough to judge what is true and what is false.

Nevertheless, for Vlastos, there remain philosophical problems in Socrates's positing of elenctic dialogues as a mechanism for determining truths. This is because dialogues cannot by themselves supply any criterion for determining whether a belief is true; rather, they merely demonstrate the incoherence of interlocutor's belief-sets. But if Vlastos is correct in attributing his assumption A to Socrates, there is a basis on which Socrates becomes entitled to treat the agreed propositions emerging from dialogues as having a certain truth-value. This is because Socrates is seen as proposing true statements and his interlocutors, whatever their earlier assertions or other beliefs, as being competent to endorse them. In other words, in conversation, Socrates is likely to steer his discussions in the direction of shared truth, through examining the entirety of the beliefs of his interlocutors. According to Vlastos, Socrates places a greater degree of faith in the elenchus than is warranted by its

<sup>39</sup> These passages seem exceptional against the backdrop of Socrates's character (as indicated in p. 41 and n. 19).

<sup>40</sup> On this point, see Vlastos, *Socratic Studies* (n. 16) 20–21; (n. 32) 48, 53. Vlastos states that Socrates typically makes his partners witnesses of his *own* views; the textual evidence he cites, though, shows something else: the fact that the elenchus typically proceeds through Socrates's gaining the assent of one interlocutor alone (*Grg.* 474 a 5–6). Moreover, it is clear that Socrates judges the elenchus worthwhile even should he fail to carry his interlocutors – that is, both his refutations of others and crucially their refutation of him yield a cognitive benefit (*Ap.* 22 a 7–8, *Grg.* 458 a 1–b 1, 470 c 6–7, 506 c 1–3). Vlastos's quotations (Vlastos, *Socratic Studies* [n. 16] 21–27, T 21–24; [n. 32] 48–54, T 22–25) tend to illustrate, *pace* Vlastos, Socrates's confidence in the elenctic method, rather than showing that dialectical situations as such are advantageous to Socrates.

merely serving as the formal guarantor of its conclusions. The criterion of truthfulness of a conclusion, though, is not that it is finally subject to agreement, but that it is Socrates who proposed it. Vlastos argues that Socrates's experience of debating, in other words, inductive evidence, leads him to the position that his own belief-set consists *exclusively* of true beliefs.<sup>41</sup> Socrates therefore becomes confident in his own abilities as an arguer to determine the truth. It follows for Vlastos's line of thought that such a formidable debater might be in no need of further enquiry, obviating the need for any interlocutor or even dialogue.<sup>42</sup>

So, for Vlastos, Socrates must be apprised of the truth of those assertions he submits to elenctic conversation. For Irwin, however, Socrates's title to this kind of knowledge comes into doubt, as Socrates, like anyone else, lacks a criterion by which he might account his true beliefs concerning any object to be "knowledge". Now, as Irwin suggests, Socrates may remain convinced of the truth of his beliefs on any subject of discussion, without attaching to them any explicit claim to knowledge.<sup>43</sup> Yet Irwin may be hasty in having Socrates separate truth and knowledge so readily; since when Socrates says that he cannot attend a claim with knowledge, he surely means that he is unable to answer disputes as to its *truth*. Whether Socrates has true beliefs or not, and which these are, must remain a matter for independent examination.

The prevailing literature on this topic would accept as uncontentious the idea that the Platonic Socrates holds some true beliefs. But which? For Nozick, Socrates, in disavowing knowledge of F, necessarily holds himself to lack *true belief* in the matter of F. Yet without claiming to define F, it may still be possible, via the process of an elenchus, to begin considering, and to seek to know, any topic insofar as it can be identified as pertaining to the nature of F.<sup>44</sup> For both Vlastos and Irwin, the elenchus is a negative procedure resting on Socrates's convictions and concerned to expose falsehoods.<sup>45</sup> But rather

<sup>41</sup> Vlastos, *Socratic Studies* (n. 16) 28; (n. 32) 55.

<sup>42</sup> In my view, Vlastos here goes too far in failing to capture the extent to which Socrates's discussions represent to him genuine opportunities to thrash out unsuspected and unformulated truths.

<sup>43</sup> Irwin (n. 11) 40–41.

<sup>44</sup> This would understand the so-called priority of definition as applying less restrictively than it is sometimes imagined. On the context-dependency of the priority of definition, see n. 31. On this point, M. F. Burnyeat, "Examples in epistemology: Socrates, Theaetetus and G. E. Moore", *Philosophy* 52 (1976) 389; Nehamas, "Socratic Intellectualism" (n. 31) esp. p. 290, would seem to hold a context-dependent interpretation. Cf. n. 31.

<sup>45</sup> For those writers, Plato's positive philosophical contributions may be found in or extrapolated from statements he arrived at independently of dialogue.

than understanding Socrates as directing discussions on the basis of principles not subject to examination (like Irwin), we can see Socrates as moving from point to point guaranteed by agreement between himself and *some* expression of his interlocutors' minds. In putting this point, Nozick modifies Vlastos's assumption A as to the latency of true beliefs for Socrates in human cognition.<sup>46</sup> Ceasing to view the elenchus as a demonstration, Nozick's new assumption is that Socrates<sup>47</sup> and his interlocutor are on a par, in the sense that some knowledge is attributed to both parties.<sup>48</sup> In order to endorse the Socratic emphasis on the value of mutual agreement, so that the elenchus may be regarded as a search for truth, we will then admit the substantial importance, not of those argumentative phases in which Socrates professes *his* true beliefs, but of those in which *both parties* come to believe something true or know something to be true.<sup>49</sup>

While Socrates strictly denies knowledge to himself and others, he nonetheless engages in dialogues which he is willing to construe as the pursuit of truth; moreover, he tries his utmost to offer himself and others the possibility of knowledge. Callicles's personal qualities were admitted as factors potentially orienting the elenchus towards truth.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>46</sup> R. Nozick, "Socratic Puzzles", *Phronesis* 40 (1995) 149–150.

<sup>47</sup> According to Nozick, the excellence of Socratic knowledge is that he knows that he does not know (what F is). Nozick describes what are elsewhere called Socratic doctrines (fragmentary statements of Socrates's seeming to attest to consistent positions e. g. it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it) as Socrates's knowledge. At this point Nozick also takes care to limit the scope of Socratic ignorance. Not knowing what F is is for Nozick compatible with knowing other things about F. Cf. n. 30.

<sup>48</sup> Nozick's modification concerns only this point; what Vlastos calls people's 'true beliefs' i. e. the beliefs that they will hold onto when confronted with a choice in the course of the elenchus, Nozick calls 'knowledge'. This modification suggests that both Socrates and his interlocutors have some tacit knowledge (cf. n. 38). Indeed, for Nozick, many of people's beliefs are likely to be true, because 'knowledge' has more stability (tenacity, stickiness) than false beliefs, which tend to be rejected after reflection or experience. Nozick's argument also admits the possibility of people's arriving at knowledge other than through the elenchus (cf. Nozick [n. 46] 151).

<sup>49</sup> The implication here would be that, in principle, the truth of the conclusion of an elenctic discussion does not entail the truth or reliability of elenctic premises. In other words, the elenchus does not comprise a method of logical induction. It is possible on a case-by-case basis for Socrates to rid himself of a commitment to his premises – this is a point on which I agree with Benson (n. 8) 47–52 and M. Nakahata, "Truth in Dialogues – A Note on the Socratic Elenchus (II)", *Methodos* 29 (1997) 11–20.

<sup>50</sup> Socrates later suggests that Callicles's goodwill was lacking over the course of their discussion (*Grg.* 499 c).

Socrates is presumably willing to posit those three qualities in everyone, at least at the latent level. If the elenchus is to work well, it rests on the assumption that interlocutors have some prior beliefs or knowledge in an implicit or explicit form, which will be adopted as a common ground of truth and tested over the course of time.<sup>51</sup> Indeed, this must be a necessary, considering, with Vlastos, that the elenchus, in point of logic, can be said at most to indicate inconsistencies of beliefs.<sup>52</sup> So some postulate of people's capacity for forming true concepts would appear a prerequisite of constructing the elenchus as a search for truth.<sup>53</sup> As long as what Socrates is searching for is not true belief but knowledge,<sup>54</sup> his dialogical procedure must be premised on the assumption that speakers (including himself) possess some ethical knowledge.

In the conversation with Callicles, Socrates allegorically represents a person's awareness of his own ignorance through the figure of a sea-pilot. The sea-pilot is a man of modesty and humility despite saving

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<sup>51</sup> In recent Stoic studies, Anthony Long upholds a version of Vlastos's assumption A as underlying not only Socratic but also Epictetan dialogical strategy (A. A. Long, *Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life* [Oxford 2002] 82–83).

<sup>52</sup> In my view, it is only when some truth is attributed to us in advance – whether in tacit or explicit form – that we can justifiably infer from the 'consistency' of our beliefs to their "truth". This postulation of latent truth goes some way to explaining why Socrates associates a person's consistency with the truth of their professions. He responds to Callicles's changes of position in argument by predicting that Callicles will be at discord with himself throughout his whole life (*Grg.* 482 b–c) – implicitly using consistency as a measure of truth and falsehood. It is important to note that Socrates characteristically examines the truth of propositions not in isolation or according to their purely formal aspect (as p, q, r, etc.), but insofar as they fit or not with the rest of a person's belief-set, as evidenced by the entirety of his person. Indeed, for Socrates, it would be hopelessly arbitrary to select one of his interlocutors' propositions as preferable to any other without pursuing further substantial indications as to propositions' truth-value. Socrates's bias in favour of personal and argumentative consistency partly solves the structural "problem of the elenchus" as set out by Vlastos: that is, why Socrates seems to believe that he has refuted a proposition (p) as false when logically he has done no more than demonstrate its incompatibility with other propositions (q, r, s, etc.).

<sup>53</sup> In this way, the refusal of Socrates's adversaries Meletus and Callicles to answer his questions suggests that to some degree they are persuaded of the truth of Socrates's arguments (*Grg.* 513 c 4–6, 517 c 7 – d 5, 518 a 5–7, *Ap.* 24 d 7, 27 c 10). This raises the question of why Socrates does not always carry his interlocutors (e. g. in the *Apology* acquit himself). Socrates himself explains this, especially pointing to their love of demos (*Grg.* 481 d 5, 513 c 7), their slander, grudge, anger, stubbornness (*Ap.* 31 a 3–5, 34 c 7 – d 1), the time restrictions imposed on him (*Grg.* 455 a 2–7, 513 c 8 – d 1, *Ap.* 19 a 2, 36 d 5–6, 37 a 8 – b 2, 38 c 1), etc.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *Grg.* 472 c 6 – d 1, 505 e 4–5.

people's "bodies and property" as well as their "lives" from perils. He never assumes an air of importance by conceiving his work to be special. Socrates says of him (*Grg.* 511 e 6 – 512 a 2):

For I suppose he knows (ἐπίσταται) how to reason (λογίζεσθαι) that it's unclear (ἄδηλον) which passengers he has benefited by not letting them drown, and which ones he has harmed;<sup>55</sup> he knows (εἰδώς) he has put them ashore no better than they were when they boarded, either in body or in soul.

It is possible that such a fine description and appreciation of the sea-pilot is available only to one who grasps the nature and scope of knowledge as subtly as Socrates himself.<sup>56</sup> Socrates posits a limit to what the sea-pilot knows – and to that extent, his emphasis falls on the negative side of the sea-pilot's cognition.<sup>57</sup> At the same time he suggests, however, that the sea-pilot is both skilful and acute in grasping the moral consequences of his actions. Socrates depicts the sea-pilot as knowing "how to reason" and as having formed ideas of various subjects. This cognitive attainment represents a form of knowledge. By being aware of one's own ignorance, like the sea-pilot, a person positions himself as oriented towards truth – for example, towards the horizon of the signifi-

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<sup>55</sup> Similarly, in the *Apology*, Socrates claims that he cannot know which of his discussants he has helped or strengthened, and which he has harmed, through engaging them in elenctic dialogue (cf. *Ap.* 30 b 4–6, 33 b 3–6).

<sup>56</sup> Vlastos, *Socratic Studies* (n. 16) 47, 59 n. 47, and "Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge" (n. 16) 10, 21 n. 48, also adduces a different passage about the sea-pilot (*Grg.* 512 b 1–2) to a consideration of the basis for Socrates's avowal of knowledge. The analogy of the sea-pilot itself does not support Socrates's knowledge-claim, but rather suggests a possible prototype for a form of knowledge. See R. Bambrough, "Plato's Political Analogies" (1971), reprint. in: G. Vlastos (ed.), *Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays II* (Notre Dame 1978) 187–205, for the importance of the sea-pilot analogy to the *Republic*. It is also worth remembering that Socrates prides himself on his expertise on politics in its proper sense at 521 d in the *Gorgias*.

<sup>57</sup> Wolfsdorf and I differ considerably in our readings of Socrates's analogy between the philosopher and a sea-pilot. For Wolfsdorf, the sea-pilot stands as one of a series of figures, including Socrates's interlocutors Callicles, Euthyphro, Hippias, and so on, whose views are ultimately refuted and whose claims to knowledge shown to be illegitimate. In my reading, the sea-pilot is a figure of Socratic knowledge (especially in the sense that his knowledge is related to a consciousness of his own ignorance). In Plato's dialogues, philosophers are compared to sea-pilots in a positive sense: while both may be caricatured as star-gazing babblers, both train their faculties on abstract objects of contemplation (compare *R.* VI 488 d – 489 a with *Phdr.* 269 e – 270 a, especially with regard to ἀδολεσχία καὶ μετεωρολογία).

cance of the pilot's rescues as such ("which passengers he has benefited, and which he has harmed"). Socrates's, and the sea-pilot's, questions paradoxically arise out of their scrupulously envisaged, or delimited, understanding of a world of which they disclaim knowledge.

Socrates always envisions the fine and good in every dialogue, and it is this viewpoint that stimulates him to ask the question what *x* is. Socrates then searches for a complete and synoptic knowledge capable of answering that enquiry. The question is predicated on his having already obtained some degree of conviction, or possibly partial knowledge, such that he may require a complete and synoptic account of the conditions by which his cognition may be accounted knowledge in a full sense.<sup>58</sup> Socrates's whole manner of life is already supported by his broad vision before he initiates an elenchus with any interlocutor. In this sense, his life appears consistent with itself, and his words and behaviour stable. Socrates's careful delimitation of his knowledge in the midst of his wider ignorance is comparable to the modest claims of the good sea-pilot. It would be natural and reasonable to assume something parallel here: Socrates's broadly-conceived cognition is likewise so rich that he can avow knowledge clearly, at 29 b in the *Apology*, while at the same time remaining deeply conscious of his own ignorance in the moral sphere.\*

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В течение нескольких последних десятилетий исследователи платоновской эпистемологии ведут дискуссии о том, в каком смысле Сократ признает и в каком не признает за собой обладание знанием. В статье,

<sup>58</sup> On the relation between "what is *x*?" question and its synoptic character, see esp. *Euthphr.* 6 d 9 – e 7, *R. I.*, 354 b 9 – c 1, *Men.* 71 b 3–4. Socrates considers that the answer to "what is *x*?" should cover all its instances without exception, coextensively.

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наряду с критикой прежних интерпретаций (Г. Властоса, Т. Ирвина, Г. Бенсона и др.), предлагается решение этой проблемы, основывающееся в первую очередь на интерпретации пассажа из платоновской *Апологии Сократа* (29 b), а также на анализе сократовского метода исследования (ἔλεγχος). Автор доказывает, что следует принимать всерьез как утверждения Сократа в “Апологии”, что он обладает знанием, так и отрицания этого, кажущееся же противоречие между ними решается в том смысле, что подобные утверждения зависят всякий раз от контекста и от содержания знания, которое Сократ имеет в виду. Уточнения, относящиеся к эленктическому методу, позволяют далее определить, в каком смысле Сократ признает, а в каком не признает за собой обладание знанием. В заключение выдвигается предположение, что фигура кормчего в “Горгии” (511 e – 512 a), обладающего знанием, которое строго ограничено определенной сферой, но в ней безусловно надежно, служит аналогией, проясняющей тонко дифференцированную позицию платоновского Сократа в эпистемологических вопросах.

THE COSMIC CYCLE IN THE *STATESMAN* MYTH. I\*

Berndo Seidensticker septuagenario

In this paper I will defend what is called the ‘traditional interpretation’ (abbreviated TI hereafter) of the myth in Plato’s *Statesman* against the new interpretation (abbreviated NI), proposed by L. Brisson,<sup>1</sup> modified<sup>2</sup> and defended<sup>3</sup> by C. Rowe, and further modified by G. Carone (who is closer to Brisson than to Rowe). This paper is written primarily in response to Carone’s version.<sup>4</sup> The NI and its philosophical implications were criticised by some scholars,<sup>5</sup> but, to the best of my knowledge, textual foundations of the NI have never been discussed in detail. In what follows I intend to show that these foundations are weak and that the TI, although in need of modification, still holds true: the cosmic cycle of the *Statesman*’s myth consists of two (and not three) phases – that of the rule of the Demiurge, when the universe rotates in the

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<sup>1</sup> The new interpretation was first proposed by L. Brisson in his *La Mème et l’Autre dans la structure ontologique du Timée de Platon* (Paris 1974) 488–496 (reprinted: Sankt Augustin <sup>3</sup>1998 with an additional note: p. 605) and later clarified and developed, in his “Interprétation du mythe du *Politique*”, in C. Rowe (ed.), *Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the III Symposium Platonicum* (Sankt Augustin 1995) 349–363.

<sup>2</sup> C. Rowe (ed.), *Plato: Statesman with Translation and Commentary* (Warminster 1995), see Introduction, 11–13, and commentary, 186–197.

<sup>3</sup> C. Rowe, “Zwei oder drei Phasen? Der Mythos im *Politikos*”, in M. Janka and Chr. Schäfer (eds.), *Platon als Mythologe* (Darmstadt 2002) 160–175.

<sup>4</sup> G. L. Carone, “Reversing the myth of the *Politikus*”, *CQ* n. s. 54 (2004) 88–108. Her monograph, *Plato’s Cosmology and Its Ethical Dimension* (Cambridge 2005), became available to me when the present paper had been completed, but, as the relevant section of the book is practically identical to the earlier article, I refer to the latter throughout this paper.

<sup>5</sup> M. Erler, “Kommentar zu Brisson und Dillon”, in Rowe (n.1) 375–380; G. R. F. Ferrari, “Myth and Conservatism in Plato’s *Statesman*”, in Rowe (n.1) 389–397; M. S. Lane, *Method and Politics in Plato’s Statesman* (Cambridge 1998) 99–117, and in the more detailed form: M. M. McCabe, “Chaos and Control: Reading Plato’s *Politikus*”, *Phronesis* 42 (1997) 98–108; Chr. Horn, “Warum zwei Epochen der Menschheitsgeschichte? Zum Mythos des *Politikos*”, in M. Janka and Chr. Schäfer (eds.), *Platon als Mythologe* (Darmstadt 2002) 137–159. Horn’s paper and that of Rowe (n. 3) are not taken in account by Carone; D. O’Brien’s unpublished critical comments are cited in Rowe (n. 3).

direction West – East, and that of the autonomous universe (the contemporary era), when the universe rotates in the direction East – West. Since one of the arguments against the TI brought forward by Brisson and Carone is that the image of the contemporary universe abandoned by the Demiurge contradicts Plato's views attested elsewhere, I will also touch on theological doctrines in other Plato's dialogues, most importantly in the *Timaeus* (see Part II).

The myth is a part of a conversation between the Eleatic Stranger (ES) and the Younger Socrates (YS), who are looking for a definition of the true statesman, or of the king. The interlocutors recognise that the initial definition of the true statesman as the shepherd or the rearer (τροφός) fails to distinguish the specific mode of herd-rearing, essential to the statesman: whereas shepherds of other herds cater for all needs of their nurslings – food, reproduction, parenting, and entertainment, representatives of the other professions (merchants, peasants, doctors, and trainers) challenge the statesman's position as the rearer of the human herd (267 e – 268 b). The immediate purpose of the myth narrated by the ES is to clarify what distinguishes the statesman from other alleged rearers (268 b 6 – e 2).

I shall start by summarising the whole story.

*Evidence of the tradition:* the ES brings up three myths. First is the myth of Atreus and Thyestes, in which Zeus makes the sun and other stars to rise and to set in places opposite to the original ones, which implies the change in the rotation of the universe from the previous direction (West – East) into the contemporary (East – West).<sup>6</sup> Second is the myth of the reign of Cronus on the earth; third is the myth that human beings previously were born from the earth and not by sexual reproduction. These three myths are, in fact, separated and distorted pieces of evidence about the same sequence of events (268 e 8 – 269 c 2);

*Theoretical preliminaries:* the ES argues that the universe, formed by the Demiurge from the primeval chaos and endowed by reason, in one period rotates with the help of his creator and in the other period is set free to rotate in the opposite direction; each time the change in the direction of rotation causes destruction of living beings on a large scale, as well as various changes in them (270 b 1 – d 2).

The following story narrates the events of the cosmic cycle:

a) the most important of these changes takes place whenever the universe changes direction opposite to the contemporary one, i. e. from E–W to W–E. At this moment, ageing of living beings stops and they begin changing in the opposite direction, from old age to childhood, gradually diminishing in size and at the end entirely disappearing (270 d 6 – 271 a 2);

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<sup>6</sup> I designate hereafter as the 'E–W rotation' the rotation of the universe in the direction East – South – West – North – East with the visible East – West path of the sun (the actual rotation of our universe, according to the geocentric cosmology), and as the 'W–E rotation' respectively the opposite rotation in the direction West – South – East – North – West with the visible West – East path of the sun (the reversed rotation of the myth).

b) in this stage of ageing backwards sexual reproduction ceases to take place; instead, the living beings spring from the earth. (The myth of the earth-born refers in fact to those who returned to life from the earth in that time; our ancestors, who lived in the beginning of the contemporary rotation, were witnesses of these earth-born, 271 a 5 – c 2);

c) the traditional stories of the reign of Cronus retain a dim memory of the era when the Demiurge took care of the universe revolutions; the herds of all living beings on the earth, including the humans, were tended by the *daimones*, who guaranteed order and peace among the humans and animals; there were no states, no wives and children in this era; the human beings came back to life from the earth; an abundance of spontaneously grown fruits and mild climate made farming, clothes, and houses unnecessary (271 c 8 – 272 d 4);

d) after a certain period, when all the souls that have accomplished the prescribed number of incarnations fell into the earth, where the bodies of living beings were formed, the Demiurge left the helm of the universe and withdrew to his observation-post. The ‘fatal inborn desire’, which is inherent to the universe, impelled it to rotate in the opposite direction; the subordinate deities, who were in charge of the regions under the supreme reign of the Demiurge deprived the parts of the universe of their care (272 d 6 – 273 a 1);

e) the reversal of rotation produced the great earthquake and ‘another perishing’ of various kinds of living beings; but afterwards the universe returned to its ‘accustomed course’, started to control itself and its inhabitants and to take care of them recollecting the teaching of the Demiurge; at first it follows<sup>7</sup> this teaching closely, but gradually forgets it and gets more and more under the impact of its bodily element; the universe now imparts cruelty and injustice to its inhabitants, and at the end the evils produced by it prevail over the goods. At that point, when the universe is at the verge of dissolution and sinking into the primeval chaos, the Demiurge returns to the helm, reverses the direction of revolutions and sets the universe again in order, imparting to it immortality; this is ‘the final point of everything’ (273 a 5 – e 5);

f) now the story-teller approaches the main point, which should shed light on the difference between the statesman in the contemporary universe and the shepherd of the human herd: after ‘the reversal of the universe to the contemporary way of generation’, the ageing backwards stopped and the living beings underwent change contrary to the one that happened during the previous reversal: those who then had diminished until they disappeared entirely began to grow again, and those who had just appeared from the earth began to die and return to the earth; the birth from the earth by the help of the external agency became impossible, and, following the order given to the universe to live autonomously, the living beings now had to conceive, to produce the offspring and

<sup>7</sup> From this point the present tense is used instead of historical tenses.

to rear them by their own means; the animals, set free from the rule of the lesser gods, turned wild and began to ravage human beings; an abundance of spontaneous food came to the end, and the humans could not procure livelihood, as previously they had not experienced any need that might have taught them how to do so; then, according to an ancient tradition, the fire was donated to the humankind by Prometheus, the crafts by Hephaestus and Athena, seeds and plants by other gods – everything that helped to establish human life took origin from these gifts (273 e 6 – 274 d 8).

According to the TI, the cycle consists of two phases, one (A) of the Demiurge's rule (age of Cronus), with the W–E rotation of the universe, and another (B) of the autonomous universe (the contemporary era), with the E–W rotation; these phases continually alternate. The story starts from the Demiurge's return to the helm (the phase A); he reverts the rotation in the direction opposite to the contemporary one (i. e. the universe begins to rotate in the W–E direction); the parts of the story a–c (the destruction of living beings; the end of the development forwards; the start of the development backwards; regeneration of the dead from the earth; blessings of the Paradise) belong to the same phase.

The following parts of the story describe the end of the divine era and the following autonomous era (phase B): the Demiurge withdraws, and the lesser gods deprive the human beings of their care (d); the universe reverts to its contemporary E–W rotation, sets itself in order, but then bit by bit degrades and approaches the catastrophe, until, at the end of the contemporary era, the Demiurge returns to the helm, reverts the universe to the W–E rotation and revitalises it (e); the new cycle starts with the phase A. In the following part (f) the story-teller returns to the beginning of the contemporary era, to describe the reappearance of development forward, sexual reproduction and the beginnings of civilised life.<sup>8</sup>

Against this traditional view, L. Brisson, C. Rowe and G. Carone argue that the universe in the contemporary era rotates in the same direction (E–W) as in the era of divine rule. They believe that the myth presupposes the third, intermediate, phase, when the universe rotates in the direction opposite both to the previous era and to the following ones, i. e. W–E. Furthermore, since the ageing backwards of

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<sup>8</sup> For the treatment of the myth in the traditional vein see L. Campbell (ed.), *The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato* (Oxford 1867), introd. XXVIII–XLI, and comm. 41–72 (second pagination), the most detailed and sensitive to the details of the text, in my view; J. Adam (ed.), *The Republic of Plato: Edited with Critical Notes, Commentary and Appendices II* (Cambridge 1902) 295–298 (remarks in the Appendix on Plato's Number); A. Diès (ed.), *Plato, Œuvres complètes IX/1. Le Politique* (Paris 1935) XXX–XLI; J. Skemp, *A Translation of the Politicus of Plato with Introductory Essays and Footnotes* (London 1952) 82–111. Since the two-phase interpretation raised no doubts in those days (Skemp apparently was not aware of the alternative interpretation of Lovejoy and Boas, see n. 9), the today debatable points of the cycle are often beyond the scope of these earlier works.

living beings starts when the universe reverts to the rotation opposite to the contemporary one (270 d 4), the proponents of the NI argue that the ageing backwards is produced by the Demiurge's withdrawal, not by his return, and thus in the era of Cronus the living beings, although sprung from the earth, develop forwards, as in the contemporary era. The ageing backwards, which stops at the beginning of the contemporary era, with the reversal to the E–W rotation (273 e 6–10), thus belongs to the interim era with the W–E rotation, opposite both to the rotation in the era of Cronus and in the contemporary one. Thus, the proponents of the NI try to find in the text, additionally to the reversal at the moment when the Demiurge lets the universe go and it starts to rotate in the opposite direction (it becomes W–E, according to the NI), one more reversal, which should return the universe to the rotation it has in the contemporary era, i. e. E–W.<sup>9</sup>

Here the versions of the proponents of the NI diverge. According to Brisson and Carone, the text gives hints that the Demiurge is at the helm in the contemporary era, although his rule is more detached than in the era of Cronus; there are indications that the subordinate deities are present, too. Since, however, both the Demiurge and the minor deities leave the universe at the end of Cronus' era, Brisson and Carone argue that the passage, usually taken as a promise of the return of the Demiurge at the end of the contemporary era (273 d 4 – e 4, the end of the section e), in fact points out to his return that has already happened in the beginning of the contemporary era: the god has already come back after the interim godless era of the W–E rotation, saved the universe from the danger of total destruction, having reverted it to the contemporary E–W rotation and rejuvenated it in the beginning of the contemporary era.<sup>10</sup>

Rowe accepts Brisson's proposal insofar as the universe rotates nowadays in the same direction as it did under the rule of the Demiurge and that there is an interim era of the W–E rotation between these two eras. He dismisses, however, the alleged indications in the text of the god's rule in the contemporary era as a mere convention, and agrees with the TI that the universe today is entirely deprived of the Demiurge's presence. Instead, Rowe proposes the following version: after the withdrawal of the Demiurge, the universe, which rotated E–W in

<sup>9</sup> This is the core of Brisson's view shared by Rowe and Carone. Brisson (n. 1, 1974) 352 n. 11 refers to A. O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity* (Baltimore 1935, repr. 1997) 158 f. as having anticipated his proposal, as concerns both admitting of three phases and the transposition in the order of story. On the other hand, he is not correct when ascribing the similar view to H. Herter, "Gott und die Welt bei Platon: Eine Studie zum Mythos des *Politikos*" (1958), in idem, *Kleine Schriften* (Munich 1975) 316–330. Herter in fact admits two alternating periods, with two opposite rotations, one of god's rule and another of his withdrawal, the latter being the world we live in; he only argues that the universe, even during the contemporary is not deprived entirely of the divine care (p. 325–327).

<sup>10</sup> Brisson (n. 1, 1995) 350–351, 360; Carone (n. 4) 101–104.

Cronus' era, reverts to the W–E rotation, following its irrational desire; then, after a relatively short interim era, it reverts, again by itself, but now following its intelligent nature (see 269 d 1–2), back to the E–W rotation it had under the god's rule; this initiates the contemporary era. This second reversal is implied at 273 a 4–b 1: after the turbulences of the reversal to the W–E, the universe calms down and returns to its 'accustomed course'. Rowe admits, contrary to Brisson and Carone and in agreement with the TI, that the picture of degradation of the universe (273 b 2–d 4) corresponds to the contemporary era, not to the interim one, and that the return of the Demiurge, the new reversal, and salvation of the universe (273 d 4–e 4) refer to our descendants; in other words, the era of the god's rule, similar to the era of Cronus, should follow the contemporary era.

The proponents of the NI claim that the three phase interpretation fits the text better than the traditional view. However, there are several major assumptions that underlie their attempt to re-interpret the myth.<sup>11</sup> For Brisson, the three phases back up the view that the contemporary era is a synthesis between the total disorder of the universe entirely abandoned by the Demiurge and the overall order of Cronus' era; he further asserts that this view of the contemporary era suits well the cosmology of the *Timaeus*, which represents the universe as the realm both of the divine intelligence and of the necessity.<sup>12</sup> Carone believes that the view of the contemporary era as deprived of the Demiurge's rule contradicts the late Plato's dialogues 'which rather tend to emphasize the existence of a divine *nous* that is responsible for the way our world is arranged, which is the best and the most beautiful way possible'.<sup>13</sup> Rowe's reasons for following the three phase interpretation are mainly of philological character, but he believes that his own proposal – the universe reverts to the direction it had under the rule of the Demiurge – corresponds better than the TI to the statement that the universe is an intelligent creature (269 d).<sup>14</sup> In one way or another, all proponents of the NI seem to believe that the contemporary era, according to the TI, appears gloomier than one should expect from Plato. I will discuss the issue in the

<sup>11</sup> The reasons for their dissatisfaction with the NI are summarised by Brisson (n. 1, 1995) 350 f.; Rowe (n. 2) 189 ad 270 b 7–8, and Carone (n. 4) 92–95.

<sup>12</sup> Brisson (n. 1, 1974) 490–492; (n. 1, 1995) 361; Rowe (n. 2) 197 ad 274 e 1 and Carone (n. 4) 103 endorse this view.

<sup>13</sup> Carone (n. 4) 88. According to her (p. 88 n. 4) such passages as *Phil.* 28 c ff.; *Tim.* 46 c–e; *Leg.* 966 d–e, 967 d–e point out "that the world as a cosmos is orderly due to the presence of a designing *nous* that orders it". The problematic word here is 'the presence': these passages point out that the divine intelligence is responsible for perfection of the existing order, but do not state unambiguously that this divine intelligence rules over the universe by its permanent presence in it after completing the creation (see Pt. II).

<sup>14</sup> Rowe (n. 2) 13: "If it were the case that it always went to the opposite direction when left to itself, its claim to rationality would look weak, given that on any account it is its non-rational elements (body, 269 d–e, 'its allotted and innate desire'), which cause the reversal, 272 e 5–6".

context of Plato's cosmological and theological views in the second part of this paper.

Before discussing textual difficulties of the myth, it should be said that there are some *prima facie* indications that favour the TI. According to the argument of the theoretical preliminaries, there are only two phases with two opposite directions, one under the Demiurge's rule and the other of the autonomous universe (270 a 1 – a 9); this statement can be reconciled with the views of Brisson and Carone, but not with that of Rowe, who asserts that one of the two autonomous rotations of the universe (that of the contemporary era) proceeds in the same direction as in the divine era. Then, the story-teller at the end of the myth mentions only two modes of human existence, which correspond to two modes of existence of the universe – one is the autonomous of the contemporary era and the other of the era of the Demiurge's rule (274 d 7–8); this statement is difficult to reconcile with Rowe's view,<sup>15</sup> and it definitely contradicts Brisson's and Carone's version.<sup>16</sup> Further, the story-teller, resuming how the myth sheds light on the mistake of the initial defining of the statesman as a shepherd, points out that such a definition fits the ruler in the divine era, but not in the contemporary one, i. e. again only two eras are envisaged; moreover, he opposes them in terms of the rotation of the universe (274 e 9 – 275 a 3):

“Ὅτι μὲν ἐρωτώμενοι τὸν ἐκ τῆς νῦν περιφορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως βασιλέα καὶ πολιτικὸν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἐναντίας περιόδου ποιμένα τῆς τότε ἀνθρωπίνης ἀγέλης εἴπομεν, καὶ ταῦτα θεὸν ἀντὶ θνητοῦ, ταύτη μὲν πάμπολυ παρηγέχθημεν.

This fits the TI, but not the NI in both its variants.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Rowe argues ([n. 2] 197 ad loc.) that the third mode of life, that of the interim era, is not mentioned, as the essential point here is the contrast between the era of divine rule and the contemporary era; notice, however, the general terms of the statement that only two modes of life exist.

<sup>16</sup> Since Brisson and Carone believe that according to the story the Demiurge rules both in the era of Cronus and in the contemporary era, although with a different mode of presence, in contrast to the interim era which is deprived of his rule totally, it would be puzzling if the era of Cronus and the contemporary era were opposed absolutely only in terms of divine rule and autonomy and the third era were not mentioned at all. For Carone's attempt to weaken this contrast, see Pt. II.

<sup>17</sup> Rowe (n. 2) 198 ad loc. argues that ἡ ἐναντία περίοδος does not refer to opposite direction of rotation, but only to the fact that rotation (and generation of living beings) took place in an 'opposite way', i. e. under the god's guidance (cf. the paraphrase of Carone, 98 n. 29). Taken that περιφορά and περίοδος are virtually synonymous (see 270 d 4; 271 b 1), and that ἐναντίος is consistently used to designate opposite directions of the rotation throughout the story, the interpretation is far-fetched; cf. 271 b 8 for the development of living beings 'opposite' to the contemporary.

The starting point of the story is the destruction of living beings that accompanies the reversals of the universe, and the changes the living beings undergo at these periods. The most important of these changes takes place whenever the revolutions of the universe become ‘the opposite to that exists nowadays’ (270 c 11–d 4):

ΞΕ. Φθοραὶ τοίνυν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τότε μέγισται συμβαίνουσι τῶν τε ἄλλων ζώων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ὀλίγον τι περιλείπεται· περὶ δὲ τούτους ἄλλα τε παθήματα πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστά καὶ καινὰ συμπίπτει, μέγιστον δὲ τὸδε καὶ συνεπόμενον τῇ τοῦ παντὸς ἀνειλίξει τότε, ὅταν ἡ τῆς νῦν καθεστηκυίας ἐναντία γίγνηται τροπή.

This change is described in the following passage as the end of development forwards and the beginning of ageing backwards, disappearance of living beings as the result of it, and birth from the earth of the next generation of living beings. The generation from the earth is represented as one of the constituents of the rule of the Demiurge; it is said that the last earth-born were witnessed by the ancestors of the contemporary humankind, who lived in the beginning of our rotation and in the proximity to the *previous* one (271 a 8–b 2). Thus, the traditionalists assume that the story follows the order of events and that the reversal of the universe to the direction *opposite to the contemporary one* with perishing of living beings and the reversal of ageing from forward to backward starts the era of the divine rule.<sup>18</sup>

The proponents of the NI argue against this: the era with the rotation of the universe opposite to the contemporary is not the divine era, but the third interim era of the universe abandoned by the god. One of the arguments is that the destruction of living beings, which accompanies this reversal, is incompatible with the salvation that the Demiurge brings to the universe.<sup>19</sup> In order to assign these events to the interim phase, the proponents of the NI suggest that the story starts from the destruction of living beings and the beginning of development backwards at the moment of the Demiurge’s *withdrawal*, after the age of Cronus.<sup>20</sup> Brisson and Rowe (who follows him) propose that the narrative diverts from the order of events in the cycle: (1) at first, the withdrawal of the god (the reversal to the W–E rotation implied), perishing of living beings, reversal of ageing to the backward and appearance of the earth-born witnessed at the dawn of our era (270 d 6–271 c 2); (2) the story returns back to the preceding era of the Demiurge with the E–W rotation, abundance of fruits and the earth-born who developed forwards (271 c 8–272 d 6); (3) [=1] the story switches

<sup>18</sup> So, explicitly, e. g. Adam (n. 9) II, 295.

<sup>19</sup> See Rowe (n. 2) 189 ad 270 b 7–8: “large-scale destruction (270 c–d) ... seems an inauspicious way of inaugurating what is supposed to be a golden age”.

<sup>20</sup> Carone, who also admits that the narrative starts from the withdrawal of the god, believes that the story follows strictly the order of the events, and introduces the additional phase for this purpose (see further).

again, now explicitly, to the withdrawal of the Demiurge, the reversal of the universe to the W–E rotation, the turbulences accompanying it and to the perishing of living beings already mentioned earlier (272 d 6–273 a 4); (4) the reversal to the contemporary era with the E–W rotation (described at 273 a 4–b 2, according to Rowe; at 273 d 4–e 5, according to Brisson);<sup>21</sup> (5) the contemporary era (273 e 6–274 d 8).

First, we shall deal with the argument that the return of the god to the helm is incompatible with the perishing of living beings on large scale. The direct statement in the text dismantles this wishful thinking: *both* possible reversals of the universe, according to the theoretical introduction, are accompanied by the greatest destructions of living beings, so that only a small part of the humankind survives (270 b 7–d 1).<sup>22</sup> Moreover, this brutal handling of humankind by the god is significant. The universe in its degraded phase, at the verge of dissolution, is involved in the whole complex of evils, both physical (growing old and illnesses) and moral, and it conveys these defects to its inhabitants (273 c 5–d 4). It is hardly surprising then that the Demiurge who returns to the helm to save the universe destroys these degraded living beings in order to clean the stage for better ones. According to the story, he cures the universe by ‘the turning round of what had got diseased and destroyed in the previous era’ (273 e 1–2); this corresponds admirably to the reversal of ageing, with its forceful rejuvenation.<sup>23</sup> The destruction is not only an inescapable device of improving the universe, but also, beyond any doubt, the act of justifiable requital in Plato’s eyes: the last generation of the autonomous universe, according to the story, is extraordinarily wicked, and the previous generations, as we shall see, deserve a better lot.<sup>24</sup> Last, there is an indirect proof: the reader can detect here coinci-

<sup>21</sup> See above on this divergence and on differences in assigning of 273 b 2–d 4 either to the contemporary era (traditionalists and Rowe) or to the interim era (Brisson and Carone).

<sup>22</sup> This is correctly stated by Diès (n. 8) XXXIV: “c’est que chaque renversement de mouvement commence par détruire ce qui est, pour faire place nette à ce qui viendra”, cf. also Horn (n. 5) 150.

<sup>23</sup> μέγιστον by itself only means that one effect of the reversal to the direction opposite to the contemporary one, namely the appearance of backward ageing, is the most considerable *among the other effects* (270 d 1–4); it says nothing about the relative scale of the destruction. However, the destruction, which accompanies this reversal, seems to be on the larger scale than the one that accompanies the Demiurge’s withdrawal: those who lived during the age of Cronus did not remember the previous era, as they *all* revived from the earth (272 a 1–2). On the contrary, those who had survived during the reversal to the contemporary rotation preserved memory of the ‘earth-born’ of the previous period (271 a 5–b 1). This should explain why no tradition of the era before the Golden Age survives, although, according to the story, the cycles alternate continuously.

<sup>24</sup> This view of the cataclysm as the divine punishment has parallels in later Plato’s dialogues. According to the *Timaeus* (22 d 6–7), the gods regularly purify the earth from the most part of population of highly developed and (for this reason) morally decayed

dence of the narrated events with Hesiod's myth of generations, the constant source of eschatological imagination throughout the story, which accurately reinterprets it in the light of advanced cosmology: Hesiod promises that Zeus will destroy the wretched race of the contemporary humankind (*Op.* 180 f.), possibly expecting the creation of the better race after that (*Op.* 175), i. e. the start of the new cycle, as many today's commentators understand Hesiod's myth and as Plato must have understood it. Thus, the salvation of the universe does not imply benefits for the last inhabitants of the autonomous universe. It is the good of the whole and not individuals that is the primary purpose of the Demiurge's return, with a possible exception of the good of individual souls (see further).

On the other hand, some references in the text do not allow proposed changes in the order of the story. First, it is said that the reversal of the universe after the withdrawal of the god caused 'again one more destruction' of living beings (273 a 3 ἄλλην αὖ φθορὰν ζώων παντοίων). The single destruction mentioned before was the one that caused the ageing backwards, when the universe reverted to the rotation *opposite to the contemporary one* (270 d 11 – 271 a 2). If both destructions referred to the same event, as Brisson and Rowe claim, ἄλλη at 273 a 3 is surprising at the least.<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, at 271 a 3 – b 2, the interlocutors maintain that sexual reproduction was impossible when the ageing was backwards: instead, the living beings were born from the earth and this form of generation is explained as the result of the ageing backwards: the people born at that time were in fact the revived dead. In the era of Cronus, as the story mentions further, the living beings were also born from the earth. Let us assume that the era of Cronus precedes the ageing backwards, and that the birth from the earth in the era of Cronus, when the living beings were formed by the god and developed forwards, should be distinguished from the birth from the earth that accompanies ageing backwards, as Brisson and Rowe argue. In this case one should expect that the story-teller, when depicting the era of Cronus, would point out the difference between two forms of the birth from the earth. He, however, does not hint at any difference; on the contrary, he says that the generation in the age of Cronus was a generation from the earth, *as the reader knows already*: ἐκ γῆς

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civilisations by the floods; the comparison of the moral health of the primitive society after the flood to the city culture destroyed by a cataclysm, in the *Laws* (III. 677 b 5–8; 678 b 1–3; 679 b–e), implies the same providential role of cataclysms.

<sup>25</sup> According to Rowe ([n. 2] 195 ad loc.), ἄλλη refers to the similar destructions in the previous cycles. This is not entirely impossible (especially if πάλιν 272 e 5 has temporal, not spatial meaning, which is not certain), but is less natural than taking ἄλλη as referring to the destruction explicitly mentioned earlier, as Carone ([n. 4] 101 n. 41) admits. Note also that ἄλλη appears at the place, where, following Brisson's and Rowe's interpretation, one would expect a reminder that this destruction is the *same* as the one that had been already mentioned.

γὰρ ἀνεβιώσκοντο πάντες (272 a 1), i. e. knows from the depiction of the reversal of ageing and its results. On the other hand, if the birth from the earth as the result of the development backwards is the next phase after the birth from the earth in the era of Cronus, one should expect some indication that one mode of birth transformed into another; however, the birth from the earth as the result of the development backwards is introduced as an entirely new phenomenon, which requires a detailed explanation, without any hint that another form of the birth from the earth existed earlier, in the age of Cronus. Both these difficulties are resolved, if the ageing backwards and the birth from the earth occur at the moment of the Demiurge's return to the helm, after the era similar to ours, and if the ES, following the order of events, now proceeds to describe the reign of Cronus with the same mode of birth as the one he just explained.<sup>26</sup>

Carone, modifying the previous versions of the NI, in fact admits that the narrative here follows the order of events. She also links, as Brisson and Rowe do, the ageing backwards (270 d 6–271 a 1) to the withdrawal of the god and to the reversal of the universe to the W–E rotation. She proposes, however, that this withdrawal happens not at the end of the age of Cronus described at 272 d 6 ff., but at the end of the previous era of Demiurge's rule.<sup>27</sup> Thus, 270 c 11–271 b 4 describes the god's withdrawal, the reversal of the rotation – it now becomes opposite to the contemporary one – and the ageing backwards as a consequence of this reversal. At 271 b 4–c 1 the text indicates, according to Carone, the change in the form of generation: the living beings are still earth-born, as they were previously, but now they are born as infants and age forwards. This implies the god's return to the helm, the reversal of the universe (now to the E–W direction) and the beginning of the new era of Cronus, which is described at 272 d 6 ff. She further argues that the beginning of the ageing forwards at the dawn of the contemporary era (those who grow smaller and almost disappear began to grow up again, 273 e 6–11) does not take place immediately after the era of Cronus, as the traditionalists believe. This change implies the start of another interim era after the god's withdrawal: the universe reverts to the W–E rotation, the living beings begin to develop backwards. After that, the god returns, reverts the universe to the E–W rotation, stops both the ageing backwards and the birth from the earth, and our era begins (Carone assumes, following Brisson, that this return is described as the saving of the universe from the danger of dissolution, 273 d 4–e 4).<sup>28</sup> Thus, according to Carone, the whole

<sup>26</sup> It is not clear for me why Brisson (n. 1, 1995) 351 is certain that the reversal of ageing at 270 d 6–271 a 2 cannot follow the era with the sexual reproduction, but only the era with generation from the earth.

<sup>27</sup> Brisson (n. 1, 1995) 352 earlier pointed out this possibility as an alternative.

<sup>28</sup> Carone (n. 4) 96–98.

story describes four phases, with three reversals, instead of traditionalists' two phases with one reversal.

This ingenious attempt to save Brisson's proposal overcomes some difficulties produced by his hypothesis, most importantly, the alleged transposition in the order of the narrative that Brisson and Rowe presuppose, which conflicts with the text, as it was shown above. However, the price paid for this improvement is high – we now have a much more complicated cycle, with two interim eras instead of one. More important is the question whether the textual foundations for this new version are solid. These foundations are reduced to two passages: (1) the comparison of the souls which fall into the earth as seeds during the era of Cronus (272 e 3), which Carone together with the other proponents of the NI interpret as evidence that the living beings in this era developed forwards, that is, as nowadays and in the direction opposite to the interim era(s); (2) 270 b 11 – 271 a 2, which she takes as an indication that the transition from ageing backwards to ageing forwards takes place and that it marks the beginning of a new era.

Let us start from the second passage (271 a 2 – c 4):

NE. ΣΩ. Γένεσις δὲ δὴ τίς τότ' ἦν, ᾧ ξένη, ζώων; καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἐγεννῶντο;

ΞΕ. Δῆλον, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἦν ἐν τῇ τότε φύσει γεννώμενον, τὸ δὲ γηγενὲς εἶναι ποτε γένος λεχθὲν τοῦτ' ἦν τὸ κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ἐκ γῆς πάλιν ἀναστρεφόμενον, ἀπεμνημονεύετο δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων προγόνων τῶν πρώτων, οἱ τελευτώσῃ μὲν τῇ προτέρᾳ περιφορᾷ τὸν ἐξῆς χρόνον ἐγειτόνουν, τῆσδε δὲ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐφύοντο· τούτων γὰρ οὔτοι κήρυκες ἐγένονθ' ἡμῖν τῶν λόγων, οἱ νῦν ὑπὸ πολλῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπιστοῦνται. τὸ γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν οἶμαι χρῆ συννοεῖν. ἐπόμενον (Stallbaum, ἐχόμενον *mss*)<sup>29</sup> γὰρ ἐστὶ τῷ (T, Eus. [IO]; τὸ βW, Eus. [BN]) τοὺς πρεσβύτας ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παιδὸς ἰέναι φύσιν, ἐκ τῶν τετελευτηκότων αὐτῶν, κειμένων δὲ ἐν γῆ, πάλιν ἐκεῖ συνισταμένους καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένους, ἔπεσθαι (om. β) τῇ

<sup>29</sup> I follow Stallbaum's emendation ἐπόμενον of the manuscript ἐχόμενον, accepted by the majority of editors: ἐχόμενον in the meaning 'next to, related to, partaking in' normally governs the genitive and not the dative (ἐάν τις σε τὰ ἐχόμενα τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ, *Gorg.* 494 e 2–3, was similarly changed into τούτων by I. Bekker; but E. R. Dodds [ed.], Plato, *Gorgias* [Oxford 1959] ad loc., retains the manuscript text, making τούτοις dependent on ἐφεξῆς, not on ἐχόμενα); 271 c 3, κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε ἔπεται τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν gives some support to this emendation. Campbell's suggestion ἐχόμενον ... τοῦ τοῦ πρεσβύτας will give a sense similar to that of Stallbaum, while his cautious defence of ἐχόμενον with the dative is hardly acceptable; τὸ τοῦ πρεσβύτας κτλ. of one part of the manuscripts (the family β, and a part of Eusebius' mss.) might be an attempt to emend the text with ἐχόμενον; this attempt makes the awkward syntax even more awkward and turns the ageing backwards into one of the results of an unclear antecedent, instead of it being this antecedent. It is interesting that the participle ἐπόμενον, normally governing the dative in Plato, may govern also the genitive (*Pol.* 271 e 3, see, however, Campbell ad loc., for an alternative construction; *Rep.* 504 b 10 with J. Adam ad loc.; *Leg.* 899 c 8 συνεπόμενα with E. B. England).

τροπή συνανακυκλουμένης εἰς τάναντία τῆς γενέσεως, καὶ γηγενεῖς δὴ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐξ ἀνάγκης φυομένους, οὕτως ἔχειν τοῦνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον, ὅσους μὴ θεὸς αὐτῶν εἰς ἄλλην μοῖραν ἐκόμισεν.  
NE. ΣΩ. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε ἔπεται τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν.

The passage follows immediately the description of the reversal of the universe, the starting of ageing backwards until total disappearance of human beings (270 b 11 – 271 a 2). According to Carone, all these processes belong to the era of the Demiurge's withdrawal and this era is described until the word ἐπόμενον. The ἐπόμενον γὰρ ἐστὶ τῷ τοῦς πρεσβύτας κτλ. indicates, on the contrary, that the birth from the earth accompanied by the ageing backwards, from old age to childhood (τοῦς πρεσβύτας ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παιδὸς ἰέναι φύσιν), now transforms into the birth from the earth accompanied by the ageing forwards, from childhood to old age; ἔπεσθαι τῇ τροπῇ συνανακυκλουμένης εἰς τάναντία τῆς γενέσεως should point out to this reversal in the mode of ageing, i. e. that it changes into the opposite to the ageing backwards.<sup>30</sup> This change implies that the Demiurge returned to the helm, reverted the universe, and produced the new stock of the earth-born.<sup>31</sup> The exception at the end of this resuming sentence, ὅσους μὴ θεὸς αὐτῶν εἰς ἄλλην μοῖραν ἐκόμισεν, represents the god as an agent and thus confirms that we are already in the divine era, and not in the autonomous one, to which the ageing backwards belongs.

This alleged transition from one form of birth from the earth to another in the passage in question turns out, however, a ghost one. The immediate purpose of the whole reasoning is evident from the introductory statement and the resuming remarks of the ES. The YS wonders how living beings were created at the time of ageing backwards. The ES states that the sexual reproduction ceased to exist and the living beings were created from the earth; this creation cannot be called birth in absolute sense, but rather the revival of the dead. Our ancestors who lived in the beginning of our rotation and in the proximity to the previous one witnessed this mode of birth; they passed on to us the stories about the earth-born, stories suspected today, unjustly. What follows is only the endorsement of this unusual view, as shown in the resuming remark of the ES (καὶ γηγενεῖς δὴ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον<sup>32</sup> ἐξ ἀνάγκης φυομένους, οὕτως ἔχειν

<sup>30</sup> Brisson and Rowe assign all process of revival to the interim autonomous era, sandwiched between the era of Cronus and the contemporary era, while the traditionalists assign them all to the era of Cronus.

<sup>31</sup> Carone (n. 4) 97 f.

<sup>32</sup> The editors of the New Oxford Plato prefer the τὸν τρόπον of Eusebius to τὸν λόγον of Plato's mss; the former variant seems, however, to have originated from an attempt to avoid the repetition of the λόγος in the same sentence, repetition, which, in fact, is not alien to Plato's style. Anyway, τὸν τρόπον emphasises even more definitely that the whole passage is devoted to only one mode of generation.

τοῦνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον), which stresses the causal connection between the reversal of ageing and re-birth from the earth. The whole reasoning shows why it is logical to accept as credible the contemporary stories about the earth-born and, at the same time, to elucidate, in accordance with the usual narrative strategy of the ES, how these stories distort the truth – they fail to mention that the birth from the earth was the direct result of the ageing backwards.

This final remark refers also to the contemporary stories about the earth-born (οὕτως ἔχειν τοῦνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον, i. e. ‘they have the name [of the earth-born] and the corresponding stories’), and resumes the beginning of the reasoning: the earth-born created by the ageing backwards were witnessed by our ancestors at the dawn of the contemporary era (τούτων γὰρ οὗτοι κήρυκες ἐγένονθ’ ἡμῖν τῶν λόγων, οἱ νῦν ὑπὸ πολλῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπιστοῦνται).<sup>33</sup> Hence, the form of generation that ceased to exist at the dawn of our era was the same that appeared together with the start of development backwards, i. e. with the return of the Demiurge to the helm, according to the TI.

So far, there is no reason to insert the transition from the earth-born of the era with ageing backwards to the earth-born with the aging forwards. The sentence, which, according to Carone, introduces the new phase in creation of living beings (ἐπόμενον γὰρ ἔστι τῷ τοῦς πρεσβύταξ κτλ.), simply indicates that the birth from the earth was a natural consequence of the ageing backwards: if the old are getting young, the infants are disappearing and dying, then the dead should follow the same reversed order of events and thus revive (Greek tradition, let us remember, knows the birth, but not the re-birth of the dead, from the earth).<sup>34</sup> Taken that the συνανακυκλουμένης εἰς τάναντία τῆς γενέσεως refers to the same ‘reversal of generation’, from the ageing forwards to the ageing backwards, as described before, the controversial sentence may be rendered as follows:

For it was the sequence [or the next step] of the development from the old age to the childhood that the [earth-born], having been formed again from the dead lying in the earth and coming back to life, followed the reversal [of the universe], when the generation began to circle back together with this reversal,

<sup>33</sup> According to Carone (n. 4) 100 n. 42 the sense of these words is that our ancestors witnessed not exactly this birth from the earth with the accompanying ageing backward, but another generation *of the same type* which emerged in the transitional era between the age of Cronus and our epoch; the arguments in favour of this transitional era are untenable, as we shall see; the immediate context does not imply this duplication of the eras either.

<sup>34</sup> Both ἐπόμενον and τὸ γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν, as well as the ἔπεται in the approving answer of the YS (271 c 3, κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν οὗτο γε ἔπεται τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν) may have the meaning both of causal connection and of temporal succession. The crucial point is not the choice between these two meanings, as Carone puts it, but the question whether the temporal succession implies the break of causal connection, as she wishes the case were. In my view, nothing suggests this break. Cf. *Polit.* 293 a ἐπόμενον (sc. ἔστι) τούτῳ introduces the next step in the argument.

and having thus come into existence in the necessary way as the earth-born, according to this reasoning, have this name and this reputation in the sense *as explained above*, – all those whom god did not translate to another destiny.<sup>35</sup>  
Y. S. Yes, this follows certainly from what went before.<sup>36</sup>

Now, taken that the ageing backwards and regeneration are results of the Demiurge's return to the helm and the reversal of the universe to the direction opposed to the contemporary (as I have argued), the reasoning we have just discussed must refer to the divine era. The exception at the end of the passage (ὅσους μὴ θεὸς αὐτῶν εἰς ἄλλην μοῖραν ἐκόμισεν) is in agreement with this view; and the point that our ancestors, who lived in the proximity to the previous rotation witnessed those who revived from the earth as an effect of ageing backwards, confirms the traditional view that the era of the Demiurge precedes *immediately* our era.

We are now in the better position to assess another passage, which adjoins this explanation of the revival. Answering the question of the YS, whether the era of Cronus belongs to the contemporary rotation of the universe or to the earlier one, the ES states that this era in no way belongs to the contemporary rotation, it *also* belongs to the earlier one (271 c 4 – d 4):

NE. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸν βίον ὃν ἐπὶ τῆς Κρόνου φῆς εἶναι δυνάμεως, πότερον ἐν ἐκείναις ἦν ταῖς τροπαῖς ἢ ἐν ταῖσδε; τὴν μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄστρον τε καὶ ἡλίου μεταβολὴν δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἑκατέραις συμπίπτει ταῖς τροπαῖς γίνεσθαι.  
ΞΕ. Καλῶς τῷ λόγῳ συμπαραηκολούθηκας. ὃ δ' ἦρου περὶ τοῦ πάντα αὐτόματα γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἥκιστα τῆς νῦν ἐστὶ καθεστηκυίας φορᾶς, ἀλλ' ἦν καὶ τοῦτο τῆς ἔμπροσθεν. τότε γὰρ αὐτῆς πρῶτον τῆς κυκλήσεως ἦρχεν ἐπιμελούμενος ὅλης ὁ θεὸς κτλ.

The most obvious sense of this conversation is that the era of Cronus belongs *also* to the rotation that immediately precedes the contemporary one, like

<sup>35</sup> I take it that τῆ τροπῆ [sc. the reversal of the universe] depends both on ἔπεσθαι and on συνανακυκλουμένης, συνανακυκλουμένης εἰς τάναντία τῆς γενέσεως being the *genetivus absolutus*, cf. 270 d 3 for a similar construction with a similar sense. Another possibility is that τῆς γενέσεως κτλ. depends on τῆ τροπῆ (the revived followed the reversal of the generation that started together with the reversal of cosmic revolutions, συνανακυκλουμένης implies τῷ κόσμῳ). The omission of ἔπεσθαι in β approved by Campbell as the genuine reading is certainly possible (τῆ τροπῆ συνανακυκλουμένης εἰς τάναντία τῆς γενέσεως would be in that case the *genetivus absolutus*).

<sup>36</sup> ἔπεσθαι τῆ τροπῆ συνανακυκλουμένης εἰς τάναντία τῆς γενέσεως, independent on the treatment of the syntax, shows (as Carone [n. 4] 72 rightly stresses) that the story suggests the strict correspondence between the development of living beings and the direction of cosmic revolutions. This rules out an otherwise possible modification of the traditional view, namely that the living beings develop forwards in both eras, the Cronus' and the contemporary one, although the universe rotates in the opposite directions, and that the ageing backwards took place only at the moment of the reversal, which made the time go back only for those who lived at this moment.

the ageing backwards and the revival of the dead, mentioned before. Rowe, however, argues *contra* that the remark that accompanies the question of the YS, ‘there is a cosmic reversal in each of two rotations’ (τὴν μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄστρον τε καὶ ἡλίου μεταβολὴν κτλ.),<sup>37</sup> would be irrelevant for the traditional two-phase interpretation. The remark, according to him, implies a radical difference of the conditions of the age of Cronus and of the present era, which should be explained by cosmic reversal. Since, however, the reversal at the end of the present era is hardly pertinent (Rowe assumes that ἐν ἑκατέραις συμπίπτει ταῖς τροπαῖς points to the reversals *at the end* of each two rotations), ἐν ἑκατέραις should mean at the end of the divine era and at the end of the interim era. Thus, the question of the YS is whether the age of Cronus belongs to the rotation steered by the Demiurge (ἐν ἐκείναις ταῖς τροπαῖς) or to the contemporary rotation (ἐν ταῖσδε), but the latter embraces *two* rotations, that of the interim era and of the contemporary one, which have *opposite* (!) directions.<sup>38</sup> This is awkward enough, and becomes even more awkward when the ES answers ἥκιστα τῆς νῦν ἐστὶ καθεστηκυῖας φοράς, ἀλλ’ ἦν καὶ τοῦτο τῆς ἔμπροσθεν, thus showing that he understands under the present rotation only the contemporary one, since καθεστηκυῖα φορά would be an absurd expression for two opposite rotations.

In fact the meaning of this conversation is simple. The question is whether the age of Cronus occurs during the more remote reversals of the universe or during the contemporary ones (πότερον ἐν ἐκείναις ἢ ἐν ταῖς τροπαῖς ἢ ἐν ταῖσδε). The following remark explains uncertainty of the YS: the μεταβολαί of the sun and the stars, i. e. the reversals of the universe, happen during *both* modes of rotation (τὴν μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄστρον τε καὶ ἡλίου μεταβολὴν δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἑκατέραις συμπίπτει ταῖς τροπαῖς γίνεσθαι). The remark is pertinent, for the TI, – the age of Cronus, according to the preamble of the story, is a part of evidence in tradition for the reversals of the universe and accompanying radical changes (269 a 7–b 3). Such changes are concomitants of two reversals – from the rotation steered by the god to the autonomous one and vice versa – and they occur *at the beginning* of each of the two rotations (270 b 10–12). Only these reversals and two opposite rotations are known to the YS and to the reader up to this moment, no matter whether the TI or the NI is correct. The YS thus shows that he is aware of the connection between appearance of the age of Cronus and one of the two reversals, but is uncertain with what reversal, or with what rotation exactly the age of Cronus should be linked.

At first sight, it is strange that the YS does not catch immediately that the age of Cronus is a part of the era of Demiurge’s rule. One should take in account,

<sup>37</sup> It is preferable to understand τροπαί here and in the preceding sentence as ‘revolutions’, not ‘reversals’ (Rowe [n. 2] 191 ad 271 c 4–7, against Brisson), not only because otherwise it makes ἄστρον τε καὶ ἡλίου μεταβολὴν pleonastic, but also because the ES renders in his answer τροπαί as φορά.

<sup>38</sup> Rowe (n. 2) 191–192 ad 271 c 4–7; 192 ad 271 d 2.

however, that the previously described processes of ageing backwards, destruction of the previous generation and revival of the new generation from the earth (all these being consequences of the Demiurge's return, according to the TI) were not favourable to human beings. Moreover, it is not entirely correct, as Rowe assumes, that the YS should have grasped immediately that the differences in conditions between Cronus' age and our world imply the cosmic reversal *between* them: the tradition does not transmit any evidence of any catastrophe on the cosmic scale separating Cronus' age from the contemporary universe. The YS might have thought that the beginning of the contemporary era was a more appropriate moment for Cronus' age than the era of the Demiurge's rule.

The question of the YS thus supposes only two opposite rotations, one under the rule of the Demiurge and the other autonomous. The reply of the ES introduces no modification: the age of Cronus was *also* during the previous rotation, and it was the rotation opposite to the contemporary one.<sup>39</sup> Thus, no interim era is implied in this part of the dialogue, and the *also* testifies that the age of Cronus belongs to the same era to which the reversal of ageing and regeneration from the earth described in the previous part belong.

There remains, if my previous argumentation is correct, only one passage that allegedly proves, according to the proponents of the NI, that living beings in the age of Cronus developed forwards, as nowadays, in contrast to the earth-born who were created as the result of the ageing backwards. This is the passage related to the end of the Demiurge's rule (272 d 6 – e 6):

ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάντων τούτων χρόνος ἐτελέωθη καὶ μεταβολὴν ἔδει γίνεσθαι καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ γήινον ἤδη πᾶν ἀνήλωτο γένος, πάσας ἐκάστης τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς γενέσεις ἀποδεδωκυίας, ὅσα ἦν ἐκάστη προσταχθὲν τοσαῦτα εἰς γῆν σπέρματα πεσοῦσης, τότε δὴ τοῦ παντός ὁ μὲν κυβερνήτης, οἷον πηδαλίων οἶακος ἀφέμενος, εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ περιωπὴν ἀπέστη, τὸν δὲ δὴ κόσμον πάλιν ἀνέστρεφεν εἰμαρμένη τε καὶ σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία.

The proponents of the NI believe that the comparison of the souls with the seeds that fall into the earth implies that the development of the earth-born in the era of Cronus was the same as nowadays, from infant to the old.<sup>40</sup> Presumably,

<sup>39</sup> For this reason, since the YS envisages only these two opposite rotations and the ES accepts the same alternative, one should reject the proposal of Carone (n. 4) 98 that the answer ἀλλ' ἦν καὶ τοῦτο τῆς ἔμπροσθεν implies not the era immediately preceding the contemporary (it should have the rotation opposite to the contemporary rotation), but the era earlier than the contemporary (it can rotate in the same direction).

<sup>40</sup> According to Carone (n. 4) 94 f., 97, the souls falling into the earth as seeds in the era of Cronus imply the normal process of development, like the plants in that era presumably had. Rowe notices that an abundance of spontaneously grown fruits in the era of Cronus (272 a 4–5) implies that the plants developed then forwards, and infers that the same is true for the animals and human beings. In my view, Plato might have not considered at all how this

they suppose something like the process of organic development, surely of an extraordinary type, but still entailing the formation of a germ in the earth, its growth and development into the organism as in womb, and then the appearance of the living being from the earth and their further development forwards.<sup>41</sup> First, it should be said that not the souls themselves are compared with the seeds, but their falling in the earth is compared with sowing ('each soul fell in the earth so many times in a way of sowings as it had been prescribed to the each').<sup>42</sup> Now, the 'sowing' of the souls on the earth and planets by the Demiurge in the *Timaeus* (42 d) does not imply any following gradual development of the organism, as if from the germ. On the contrary – the lesser gods, who overtake the task of creation from the Demiurge, mould the bodies for the souls sown by him.<sup>43</sup> The sowing in the *Statesman* does not

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traditional feature of the era of Cronus may be harmonized with the processes of growth he describes; however, if he did, he may well have implied that the plants were produced by the divine force in the same way as the living beings, without any sowing, from the remnants of plants of the previous era; their development should be accordingly the same, from the old age through flourishing up to diminution and total destruction at the end.

<sup>41</sup> Note that according to the NI the sowing implies that the soul is a germ from which the body develops, the idea certainly alien to Plato.

<sup>42</sup> The phrase is often misconstrued, as if σπέρματα is apposed to the τῆς ψυχῆς ... πεσοῦσης. However, if it were the case, we would have expected the *genitive* σπερμάτων; in fact, τοσαῦτα σπέρματα πεσοῦσης is the internal accusative (cf. examples in *Kühner – Gerth*, I. 305–307), which means 'so many sowings', as pointed out already K. F. Hermann (*Platonis opera* [Lipsiae 1872], praef. XXIX ad loc.: "σπέρματα ipsas cadendi vices significare"; Hermann rejected the emendation proposed by H. Sauppe τῆς ψυχῆς ... εἰς γῆς σπέρματα πεσοῦσης as superfluous); cf. Campbell (n. 8) 62 f. ad loc., who compares for the verbal meaning of σπέρμα Hes. *Op.* 781 (Μηνὸς δ' ἰσταμένου τρεῖσκαδεκάτην ἀλέασθαι / σπέρματος ἀρξασθαι) and Soph. *OR* 1246; see on Hesiod M. L. West (ed.), Hesiod, *Works and Days* (Oxford 1978) 355 ad *Op.* 781. This usage of σπέρματα may have an archaic flavour, as indeed the phrase itself.

<sup>43</sup> Typically, Plato re-interprets the birth by the earth of the Greek myths as creation from the earth by the god(s): according to Protagoras' myth (*Prot.* 320 d), the humans are moulded and equipped with everything necessary in the depth of the earth by the gods; the future guardians of the Kallipolis should be persuaded by the 'Phoenician lie' that they are born from the earth (*Rep.* III. 414 d–415 a), and this entails that they are created by a god (415 a 4: ὁ θεὸς πλάττων). Plato's resistance to the idea of spontaneous generation is not only implicit: in the *Phaedo* (96 b 2–3) Socrates criticises, among the other doctrines of his predecessors who admitted in their cosmogonies material causality only and ignored rational agency, the view that the living beings are generated by putrefaction produced by 'the hot' and 'the cold'; the creation of the humankind by the gods in the *Tim.* 42 d is clearly presented as an alternative to these materialistic views: the Demiurge (see above) sows the souls into the Earth, the Moon and the other planets and then hands over to the subordinate gods to mould the human bodies; the creation of the Athenians by Athena and Hephaistos in the *Critias* (109 d 1–2) obviously illustrates this latter process. The mechanistic formation of living beings in the interim era, as the proponents of the NI suggest, would be out of tune with this insistent creationist stance. Only in the earlier *Menexenus* (238 b 1–2) the earth

need to imply the gradual development of an embryo and the ageing forwards. There are reasons to believe, as we shall see, that the lesser gods play in the *Statesman* myth the creative role similar to that in the *Timaeus*.

The birth from the earth in the result of the ageing backwards is described as the re-formation of the dead bodies, which lay in the earth, and their revival: *πάλιν ἐκεῖ συνισταμένους καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένους* (271 b 7). Brisson and Rowe treat this formation of living beings as purely mechanical and assign it to the period deprived of divine rule.<sup>44</sup> There are two indications in the text that prove, to the contrary, that this is the process directed by divine forces.<sup>45</sup> The first is the retrospective *γάρ* at 272 a 1 already cited (*ἐκ γῆς γὰρ ἀνεβιώσκοντο πάντες*), where the revival from the earth in the age of Cronus is mentioned. It implies that it is the same mode of birth as explained above (271 b 7), i. e. revival of the dead that was the result of the ageing backwards. The second indication is in the beginning of the description of the contemporary era: here the ES opposes the new form of sexual reproduction and parenting to the creation of living beings with the help of external agents in the era of the god's rule (274 a 3 – b 1):

οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν ἔτ' ἐν γῆ δι' ἐτέρων συνιστάντων φύεσθαι ζῶον, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τῷ κόσμῳ προσετέτακτο αὐτοκράτορα εἶναι τῆς αὐτοῦ πορείας, οὕτω δὲ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν, καθ' ὅσον οἶόν τ' ἦν, φύειν τε καὶ γεννᾶν καὶ τρέφειν προσετέτακτο ὑπὸ τῆς ὁμοίας ἀγωγῆς.

The passage refers to the mode of creation under the god's rule as something the reader already knows. Now, as we have seen, this mode was not described explicitly, but only briefly referred to (272 a 1, *ἐκ γῆς γὰρ ἀνεβιώσκοντο πάντες*) as identical to the mode of birth that appeared as a consequence of the ageing backwards (271 b 7, *πάλιν ἐκεῖ συνισταμένους καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένους*). Thus, the reference in 274 a 3 is related ultimately to 271 b 7, and *πάλιν ἐκεῖ συνισταμένους καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένους* (271 b 7) is the same process as *ἐν γῆ δι' ἐτέρων συνιστάντων* (274 a 3), the creation of the living beings by the divine forces, not the 'mechanistic process' of formation in the earth of the proponents of the NI, for which there is no traces in the story at all.

Now to a more difficult point: the final stage of the development backwards is diminishing and total disappearance of a body (270 e 8–10). On the other hand, the earth-born of the era of Cronus are the dead who, *lying in the earth*, were put together again and revived (271 b 4–7). Here arises a difficulty for the TI: if the revived of the divine era were those who had died in the course of

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itself is represented in a more traditional vein, as a *creatrix* who then gives her children to the gods for education.

<sup>44</sup> Rowe (n. 2) 191 ad 271 b 6–7; 194 ad 272 d 8–e 3; idem (n. 3) 166 n. 9.

<sup>45</sup> Rowe ([n. 3] 166 n. 9) takes into account this possibility but regards these indications as non-conclusive.

ageing backwards, there would have been no remnants in the earth to make new bodies for them.<sup>46</sup> Rowe uses this discrepancy to show that the development backwards and the revival as its consequence belong not to the divine era, but to the era of god's withdrawal, and that those who came back to life (born old from the earth) were those who had died in the previous, divine era (described later in the text, as he believes). According to his interpretation, those who came back to life in the era of Cronus as the earth-born were totally different: they were produced by gods with new bodies, "from the sowing of earth with souls", grew from the earth as infants, developed normally, died old and came back to life as grey-haired in the next era after the Demiurge's withdrawal.<sup>47</sup>

However, given that the development backwards and the revival of the dead as its consequence belong to the era of the Demiurge's return, as I argue, the difficulty is easily overcome: the revived under the rule of the god were those who had died in the previous era of the autonomous universe.<sup>48</sup> This explains why the end of the era of Cronus coincides with *using up the entire earth-born generation* (272 d 6–e 1): ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάντων τούτων χρόνος ἐτελεώθη καὶ μεταβολὴν ἔδει γίγνεσθαι καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ γήνον ἤδη πᾶν ἀνήλωτο γένος, πάσας ἐκάστης τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς γενέσεις ἀποδεδωκυίας, ὅσα ἦν ἐκάστη προσταχθὲν τοσαῦτα εἰς γῆν σπέρματα πεσοῦσης. If the revived of the divine era were those who had died during that era, who grew forwards, died old and were created permanently, as Rowe proposes, the process might have continued endlessly.<sup>49</sup> But if the revived were those who had died in the previous era, the revival had its natural end, and this again explains why every soul fell into the earth the prescribed number of 'sowings': it had to incarnate as many times as it was necessary to revive the all dead of the previous era.<sup>50</sup> The revival during the divine era of those who had died during the

<sup>46</sup> See e. g. Skemp (n. 8) 114: "they live from maturity to infancy in the opposite course to us and *disappear in utmost infancy into the earth to be the seed of further generations of the earth-born*" (my italics).

<sup>47</sup> Rowe (n. 2) 191 ad 271 b 6–7; 194 ad 272 d 8–e 3; 196 ad 274 a 3–4.

<sup>48</sup> Here I develop a brief proposal of Lane ([n. 5] 105 with n. 8), in her criticism of Rowe. Earlier, Campbell ([n. 8] 54 ad v. 1 and 68 ad v. 1) made a similar albeit less clear proposal, but it seems to have been overlooked by other scholars.

<sup>49</sup> Rowe (n. 3) 164 n. 6, 166 n. 9 supposes that the adjective γήινος was chosen with the purpose to distinguish the earth-born of the era of Cronus from the earth-born of the following interim era, who are called γηγενεῖς. In fact, the epithets imply no difference (γήινος means simply 'of the earth matter', see e. g. *Phaedr.* 246 c 3; *Epin.* 981 c 8; 982 a 6; 984 b 3; cf. Semon. 7. 21 f. West: τὴν δὲ πλάσαντες γήινην Ὀλύμπιοι ἔδωκαν ἀνδρὶ πηρόν).

<sup>50</sup> The amount of souls is fixed, according to the *Rep.* 611 a; it is equal to the amount of the stars, according to the *Tim.* 41 d 8–e 1; apparently, the number of the dead of the autonomous era exceeds this amount. An alternative proposal (D. O'Brien, *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle* [Cambridge 1969] 90 f.; Rowe [n. 2] 194 ad loc.) is that the limit of

autonomous era, similar to one in which we live, full of defects and sins, is certainly much more meaningful and relevant for us than the revival of those who had died during the blessed and sinless era of the divine rule during the alleged third era, the distorted counter-world, on which nothing is reported in the story, apart of the ageing backwards, according to the NI.

Some other details of the revival of the dead are significant: since the souls, following the order of the Demiurge, had to fall into earth several times, the revival of the dead of the previous era was not simultaneous. Rather, it was a gradual process, which went together with the rotation of the universe in the direction opposite to that of the autonomous era – one can imagine that when the universe attained the certain point, those who died at that moment came to life.<sup>51</sup> The souls, most naturally, had to incarnate into the bodies in which they incarnated previously, during the autonomous era, but now in the order opposite to the order of their previous incarnations. Plato in general does not think that the next incarnation of any soul in the autonomous era is necessarily worse than the previous one (there are certainly those who are able, due to virtuously lived life, to improve their lot in the next generation, see further on the minority exempted from the revival), but for the majority of souls it is certainly the case. The reverse order of incarnations makes for them possible to attain, under the divine guidance, the initial perfection they did not attain by their own efforts during the autonomous era:<sup>52</sup> they now ought to live back their previous incarnations in order to escape from the sins they had committed previously, and to do so under the divine control, which rules out any possibility of further sins.

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incarnations is implied in the doctrine of the *Phaedrus*, where *all* souls fallen from the highest of the heaven should regain their wings after ten incarnations in 10 000 years and return to the heavenly region, except the souls of those who lived three philosophical lives one after another and are released quicker, only in 3000 years (*Phaedr.* 248 e–249 a; cf. 257 a on floating of the worse souls around for 9000 years between incarnations). This proposal is less plausible, since, contrary to the *Phaedrus*, each soul in the *Statesman* should incarnate individual number of times, not one and the same number for all. Moreover, the widespread belief that the cycle of reincarnations in the *Phaedrus* implies the cosmic cycle (already Ed. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* II/1 [Leipzig 1922] 811 n. 4, identified the period of reincarnations in *Phaedr.* 248 c–e with the *Weltjahr*) is not correct: since the souls fall on the earth not simultaneously, the period of 10 000 years for one soul does not coincide with the same period for another.

<sup>51</sup> The present participles συνιστάμενους και ἀναβιωσκομένους ... φουμένους (271 b 7–c 1) confirm that the revival should be seen as a continuous process. It is not clear for me why Rowe ([n. 3] 166 n. 9) believes that if all those revived in the era of Cronus were the dead of the previous epoch, the divine era would have been enormously short (for this reason, he prefers to assign the process of revival to the interim epoch, which *is* short on his interpretation). Presumably, he admits that the revival must be simultaneous, but it is certainly not the case.

<sup>52</sup> According to the *Timaeus* (41 e), the souls have equal chances at the point of their first incarnation and the Demiurge is free of suspicion of unfairness to any of them.

The proponents of the NI resist the view that the ageing backwards may be an element of the Demiurge's rule. We have seen that this abnormal development makes sense as far as the fortune of souls is concerned. But it has also other important functions. As we have seen, it is an effective device to remove from the stage the deprived people of the autonomous era, and an ingenious explanation of the birth from the earth, an essential constituent of the divine era. Moreover, both the question of the YS and the answer of the ES (271 a 3–5) show that they take incompatibility of ageing backwards and sexual reproduction for granted, presumably because an embryo would diminish and disappear, instead of growing, in the era of development backwards. Now one of the important elements of the rule of the Demiurge is the absence of family, which is necessary to contrast the all-controlling ruler of that era with the ruler of the contemporary world, whose competence is much more limited, *inter alia* by the parental power. Without the ageing backwards it would be necessary to find some additional device to explain why not only the first generation of the Cronus' people was the earth-born, but also the next generation was produced from the earth, from the ashes of the dead of the previous era.

At the same time, the ageing backwards is an appropriate demonstration of the divine agency in its effects upon natural processes. The ageing backwards is not an automatic process, it implies overriding the usual growing old and degradation, which are inevitable under normal conditions.<sup>53</sup> And this corresponds finely to what one may expect from the salving action of the Demiurge, who, according to the story, conveys to the universe immortality and agelessness it had initially, at the moment of creation, by curing the illnesses it acquired during its autonomous existence (270 a 4–6; 273 e 3–5). The ageing backwards, which works on individual level, implies an analogous rejuvenating process on the scale of the universe. At the end of this process all dead of the previous era are revived and the totality of souls attains again its initial perfection. It also means that at the end of the divine era the universe is entirely clean from the dead bodies, and in the beginning of the next autonomous era it is perfect and sane, as it was when it was created.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>53</sup> There is a significant remark that the bodies of those, who suffered violent death in the time of ageing backwards, were destroyed so rapidly that there were no traces of them within a few days, *undergoing the same process as those who went through the normal back-ageing* (270 e 9–271 a 2). This acceleration of the processes opposite to rotting implies that supernatural forces stay behind the process of ageing backward. Rowe argues ([n. 3] 166 n. 9) that violent death cannot belong to the era of the god and contends that the ageing backwards is a part of the interim epoch, after the withdrawal of the god. But the violent death is a necessary concomitant of any reversal of the universe (see above).

<sup>54</sup> Although the reincarnations of souls backwards are more important than the revival of bodies, it seems nevertheless that purification of the earth from the dead bodies has also its own significance in the vision of cosmic cycles. The interest in this matter, of much

Now I turn to another debatable point: at what age the human beings were born from the earth in the era of Cronus? Here the difficulty lies in the passage that describes the end of the development backwards and the start of development forwards in the beginning of the contemporary era (273 e 6–11):

στρεφθέντος γὰρ αὖ τοῦ κόσμου τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν νῦν γένεσιν ὁδὸν τὸ τῆς ἡλικίας αὖ πάλιν ἴστατο καὶ καινὰ τὰναντία ἀπεδίδου τοῖς τότε. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ σμικρότητος ὀλίγου δέοντα ἠφανίσθαι τῶν ζῶων ηἰξάνετο, τὰ δ' ἐκ γῆς νεογενῆ σώματα πολλαὰ φύντα πάλιν ἀποθνήσκοντα εἰς γῆν κατήει.

L. Campbell and many scholars after him believed that the human beings in the age of Cronus were born from the earth as adults in prime of their life and then developed backwards into infants until they disappeared.<sup>55</sup> The *πολιὰ φύντα* in the cited passage would mean that these adult new-born in the moment of reversal suddenly *became grey* and began to die, instead of growing younger. According to J. Adam, however, *πολιὰ φύντα* means ‘born with grey hair’ (*πολιὰ φύντα*),<sup>56</sup> and this implies that in the age of Cronus the people were normally born as old and then went backwards through all ages to childhood and disappearance; now, in the moment of reversal, these new-born die, instead of their usual transformation. The proponents of the NI accept Adam’s understanding of *φύντα* as ‘born’. Since they believe that not the age of Cronus, but the interim era immediately precedes our contemporary rotation, they assign this development from old age to infancy to this era, completely abandoned by the god.<sup>57</sup>

The choice is not easy, but I think that Adam’s understanding of *πολιὰ φύντα* is preferable to that of Campbell, for the following reasons.<sup>58</sup> First of all, the ageing backwards, which, as I argued, started in the beginning of the divine era, was the development from old age to childhood and then to total disappearance (271 d 6–e 9), and the story does not imply any changes in this process.

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more realistic kind, can be seen from the special provision in the *Laws* (959 d 6–e 6), to bury only in the earth that is unsuitable for cultivation. There the considerations are not so much ecological as ethical and religious: facing inevitably lack of arable land in the course of time, the state would be constrained either to destroy graves or to sacrifice its urgent needs for the sake of piety. This might explain how increase of burials on the global scale became for Plato one of the symptoms of the universal decay. The famous exhumation of the dead on Delos, accompanied by the prohibition of burying on it in future, during purification of the island by the Athenians in the 420s (Thuc. 1. 8. 1; 3. 104. 1–2, see further R. Parker, *Athenian Religion* [Oxford 1996] 150) might have been a realistic counterpart to Plato’s eschatological vision.

<sup>55</sup> Campbell (n. 8) 54 and 68, followed by Diès (n. 8) XXXIV; P. Frutiger, *Les mythes de Platon* (Paris 1930) 243 n. 5; Skemp (n. 8) 110–111; McCabe (n. 5) 107 n. 56. Campbell’s main reason is that old age was unknown to Hesiod’s Golden Race.

<sup>56</sup> Adam (n. 8) II, 297, see also Ferrari (n. 5) 390 n. 2.

<sup>57</sup> Rowe (n. 2) 196 on 273 e 9–10; Carone (n. 4) 100, cf. 94.

<sup>58</sup> *φύομαι* + adjective certainly can have both meanings, ‘born as such’ or ‘grown as such’ (for the latter see 270 d 6–e 1).

Given the promptness of the author to paradoxes, one should not expect from him the silent admission of the young earth-born of the lore; on the contrary, *πολιὰ φύντα* would be an appropriate reminder that they were born as old.

Second, there is a more formal consideration: the passage depicts the end of previous development and the start of the opposite one; it focuses on two extreme points of the process – the infants, who are about to disappear, instead start to grow, and the new-born, who grew younger earlier, start to die. Now the first transformation is depicted as the beginning of the contemporary processes, as we know them – the infants started to grow, obviously at normal pace (*impf.* *ἡϋξάνετο*). The second transformation should be imagined as similar – the new-born began to die (*πάλιν ἀποθνήσκοντα εἰς γῆν κατήει*) – also gradually. Accordingly, these new-born should be old; if they were young or adults, one would expect that the story-teller would depict their gradual growing old, instead of immediate getting grey (*part. aor.* *φύντα*) and then dying.<sup>59</sup> The reminiscence of Plato's age of Cronus in Theopompus (Ael. *VH* 3.18 = *FGrH* 115 F 75 C) does not contradict this understanding, even if it does not support it directly.<sup>60</sup> If, as I argued, the revived of the divine era were the dead of the previous autonomous era, it is natural that they were revived as old (or the majority of them, at least), since in that era they developed forwards and died old, as nowadays.

So far, if one admits that the human beings were born as old before the reversal that initiated the contemporary era, the proponents of the NI have no means to demonstrate that the interim era, and not the era of Cronus immediately precedes the contemporary one. Since the story depicts that ageing backwards started when the Demiurge returned to the helm and no change in devel-

<sup>59</sup> If *ἐκ γῆς* depends on *φύντα*, rather than on *νεογενῆ*, we have a symmetrical structure with two descriptions of two opposite states before the reversal of ageing, and two verbs in the *imperfect* that describe the transformation in the beginning of it.

<sup>60</sup> Theopompus mentions the trees on the borders of the land of the *Meropes* which grow on the banks of two rivers, Grief and Pleasure. The fruits of the first make the eaters to cry the rest of their life, the fruits of the second to forget all previous desires and to live back all previous phases from the old age to childhood, then to the state of embryo and at last to total disappearance. Since E. Rohde ("Zum Griechischen Roman" [1894], in idem, *Kleine Schriften* II [Tübingen – Leipzig 1901] 22–24), this story is considered to be influenced by Plato. Frutiger (n. 55) 243 and Skemp (n. 8) 111, who assume that in Plato's era of Cronus the old age did not exist, find a difference between Theopompus and the *Statesman* (Frutiger supposed that Hesiod, Plato and Theopompus follow independently and develop differently the same tradition). In fact, independent on how development of living beings in Plato's era of Cronus is interpreted Theopompus certainly borrowed from the *Statesman* the ageing backwards from the old age to childhood and disappearance during the reversal of the universe (270 d 6–271 a 1). Moreover, he made not the permanent youth, but the ageing backwards an important constituent of blessed life, i. e. he believed (rightly, in my view) that Plato ascribes this detail not only to the transitional period but also to the era of Cronus.

opment of living beings is implied in the description of the age of Cronus, as I argued, the grey new-born are the last instances of the same process.

Hesiod represented the golden race *as having no old age to come* (*Op.* 112–115). Since the physical world and human organisms cannot be exempted from change entirely,<sup>61</sup> Plato ingeniously adapted Hesiod's image and made the old age as lying not in front of us, but behind us. Contrary to the prevailing view of the scholars, the development backwards is a part of idealization of physical conditions of man's existence: it is a constituent of blessed life to know that the troubles of old age do not wait you in future. But why did not Plato abandon the old age in this marvellous era entirely, in contrast to the prevailing stories about the Golden age, as well as to the stories of the earth-born, who were represented as adults, not as old? Probably because the world he depicts is not an ideal world of the dream, but rather the world of renovation and redemption of the contemporary era: the revived dead of the previous era should be mostly, albeit not exclusively, people of old age.<sup>62</sup> The inspiration for this idea could have been again Hesiod: Zeus will destroy the iron generation on the top of its vices, at the moment when the newborn turn out to be grey-headed (*Op.* 180 f.). Hesiod also hints at some improvement after the destruction of the contemporary generation (*Op.* 175), i. e. he seems to favour a cyclical view of the development of the humankind.<sup>63</sup> It looks like Plato reads Hesiod's prophecy of the end of the contemporary era as pointing to the beginning of the divine era when the living beings will be born as old.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>61</sup> See *Tim.* 37 d 3–4; cf. the similar approximation to divine inalterability: the reversal of rotation the universe received from the Demiurge is the minimal declination from the eternal movement the universe would have had if it were entirely divine (269 e d 7–e 3).

<sup>62</sup> The underlying idea might be that ageing backwards gives sufficient time for learning: those who lived long in the age of Cronus cumulated knowledge and experience while still preserving physical and mental abilities. Growing younger both in soul and body (270 d 5–8) need not imply diminishing of these abilities, at least, for the most part of life.

<sup>63</sup> Μηκέτ' ἔπειτ' ὄφελλον ἐγὼ πέμπτοισι μετεῖναι ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ πρόσθε θανεῖν ἢ ἔπειτα γενέσθαι. For the classical, Byzantine and modern debates whether these words imply Hesiod's faith in a better race in future, and thus a cyclical view of history, see Th. G. Rosenmeyer, "Hesiod und die Geschichtsschreibung" [1957], in E. Heitsch (ed.), *Hesiod, Wege der Forschung* 44 (Darmstadt 1966) 631–633; West (n. 42) ad loc.

<sup>64</sup> I follow here Adam's proposal ([n. 8] II, 296 f.). The other scholars who compared *Pol.* 273 e 6–11 with Hesiod's prophecy, stressed on the contrary the different role of grey-haired infants. In fact, the passage in the *Statesman* points to the *end* of the process of being born as old in the beginning of our era, while Hesiod prophesies the *beginning* of this process to come (in the end of contemporary rotation, in terms of the *Statesman*). Hesiod's verses are not free of ambiguity since τελέθωσιν can mean both 'become' and 'turn out to be', i. e. point either to the infants who grow grey-haired immediately after the birth, or to the infants born with grey hair; West ([n. 42] 199 ad loc.) points out rightly, that τελέθωσιν

Hesiod's people of the Golden race continue to live after their death as invisible guardians of mortals, the δαίμονες ἐπιχθόνιοι (*Op.* 122–123), i. e. they are not under the earth as the dead of the following generations. It is tempting to think that the latter detail inspired Plato when he exempted Cronus' people from the usual death: their bodies disappear at the end of life,<sup>65</sup> their souls, having performed all prescribed incarnations, become, before the beginning of the next autonomous era, the pure spirits, as in Hesiod. According to Hesiod, these spirits serve as the φύλακες, the invisible overseers of the contemporary humankind, in service of Zeus. There is, however, an 'improvement' on Hesiod in this point: according to the *Statesman* myth, the *daimones* rule the humankind in a much more direct way in the era of the Demiurge, under his supreme command.

There is an important hint in the myth itself at who these *daimones* might be: in the course of ageing backwards all the dead from the earth returned to life, apart from those whom the god took to another destiny, or more literally, the god carried them into another division (271 c 2 ὄσους μὴ θεὸς αὐτῶν εἰς ἄλλην μοῖραν ἐκόμισεν). It is tempting to see in these souls those, who, according to Plato's standard view, already attained perfection in their previous life (in the autonomous era, like the contemporary one, due to philosophical way of life)<sup>66</sup> and are released from further rein-

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in these verse has the latter meaning. Plato of course could interpret these verses as he wished, but there are reasons to think that he took them as pointing to the birth of grey-haired infants (see below).

<sup>65</sup> In the *Crat.* 397 e 12–398 a 2 Plato cites *Op.* 121 αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ μοῖρα κάλυψε versus κατὰ γαῖα κάλυψε of Hesiod's manuscripts. Some scholars prefer Plato's variant as more logical (the people of the Golden race in Hesiod *did not go* below the earth). West ([n. 42] 181 ad loc.) argues *contra* in defense of manuscripts that according to Hesiod their bodies were buried as usual and supposes that Plato's variant results from a slip of memory. However it might be (I suppose that Plato willingly or unwillingly adapted Hesiod's text to suit his own view of the *daimones*, but he also could have relied on somebody's attempts to make Hesiod's text more consistent), the citation in the *Cratylus* corresponds to the view of the *Statesman* that there were no buried bodies in the age of Cronus. When citing the following vv. 122 f. of the *Works and Days* in the *Cratylus* (loc. cit.) and in the *Republic* 469 a, Plato seems to give an 'improved' version: here it is omitted that the Golden race owed their posthumous lot to Zeus' will (Zeus' role contradicts *Op.* 111: the Golden race lived when Cronus, not Zeus, ruled, but corresponds to *Op.* 253: the invisible deities are Zeus' guardians of justice). Plato's version stresses the connection of the *daimones* with Cronus, not with Zeus, which is important for the myth in the *Statesman*. On the other hand, ὑποχθόνιοι (*Crat.* 398 a 1 mss βT versus ἐπιχθόνιοι mss δ; *Rep.* 469 a 1 and the rest of tradition) seems to be a real slip, influenced by similarly sounding *Op.* 141, made either by Plato or by scribes, since this variant definitely contradicts Plato's thought on the *daimones*.

<sup>66</sup> *Phaedo* 114 c, cf. 80 e–81 c; 82 c; it is necessary to live three philosophical lives during three successive incarnations, according to the *Phaedr.* 249 a; in the *Timaeus* (90 a–d) philosophy provides mental health and the salvation from reincarnations, either after the

carinations.<sup>67</sup> It is further tempting to identify these chosen souls with the *daimones*, who rule human herds in the god's era (it is hard to see what might be another reason of mentioning this exception). There is an insistent claim in some dialogues that the *daimones* are not the representatives of a certain race or of a certain age, but those among us who have attained perfection due to virtuous life and philosophy, the latter being the necessary precondition of the former.<sup>68</sup>

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first incarnation in the human form (42 b) or after numerous further incarnations, including that in the form of animals (42 c; 90 d); the released souls return to the unmoved stars they initially inhabited (42 b).

<sup>67</sup> Rowe ([n. 2] 191 ad 271 b 6–7, c 2; 193 f. ad 272 e 5), who treats, on the contrary, the ageing backwards and rebirth as mechanical processes of the interim era deprived of god's presence, sees in the exempted philosophers of the previous era of Cronus. The story-teller, however, leaves uncertain whether in this era pure knowledge was pursued at all (272 b–c). An alternative would be that the exempted from revival are sinners, whose souls are incurable and who bear the permanent penalty in the underworld. This possibility is rejected by Rowe, since he believes that revived are the people of the era of Cronus where there is no place for incurable sinners. If they are the dead of the autonomous era, as I argue, this is possible; nevertheless, it is far more effective to hint at the award for philosophers under the rule of the Demiurge, who controls the process of revival, than at the eternal punishment of the incurable that should have been imposed on them already in the previous era, by the underworld gods, as usual. An additional detail in favour of the high rank of these exempted souls: the expression ὅσους μὴ θεὸς αὐτῶν εἰς ἄλλην μοῖραν ἐκόμισεν is similar to the version of the Hes. *Op.* 121 Plato cites twice (*Crat.* 397 e–398 a; *Rep.* 469 a), on behalf of the Golden race appointed after the death to be the guardians of living humans: αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ μοῖρα κάλυψε (see above n. 65); cf. also his own paraphrase of these verses: ἐπειδὴν τις ἀγαθὸς ὢν τελευτήσῃ, μεγάλην μοῖραν καὶ τιμὴν ἔχει καὶ γίγνεται δαίμων κατὰ τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως ἐπωνυμίαν (*Crat.* 398 b 9–11).

<sup>68</sup> This notion underlies the etymology of δαίμων in the *Crat.* 397 b: the genuine form of the word is δαήμων, i. e. the wise – the *daimones* are not only the people of the Golden race, but *all* dead wise men. In the *Republic* (V. 468 e 3–469 b 3), the authority of Hes. *Op.* 122 f. provides to those members of the ruling class who excelled in virtue, posthumous worship after, either as *daimones*, or as divine beings, in accordance with the decision of Pythia: the earthly *phylakes* or their assistants are thus transformed in the heavenly *phylakes* of Hesiod. Again, the rulers who attained the highest philosophical knowledge, the Idea of the Good, after the death dwell on the Isles of the Blessed (Hesiod located there the dead heroes under the permanent rule of Cronus!) and are worshipped similarly as δαίμονες or as εὐδαίμονες and divine, depending on Pythia's prescription (*Rep.* VII. 540 b–c, oracle might be necessary, as otherwise it is not clear whether this virtuous life is the last of three virtuous lives, the *sine qua non* for release from further reincarnations). The special funerary rites, prescribed in the *Laws* for the dead εὐθνοὶ, who blamelessly performed their functions, are remarkably deprived of usual signs of mourning (white clothes of the procession, 947 b 4–5) and are free of pollution for attending priests, in contrast to usual funerals; Pythia again should approve these honours (947 b–d). This may imply the daemonic status of these chosen dead, as suggested O. Reverdin, *La religion de la cité platonicienne* (Paris 1945) 125–139.

Plato, I think, could not resist a temptation to promise that philosophers, the only true rulers, will govern the humankind in the divine era as pure spirits, even if they lived in our era as private persons; according to the *Republic*, they ought to perform their duties against their natural desire to follow contemplative life (496 b–497 b, 519 b–521 b); this earthly duty thus acquires an eschatological dimension in the *Statesman* myth.<sup>69</sup> Although these considerations might have impelled Plato to modify Hesiod's view on *daimones* as φύλακες of the contemporary humankind, this view probably was not abandoned altogether: at the end of the divine era, all souls, after a due number of incarnations, will attain the initial perfection; after that they should incarnate again in the era deprived of Demiurge's rule.<sup>70</sup> They will be the φύλακες of the contemporary humankind, as in Hesiod, but in the spiritualized sense: according to the *Timaeus*, the δαίμων represents the intelligence, the divine part in us that assures possibility for everybody to return to the original perfect state (42 c 1–d 2; 90 a; c–d).

Some scholars believe that the development backwards in the age of Cronus causes the people of this era to lack memory.<sup>71</sup> But the very possibility that the people of Cronus could spend time accumulating knowledge, speaking to each other and animals for this purpose (272 b 8–c 6), even if the story leaves uncertain

<sup>69</sup> Plato treats the daemonic beings as intermediate between the gods and the humans in many different ways; there is no certainty that the *daimones* who rule over the humankind in the era of Cronus, according to the *Statesman* and the *Laws* (*Polit.* 271 e 5–7; *Leg.* IV. 713 c–e), are the souls elevated to this rank. Still, there is insistent tendency in Plato to treat the virtuous dead as daemonic deities, leaning on Hesiod (see the previous note). On the other hand, Plato re-interprets the old view of δαίμων as a human lot and as a human guardian in the sense that the δαίμων is the intelligent and deathless part of the soul created by the god and surviving through all incarnations; this δαίμων if he is duly cherished, provides return of the soul to its initial perfect state (*Tim.* 41 c 6–42 d 1; 90 a 2–d 7; cf. also *Leg.* 775 e: ἀρχὴ γὰρ καὶ θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἰδρυμένη σὺζει πάντα, τμῆς ἐὼν τῆς προσηκούσης αὐτῆ παρ' ἐκάστου τῶν χρωμένων λαγχάνη). Taking these two tendencies into account, it would not be too hazardous to identify the philosophical souls exempted from the incarnations with the *daimones* who rule in the age of Cronus in the *Statesman* myth.

<sup>70</sup> According to the *Tim.* 41 e, the Demiurge provides equal chances of salvation for each soul before their initial incarnation in the beginning of the world, thus freeing himself from responsibility for their further vices (42 d). The *Statesman* shows how this perfect state is attained again at the end of each era of the Demiurge's rule.

<sup>71</sup> H. Scodel, *Diaeresis and myth in Plato's Statesman*, Hypomnemata 85 (Göttingen 1987) 89 n. 9; Ferrari (n. 5) 393–394; McCabe (n. 5) 107. According to Ferrari, the lack of memory should explain why the people of Cronus do not possess *technai*. However, this is explained sufficiently by an ideal environment the story-teller refers to when he proceeds to describe inability of the humankind to cure itself when this Paradise came to the end in the beginning of the contemporary era (274 b 4–d 5).

whether they in fact did so, shows that they are not imagined as creatures without memory.<sup>72</sup> Further, the story implies the dim memory of the age of Cronus; the first humans of the contemporary era, i. e. the survived representatives of Cronus' epoch, preserve memory of the birth from the earth (271 a 5–b 4). This would be impossible if they acquired memory only after the transition to the contemporary way of reproduction and development.<sup>73</sup> In fact, the single explicit reference to the lack of memory is a part of the explanation why there were no states and no possession of wives and children in the reign of Cronus – the nurslings of Cronus possessed no memory of these things, since they all were revived from the earth (271 e 7–272 a 1).<sup>74</sup> Apparently, what is meant here is not oblivion of the events of their individual life, but oblivion of the previous era, when the state and the family existed. The intellectual experiment of the *Statesman* consists in possibility of living your previous life once again in the reverted order to avoid its mistakes, rather than in mechanic repetition of the same life. Keeping alive the memory of the individual past, while living backwards, would be essential for this life of redemption.<sup>75</sup>

(to be continued)

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<sup>72</sup> The purpose of this question, in my view, is not to evoke the negative answer and to point to disadvantages of the era of Cronus, as often assumed, or to hint, on the contrary, at the existence of philosophy in that era, as Rowe believes. Since the answer is earnestly uncertain, the purpose of the question is rather to show that the relative value of life depends entirely on whether it is devoted to pursuit of pure knowledge and that it depends on us whether we use favourite external circumstances for pursuit of knowledge or for consumption only. It also may hint that this pure knowledge arises independently from the development of crafts that emerges under constraints of need in the contemporary era only.

<sup>73</sup> Ferrari (n. 5) 393 in fact believes that the first representatives of the contemporary humankind acquired memory immediately after stop of ageing backwards; he compares this with the recollection of the divine teaching by the universe in its autonomous period. But the universe certainly possessed memory, otherwise it would not have been able to recollect the lessons of its creator.

<sup>74</sup> Carone ([n. 4] 106 n. 64) rightly points this out but argues that living beings under Cronus developed forwards.

<sup>75</sup> The state and family are unnecessary in the era of Cronus because they are replaced by the divine shepherds and by birth from the earth respectively. However it might be the case that the mankind, although unable to reproduce sexually, still had sexual desires. Thus, the destruction of memory of the previous mode of life might be an additional proviso to maintain a harmony. Cf. a distant analogy: the citizens of the ideal state, in the first instance the guardians and their assistants, should be persuaded that they had been born from the earth and that their previous life was only a dream (*Rep.* III. 414 d).

В статье критически рассматриваются различные варианты “новой интерпретации” мифа в платоновском *Политике* (Л. Бриссон, Кр. Роу, Г. Кароне), согласно которой космический цикл, описанный в этом мифе, состоит из трех фаз, а не из двух, как обычно понималось: космос под управлением божественного Демиурга вращается в том же направлении с востока на запад, что и в современную эру, живые существа во время обеих эр развиваются одинаковым образом – от детства к старости; между двумя этими фазами, в третью промежуточную эру, мир вращается с запада на восток, а живые существа развиваются в обратном направлении – от старости к детству. В противовес подобным толкованиям в статье защищается правильность традиционного понимания цикла как состоящего только из двух фаз – эры правления Демиурга (“век Крона”), когда мир вращается с запада на восток, а живые существа развиваются в направлении от старости к детству, и автономной эры, подобной современной. При этом доказывается, что уничтожение прежнего, деградировавшего рода людей в момент возвращения Демиурга к управлению космосом согласуется с его ролью в мифе как спасителя и обновителя мира; рождение из земли, которое миф трактует как воскрешение мертвецов, означает возвращение к жизни тех, кто жил в прежнюю, автономную эру: они появляются на свет, соответственно, стариками и проживают жизнь в направлении, обратном предыдущему существованию; вселение душ в воскресающие тела предполагает, таким образом, искупление прежней, неправильно прожитой жизни. Конечный пункт каждой божественной эры – восстановление всех душ в их начальном совершенстве и освобождение земли от мертвых тел – возвращает мир к тому состоянию, в котором он находился некогда в момент творения, согласно *Тимею*.

OPFERKULT UND VEGETARISMUS  
IN DER AUFFASSUNG GRIECHISCHER PHILOSOPHEN  
(4. JAHRH. V. CHR. BIS 4. JAHRH. N. CHR.)

In allen frühen Kulturen waren die Menschen von der Vorstellung geprägt, dass höhere Mächte existieren, die auf das menschliche Leben einwirken, und dass es notwendig sei, die Verbindung mit ihnen zu pflegen und ihnen Verehrung zu erweisen, da man sich als abhängig von ihnen verstand. Die Verehrung bekundete sich in Gebeten und in der Darbringung von Opfergaben. Es galt, die göttlichen Wesen freundlich zu stimmen oder ihren möglichen Groll zu besänftigen, damit sie wohlwollend zum Gedeihen und zum Schutz der Gemeinschaft, bei den Griechen der Polis, wirken. Die Opfergaben waren von verschiedener Art, zu nennen sind Trankspenden, Honig, gewisse Opferkuchen, auch Rauchopfer, bei weitem dominant aber waren in der griechischen Welt die Tieropfer.<sup>1</sup> Zu Ehren der Götter tötete man Schafe, Ziegen, Rinder, Schweine; dabei wurden gewisse Teile des Tieres für die Götter verbrannt, das Fleisch aber wurde gebraten und diente den Menschen als Festmahl. Homer berichtet, wie die Götter den Opferdunst des gebratenen Fleisches liebten; anscheinend bedurften sie der Opfer.<sup>2</sup> Die Ursprungslegende für die griechische Opferpraxis überliefert Hesiod in der Prometheus-Geschichte:<sup>3</sup> Das erste Opfer fand statt, als bei Mekone die Menschen und Götter sich trennten; demnach lebten zuvor Menschen und Götter

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<sup>1</sup> Zu den Opfern der Griechen vgl. M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* I<sup>2</sup> (München 1955) 132–157; J. Rudhardt, O. Reverdin (Hgg.), *Le Sacrifice dans l'Antiquité*, *Entretiens d'antiquité classique* 27 (Vandœuvres–Genève 1981), darin W. Burkert, "Glaube und Verhalten: Zeichengehalt und Wirkungsmacht von Opferritualen", 91–125, S. 107 zu den verschiedenen Arten der Opfer: θυσία meinen Fleischspeiseopfer, σφάγια Vernichtungsopfer. – Im folgenden wird nicht eingegangen auf Menschenopfer, auch nicht auf die Opfer, bei denen Tiere vollständig verbrannt wurden; behandelt werden nur die Speiseopfer, die das Mahl nach Tötung der Tiere einschlossen.

<sup>2</sup> Z. B. *Il.* 1, 317; 4, 49; 8, 548 ff.; 9, 498 ff.; *Od.* 18, 45; 118 f. Bei Kalypso, die fernab der Menschen lebt, wird betont, dass es dort keine Opfer gebe *Od.* 5, 100 ff. Wenn Demeter in Trauer um die geraubte Persephone alles Wachstum verhindert, leiden die Menschen Hunger und werden auch die Götter der Opfer beraubt; Zeus muss daher eingreifen, *Hymn. Demeter* 310 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Theog.* 535 ff.

gemeinsam, offenbar ohne dass Opfer nötig waren, auch besaßen die Menschen das Feuer nicht. Durch das Handeln des Prometheus, der den Göttervater Zeus zu täuschen suchte, wird der Kontrast zwischen Menschen und Göttern konstituiert und zugleich der Ritus der Tieropfer – zu welchem die Menschen das Feuer erhalten – begründet; als Gabe für die Götter werden Knochen und Fett verbrannt, das Fleisch aber verzehren die Menschen.

Dabei war die Ernährung der Griechen in früher und klassischer Zeit überwiegend vegetabil; sie werden ‘Getreideesser’, σιτοφάγοι, genannt.<sup>4</sup> Etliche Schriften des *Corpus Hippocraticum* handeln von der Zubereitung der Getreidenahrung, die das alltägliche Leben bestimmte.<sup>5</sup> Das Fleisch aber, das man aß, war fast ausschließlich das Fleisch der bei Opferfesten getöteten Tiere, also die Ausnahme-Nahrung, und die Tötung war ein ritueller Akt. Rein vegetarische Ernährung scheint jedoch in früherer Zeit als eine kuriose Besonderheit gegolten zu haben; so sind es in den homerischen Epen allein die Lotophagen, denen Odysseus mit seinen Gefährten begegnet, die ausschließlich Pflanzen verzehren, wobei der Lotos obendrein als eine Art Droge, die süchtig macht, beschrieben wird.<sup>6</sup>

In den mythischen Berichten wird das goldene Zeitalter als eine glückliche Phase ohne Blutvergießen geschildert. Bei Hesiod lebt das goldene Geschlecht unter Kronos “wie die Götter” und ohne jegliche Mühen; von Götterverehrung, gar von Opfern verlautet nichts. Im Gegensatz dazu wird das silberne Geschlecht dadurch charakterisiert, dass es der Hybris verfällt und die Götter nicht achten und verehren noch ihnen auf den Altären Opfer darbringen will, wie es der Brauch der Menschen ist.<sup>7</sup> Erst in dieser Phase sind also Opfer (vermutlich Tieropfer) vorausgesetzt. – Deutlich äußert sich Empedokles: Einstmals habe man nicht Ares, Zeus, Kronos, Poseidon verehrt, sondern allein Kypris; man besänftigte sie mit Duftstoffen, Honig, Opfertropfen und gemalten Tieren (!), der Altar aber wurde nicht mit Blut benetzt, denn es galt als höchster Frevel, zu töten und Getötetes zu essen. So waren damals auch alle Lebewesen in Freundschaft vereint. – Hier werden in einer speziellen Version des goldenen Zeitalters zwar Götterkult und Opfer einbezogen, jedoch ohne Blutvergießen, φόνοϛ, denn derlei

<sup>4</sup> *Od.* 9, 191; *Hdt.* 4, 109. Zur Ernährung vgl. H. Schneider, “Ernährung”, *Der neue Pauly* 4 (1998) 83 ff.; Jameson, “Fleischkonsum”, *ibid.*, 553 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Vgl. z. B. Hipp. *Vet. med.* c. 3, 5; 5, 3–5. Auch wird hier als Regel nur eine Mahlzeit täglich angenommen, μονοσιτεῖν, c. 10–11.

<sup>6</sup> *Od.* 9, 82 ff.; die Lotophagen essen ἄνθινον εἶδρα.

<sup>7</sup> *Erga* 109 ff.; 132 ff.

bedeutete Frevel und Schuld.<sup>8</sup> Die traditionelle griechische Opferpraxis erscheint daher als ein Abfall von der wahren Götterverehrung; so preist Empedokles jenen Menschen glücklich, der einen Reichtum göttlicher Gedanken besitzt:<sup>9</sup> er wird die Götter in der gebührenden Weise verehren, ohne Blutschuld zu begehen. – Auch Platon erzählt einmal, quasi als Märchen, von einem einstigen glückseligen Leben unter Kronos, als Menschen und Tiere miteinander freundlichen Umgang hatten und es kein gegenseitiges Auffressen, ἀλλήλων ἐδωδαί, gab; die Erde brachte von selbst Früchte in Fülle hervor.<sup>10</sup> Von Opfern wird hier nichts gesagt.

Im Unterschied zu solchen mythischen Bildern eines paradiesischen Daseins bedeutete in historischer Zeit der bewusste Verzicht auf Fleischnahrung einen Bruch mit der traditionellen Kultreligion und insofern eine Absonderung von der Polis-Gemeinschaft, deren Schutz man durch die Opfer von den Göttern erbat. Erinnert sei hier an die Anklage gegen Sokrates, er habe die Götter der Stadt nicht geehrt, und die apologetische Stellungnahme Xenophons: Sokrates habe offenkundig häufig geopfert sowohl zu Hause wie an den öffentlichen Altären der Stadt.<sup>11</sup> Eine bewusste vegetarische Lebensweise, nämlich die Enthaltung vom Opferfleisch, bedurfte daher gravierender Gründe.<sup>12</sup> Diese betreffen einerseits den Menschen selbst, seine Gesundheit an Körper und Seele, andererseits das Verhältnis zu den Tieren und schließlich die Auffassung der Götter und der Bedeutung der Opfer.

In früher Zeit (6./5. Jahrhundert) sind als Vertreter des Vegetarismus die Anhänger der orphischen und pythagoreischen Richtungen zu nennen. Dabei geht es für die Orphiker offenbar primär um die innere Reinheit. Das älteste Zeugnis für eine orphische Lebensweise findet sich bei Euripides: Theseus beschuldigt seinen Sohn Hippolytos, er prahle

<sup>8</sup> Empedokles 31 B 128 u. 130 D.–K. – Hingewiesen sei auf Pindar frg. 129 Sn.–M.: hier wird von den Eingeweihten gesagt, dass sie dereinst in ihrem glückseligen Jenseitsdasein auch “Opfer verbrennen in weitstrahlendem Feuer”. Tieropfer sind gewiss nicht gemeint.

<sup>9</sup> Empedokles 31 B 132 D.–K.

<sup>10</sup> Plat. *Politik.* 271 d ff. Zu vergleichen ist auch die Beschreibung eines seligen jenseitigen Lebens in Gemeinschaft mit Göttern, die in den Heiligtümern tatsächlich wohnen, im Mythos *Phaid.* 111 b.

<sup>11</sup> Xen. *Mem.* I, 1, 2.

<sup>12</sup> Zum Vegetarismus vgl. J. Haussleiter, *Der Vegetarismus in der Antike*, RVV 24 (Berlin 1935); U. Dierauer, *Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike*, Studien zur antiken Philosophie 6 (Amsterdam 1977); D. A. Dombrowski, “Porphyry and Vegetarism: A Contemporary Philosophical Approach”, *ANRW* II 36, 2 (1987) 774–791; dort weitere Literaturangaben.

mit seiner fleischlosen Nahrung, ἄψυχος βορά, nenne Orpheus seinen Herrn und halte einen Wust vieler Schriften in Ehren.<sup>13</sup> Die Fleischenthaltung der Orphiker wird ebenfalls bezeugt von Aristophanes<sup>14</sup> sowie von Platon, der in den *Nomoi* von ihrer Ablehnung der Blutopfer und des Fleischverzehrns spricht, da es unfrohm sei, die Altäre der Götter mit Blut zu beflecken, und der in der *Politeia* einen "Haufen" von Schriften, βίβλων ὄμαδος, erwähnt, nach denen diese Leute ihre Opfer durchführen, um damit Befreiung und Reinigungen von ungerechten Taten zu erzielen.<sup>15</sup>

Von einer Rücksicht auf die Tiere sagen die alten Berichte über die Orphiker nichts aus. Ganz anders verhält es sich bei Pythagoras und seinen Anhängern. Sie waren davon überzeugt, dass alle Lebewesen miteinander verwandt seien und die Tiere unsere Achtung verdienen. Für jene Zeit wird eine neue Lehre von der Seele, ihrer Unsterblichkeit sowie der Reinkarnation, in verschiedenen Zeugnissen dokumentiert; sie wird vertreten von den Orphikern (da man zumeist Aussagen Pindars dem orphischen Bereich zuordnet<sup>16</sup>) wie von den Pythagoreern, aber anscheinend nahmen nur diese an, dass Menschenseelen sich in Tieren inkarnieren können. Dass diese Lehre damals spöttisch betrachtet wurde, bezeugt Xenophanes.<sup>17</sup> Infolge einer solchen Auffassung konnte nun jede Tötung von Tieren als ein Verwandtenmord gelten, und die Ablehnung des traditionellen Opferwesens ergab sich als Konsequenz. Pythagoras hat keine Schriften verfasst, wir sind in vieler Hinsicht auf spätere Referate angewiesen. Seine Lehre hat aber unmittelbar nachgewirkt. Vieles wird bei Platon reflektiert, dabei auch abgewandelt. Hier sei einiges aus zwei spätantiken Berichten angegeben (3. Jahrh. n. Chr.): Porphyrios notiert in seiner *Vita Pythagorae* als wichtigste Lehre des Pythagoras, dass die Seele unsterblich sei und in andere Arten von Lebewesen überwechsle und dass alle lebendigen Wesen als verwandt anzusehen seien; unbedingt solle man sich der Fleischnahrung enthalten.<sup>18</sup> Jamblich betont in seiner Schrift über die pythagoreische Lebensführung, *Vita Pythagorica*, die Bedeutung der Reinheit und Heiligung

<sup>13</sup> Eur. *Hipp.* 952 ff. Dabei befindet Theseus sich im Irrtum über seinen Sohn, der als Jäger und Anhänger der Artemis gewiss kein Vegetarier war. Dennoch ist diese Textstelle wichtig für die damalige Einschätzung der Orphiker.

<sup>14</sup> Aristoph. *Ran.* 1032 ff.

<sup>15</sup> Plat. *Nom.* 782 c–d; *Polit.* 364 e. Vgl. ferner Plut. *Sept. sap.* 16, 159 C.

<sup>16</sup> Vgl. Pind. *Ol.* 2, 58 ff.; fr. 133 Sn.–M.

<sup>17</sup> 21 B 7 D.–K.: Pythagoras habe im Jaulen eines geprügelten Hundes die Stimme eines verstorbenen (als Hund wiedergeborenen) Freundes erkannt. Zu den Tierinkarnationen Pythagoras 14 fr. 1 D.–K. (Hdt. II, 123).

<sup>18</sup> Pythagoras 14 fr. 8 a u. 9 D.–K. (Porph. *V. Pyth.* c. 18–19 u. 6–7).

der Seele, die durch die richtige Lebensweise zu erzielen sei: Pythagoras habe alles verworfen, was den Göttern fremd ist und uns von der Angleichung an sie fernhält. Man dürfe das Fleisch der Opfertiere nicht essen, da sie uns verwandt sind und ihnen unsere Achtung gebührt. Den Göttern solle man keine Tiere opfern, sondern sie an unblutigen Altären verehren. Besonders Philosophen sollten sich des Fleisches enthalten, doch gelte dies auch für die Gesetzgeber, die absolute Gerechtigkeit zu üben hätten, also keine uns verwandten Wesen schädigen dürften.<sup>19</sup> Auf die Reinkarnation in Tiere weist Jamblich nur einmal beiläufig hin;<sup>20</sup> vermutlich stand er dieser Lehre skeptisch gegenüber. Sie wird auch keineswegs von allen späteren Pythagoreern akzeptiert. Platon bezieht sie in einige seiner Mythen ein, zumeist aber in ironischer Färbung.<sup>21</sup>

Uneingeschränkt wird die pythagoreische Überzeugung von der Verwandtschaft aller Lebewesen und der Reinkarnationen in deren verschiedene Arten von Empedokles übernommen, sie wird sogar erweitert, indem die Skala bis hinab zu den Pflanzen und hinauf bis zu einem Götterdasein reichen kann. Der Mensch ist aus einer höheren Sphäre schuldhaft hinabgestürzt in den irdischen Bereich und den Kreislauf hiesiger Inkarnationen; ein neuerlicher Aufstieg ist erreichbar bei geistigem Streben, vor allem aber durch Vermeiden jeglichen Tötens, φόνος. Wie schon erwähnt, skizziert er das Ideal einer paradiesischen Urzeit ohne Blutopfer. Darum ermahnt er seine Mitmenschen, vom Töten abzulassen, denn das Töten der Tiere bedeute, sich gegenseitig zu zerfleischen. Drastisch schildert er, wie ein Opferpriester am Altar im Opfertier seinen (wiedergeborenen) Sohn schlachtet, taub für dessen Flehen, und danach ein böses Mahl zubereitet.<sup>22</sup> – Diese Auf-

<sup>19</sup> Iambl. *V. Pyth.* § 86 u. 106–109. Allerdings wird § 150 auch notiert, dass die „theoretischen Philosophen“ sich der Tieropfer (und damit des Fleischessens) enthalten sollten, dass die „Akusmatiker“ immerhin selten Tiere opfern dürften, nur Rinder gar nicht.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, § 85: er notiert, dass Menschenseelen nicht in Opfertiere eingehen.

<sup>21</sup> Vgl. Plat. *Phaidr.* 81 e – 82 b; *Polit.* 620 a–d; *Tim.* 42 c u. 91 d – 92 c; allein *Phaidr.* 249 b stellt Platon diese Lehre verbunden mit einer seriösen Modifikation dar, nach welcher Tiere nur dann zu Menschen werden können, wenn sie zuvor Menschen waren und einst die Ideen geschaut hätten, denn dies sei die Voraussetzung für das Menschsein. Vgl. zu den Tierinkarnationen: K. Alt, „Zu einigen Problemen in Platons Jenseitsmythen“, in M. Janka, Chr. Schäfer (Hgg.), *Platon als Mythologe* (Darmstadt 2002) 284 ff.

<sup>22</sup> Empedokles vgl. o. Anm. 8 u. 9; ferner 31 B 117 D.–K. zu Reinkarnationen, B 115 u. 118–119 zum Absturz ins Erdenleben, B 136–137 zum Verhängnis des Tötens, B 146–147 zum Aufstieg ins Götterdasein.

fassung einer unmittelbaren Verwandtschaft von Mensch und Tier impliziert eine totale Abkehr vom traditionellen Opferkult. In seiner Heimatstadt Akragas scheint Empedokles eine große Anhängerschaft besessen zu haben;<sup>23</sup> in Großgriechenland mag manches möglich gewesen sein, was etwa in Athen kaum denkbar wäre. Aber eine Nachfolge hat Empedokles in seiner radikal veränderten Auffassung von den Göttern und den ihnen angemessenen Opfern offenbar nicht gefunden.

Nach diesem Überblick über unterschiedliche Positionen früherer Autoren zur üblichen Opferpraxis soll nun nach der Haltung der Philosophen zum Problem der Tieropfer und des Vegetarismus seit dem 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. gefragt werden. Der Zwang des gebührenden Verhaltens zu den Polis-Opfern dürfte in jener Phase gelockert gewesen sein. Für das Phänomen des Vegetarismus sind die schon erwähnten drei Aspekte zu berücksichtigen:

1) Wie wird das Fleischessen bewertet für die Gesundheit? Belastet es den Körper, behindert es die seelisch-geistige Aktivität?

2) Wie werden die Tiere eingeschätzt? Stehen sie als vernunftlose Wesen, ἄλογα ζῶα, uns fern und sind nur zu unserem Nutzen vorhanden? Oder sind sie uns verwandt und verdienen – auch wenn man nicht an mögliche Tierinkarnationen glaubt – unseren Respekt?

3) Welche Bedeutung haben die Opfer? Wie werden die Götter gesehen? Sind die Opfer bedeutsam für die Götter – oder vielleicht für die Menschen? Wandelt sich im Verlauf der Jahrhunderte die Auffassung der Opfer, ihres Sinnes, ihrer Wirkung?

### I. Philosophen des 4. und 3. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.

Für Platon galt die Grundüberzeugung, dass Götter gut sind und nur Gutes bewirken können; anders lautende mythische Geschichten sollten in seiner geplanten Staatsordnung keinen Raum haben. Wie aber stand er zu den Opferriten und der damit verbundenen Fleischnahrung? In seinen Texten findet sich kein klares Bekenntnis zur pythagoreischen, also vegetarischen Lebensweise. Wo er aber die Ernährung behandelt, kommt fast nur pflanzliche Nahrung zur Sprache. Einmal wird in einem ironischen Kontext gesagt, dass für Faustkämpfer vielleicht Rindfleisch zuträglich sei.<sup>24</sup> In der *Politeia* nennt Sokrates bei der ausführlichen Beschreibung der Lebensweise, die

<sup>23</sup> Vgl. Empedokles 31 B 112 D.–K.

<sup>24</sup> Plat. *Polit.* 338 c.

für die Menschen der zu gründenden Stadt gelten solle,<sup>25</sup> Gerste und Weizen und deren Zubereitung sowie Wein; Opfer werden nicht erwähnt, wohl aber Preislieder, welche die Menschen für die Götter singen. Auf den Einwand des Glaukon, ob es denn keine Zukost, ὄψον, gebe, fügt Sokrates ergänzend Oliven, Käse, Zwiebeln, Gemüse, Feigen und ähnliches hinzu, denn so werden die Menschen friedlich und gesund ihr Leben zubringen. Glaukon ist entsetzt und meint, dies sei eher eine Stadt der Schweine, da man nicht hat, was jetzt doch üblich ist (womit er besonders Fleischnahrung meinen dürfte). Sokrates aber erwidert, man plane die wahre, nämlich eine gesunde Stadt, nicht aber eine verweichlichte und aufgeschwemmte mit vielerlei Luxus, für die man Hetären, Diener, Pfleger und vor allem Köche, Metzger und Schweinehirten und dazu Ärzte benötigte. – Im *Timaios* heißt es, dass die Götter die Pflanzen eigens für unsere Nahrung erschaffen hätten.<sup>26</sup> Die Verwandtschaft von Mensch und Tier wird in dieser Schrift dadurch betont, dass allen Lebewesen bis zu den niedersten Tieren – freilich in unterschiedlichem Grade – Anteil am Geist, νοῦς, zugestanden wird, den sie durch ihre Lebensweise steigern oder vermindern können.<sup>27</sup> Von Opfern wird nichts gesagt, wohl aber von der nötigen geistigen Orientierung des Menschen und der Pflege, die er dem Göttlichen, dem δαίμων, in sich schuldet.<sup>28</sup>

Zum üblichen Opfergeschehen äußert Platon sich einerseits im historischen Rückblick,<sup>29</sup> andererseits gelegentlich in seinen Texten, ohne dabei zu präzisieren, was inhaltlich mit ‘Opfer’, θυσία, θύειν, gemeint ist. Eine längere Opfer-Passage in den *Nomoi* erklärt, dass der Besonnene, ein Freund des Gottes, der rein an der Seele und dem Gotte ähnlich ist, sich immer wieder den Göttern nähern werde mit Gebeten, Weihgaben und jeglicher Verehrung. Es handele sich primär um die olympischen Götter und jene Götter, welche die Stadt beschützen, danach um die chthonischen Götter; letzteren gelten Opfer von gerader Zahl, von zweitem Rang und der linken Seite, den höheren Göttern Gaben von ungerader Zahl und der konträren Seite. Leider bleibt diese Aussage, die an gewisse pythagoreische Regeln gemahnen soll, für uns unklar; keinesfalls wird deutlich von Tieropfern gesprochen, es fehlen

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 372 a – 373 d.

<sup>26</sup> *Tim.* 77 a–c u. 80 d.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 90 e – 92 c, vgl. 47 b. Die wechselnden Inkarnationen zwischen Menschen und Tieren werden vom verschiedenen Anteil am Geistigen her begründet, sind aber von Platon gewiss nicht ernst gemeint.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 90 a–c.

<sup>29</sup> *Nom.* 782 a–d, wobei er auch die Bräuche der Orphiker anführt (vgl. o. Anm. 15).

Begriffe wie ἱερεῖα (Opfertiere), Platon nennt nur ἄρτια, δεύτερα etc.<sup>30</sup> Erwähnt sei noch, dass Platon die Jagd in den *Nomoi*, sofern sie der “göttlichen Tapferkeit” dient, positiv bewertet; vom Verzehren gejagter Tiere wird dabei nichts notiert.<sup>31</sup>

Einmal nur wird bei Platon eindeutig ein Stieropfer für einen Gott beschrieben, doch betrifft dies nicht Griechenland, sondern hat im längst versunkenen Atlantis stattgefunden. In dem Fragment des *Kritias*, wo man wiederum von der pflanzlichen Ernährung hört, wird von Heiligtümern und jährlichen Opfern für Götter und dazu als eine Besonderheit berichtet, dass alle fünf oder sechs Jahre anlässlich der Zusammenkunft und Gerichtssitzung der zehn Könige einer der frei weidenden Stiere des Poseidon ohne Eisen gejagt und dem Gott geopfert wurde. Dabei wurde Blut in einem Kessel gesammelt, alles übrige dem Gott zu Ehren verbrannt.<sup>32</sup> Auch bei dieser Ausnahme handelt es sich nicht um ein Tier-Speiseopfer.<sup>33</sup>

Platon scheint die traditionellen Opfer nicht geradezu verworfen zu haben, doch spricht er bei der Ernährung – die wie bei allen Philosophen maßvoll sein soll – nicht von tierischer Nahrung. Bei dem Kontakt mit den Göttern aber handelt es sich um nichts äußerlich und rituell Bedingtes, sondern um den inneren Weg, das Ziel der ‘Angleichung an Gott’, ὁμοίωσις θεῶ.<sup>34</sup>

Die Philosophen nach Platon divergieren erheblich in ihrer Haltung zu den hier behandelten Fragen. Von Xenokrates, der 339–314 die platonische Akademie leitete, kennen wir zwar keine Äußerung zur Opferpraxis, doch ist überliefert, dass er ein Werk über die von Tieren stammende Nahrung, *Περὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ζῴων τροφῆς*, verfasst und deutlich die Fleischnahrung für nicht zuträglich erklärt habe, da sie eine Angleichung an die Seelen der vernunftlosen Wesen bewirke. Auch meine er zuversichtlich, dass die vernunftlosen Tiere eine Ahnung des Göttlichen, *περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἔννοιαν*, besäßen.<sup>35</sup>

Dagegen hatte Aristoteles offenbar keinerlei Bedenken gegenüber Tieropfern. Wiederholt erwähnt er die für das Leben in der Polis ge-

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 716 c – 717 b. Vgl. auch 955 e – 956 a: Als Weihgaben an die Götter, die maßvoll sein sollen, werden genannt Objekte aus Holz und Stein, Gewebe sowie Vögel und Bilder, die ein Maler an einem Tag herstellen könne; bei den Vögeln dürfe es sich um Bilder oder Figuren handeln.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 824 a.

<sup>32</sup> *Kritias* 113 b, 115 a–c, 116 c, 119 d – 120 a.

<sup>33</sup> Der *Phaid.* 118 a zitierte Hinweis des Sokrates auf das nötige Hahn-Opfer an Asklepios ist ebenfalls kein Speiseopfer. Dies wird als das letzte Wort des Sokrates zitiert, es ist keine Aussage Platons. Zu Sokrates vgl. o. Anm. 11.

<sup>34</sup> *Theait.* 176 b, *Polit.* 613 b.

<sup>35</sup> Xenokrates fr. 267 u. 220 Isnardi Parente (= fr. 100 u. 21 Heinze), beide Passagen aus Clemens Alex. *Strom.* (VII, 32, 9 u. V, 87, 3).

botenen Opfer, nennt dafür auch Ziegen, Schafe oder allgemein geopfer- te Tiere.<sup>36</sup> Nach seiner Einschätzung haben die Tiere weder Denken noch Überlegung, νόησις, λογισμός, sondern nur Vorstellung, φαντα- σία, sind uns also weit unterlegen.<sup>37</sup> Bezüglich der Nahrung hält er es für evident, dass die Pflanzen um der Tiere willen vorhanden sind, die Tiere aber um der Menschen willen; sie existieren generell für unseren Gebrauch, nämlich zur Ernährung und dazu für andere Hilfsmittel, indem man Kleidung und Werkzeuge durch sie gewinnt. Da die Natur nichts zwecklos hervorbringe, sei zwingend zu folgern, dass sie alles um der Menschen willen geschaffen habe.<sup>38</sup> – Damit erübrigt sich jegliche Rücksicht des Menschen auf die Tiere.

Im Kontrast zu seinem Lehrer Aristoteles hat Theophrast, der ihm in der Leitung der Schule 322 folgte, die Tieropfer nachdrücklich abgelehnt. In seiner verlorenen Schrift *Über die Frömmigkeit*, Περὶ εὐσεβείας, hat er eine Geschichte der Opferpraxis von deren sanften Anfängen bis zur späteren Grausamkeit entworfen. Auszüge aus diesem Traktat sind allein bei Porphyrios in dem Werk *Über die Enthaltung vom Fleischgenuss*, Περὶ ἀποχῆς ἐμψύχων, überliefert.<sup>39</sup> Porphyrios beruft sich mehrmals namentlich auf Theophrast.<sup>40</sup> So schreibt er, dieser habe dargelegt, dass die Menschen in frühester Zeit nur Gräser und Kräuter, danach auch Früchte geopfert hätten, als Weihegüsse aber seien zunächst Wasser, dann Honig und Öl und zuletzt auch Wein gespendet worden.<sup>41</sup> Für jene glückliche Urzeit zitiert Theophrast die Verse des Empedokles über die einst der Kypris geweihten unblutigen Opfergaben, die den Gegensatz zum jetzt Üblichen bezeugen.<sup>42</sup> Denn erst viel später habe man die böse Wendung zu Frevel und Gesetzwidrigkeit, zur παρανομία, vollzogen und schreckliche Opfer voller Grausamkeit dargebracht.

<sup>36</sup> Aristoteles z. B. *Polit.* III, 9, 1280 b 37; 14, 1285 b 10, 16; *EN* IV, 5, 1122 b 20; V, 10, 1134 b 21; VIII, 11, 1160 a 20 ff.; *Part. an.* III, 5, 667 b 1. – Vgl. zu Aristoteles Dierauer (o. Anm. 12) 155 ff.; 177 f.

<sup>37</sup> *De an.* III, 10, 433 a 10 ff. Eine ähnliche Aussage notiert Theophrast schon von Alkmaion 24 A 5 u. B 1 a D.–K.

<sup>38</sup> *Polit.* I, 8, 1256 b 15 ff. – Vgl. Xenophon *Memor.* IV, 3, 10: Sokrates meinte, die Tiere existierten unseretwegen.

<sup>39</sup> Edition der Fragmente: W. Pötscher, *Theophrastos' Περὶ εὐσεβείας*, *Philosophia Antiqua* 11 (Leiden 1964). – Zu Theophrast bei Porphyrios: Porphyre, *De l'abstinence*, II, ed. par J. Bouffartigue, J. Patillon (Paris 1977): “Les Sources du Livre II, Théophraste”, S. 17–29. – Vgl. Dierauer (o. Anm. 12) 81 ff.; 170 ff.

<sup>40</sup> Über die Abgrenzung der Exzerpte aus Theophrast bei Porphyrios vgl. Bouffartigue (o. Anm. 39) 20 ff.

<sup>41</sup> Porph. *De abst.* II, 5, 2–4; 6, 2–3; 12, 2; 29, 1.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 21, 2–4 (vgl. o. Anm. 8); diese Empedokles-Verse sind nur hier überliefert.

Die Menschen schlachteten Opfertiere und befleckten die Altäre mit Blut. Sie waren entweder gottlos oder übelgesonnen, bösen Göttern zugewandt, indem sie die Hand an widergesetzliche Opfer legten.<sup>43</sup> Als Ursachen für diese sehr spät einsetzenden Tieropfer seinen Hunger oder sonstige Unglücksfälle anzunehmen; von daher resultiere die praktizierte Ungerechtigkeit. So begann man, lebendige Wesen zu essen, und war daran gewöhnt, von der eigenen Nahrung auch die Opfer darzubringen. Allen, die wahrhaft fromm sein wollen, verbiete Theophrast daher, lebende Wesen zu töten, keinesfalls dürfe man getötete Tiere als Opfer den Göttern weihen. Denn wie könnte ein Handeln fromm sein, wenn man Unrecht begeht an den Opfern?<sup>44</sup> Wiederholt wird betont, dass wir kein Unrecht an den Tieren verüben dürfen.<sup>45</sup> Anders als Aristoteles erkennt Theophrast eine Verwandtschaft zwischen Menschen und Tieren: sie gleichen uns hinsichtlich ihrer Körper wie auch ihrer Seelen, denn sie haben Begierden, Emotionen, Gedanken, λογισμοί, und vor allem Wahrnehmungen wie wir, freilich in unterschiedlichem Grade, doch sind die Prinzipien, ἀρχαί, dieselben.<sup>46</sup> – Aristoteles verneint, dass die Tiere denken könnten, λογισμός besäßen, Platon dagegen erkennt im *Timaios* ihnen Anteil am Geist, νοῦς, zu.<sup>47</sup> Ein späterer doxographischer Bericht notiert, nach Pythagoras und Platon hätten auch die sogenannten vernunftlosen Wesen vernünftige Seelen, λογικὰς ψυχὰς, nur könnten sie nicht vernunftgemäß wirken wegen der ungünstigen Mischung ihrer Körper und weil ihnen die Fähigkeit des Sprechens fehle.<sup>48</sup>

Während in der Schrift des Porphyrios das Vermeiden des Fleischessens von zentraler Bedeutung ist, steht bei Theophrast das Thema der Degeneration des Opfergeschehens im Vordergrund, der Wandel von ursprünglich pflanzlichen Opfern hin zum gesetzwidrigen Töten.<sup>49</sup> Doch werden auch bei Theophrast die Tieropfer – wie es für die Griechen natürlich war – mit dem Fleischgenuss verbunden; so spricht er von den Tieren, die wir essen, die uns als Nahrung, τροφή, dienen. Dabei bedeutet für ihn das Fleischessen, σαρκοφαγία, ζωοφαγία, ein “Vergessen” der Frömmigkeit, einen Schritt zu Gier und Völlerei, ἀπληστία, jenseits jeglicher Besonnenheit.<sup>50</sup> Auch wenn nach den Exzerpten bei

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 7, 2–3; 9, 1; 10, 3.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 11, 3; 12, 3–4; 13, 3; 23, 2; 24, 2–5.

<sup>45</sup> Z. B. *ibid.*, II, 24, 3.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 25, 2–3 (auch hier ist Theophrast als Quelle genannt).

<sup>47</sup> Zu Aristoteles vgl. o. Anm. 37, zu Platon o. Anm. 27.

<sup>48</sup> Aetios V, 20, 4 (*Doxogr. Graeci*, S. 432).

<sup>49</sup> Vgl. zum Unterschied Theophrast-Porphyrios Bouffartigue (o. Anm. 39) 19.

<sup>50</sup> *De abst.* II, 25, 3–4; 27, 1–5. Die Begriffe σαρκοφαγία, ζωοφαγία und die entsprechenden Verben sind zuerst bei Aristoteles belegt.

Porphyrios Theophrast nicht ausdrücklich die Abkehr vom Fleischgenuss, wohl auch nicht eine Rückkehr zur ehemaligen unblutigen Opferpraxis fordert,<sup>51</sup> so dürfte Theophrast doch für die vegetarische Lebensweise eingetreten sein, sich also dabei nicht an Aristoteles, sondern eher an Platon orientiert haben. Auch betont er, dass die Götter keine aufwendigen Opfer verlangen, sich vielmehr am Einfachen erfreuen; vor allem aber schaue die Gottheit mehr auf die Gesinnung, ἦθος, der Opfernden als auf die Fülle der Opfergaben.<sup>52</sup>

In der Schule des Aristoteles hat sich die Position Theophrasts offenbar nicht durchgesetzt, es dominierte weithin die Ablehnung des Vegetarismus. Von Straton, der nach Theophrast Schulleiter war, ist von einer allerdings nicht immer zuverlässigen Quelle überliefert, er habe jedes Lebewesen für fähig gehalten, den Geist, νοῦς, aufzunehmen,<sup>53</sup> welche Folgerungen er daraus zog, wissen wir nicht. – Herakleides Pontikos, der als Schüler sowohl Platons wie des Aristoteles einzuordnen ist, wird von Porphyrios unter den Peripatetikern angeführt, welche gegen das pythagoreische Fleischverbot polemisieren. Da Herakleides aber der pythagoreischen Richtung nahestand, erscheint eine solche Haltung unwahrscheinlich; die Notiz dürfte eher auf einem Irrtum beruhen,<sup>54</sup> Herakleides also nicht zu den Gegnern des Vegetarismus zu zählen sein.

Derartige Gegner der pythagoreisch-fleischlosen Lebensweise waren aber fast alle Stoiker, wie dies für Kleanthes und Spätere bezeugt wird. Von Zenon, dem Begründer der Schule, ist keine Aussage zu dieser Frage erhalten, wohl aber seine Ablehnung jeglichen Tempelbaus: Man solle den Göttern weder Heiligtümer errichten noch Götterbilder weihen, denn derartige Werke von Baumeistern und Handwerkern seien nicht heilig und der Götter nicht würdig.<sup>55</sup> Vermutlich wird er auch die Opfer abgelehnt haben, doch war der Fleischgenuss zu seiner Zeit nicht mehr an die Tieropfer gebunden. Zenons Nachfolger Kleanthes preist für unsere Nahrung die Schweine: sie besäßen die Seele gleichsam als Salz, damit das Fleisch nicht faulig werde. Clemens Alexandrinus, der diesen Satz überliefert, zitiert zuvor einige Verse des Komikers Platon: Von den

<sup>51</sup> Vgl. Bouffartigue (o. Anm. 39) 27: Die Passage *De abst.* II, 59, 1 – 61, 2 rührt nicht von Theophrast her, sondern von Porphyrios.

<sup>52</sup> *De abst.* II, 14–15.

<sup>53</sup> Epiphanius 33 (*Doxogr. Graeci*, S. 592).

<sup>54</sup> Porph. *De abst.* I, 26. Vgl. dazu F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles VII: Herakleides Pontikos* (Basel 1953) fr. 40 und Kommentar S. 70: "Er kann aber durch bloße doxographische Willkür in die Reihe der Kritiker an Pythagoras geraten sein".

<sup>55</sup> Zenon *SVF* I fr. 264, 265 (Texte von Clemens Alex., Plutarch, Origenes). Zur Stoa vgl. Dierauer (o. Anm. 12) 238 ff.

vierfüßigen Tieren dürfe man nur die Schweine töten, denn sie hätten das wohlschmeckendste Fleisch, κρέα ἡδιστον.<sup>56</sup> Das Lob des Schweinefleischs findet sich also schon im fünften Jahrhundert und nicht erst bei den Stoikern. Von Chrysipp, der auf Kleanthes folgte, ist ebenfalls die These überliefert, dass den Schweinen die Seele wie das Salz gegeben sei. Ausführlich referiert Porphyrios dessen Ansichten: Jegliche Tiere seien nur unseretwegen erschaffen worden, sei es zum Kriegführen, sei es zum Jagen oder zur Übung der Tapferkeit. Das Schwein aber sei von allen Gunsterweisen der Götter am angenehmsten, denn es sei allein für die Opferung, θύεσθαι, entstanden, und der Gott habe die Seele gleichsam als Salz beigegeben, um uns eine gute Zukost zu bereiten. Auch Vögel und Meeresgetier werden noch als Göttergaben angefügt.<sup>57</sup> Von “einigen Philosophen” berichtet Clemens, sie hätten das Schwein statt ὄς lieber θῶς benannt, weil dieses Tier allein zum Opfern und Schlachten, εἰς θῶσιν καὶ σφαγὴν, nützlich sei, und die Seele sei ihm zur Kräftigung des Fleisches gegeben.<sup>58</sup> Hier wird deutlich, dass ‘Opfern’ mitunter nichts anderes als ‘Schlachten’ meinen kann.

Da die Stoiker, ebenso wie Aristoteles, die Tiere als lediglich zu unserem Gebrauch vorhanden betrachteten, ist es folgerichtig, dass sie keine Gemeinsamkeit zwischen ihnen und uns und kein Unrecht in unserem Verhalten ihnen gegenüber annahmen. So referiert Plutarch den Ausspruch Chrysipps, es bestünde von uns keine Verwandtschaft mit den Tieren, οὐδὲν οἰκεῖον, und insofern auch kein Rechtsverhältnis, οὐδὲν δίκαιον, das uns binden könnte.<sup>59</sup> Demnach besitzen wir keinerlei Verpflichtungen gegenüber den Tieren.

Angefügt sei noch eine Bemerkung, die Porphyrios im Anschluss an seine Angaben zu Chrysipp über den Platoniker Carneades notiert (welcher der skeptischen Richtung der Akademie zugehörte, die er etwa von 160 oder 156 bis 137 leitete).<sup>60</sup> Dieser meine, ein jedes Naturwesen habe selber Nutzen, wenn es das Ziel, für das es entstanden sei, erreiche. Das Schwein sei seiner Natur nach nur vorhanden, um geschlachtet und gegessen zu werden, πρὸς τὸ σφαγῆναι καὶ καταβρωθῆναι. Und da es damit sein Ziel erreicht, habe es selber Nutzen davon. – Auch in der

<sup>56</sup> Kleanthes *SVF* I fr. 516 u. Komiker Platon (bei Clem. Alex. VII, 33, 2–3).

<sup>57</sup> Chrysipp *SVF* II fr. 1152 (Porph. *De abst.* III, 20) u. fr. 1156 (Origenes); vgl. zur Seele als Salz fr. 723 u. 1154 (Cicero).

<sup>58</sup> *Strom.* II, 105, 2.

<sup>59</sup> Chrysipp *SVF* III De iure et lege fr. 374: v. Arnim druckt im Text die Konjektur δίκαιον (Bernadakis); die Passage ist aus Plut. *De esu carn.* II, 6, 999 A entnommen, wo οἰκεῖον steht, doch folgt wenige Zeilen später c. 7, 999 B τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸς τὰ ζῶα δίκαιον ἡμῖν. Der Sinn ist also evident.

<sup>60</sup> Porphyr. *De abst.* III, 20 (folgt auf Chrysipp *SVF* II 1152).

platonischen Akademie war also der Gedanke an Rücksicht auf die Tiere geschwunden.

## II. Philosophen des 1. und 2. Jahrhunderts n. Chr.

Die Stoiker jener Zeit folgten allgemein den Maximen ihrer Vorgänger, doch gibt es bezüglich des Vegetarismus – wie im Peripatos mit Theophrast – auch bei den stoischen Philosophen eine Ausnahme. Während Seneca als älterer Mann bekennt, er habe in seiner Jugend sich mit Liebe der Lehre des Pythagoras zugewandt, welche den Fleischgenuss verachtet, sei es aus Gründen der Gesundheit, sei es wegen der Verwandtschaft aller Lebewesen, dies aber nur als eine frühere Lebensphase darstellt,<sup>61</sup> vertritt Musonios, der Lehrer Epiktets, nachdrücklich die vegetarische Lebensweise. Erhalten sind Exzerpte aus seinen Lehrvorträgen, darunter aus einem Traktat *Über die Ernährung*, Περὶ τροφῆς.<sup>62</sup> Er erkannte in der Selbstbeherrschung beim Essen und Trinken die Grundlage für eine besonnene Lebenshaltung und forderte daher eine einfache Nahrung, die wenig Aufwand benötigt. Die angemessene Ernährung für den Menschen sei alles, was aus der Erde emporwächst, insbesondere das Getreide sowie Früchte und Gemüse, doch auch jenes, was von nicht getöteten Tieren stammt, Milch, Käse, Honig. Die Fleischnahrung nannte er eher tierisch, θηριώδες τέρα, und wilden Tieren zuträglich. Denn sie verdüstere die Seele und behindere das Denken. Musonios versucht dies zu erklären, indem er eine negative Wirkung von den Ausdünstungen des verzehrten Fleisches annimmt. Der Mensch, der von allen Erdenwesen den Göttern am nächsten verwandt ist, solle sich möglichst ähnlich wie jene ernähren. Den Göttern genügen die von Erde und Wasser aufsteigenden Dünste, wir aber sollten eine leichte Nahrung zu uns nehmen, die solchen Dünsten soweit nur möglich nahe kommt, damit unsere Seele sich rein befindet. Auch seien alle vielfältigen Künste und Techniken, die sich sogar in Büchern zur Kochkunst dokumentieren, wie überhaupt jeglicher Luxus abzulehnen. Im Sinne des Sokrates-Wortes sollen wir essen, um zu leben, nicht aber leben, um zu essen.

Für Musonios geht es bei der Ernährung um die seelisch-geistige Gesundheit und Reinheit, die durch den Fleischgenuss getrübt wird. Von Opfern, welcher Art auch immer, ist nicht die Rede, auch nicht von einer speziellen Rücksicht auf die Tiere, wohl aber von einer Annäherung

<sup>61</sup> *L. Annaei Senecae ad Lucilium epistulae morales* rec. L. D. Reynolds (Oxford 1965): *Epist.* 108, 17–19.

<sup>62</sup> C. Musonius Rufus, *Reliquiae*, ed. O. Hense (Leipzig 1905): Traktat XVIII A u. B.

an die Götter mittels einer sehr leichten Nahrung. Diese stoischen Götter unterscheiden sich erheblich von den homerischen, welche sich am Dunst des Opferfleisches erfreuen, da sie sich von den Ausdünstungen aus Erde und Wasser nähren.

Epiktet, der Schüler des Musonios, schloss sich in der Ernährungsfrage seinem Lehrer nicht an. Er äußert sich über die Tiere,<sup>63</sup> indem er zwischen den Menschen und ihnen trotz gewisser Gemeinsamkeiten einen wesentlichen Unterschied darin sieht, dass diese – wie bei Aristoteles – allein nach ihren Vorstellungen, φαντασῖαι, leben, während uns Menschen der Gott die Verstandeskraft, παρακολουθητικὴν δύναμιν, gegeben hat. Nur wenn wir den Verstand in der rechten Weise gebrauchen, können wir unser Ziel erreichen. Die Tiere nun hat der Gott in verschiedener Hinsicht ausgestattet, die einen, dass sie gegessen werden, ὥστ' ἐσθίεσθαι, andere dass sie beim Ackerbau helfen, andere um Käse zu produzieren oder je zu sonstigem Gebrauch. Sie benötigen keine Fähigkeit des Verstehens; den Menschen aber hat der Gott zum Betrachter und Deuter Gottes und seiner Werke bestimmt. – Hier wird, wie überwiegend im Peripatos und der Stoa, die Existenz der Tiere rein von ihrem Nutzen für den Menschen her begründet.

Von Musonios unterscheidet Epiktet sich auch insofern, als er die traditionelle Opferpraxis in sein Denken einbezieht und offenbar als selbstverständlich gegeben betrachtet. So erwähnt er einmal die Eingeweideschau und sagt ein andermal, niemand unternehme eine Schiffsreise, ohne zuvor den Göttern zu opfern und sie als Helfer anzurufen, da sonst eine glückliche Fahrt ungewiss sei.<sup>64</sup> In seinem *Handbüchlein* heißt es, die Frömmigkeit bestehe vor allem in der richtigen Vorstellung von den Göttern und im Gehorsam ihnen gegenüber. So werde man die Götter niemals tadeln. Auch gelte es, Trankopfer, Opfertgaben und Erstlingsopfer jedesmal gemäß der väterlichen Tradition in reiner Weise darzubringen, nicht nachlässig oder unbedacht und auch weder zu karg noch im Übermaß.<sup>65</sup> Epiktet war offenbar solchen Traditionen stärker verhaftet als die meisten anderen Stoiker.

Nach diesen soll nun wieder ein Vertreter des Platonismus in seiner Position zum Vegetarismus, den Tieren und den üblichen Opfern betrachtet werden. Plutarch von Chaironeia hatte als Philosoph zugleich großes Interesse an der Religion in ihren verschiedenen Ausprägungen; so verfasste er ein umfangreiches Werk *Über Isis und Osiris*, den ägypt-

<sup>63</sup> *Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae*, rec. H. Schenkl (Leipzig 1965): I, 6, 12–19.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 17, 20–21; III, 21, 12 u. 14; vgl. IV, 6, 32.

<sup>65</sup> Epict. *Ench.* 31, 1–2 u. 5.

tischen Mythos, den er unter mehreren philosophischen Aspekten interpretierte. Mit der tradierten griechischen Religion war er in besonderer Weise verbunden, da er, vermutlich über Jahrzehnte hin, ein Priesteramt in Delphi innehatte. Daher verfügte er über genaueste Kenntnis der Opferpraxis an Orakelorten, wo vor jeder Befragung ein Tier geopfert werden musste, ein σφάγιον, das kein Speiseopfer war. In seiner Schrift *Das Verstummen der Orakel* hat er geschildert, wie man mit den Opfertieren umging, und zwar unterschiedlich mit Rindern, Ebern, Ziegen, die nach einer Besprengung durch den Priester am ganzen Körper zittern sollten, um die Bereitschaft des Gottes zur Orakelerteilung anzuzeigen.<sup>66</sup> Ferner wird in dem Traktat *Das Daimonion des Sokrates* auf den Opferritus vor dem Betreten des Trophonios-Orakels hingewiesen.<sup>67</sup> Einmal äußert Plutarch sich negativ über die Tieropfer, über den Irrglauben, die Götter freuten sich am Blutvergießen der Menschen, die ein derartiges Opfer als das vollendetste einschätzten.<sup>68</sup> Doch spricht er nicht allgemein über die Opferpraxis; überwiegend ist der Verzicht auf das Fleischessen und die Schonung der Tiere sein Thema.

Ausführlich handelt er davon in seiner Schrift *Über den Fleischgenuss*, *Περὶ σαρκοφαγίας*. Er fragt, wie erstmals ein Mensch dazu kam, an das Blutige zu rühren und mit seinen Lippen das Fleisch eines toten Tieres zu erfassen. Wie ertrug er den Anblick geschlachteter, zerstückelter Wesen, wie deren Geruch und Geschmack, ohne sich abzuwenden? Der Anlass für den ersten Fleischgenuss müsse eine Notlage, ἀπορία, gewesen sein.<sup>69</sup> Wir aber leben jetzt im Überfluss; warum scheuen wir uns nicht vor Mordtaten, verhalten uns schlimmer als wilde Tiere? Warum beschämen uns bei den Tieren nicht die Reize ihrer Körper, nicht ihre Stimmen, die Fähigkeiten ihrer Seelen, ihr hohes Maß an Verständnis, σύνεσις, warum begreifen wir nicht ihr Flehen? Welche Grausamkeit, ὀμότης, herrscht hier! Die Tische fürs Mahl sind reich gefüllt mit toten Wesen, die gegessen werden, aber schlimmer noch ist, dass eine Menge übrig bleibt und das Sterben vieler Tiere vergebens war.<sup>70</sup> Für den Menschen ist, der Konstitution seines

<sup>66</sup> Plut. *De def. orac.* 46 (435 A–B); 49 (437 B–C); 51 (438 A). Als häufigste Opfertiere werden in Delphi Ziegen angenommen.

<sup>67</sup> *De gen. Socr.* 21 (590 A); zur dortigen Opferpraxis vgl. Pausanias IX, 19. Plutarchs Bruder Lamprias war Priester am Trophonios-Orakel.

<sup>68</sup> *De superst.* 13 (171 B). – Zu Plutarch vgl. Dierauer (o. Anm. 12) 253 ff.; 287 ff.

<sup>69</sup> *De esu carn.* I, 1 (993 A–C).

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 2 (994 A–B); 4 (994 E–F).

Körpers nach, der Fleischgenuss nicht naturgemäß. Wer dennoch meint, er sei für solches Essen geschaffen, der möge selber sich auf ein lebendes Tier stürzen und es töten, aber nicht mit Messer oder Beil, sondern er solle wie Wölfe oder Bären sein Opfer mit einem Biss packen und es zerreißen. Jedoch essen die Menschen nicht einfach etwas Totes, denn sie verwandeln es zuvor durch Feuer und Gewürze, damit ihr Geschmackssinn getäuscht wird.<sup>71</sup> Die Folge dieser für uns fremdartigen Nahrung ist, dass der Körper beschwert wird, der Glanz der Seele aber abstumpft und Verwirrung eintritt. Positiv dagegen wirkt sich die andere Lebensweise aus, denn wer sollte einem Menschen Unrecht antun, der sich den Tieren gegenüber mild und freundlich zeigt?<sup>72</sup>

Plutarch gesteht jedoch zu, dass wir durch die Gewohnheit des Fleischverzehr kaum ohne Schuld bleiben. Darum sollen wir Fleisch nur aus Hunger essen, nicht zur Schwelgerei, und wenn wir Tiere töten, sollen wir Mitleid und Schmerz empfinden und alle Quälerei vermeiden. Welche Misshandlungen an Tieren damals üblich waren, schildert Plutarch: Man sticht Schweine mit glühenden Spießen ab, um das Blut zu stillen und weiches Fleisch zu erhalten, reißt Kranichen die Augen aus, damit sie im Dunklen besser fett werden, und anderes mehr.<sup>73</sup> Die üppigen Fleischmahlzeiten der Feste sind für Plutarch gesetzwidrig, sie wirken negativ auf Körper und Seele, sie verrohen unsere Sinne, da wir uns nicht am Schönen erfreuen, sondern an Blut und Mord, wobei sich unser Mitempfinden auch für Menschen vermindert.<sup>74</sup> Bei den Tieren vergehen wir uns an Wesen, welche Wahrnehmungen, Vorstellungen, Verständnis, *σύνεσις*, besitzen. Pythagoras und Empedokles lehren uns, ihnen gegenüber gerecht zu sein. Wenn wir nicht wie sie daran glauben, dass unsere Seelen auch in andere Lebewesen eingehen, werden wir schwerlich von unserer rohen und zügellosen Lebensweise ablassen; aber wir sollten, da alles ungewiss ist, uns doch von großer Vorsicht und Scheu leiten lassen.<sup>75</sup>

In anderem Zusammenhang geht Plutarch auf die Fische ein: Für die Ernährung seien sie weniger beschwerlich als Fleisch, daher eine gesunde, dazu auch gerechte Zukost. Die Landtiere leben durch dieselbe Nahrung und die Luft wie wir, die Meerestiere aber sind uns gänzlich

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 5 (994 F–995 B).

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 6–7 (995 E–996 A). Dass die fleischlose Nahrung besser ist für Körper und Seele, betont Plutarch auch in *De tuenda sanitate praec.* 18 (131 D–132 A).

<sup>73</sup> *De esu carn.* II, 1 (996 E–997 A).

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 2 (997 B–C).

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 3–5 (997 D–998 D).

fremd, leben wie in einem anderen Kosmos; unsere Welt ist für sie tödlich, also gleichsam der Hades. Auch lassen die Landtiere, die zuvor unsere Helfer waren, jammervolle Stimmen ertönen, wenn wir sie töten, die Fische aber sind stumm und waren uns nie zu Diensten.<sup>76</sup> Ihnen gegenüber ist unser Vergehen demnach gering, die Tötung nicht ungerecht.

Mit Nachdruck wendet Plutarch sich gegen die Jagd, die nur zum Vergnügen, nicht wegen des Hungers erfolge; sie verrohe den Menschen, der sich ans Töten gewöhne, stärke in ihm das Tierhafte und Wilde, mache ihn unerweichlich für Mitleid und stumpfe ihn ab für alles Sanfte. Tiere haben Anteil an Überlegung, Denken, Verstehen, *διάνοια*, *λογισμός*, *σύνεσις*, sind uns verwandt. Die Pythagoreer hielten die Milde gegenüber Tieren für eine Übung im mitmenschlichen Verhalten, *φιλόανθρωπον*.<sup>77</sup> Wie für sie ist auch für Plutarch unser Umgang mit den Tieren grundlegend für unser Menschsein.

Es mag verwundern, dass Plutarch, der Philosoph und delphische Priester, sich kaum kritisch über die Opferpraxis des Tötens äußert. Vielleicht war ihm dies gerade in seiner Position in Delphi schwer möglich, in der er die kultische Tradition jedenfalls im Rahmen des Orakeldienstes (wobei es sich nicht um Speiseopfer handelte) zu vertreten hatte. Umso vehementer wendet er sich gegen alles Töten zum Genuss und Luxus der Menschen, wovon diese nur Schaden an Körper wie Seele erleiden. Vor allem tritt er für die Tiere ein, denen als uns verwandten Wesen Schonung und Gerechtigkeit gebührt. Dass aber der Gott, den man in Delphi verehrte, Blutopfer benötige, dürfte nicht Plutarchs religiöser Überzeugung entsprochen haben. Hier sei eine Charakterisierung angefügt, die Plutarch in seiner Schrift *Über das E in Delphi* diesem Gott mit einer speziellen Interpretation der Tempelinschrift des E widmet. Während Apollon, so schreibt er, dem Menschen sein "Erkenne dich selbst", *γνώθι σεαυτόν*, zurufe, antworte ihm der Mensch (wobei das E als *εἶ* gedeutet wird): "Du bist der Seiende", denn der Gott steht jenseits von uns, den dem Werden unterworfenen Menschen.<sup>78</sup> Der Gott gehört für Plutarch, im Sinne Platons, dem wahren Sein, also der Transzendenz an. Über die Art einer ihm angemessenen Verehrung äußert Plutarch sich nicht. Immerhin ist dieser

<sup>76</sup> *Quaest. conviv.* IV, 4, 3–4 (669 B–F).

<sup>77</sup> *De soll. anim.* 2–3 (959 D–960 C); 4 (962 C). Vgl. auch *Bruta ratione uti* 8–10 (991 B–992 E): Der Mensch als *πάμφαγος* ist im Essen maßloser und roher als wilde Tiere; die Tiere besitzen Vernunft, *φρόνησις* etc. Diese Schrift beinhaltet ein ironisches Gespräch mit ernstesten Themen.

<sup>78</sup> *De E apud Delphos* 17 (392 A) und weiter c. 18–21. Plutarch stellt diese Interpretation als These seines Lehrers Ammonios ans Ende des Dialogs.

Gott – auch in einer vergeistigten Deutung – der Gott des Tempels von Delphi.

Eine Aussage darüber, wie der Mensch sich gegenüber einer geistig verstandenen Gottheit verhalten solle, findet sich nun bei einem etwas jüngeren Zeitgenossen Plutarchs, bei Apollonios von Tyana (er starb 96/98 n. Chr.). Apollonios galt als Wundermann, von dem erstaunliche Legenden berichtet wurden. Doch philosophisch war er ein Verehrer des Pythagoras, vertrat strikt die pythagoreische vegetarische Lebensweise und wandte sich gegen jegliche Tötung von Tieren. Verfasst hat er verschiedene (verlorene) Schriften, darunter ein Werk *Über die Opfer*, Περὶ θυσιῶν. Daraus sind Passagen erhalten in Schriften des Porphyrios (*De abst.* II, 34) und des Eusebios (*Praep. Ev.* IV, 11–13). Außerdem wird über ihn in einer Biographie Philostrats (geb. ca. 170 n. Chr.) berichtet, die einer Hagiographie ähnelt, aber manches Interessante enthält.<sup>79</sup>

Dass man weder Tiere opfern noch Fleisch essen dürfe, war nach Philostrats Darstellung eine Gewissheit für Apollonios; eine solche Nahrung, meinte er, sei nicht rein, und sie beschwere den Geist. Auch solle man keinen Wein trinken, da er zwar rein sei, aber der Geistesverfassung zuwider wirke und den “Aither” der Seele verdüstere. Essen solle man Gemüse, Getreide und Zuckerwerk.<sup>80</sup> Deziidiert verurteilt er die kultischen Tieropfer: man dürfe die Altäre nicht mit Blut beflecken, vielmehr solle man Gaben von Honig sowie Weihrauch darbringen und den Göttern Hymnen singen.<sup>81</sup> Über eine den Tieren gebührende Schonung wird nichts gesagt. Auf die Frage, worin seine Weisheit, σοφία, bestehe, antwortet Apollonios bei Philostrat: “Erfüllt sein vom Göttlichen und wie man zu den Göttern beten und ihnen opfern soll”, θειασμός, ἔφη, καὶ ὡς ἄν τις θεοῖς εὔχοιτο καὶ θύοι. Denn vielen fehle dieses Wissen. Er selber bete, wenn er zu den Altären trete, um Gerechtigkeit, den Bestand der Gesetze und dass die Weisen arm, die anderen aber auf ehrliche Weise reich seien, oder zusammengefasst in einem Gebet: Die Götter mögen das Nötige gewähren.<sup>82</sup> Hinsichtlich der Opfer erklärt er, dass den verschiedenen

<sup>79</sup> Zu Apollonios: E. L. Bowie, “Apollonius of Tyane, Tradition and Reality”, *ANRW* 16, 2 (1978) 1652–1699. M. Frede, “Apollonios von Tyana”, *Der neue Pauly* 1 (1996) 887. – Zu Philostrat: E. L. Bowie, “Philostratos [5–8]”, *Der neue Pauly* 9 (2000) 888–894. – Zu den Apollonios-Referaten bei Porphyrios und Eusebios und deren Abgrenzung von einander vgl. Porphyre, *De l'abstinence* (o. Anm. 39): “Les Sources du Livre II” 30–34.

<sup>80</sup> Philostr. *Vita Apoll.* I, 1, 1; 8, 1; 21, 3; 32, 2; VI, 15.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 1, 1; 10, 1; 31, 2. Gegen das Übermaß von Opfern I, 11, 1. – Die Reinkarnation als Tier wird erwähnt V, 42, 1–2.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 40, 1–2.

Göttern je besondere Opfer gelten und man einem jeden das ihm Entsprechende darbringen solle. Als Opfer für Helios wird Weihrauch genannt.<sup>83</sup>

Bedeutender noch als diese Angaben bei Philostrat sind für die Gottesverehrung des Apollonios die Texte (oder Paraphrasen) aus seiner Schrift *Über die Opfer*, die Porphyrios und Eusebios überliefern. Porphyrios beruft sich dabei auf einen "weisen Mann", der als Apollonios zu identifizieren ist. Nach dessen Lehre sollen wir dem höchsten Gott, der über allem steht, nichts Wahrnehmbares opfern, auch kein Räucherwerk, denn nichts Materielles ist rein für das Immaterielle. Auch gesprochene Worte sind nicht angemessen, nicht einmal das innere Wort, wenn es von seelischen Emotionen befleckt ist, sondern wir verehren ihn in reinem Schweigen und in reinen Gedanken.<sup>84</sup> Eusebios fügt ein wörtliches Zitat aus Apollonios, der "Ähnliches" gelehrt habe, hinzu:<sup>85</sup> "Auf diese Weise wird man am besten ... der Gottheit die ihr zukommende sorgliche Aufmerksamkeit, ἐπιμέλεια, erweisen und ihre Gunst und ihr Wohlwollen erfahren, wenn man dem Gott, den wir den Ersten nennen, der Einer ist und abgesondert von allem ..., generell nichts opfert, auch nicht Feuer entzündet oder irgendetwas aus der sichtbaren Welt benennt. Denn der Gott bedarf keines Dinges". Der Anbetende "gebraucht ihm gegenüber allein den höchsten Gedanken, λόγος, der nicht durch den Mund geht, und er erbittet von dem Edelsten alles Existierenden durch das Edelste in uns das Gute; dies ist (in uns) der Geist, νοῦς, der kein Werkzeug benötigt. Keinesfalls also darf man dem großen, über allem stehenden Gott etwas opfern".

Apollonios unterscheidet demnach von der Vielfalt der im Kult verehrten Götter, denen durchaus Opfer gebühren, freilich nur unblutige, den einen höchsten Gott, dessen Gnade und Wohlwollen man allein durch eine innere Hinwendung erlangen kann.

### III. Neuplatoniker des 3. und 4. Jahrhunderts n. Chr.

Plotin, der Begründer des Neuplatonismus, berührt in keiner seiner zahlreichen Schriften die Frage der Opfer und der tradierten oder anderen Götterverehrung, auch fordert er nirgends, man solle die Tiere schonen und sich fleischlos ernähren. Dass aber die vegetarische Lebensweise für ihn selbstverständlich war und ebenso die absolute

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 41; IV, 19. Zu Helios I, 31, 2, vgl. III, 15, 1–2.

<sup>84</sup> Porph. *De abst.* II, 34, 1–2; Euseb. *Praep. Ev.* IV, 10, 7 u. c. 11–12 (aus Porphyrios).

<sup>85</sup> Euseb. *ibid.*, 12–13; Ende 12 wird der Name des Apollonios genannt, 13 eine Passage aus dessen Schrift *Περί θουσιῶν* zitiert, die nur hier überliefert ist.

Distanzierung zum traditionellen Opferkult, erfahren wir aus der Biographie, die sein Schüler Porphyrios verfasste, in der er uns ein facettenreiches Bild von Plotins Persönlichkeit und Lebenshaltung vermittelt. So berichtet Porphyrios, Plotin habe nicht nur keine Nahrung, die von gezähmten Tieren herrührt, zu sich genommen, sondern auch in seiner Krankheit keine Heilmittel, die von wilden Tieren stammen, zugelassen. Überhaupt habe er sehr wenig gegessen, oft nicht einmal Brot, um unentwegt dem Geistigen zugewandt zu sein.<sup>86</sup> Doch gab es zu den Geburtstagen von Platon und Sokrates Feiern im Schülerkreis (aber nicht zu Plotins Geburtstag, den er nie verriet); dabei opferte Plotin und bewirtete seine Schüler, auch wurden Reden vorgelesen.<sup>87</sup> – Dieses “opferrn”, θύειν, wird nicht näher erläutert, es dürfte sich um Trankopfer gehandelt haben.

Wie Plotin sich zum üblichen Opferkult verhielt, wird aus einer Begebenheit deutlich, die Porphyrios referiert. Amelios, ein langjähriger Schüler Plotins, sei ein eifriger Opferer gewesen, φιλοθύτης, und habe an allen kultischen Festen teilgenommen. Einmal habe er Plotin aufgefordert, er solle mit ihm zum Fest gehen, dieser aber habe geantwortet: “Jene (die Götter) sollen zu mir kommen, nicht ich zu ihnen”. Die Schüler hätten diese stolze Antwort nicht verstanden, aber auch nicht gewagt, Plotin nach seiner Gesinnung zu fragen.<sup>88</sup> – Offenbar ließ sich das Verbundensein mit der überkommenen Kultpraxis für Schüler Plotins mit dessen religiös ausgerichteter Philosophie vereinen, und die strikte Haltung des Lehrers blieb ihnen unbegreiflich. Für Plotin selber aber gab es keine Brücke von seiner geistigen Gottessicht zur Tradition des Kultes, auch keine Mahnung, die Opfer zu verändern, wie etwa bei Apollonios, der die Tieropfer verurteilte und unblutige Gaben forderte. Doch selbst in der Hinwendung zu einem höchsten Gott – für Plotin das Eine, welches das Gute ist – unterscheidet sich Plotin von der Vorstellung des Apollonios; spricht dieser von der ‘sorgenden Aufmerksamkeit’, ἐπιμέλεια, für den Gott, durch die der Mensch dessen Wohlwollen zu erreichen sucht, so geht es für Plotin allein um den inneren Aufstieg, den man mit äußerster geistiger Energie erstreben müsse, und dies nicht um göttlicher Gunst, sondern um der eigenen Erhebung willen, der Erfahrung einer höheren Existenz bereits im Erdendasein. Plotin spricht bewegend von diesem Erleben, seinem Aufstieg zur Sphäre des Geistes, und wiederholt gibt er Anweisungen, wie man über den Bereich des

<sup>86</sup> Porph. *V. Plot.* (abgedruckt in den Ausgaben der Schriften Plotins) c. 2, 3 ff.; 8, 20 ff.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 2, 38 ff.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 10, 33 ff.

Intellektuellen hinaus bis zur Schau des höchsten Einen, zum mystischen Einswerden, der ἕνωσις, gelangen könne.<sup>89</sup> – Plotin dürfte in seiner geistigen Intensität und Kraft eine Ausnahmeerscheinung geblieben sein.

Im Unterschied zu Plotin hat sein Schüler Porphyrios in den verschiedenen Phasen seines philosophischen Lebens sich mit dem Phänomen der Opfer und ihrer Bedeutung beschäftigt. Schon während seiner Studienzeit in Athen, bevor er zu Plotin nach Rom kam, hat er Schriften verfasst, in denen er unterschiedliche Opferarten behandelte. So berichtet er in dem Werk *Über die Philosophie der Orakel*, dass Apollon gebiete, Tieropfer darzubringen nicht nur für chthonische Gottheiten, sondern auch für die Mächte, die im Äther und Himmel wirken; weitere Details werden angegeben, etwa dass man den Göttern der Luft Vögel opfern solle, den Meergöttern schwarze Vögel, die man lebendig in die Fluten wirft, den Äther- und Himmelsgöttern aber weiße Tiere.<sup>90</sup> Eine Kritik an derlei Opfern findet sich nicht. Später aber wendet Porphyrios sich energisch gegen jegliches Töten von Tieren, gegen das Opfern ebenso wie gegen das Essen von Fleisch. Davon handelt vor allem seine Schrift *Über die Enthaltung vom Fleischgenuss*, *Περὶ ἀποχῆς ἐμψύχων* (*De abstinentia*), die vermutlich während der 270er Jahre in Sizilien, nach den Jahren bei Plotin, entstanden ist.<sup>91</sup> In diesem Werk tritt Porphyrios dezidiert für die fleischlose Ernährung ein. Im ersten Buch verteidigt er den Vegetarismus gegen dessen Widersacher und widerlegt deren Argumente. Allerdings meint er, der Verzicht auf Fleisch sei nicht für alle Menschen zwingend geboten, so nicht für Handwerker, Athleten, Soldaten, unbedingt aber sei er nötig für die Philosophen und für jeden Menschen, der bedenkt, „wer er sei, woher er gekommen ist und wohin er streben solle“, τίς τ' ἐστὶν καὶ πόθεν ἐλήλυθεν ποῖ τε σπεύδειν ὀφείλει. Als Ziel gilt ihm, wie seinem Lehrer Plotin, der innere Aufstieg und ein Leben gemäß dem Geist, τὸ ζῆν κατὰ νοῦν. Die Fleischnahrung ist zu vermeiden, da sie die geistige Orientierung behindert.<sup>92</sup> Auch für die Schonung der Tiere, unser gerechtes Verhalten zu ihnen, setzt er sich nachdrücklich ein; das dritte Buch der Schrift ist dem Thema der

<sup>89</sup> Plotin zur Erfahrung im Bereich des Geistigen IV, 8 [6] 1, 1 ff.; Hinweise zum Aufstieg bis zur Schau des Einen u. a. IV, 7 [2] 10, 27 ff.; V, 3 [49] 9, 2 ff.; 17, 38.

<sup>90</sup> *Porphyrii Philosophi Fragmenta* ed. A. Smith (Stuttgartiae – Lipsiae 1993) fr. 314 u. 315.

<sup>91</sup> Porphyre, *De l'abstinence*. I–II, texte établi et traduit par J. Bouffartigue, J. Patillon (Paris 1977 – 1979); III, par M. Patillon, A. Ph. Segonds, L. Brisson (Paris 1995). – Zu Porphyrios und dem Vegetarismus vgl. Dombrowski, Dierauer (o. Anm. 12) 81 ff.; 170 ff.

<sup>92</sup> Porph. *De abst.* I, 27, 1; 28, 3; 29, 4; 57, 1–2 u. öfter; II, 3, 1.

Gerechtigkeit den Tieren gegenüber gewidmet. Mit Berufung auf Pythagoras sowie Theophrast und Plutarch betont Porphyrios die Verwandtschaft zwischen Mensch und Tier in Bezug auf den Körper wie die Seele, ohne aber die Möglichkeit der Tierinkarnation für Menschenseelen einzubeziehen. Doch sind die Tiere uns nahestehende Wesen, die eine vernünftige Seele, λογικὴ ψυχή, besitzen; wer ihnen Unrecht und Schaden zufügt, habe zu Recht als gottlos, ἄσεβής, zu gelten, wer sich davon frei hält, wird sich mehr dem Gott angleichen.<sup>93</sup>

Wichtig für die vorliegende Thematik ist vor allem das zweite Buch, das die Praxis der Opfer, ihre Entwicklung, ihre Relation zur menschlichen Ernährung und ihre Zuordnung zu verschiedenen göttlichen Instanzen behandelt. Porphyrios geht zunächst auf die Ursprünge der Opfer ein, wobei er sich auf Theophrast bezieht: Zu Beginn hätten die Menschen nur Gräser, Blätter, Wurzeln, danach auch Früchte geopfert. Viel später sei man der Gesetzlosigkeit, παρανομία, verfallen und habe begonnen, mit dem Blut der Tiere die Altäre zu beflecken. Erst seit die Menschen Fleisch aßen, brachten sie auch Tieropfer dar.<sup>94</sup> Aber man dürfe mit Opfertieren keinen anderen Wesen Schaden zufügen, denn wie könnte dies fromm sein? Keinesfalls also darf man den Göttern Tiere opfern. Dazu hebt Porphyrios hervor, dass die bestehenden Gesetze – gegen die er sich nicht wende – es durchaus erlauben, die Götter mit einfachen und unbelebten Opfertieren zu verehren; und wenn wir uns des Fleisches enthalten, wie sollten die Götter dessen bedürfen?<sup>95</sup>

Über diese generellen Aussagen geht Porphyrios aber hinaus, indem er sich detailliert zum Thema äußert und eine Skala der verschiedenen Opfer angibt, die einem hierarchisch gegliederten Bereich des Göttlichen zugeordnet sind. Jeder Stufe ist eine bestimmte Weise von Verehrung und Opfertieren angemessen. Für die höchste Stufe der Gottheit beruft Porphyrios sich auf einen „weisen Mann“, der, wie oben angegeben, Apollonios von Tyana ist und dessen Lehre hier zitiert oder paraphrasiert wird.<sup>96</sup> Sie besagt, dass dem ersten Gott, der über allem steht, nichts Wahrnehmbares gebührt, auch nicht Räucherwerk oder gesprochene Worte, sondern dass wir ihn verehren in reinem Schweigen und in reinen Gedanken. – Der anschließende Text dürfte in seinen Formulierungen von Porphyrios stammen. Zunächst fügt er zur Verehrung des höchsten Gottes hinzu:<sup>97</sup> „Wir sollen uns mit ihm verknüpfen

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 1 zum Thema der Gerechtigkeit; zur Verwandtschaft zwischen Mensch und Tier und unserem gerechten Verhalten zu Tieren III, 24–27.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 5–7 u. 9; zu Theophrast vgl. oben den Text zu Anm. 40–49.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 12, 3–4; 13, 3; 23, 1–2; 24, 5; 33, 1–3; vgl. 59, 1.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 34, 1–2; zu Apollonios vgl. o. Anm. 79 u. 84.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, II, ab 34, 3. Zum höchsten Gott vgl. auch II, 37, 1; zu νοερά θυσία II, 45, 4.

und in der Angleichung an ihn unseren (geistigen) Aufstieg ihm als ein heiliges Opfer, ἱερὰν θυσίαν, darbringen, und dies ist unser Lobpreis Gottes, ὕμνος, und unser Heil, σωτηρία. Das Opfer vollendet sich in der unberührten Ruhe der Seele und der Schau des Gottes“. Hier sind Gedanken platonischen und plotinischen Ursprungs vereint mit Vorstellungen des Porphyrios, die sich sowohl im Begriff des Heils finden – Porphyrios spricht von σωτηρία häufig, Plotin niemals – wie in der Erklärung des inneren Aufstiegs im Sinne eines Opfers, hier als ἱερὰ θυσία benannt, an späterer Stelle als νοερὰ θυσία. Plotin würde die geistige Erhebung nie als ‘Opfer’ verstehen.

Im folgenden verzeichnet Porphyrios weitere Bereiche der göttlichen Wesenheiten und der entsprechenden Opfer. Zunächst nennt er die ‘geistigen Götter’,<sup>98</sup> νοητὸν θεοί, die als “Abkömmlinge des ersten Gottes” gelten; ihnen sind Worte und gesungene Hymnen sowie gute Gedanken als Dankopfer angemessen für das, was sie uns in der geistigen Schau zu unserem Heil, σωτηρία, gewähren. Hier beklagt Porphyrios, dass selbst viele Philosophen nicht zu derart geistigen Opfern bereit seien. – Die nächste Stufe der höheren Wesen, denen wir Verehrung schulden, umfasst die sichtbaren Himmelsgötter,<sup>99</sup> die Fixsterne und Planeten, unter denen Helios hervorragt; diesen Göttern sollen wir das ihnen verwandte Feuer entzünden und Sichtbares, niemals aber etwas Lebendiges opfern. Porphyrios, der sich hier auf den “Theologen” beruft (womit Pythagoras gemeint ist), fasst zusammen: “Wer sich auf die Frömmigkeit versteht, weiß, dass den Göttern kein Lebewesen geopfert wird...” – und er fährt fort: “wohl aber den Daimones, den guten wie den bösen, und er weiß, wer ihnen die Opfer darbringen soll und bis zu welchem Grad dies nötig ist”.<sup>100</sup>

Hier nimmt die Opfer-Darstellung des Porphyrios eine interessante Wende, indem er die Daimones, zumal die bösen, einbezieht und eine wahre Dämonologie entwickelt. Überwiegend wurde in jenen Jahrhunderten die Existenz guter wie böser Daimones angenommen; Plotin allerdings kennt keine bösen Daimones. Porphyrios erklärt nun sogar die Herkunft dieser Wesen (was innerhalb des Platonismus singulär ist): Sie entstammen der Weltseele, sind mit Pneuma (einer offenbar negativ wirkenden Kraft) verbunden; jene, die das Pneuma beherrschen, sind die guten Daimones, die anderen sind die bösen, die vom Pneuma

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 34, 4–5; 35, 1.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 36, 3–5 u. 37, 3.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 36, 5; weiter zu den Daimones, ihrer Herkunft, ihrem Wirken und den Opfern 37, 4–5 u. c. 38–46. Daimones werden von Opferdünsten angezogen 42, 3 (vgl. *Il.* 9, 500), ferner 58, 1–2.

beherrscht werden. Die guten Daimones wirken zum Nutzen in der Natur wie bei den Menschen, die bösen aber, die κακοεργοί, haben einen gewaltsamen Charakter, βίαιον ἦθος, und verursachen Übles soweit sie dies nur vermögen, nämlich Erdbeben, Missernten und dergleichen, doch wirken sie auch auf die Menschen ein, indem sie deren Begierden entfachen und sie von der wahren Gottesvorstellung abzubringen suchen. Sie erfreuen sich am “Dunst von Opferfleisch” und Blut (wie die homerischen Götter!), wodurch ihr pneumatischer Bestandteil und damit ihre böse Energie gestärkt wird.

Nach dieser Beschreibung ist evident, dass blutige Opfer nur bösen Wesen gelten und dass jeder vernünftige Mensch sich daher von solchen Akten fernhalten müsse, um sich nicht in die Nähe des Dämonenwirkens zu begeben. Zwar gesteht Porphyrios zu, dass im politischen Umfeld derlei Opfer geboten sein mögen,<sup>101</sup> da man meint, man müsse die Daimones sanft stimmen, welche zum Erwerb von Reichtum und sonstigen äußeren Gütern behilflich sein können; für die Philosophen aber sind solche Dinge ohne Belang, ihnen geht es allein um die Seele und um die Angleichung an Gott. Sollte man aber doch einmal genötigt sein, einem öffentlichen Opfer beizuwohnen, so darf man auf keinen Fall vom Opferfleisch essen, da dies den Einfluss der Daimones verstärkt. Der Philosoph wird bestrebt sein, die Seele rein zu erhalten. Denn die Götter, die keines Dinges bedürfen, schauen auf das Wesen des Menschen, dessen ἦθος, und erkennen in der rechten Gottesvorstellung, dem reinen Geist und der von Emotionen freien Seele das größte Opfer.<sup>102</sup>

Der besondere Beitrag des Porphyrios zur Auffassung des Opfers ist einerseits dessen vergeistigte Deutung im Sinne der inneren Erhebung, eines ‘heiligen’ und ‘geistigen Opfers’, ἱερά und νοερά θυσία. Zu erwähnen ist, dass etwas Vergleichbares sich in hermetischen Schriften findet, nämlich der Ausdruck λογικὴ θυσία.<sup>103</sup> Zur Ergänzung sei noch auf das Alterswerk des Porphyrios, den *Brief an Markella*, hingewiesen; darin ist zwar nicht von Opfern die Rede, doch wird metaphorisch vom inneren “Tempel” gesprochen: Der Geist des Menschen, διάνοια, νοῦς, wird als Tempel für die Aufnahme des Gottes bezeichnet. Dem Gotte aber nähert sich der Mensch in schweigender Verehrung und erstrebt die Angleichung an ihn.<sup>104</sup> – Andererseits hat Porphyrios die blutigen Opfer nicht generell ausgeschlossen (wie Apollonios), sondern sie

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 43, 1–3; 44, 1; 58, 1.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 60, 4; 61, 1.

<sup>103</sup> *Corpus Hermeticum*, ed. É. des Places. I–II (Paris 1946–1983) I, 31 (19, 1); XIII, 18 u. 19 (208, 13 u. 16); 21 (209, 7).

<sup>104</sup> Porph. *Ad Marc.* [ed. des Places 1982] c. 11 (S. 111, 12 ff.); 15 (115, 1 ff.); 16 (115, 7 ff.; 20 ff.); 19 (117, 10 ff.).

niedereren bösen Wesen zugeordnet, von deren Wirken man damals weitgehend überzeugt war.<sup>105</sup> Damit werden die Tieropfer nicht nur abgewertet, vielmehr werden sie, zumal in Verbindung mit der Fleischnahrung, als eine Gefährdung für die Menschen aufgefasst. Daher ist die Abkehr von ihnen eine religiös begründete dringende Pflicht.

Jamblich, der aus Chalkis in Syrien stammte, war für einige Zeit Schüler des Porphyrios, hat sich später aber von ihm abgewandt, eigene Wege beschritten und sich sehr kritisch mit Schriften des einstigen Lehrers auseinandergesetzt. Dies geschieht in einem anonymen Werk (als dessen Verfasser aber Jamblich feststeht), das in der Überlieferung den Titel *Über die Mysterien von Ägypten (De mysteriis)* trägt und sich als Antwort auf eine frühe Schrift des Porphyrios, dessen *Brief an Anebo*, darstellt, allerdings auch auf Positionen der Schrift *De abstinentia* eingeht.<sup>106</sup> Im fünften Buch dieses umfangreichen, zehn Bücher umfassenden Werkes werden die Opfer behandelt; dabei wird die Ablehnung der Tieropfer durch Porphyrios zurückgewiesen und der Sinn der Opfer auf eine neue Weise gedeutet. Hier seien nur die wichtigsten Gedanken referiert.

Der Autor wirft dem Porphyrios vor, dass er im Unklaren sei über den Nutzen und die Wirkung der Opfer. Tieropfer seien nicht etwa darum zu vermeiden, weil die aufsteigenden Dämpfe die Götter verunreinigen könnten, denn göttliche Wesen sind gar nicht affizierbar, sind ἀπαθεῖς, und können durch nichts Materielles beeinträchtigt werden, im Unterschied zu den Seelen der Menschen.<sup>107</sup> Zu den höheren Wesen rechnet Jamblich auch die Daimones; von denen im hiesigen Kontext aber nur gute erwähnt und hinsichtlich der Opfer gar nicht einbezogen werden. Für die Menschen nun bringt der Genuss von Fleisch Beschwernis und Befleckung und verursacht krankhafte Zustände der Seele; den Göttern aber gleicht sich der aufsteigende Dunst an und ordnet sich dem All ein. Alle göttlichen Wesen sind unvereinbar mit irdisch-materiellen Elementen; dies gilt auch für die sichtbaren Sterngötter.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>105</sup> Die Christen sahen in den antiken Göttern generell böse Dämonen, denen die üblichen Kultopfer galten.

<sup>106</sup> Jamblique, *Les mystères d'Égypte*. Texte établi et traduit par É. des Places (Paris 1966). Der ursprüngliche Titel lautet: Antwort des Lehrers Abammon auf den Brief des Porphyrios an Anebo und Lösung der darin enthaltenen Probleme. – Der Anebo-Brief dürfte entstanden sein, bevor Porphyrios Schüler Plotins wurde (vor 263), die Antwortschrift Jamblichs viel später, vermutlich in den 280er Jahren.

<sup>107</sup> Iambl. *De myst.* V, 1 (199, 8 ff.); 2 (200, 1 ff.). – Jamblich beschreibt auch das Wirken böser Daimones in Buch II–IV (besonders III, 13 u. 30–31), von diesen ist aber bei der Behandlung der Opfer keine Rede.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 3–4 (201, 1–202, 7).

Anschließend legt Jamblich seine eigene Lehre der Opfer, δόγμα περὶ θουσιῶν, dar: Sie erfolgen nicht um der Verehrung der Götter willen, sind auch nicht Ausdruck der Dankbarkeit für die göttlichen Gaben, denn Dank ist nur unter Menschen angemessen und entspricht nicht dem überlegenen Rang der Götter. Auch lässt sich von solchen Motiven her nicht die Wirkung der Opfer erklären, etwa dass sie eine Pest oder Dürreperiode beenden können oder, was viel bedeutender ist, dass sie zur Reinigung und Vollendung der Seele, ihrer Loslösung vom Bereich des Werdens führen.<sup>109</sup> Will man erklären, worauf die Wirkung der Opfer und ihre Verbindung zu den Göttern beruht, muss man zunächst davon ausgehen, dass die Welt ein einziges Lebewesen ist, in dem verschiedene Energien, ähnliche und konträre, walten, die nach dem Gesetz der Sympathie, συμπάθεια, alles durchdringen. Doch wird auch damit die gesuchte Ursache noch nicht enthüllt, denn die Götter stehen über der Natur mit ihren notwendig ablaufenden Prozessen. Ein viel wichtigeres Prinzip als das der Sympathie im Naturbereich ist das der Liebe, φιλία, seitens der Schöpfer zu den Geschaffenen und die gegenseitige Zuwendung, οἰκείωσις. Wenn wir etwas Reines, ein Tier oder eine Pflanze opfern, setzen wir schöpferische Prinzipien in Tätigkeit; von diesen existieren viele verschiedene, wozu die Daimones, untere Kräfte der Götter, kosmische Instanzen zählen, die alle ihre Gültigkeit besitzen. Die wahre Ursache für die Wirksamkeit der Opfer ist jedoch die Liebe, die das All zusammenhält und eine geheime Gemeinschaft, ἄρρητος κοινωνία, herstellt.<sup>110</sup>

Hier ist bereits deutlich geworden, dass für Jamblich das Phänomen der Opfer in einem veränderten Licht erscheint. Dies stellt sich im folgenden noch klarer dar. So wird dem Feuer eine verwandelnde Kraft zugeschrieben; im Verbrennen der Opfer, heißt es, wird die Materie nicht nur vernichtet, sondern das Feuer gleicht diese sich selbst an und führt sie hinauf zum göttlichen, himmlischen, immateriellen Feuer, θεῖον καὶ οὐράνιον πῦρ καὶ ἄυλον. Dadurch bewirken nun die höheren Wesen, dass auch wir unberührbar, ἀπαθεῖς, werden, und sie gleichen uns den Göttern an.<sup>111</sup> – Für Jamblich sind die Opfer nur im Sinne der Theurgie verständlich, jener religiösen Auffassung und Praxis, die ein Zusammenwirken der Menschen mit göttlichen Energien voraussetzt: Die Opfer werden “theurgisch” vollzogen, die Priester sollen θεουργικῶς θεραπεύειν.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 5–6 (206, 3–207, 6).

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 7 (207, 7–208, 6); 9–10 (209, 11–211, 18).

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 11 (214, 6–215, 7).

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 14 (217, 17). – Auf das Wirken der Theurgen geht Jamblich wiederholt ein, vgl. 20 (228, 2 ff.); 21 (229, 15 ff.); 23 (233, 11 ff.) etc.

Eine Rangordnung der göttlichen Instanzen und der ihnen entsprechenden Opfer ist wie für Porphyrios auch für Jamblich wichtig. Bei ihm aber müssen nacheinander die verschiedenen Götterebenen mit Opfern bedacht werden.<sup>113</sup> Beginnen muss man bei jenen Göttern (es sind nicht Daimones), denen die Aufsicht über das Materielle obliegt, welches sie mit ihren immateriellen Energien durchdringen. Ihnen gebühren materielle Opfer einschließlich getöteter Tiere, νεκρὰ σώματα ... φόνοϛ τε τῶν ζῴων. Denn den Göttern, die über die Seele und die Natur gebieten, wozu die von der Natur verwalteten Körper gehören, darf man Kräfte, die von der Natur herrühren, φυσικὰς δυνάμεις, darbringen. Tiere zu töten, ist für Jamblich kein Problem; er erklärt, sie hätten keinen Anteil am "göttlicheren Leben", daher sei auch die Berührung toter Tiere nicht befleckend.<sup>114</sup> – Andere Götter stehen völlig über der Natur, sind eigenständig und 'eingestaltig', μονοειδεῖς; ihnen gebühren ausschließlich immaterielle, geistige Gaben, νοερὰ δῶρα. Ferner existieren göttliche Wesen von mittlerem Rang, denen Opfer beider Arten entsprechen. Von der höchsten Ebene her wird alles erleuchtet und durchstrahlt.<sup>115</sup> Einem jeden Gott sollen die richtigen Opfer dargebracht werden, seien es Steine, Pflanzen, Tiere oder Duftstoffe, deren vollkommene Reinheit dafür notwendig ist. Manche Materie ist sogar den Göttern verwandt und kann diese zur Epiphanie bewegen. Auch ermöglichen gewisse Pflanzen und Tiere es dem Menschen, die Verbindung zu den höheren Wesen zu erlangen. Wichtig sind dazu die Gebete, denn erst sie führen zur Vollendung der Opferhandlung und zu einer unauflösbaren Gemeinschaft des Menschen mit den Göttern.<sup>116</sup>

Jamblich gibt den Opfern eine völlig neue Deutung im Sinne der Theurgie, welche durch rituelle Akte einer besonderen Art die Verbindung des Menschen zur Götterwelt herzustellen verspricht. Im Opfer, ergänzt durch Gebete, werden, so glaubt man, göttliche Energien freigesetzt, welche die Seelen der Menschen emporziehen und sie fest mit den Göttern verbinden.

Die Schrift des Salustios *Über die Götter und die Welt*, Περὶ θεῶν καὶ κόσμου, die eine knappe Zusammenfassung der neuplatonischen Lehren, dabei auch eigenständige Positionen des uns sonst unbekanntem Autors enthält, ist in die zweite Hälfte des vierten Jahrhunderts zu datieren.<sup>117</sup> Manches ist von Jamblich übernommen, jedoch fehlt gänzlich

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 14 (217, 3–218, 18); 19 (226, 3–9).

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, VI, 1 (241, 12 ff.).

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 19 (225, 9–20); der Begriff μονοειδές als Merkmal des Geistigen seit Platon *Symp.* 211 b, *Phaid.* 78 d.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 23 (233, 14–234, 14); 24 (234, 15–235, 18); 26 (237, 8 ff.).

<sup>117</sup> Saloustios, *Des Dieux et du monde*. Texte établi et traduit par G. Rochefort (Paris 1960). – Die Schrift ist ohne Titel überliefert, der übliche Titel stammt von der ersten Ausgabe von Allatus 1638.

die Dimension der Theurgie. Insgesamt werden die Lehren rational klar, oft vereinfacht dargestellt. Die Opfer erhalten wiederum eine neue Erklärung; der Vegetarismus ist kein Thema.

Dass ein Gott keines Dinges bedarf, wird seit langem von den Philosophen betont; hier wird dazu ergänzt, dass ein Gott gar nicht Freude oder Zorn (kein πάθος) empfinden könne, darum nicht mit Gaben zu verehren ist. Die Opfer sind vielmehr von Nutzen für uns Menschen, denn wir werden durch sie und die Gebete, durch unsere Hinwendung zu den Göttern von unseren Verfehlungen befreit, gewinnen erneut Anteil an der Güte der Götter und die Verknüpfung, συναφή, mit ihnen. Die Orte und Arten der Verehrung haben symbolische Bedeutung: Die Tempel ahmen den Himmel nach, die Altäre die Erde, die Götterbilder das Leben, die Gebete das Geistige, die Pflanzen und Steine die Materie, die geopferten Tiere aber das vernunftlose Leben in uns. Gebete ohne Opfer sind bloße Worte, vereint mit Opfern aber bewirken sie die Verknüpfung mit dem eigenen Ursprung und mit den Göttern.<sup>118</sup> Die Tieropfer haben einen notwendigen Sinn; dazu wird erklärt: Den Göttern eignet das primäre Leben, den Menschen eine gewisse Art des Lebens; um beides zu verbinden, bedarf es eines Mittleren, das ebenfalls Leben hat. Dies findet sich in den Tieren, die wir opfern. Dabei müssen einem jeden Gott die ihm gebührenden Opfer und Riten vollzogen werden.<sup>119</sup>

Salustios stellt einfache Regeln auf: Opfer sind bedeutsam zum Wohle der Menschen, weil sie, gemeinsam mit den Gebeten, die Verbindung zu den Göttern bewirken; dabei haben Tieropfer eine wichtige Funktion. Die Frage des Fleischessens wird nicht berührt.

\* \* \*

Überblickt man die Haltung der Philosophen gegenüber dem Vegetarismus und der Opferpraxis, so lässt sich sagen, dass sie alle für maßvolle Ernährung eintreten, aber nicht generell die Enthaltung von Fleisch fordern. Für Pythagoras und Empedokles ist das Töten von Tieren als uns nächstverwandten Wesen ausgeschlossen, zumal nach ihrem Glauben auch Menschenseelen sich in Tiere inkarnieren können. Platon äußert sich nicht präzise im Sinne der pythagoreischen Lebensweise, empfiehlt aber für seine geplante Polis vegetarische Nahrung, da sie gesund sei; Tieropfer erwähnt er nirgends. Aristoteles und die meisten Stoiker sehen keinen Anlass für den Verzicht auf Fleisch; sie

<sup>118</sup> Salustios XIV, 1–3; XV, 1–3.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, XVI, 1–2.

meinen, die Tiere als ἄλογα ζῶα seien allein zu unserem Gebrauch erschaffen worden. Jedoch treten Theophrast und später Musonios für die vegetarische Ernährung ein. Auch Plutarch, der nachdrücklich Respekt und Schonung für die Tiere fordert (ohne die Reinkarnation in Tiere anzunehmen), wendet sich gegen den Fleischverzehr, gesteht aber aufgrund der Gewohnheit doch Kompromisse zu. Plotin lehnt selbst Medizin ab, die von Tieren herrührt. Radikal vertritt Porphyrios den Verzicht auf den Fleischgenuss, indem er diesen nicht nur als belastend, sondern als eine Gefährdung einschätzt, da schädigende Daimones dabei angezogen würden. Jamblich hält die Fleischnahrung für beschwerend, ohne sie geradezu abzulehnen. Salustios äußert sich zur Ernährung nicht.

Von der homerischen Vorstellung, dass die Götter blutige Opfer und deren Dunst lieben oder gar brauchen, sind die Philosophen weit entfernt. Das Bild einer glücklichen Urzeit ohne Blutopfer zeichnet Empedokles, der, wie die Pythagoreer, strikt das Töten der Tiere abweist, als Frevel einstuft. Platon äußert sich nicht ausdrücklich zur Frage der Tieropfer, Plutarch nur gelegentlich. Doch wird bei ihm eine neue vergeistigte Form der Götterverehrung angedeutet, die sich ausgesprochen findet bei Apollonios von Tyana, der die Hinwendung zum Gott als geistige ἐπιμέλεια bezeichnet. Erst Porphyrios wendet für diesen geistigen Akt den Begriff des Opfers an und spricht von νοερά θυσία als einem Opfer, das dem höchsten Gott gebührt. Indes hält er für jene Götter, die dem Kosmos verbunden sind, durchaus materielle, aber unblutige Opfer für angemessen, während er Tieropfer allein den bösen Daimones zuordnet. Daher sind diese Opfer wie das Essen von Fleisch unbedingt zu vermeiden.

Erneut werden die Tieropfer einbezogen von Jamblich, der den Opfern eine neue Deutung gibt im Sinne der Theurgie. Für ihn existieren verschiedene Stufen der Götter und der Opfer; beginnen muss man, will man höher aufsteigen, mit den materiellen Opfern für die kosmisch wirkenden Götter, wozu auch getötete Tiere gehören. Die Opfer erfahren durch das Feuer eine Verwandlung ins Immaterielle; zugleich werden die Menschenseelen empor geführt zur Vereinigung mit den Göttern. Salustios schließlich betont, dass die Opfertgaben gar nichts für die Götter bedeuten, sondern allein zu unserem Nutzen dienen; dabei sind auch Tieropfer geboten, um die Verbindung zu den Göttern herzustellen.

Die Vorstellung, dass Opfer für die Götter zum Menschendasein gehören, bleibt – mit wechselnder Begründung und mit verschiedenen Inhalten – von Homer bis zur Spätantike gültig. In der Auseinandersetzung der Philosophen mit dem tradierten Kult zeigen sich die Aus-

prägungen des Wandels in der religiösen Haltung, im Selbstverständnis des Menschen und seiner erstrebten Verbindung zu höheren Mächten.

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Отношение философов к кровавым жертвоприношениям и едению мясной пищи различается в зависимости от школы и меняется на протяжении истории. Многие философы отвергали мясную пищу из-за ее отягощающего воздействия на душу. Для Пифагора и его последователей запрет на убийство животных и едение мяса проистекает из трактовки всех живых существ как родственных друг другу (учение о метемпсихозе). Платон в своем проекте идеального государства рекомендует вегетарианский образ жизни; он не упоминает о приношении животных в жертву в “Законах”. Для Аристотеля, большинства перипатетиков и стоиков животные существуют лишь для пользы человека; исключения составляют Феофраст и Мусоний Руф, которые выступают за отказ от мясной пищи. Плутарх требует гуманного отношения к животным, не отвергая полностью едение мяса. Одновременно у него намечается и новое, спиритуализованное понимание культа, которое получает затем отчетливое выражение у Аполлония Тианского. Порфирий еще решительнее выступает за реформу традиционных обрядов, утверждая, что кровавые жертвы приносятся злым демоническим силам, и определяя как жертвоприношение то внутреннее обращение человека к божественному, которое занимает уже у Плотина центральное место: Порфирий говорит об “умственной жертве”, которая приносится высшему богу. Ямвлих, однако, вновь отводит кровавым жертвам место в почитании богов, на этот раз в связи с теургией. Для неоплатоника Салюстия, наконец, принесение животных в жертву служит связью, соединяющей человека с богами. Так в реакциях философов на традиционный кровавый культ выражаются изменения в религиозном чувстве, в трактовке природы людей и в стремлении к единению с высшими силами.

## SIX LUCRETIAN EMENDATIONS

1, 716–721:

quorum [sc. philosophorum] Agragantinus cum primis Empedocles est,  
 insula quem triquetris terrarum gessit in oris,  
 quam fluitans circum magnis anfractibus aequor  
 Ionium glaucis aspargit uirus ab undis

720 angustoque fretu rapidum mare diuidit undis  
 Italiae terrarum oras a finibus eius.

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720 *undis* OQG Priscian *GL* II, 27, 3 : *undans* Lachmann : *almae* Bernays :  
*intrans* Grasberger : *oris* Goebel (*Italia... affinibus* in 721 lectis) : *aeque*  
 Merrill : *unda* Brakman : *omnis* Orth : *arcens* Shackleton Bailey 721 *Italiae*  
 LPA<sup>a</sup>FC : *Haeliae* O<sup>a.c.</sup>QG : *Haeoliae* O<sup>2</sup> : *Aeoliae* G. Vossius (et Heinsius suo  
 Marte) : *Aeolidae* (si non *Italiae*) dub. Sandbach

The text of 721 has elicited much discussion from previous critics but is not my concern here. It will suffice for present purposes to say that *Italiae*, the emendation (appropriately enough) of certain Italic manuscripts,<sup>1</sup> is very little removed from the paradosis once it is realised that *it > h* is not a difficult corruption in early minuscule;<sup>2</sup> *Aeoliae*, by contrast, lacks a parallel for its application to southern Italy and cannot therefore be introduced with any confidence into the text. I wish rather to focus upon the final word of 720. The repetition of the same word in the same case at the close of two successive verses is stylistically striking but there are few secure Lucretian parallels to support the usage.<sup>3</sup> What is more troublesome is the wholly otiose nature of the latter *undis*: we are told in 718–721 that the Ionian sea sprinkles brine from its waves around Sicily and that the choppy

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<sup>1</sup> I wish to make clear at the beginning of this article that I am of the firm opinion that the Italian mss of Lucretius do not provide a witness to the text independent from OQGVU and should therefore merely serve as a repertory for conjectures of the Quattrocento.

<sup>2</sup> The reverse error (*it* for *h*) can be seen at 4, 822: *in his* O : *initis* Q.

<sup>3</sup> In a forthcoming *Prometheus* article I discuss the matter of repetition of identical forms of the same word or words at the close of successive Lucretian hexameters. I conclude that there are only four true instances of exact repetition (1, 393–394; 2, 597–598; 4, 509–510; 5, 1178–1179), of which 4, 509–510 is the only example where no obvious motivation (poetic or otherwise) lies behind the iteration.

sea divides by a narrow strait *with its waves* the shores of the Italian land from its borders. The ablatival *undis* therefore bears no real semantic weight and, even as a metrical filler, falls lamentably beneath Lucretius' artistic threshold, particularly in a passage as striking as this famous praise of Empedocles (716–733). With the repetition of *undis* from the preceding verse being so easy, and so well paralleled, an error,<sup>4</sup> I believe that Lachmann and subsequent critics have been right to suggest emendations in its stead. That *undis* has support from the indirect tradition in a late-antique grammarian need not cause undue alarm: provided that this corruption took place in the five centuries intervening between Lucretius and Priscian, and that the latter had access to a similar manuscript tradition to that which survived the fall of Rome (as is very likely), there is no problem with the hypothesis of textual error at the close of 720.

Unfortunately, few emendations made to date can be deemed at all probable: Lachmann's, Grasberger's and Shackleton Bailey's participles not only complicate the syntax but are superfluous in sense; Merrill's *aeque* is weak, Bernays' *almae* is surprising and Goebel's alterations to this and the following verse are too convoluted to convince; Brakman's *unda* only shifts the problem to the singular. I believe, however, that Orth took the right tack in introducing an adjective to modify *oras* of 721, although his *omnis* is untrue: the whole of Italy is not divided from Sicily by the Ionian sea. It strikes me as a considerably more attractive option to read *udas*, 'damp', 'moist', i. e. wave-splashed. For a similar employment of the adjective, cf. Hor. *Carm.* 1, 32, 7–8 *iactatam religarat udo / litore nauim* and Stat. *Silv.* 3, 1, 68 *forte diem Triuiiae dum litore ducimus udo*. The similarity of the *ductus* of *udas* to *undis* would certainly have aided the corruption.

4, 104–109:

sunt igitur tenues †formarum dissimilesque†

105 effigiae, singillatim quas cernere nemo  
quom possit, tamen assiduo crebroque repulso  
reiectae reddunt speculorum ex aequore uisum,  
nec ratione alia seruari posse uidentur,  
tanto opere ut similes reddantur quoique figurae.

104 *formarum* OQ : *formae rerum* Purmann *dissimilesque* OQ : *consimilesque*  
Lambinus : *similesque* Purmann : *illis similesque* Lachmann (*formarum*  
retento) : *his similesque* Postgate

<sup>4</sup> K. Müller (ed.), *T. Lucreti Cari De rerum natura* (Zurich 1975) in his critical note *ad loc.* aptly compares 1, 1023; 2, 422; 2, 467; 2, 636; 2, 1168; 3, 594; 4, 493; 4, 990; 6, 15; 6, 1012.

Although the text of 104 is metrically sound, it cannot be what Lucretius wrote: ‘therefore there are thin and dissimilar idols of forms’ is distinctly unwelcome for two reasons. Firstly, Lucretius is here offering the conclusion that there exist *similar* images emitted from things and traversing the air, and any mention of dissimilarity is thus grossly inappropriate.<sup>5</sup> Secondly, these *effigiae* are the likenesses of *res* in general and therefore have a shape similar to them; they are not the likenesses of *formae*. Emendation is clearly required. It is of primary importance for correcting the text, as Bailey and other commentators have noted, that *forma* is used by Lucretius strictly for the *shape* of the images produced from things, not as a synonym for the *simulacra* or *effigiae* themselves (cf. 4, 52; 4, 69; 4, 87). Accordingly, Lachmann’s *formarum illis similesque* reads like a conjecture, introducing as it does *formae* in an unparalleled sense, and is inherently risky (*-que* is to be construed in second position); Bailey is skirting the issue by generously translating “images of the shapes of things like to them” and stating that there is only “a slight awkwardness of expression”.<sup>6</sup> Since a more general genitive dependent upon *effigiae* is required, most editors instead follow Purmann’s *formae rerum* (independently conjectured by Munro) along with Postgate’s *his similesque*, a suggestion which again presents *-que* trajected to second position. Again, the plural *formae* presents the same difficulty of referring to the *simulacra* themselves rather than a property of them, a usage not employed by Lucretius elsewhere.

I believe that critics have been mistaken in looking for two separate entities in 104–105: the subsequent lines 105–109 seem to treat the single phenomenon of emitted *simulacra*, whether reflected or not. Accordingly, since *effigiae* is guaranteed as our subject, I suggest that the transmitted *formarum dissimilesque* should be emended to *forma* (abl.) *rerum similesque*. The *effigiae rerum* are ‘thin (cf. 4, 85 *effigias... tenues*) and like in shape’.<sup>7</sup> To translate 104–106: ‘therefore there are semblances of things thin and alike in shape which, although no one can see them individually, nonetheless are reflected by continual and unremitting repulsion and return (to us) an image from the surface of mirrors’. Once *forma rerum* was contracted to *formarum* by an easy error, a

<sup>5</sup> The theory of W. A. Merrill, “Studies in the text of Lucretius”, *UCPCPh* 2 (1911) 93–150, at 117, that *dissimilesque* “here appears to be a cautious parenthetical qualification” since *effigiae* “are similar, and yet unlike, for they are often distorted or slightly changed”, is manifestly untenable.

<sup>6</sup> C. Bailey (ed.), *T. Lucreti Cari De rerum natura libri sex* (Oxford 1947) *ad loc.*

<sup>7</sup> This construction is easier than taking *rerum* as a genitive dependent upon *similesque* (with *-que* in second position): ‘idols thin in shape and alike things’.

scribe with a head for metre but little interest in the minutiae of the physics at hand expanded *similesque* to *dissimilesque*.

4, 598–602:

colloquium clausis foribus quoque saepe uidemus;  
ni mirum, quia uox per flexa foramina rerum

600 incolumis transire potest, simulacra renutant;  
perscinduntur enim, nisi recta foramina tranant,  
qualia sunt uitri, species qua trauolat omnis.

I wish merely to suggest that editors return to the pre-Lachmannian vulgate in 602, that is reading *quae* for the transmitted *qua*.<sup>8</sup> Lucretius employs *trauolare* transitively at 4, 559 and we would naturally expect the same here.<sup>9</sup> *qua* is inelegant for *per recta foramina* after *species*; *quae*, once written *que* as per mediaeval orthography, could have easily been ‘corrected’ to *qua*. *qua* is wrongly transmitted in lieu of *quae* at 1, 484.

4, 757–761:

nec ratione alia, quom somnus membra profudit,  
mens animi uigilat, nisi quod simulacra lacessunt  
haec eadem nostros animos quae quom uigilamus,

760 usque adeo, certe ut uideamur cernere eum quem  
†reddita† uita iam mors et terra potitast.

760 *quem* FC et al. Itali : *que* OQ 761 *reddita* OQ : *relicta* I. Vossius : *reddita* pro Lachmann : *reddigit* a Bockemüller : *concessa* Merrill : *reddidit* a Krokiewicz : *derepta* Romanes : *reddita* ea Orth

*reddita* of 761 is at once unmetrical and inappropriate in sense: one does not give one’s life back on death and, even if some did hold that belief, Lucretius would certainly not have endorsed it, casually or otherwise. Isaac Voss’ *relicta* has been widely accepted, on the grounds that *re-* has a prevocalic byform *red-* which was occasionally employed before consonants in early Latin. Certain editors have written *redlicta* or *rellicta* to make the prosodic anomaly clear but Bailey and subsequent critics have typically retained the Classical spelling (which indeed Vossius employed in his manuscript note, cited by Munro).<sup>10</sup> Yet

<sup>8</sup> The 15<sup>th</sup>-century corrector of Q curiously chose to add a virgula to the word so as to read *quam*, a fact which has not, to my knowledge, been noted previously.

<sup>9</sup> It is a moot point what verb should be read for the transmitted *transuiat*, a *hapax*, at 6, 349.

<sup>10</sup> H. A. J. Munro (ed.), *T. Lucreti Cari De rerum natura libri sex* (Cambridge 1886) app. crit. *ad loc.*

*relictta uita* is a rather weak expression<sup>11</sup> and the metrical licence with *relinquo* not only has no verbal parallel but is apparently unmotivated, for the natural scansion of ablative *relicta* (a bacchius) is tractable elsewhere in the hexameter. It would seem better method to offer a participle that does not fall foul of such objections.

Romanes' *derepta* is suitably forceful but rather removed from the paradosis; Merrill's *concessa* arises from the improbable supposition that *reddita* is a gloss of a lost participle. Orth's suggestion involves the awkward elision of a cretic and an unwanted pronominal adjective. The conjectures of Lachmann, Bockemüller and Krokiewicz can also be dismissed quickly: Lachmann wishes to take *reddita* in agreement with *mors* followed by *pro uita*, an expression which Bailey was right to term "very improbable";<sup>12</sup> the two other scholars inappropriately introduce a personified *Mors*, and the former posits a verbal form of equally questionable prosody. To offer a more striking participle, I suggest that Lucretius wrote *restincta*, 'after his life has burned out', 'after his life-force has been extinguished' (cf. *OLD* s. v. 1 a [*in fig. phrs.*]), thereby invoking the pervasive Classical imagery of life as a flame. If *restincta* (*restīcta*) was miscopied as *restitta* or *redincta*, 'correction' to *reddita* by a scribe with little knowledge of Classical metre could easily have followed.

4, 907–909:

nunc quibus ille modis somnus per membra quietem  
irriget atque animi curas e pectore soluat,  
suauidicis potius quam multis uersibus edam.

907 *modis* O<sup>2</sup>Q<sup>2</sup> Macr. Sat. 6, 1, 44 : *modo* O<sup>a.c.</sup>Q<sup>a.c.</sup> *quietem* Macr. loc. cit :  
*quiete* OQ

Although I wish to discuss 907, I have nothing to say about *modis... quietem*, both of which are certain supplements from the indirect tradition. Instead, I find the employment of *ille* puzzling. Of those commentators that have addressed the word, the responses to the pronoun have been remarkably varied: "der viel besprochene, oft erwähnte Schlaf" (Bockemüller);<sup>13</sup> "di cui s'è parlato sopra" (Gius-

<sup>11</sup> Would Lucretius even say that life could be left behind? We may compare his phraseology at 5, 63, where contrariwise *life* is said to leave the human: *cernere cum uideamur eum quem uita reliquit*. Lucretius' discussion of the dispersal of the *animus* and *anima* from the body in Book 3 further supports focus on the fact that it is the vital spirit that leaves mortal man.

<sup>12</sup> Bailey (n. 6) *ad loc.*

<sup>13</sup> F. Bockemüller (ed.), *T. Lucreti Cari De rerum natura* (Stade 1873–1874) *ad loc.*

sani);<sup>14</sup> “oft mentioned sleep” (Merrill);<sup>15</sup> “i. e., the well-known phenomenon we think and talk about so often” (S. B. Smith);<sup>16</sup> “i. e. sleep of which he has spoken in iv. 757 ff. and 788 ff.” (Bailey).<sup>17</sup> Yet I cannot believe that Lucretius would have referred to a literally everyday occurrence for all humans as ‘that well-known sleep’. Giussani and Bailey are on better ground in believing that *ille* refers to earlier discussions in Book 4 yet the argument at hand does not require the reader to cast his mind back to what were instead basic discussions about dreams. The passage would read more smoothly if *ipse* were read for *ille*: it is sleep itself that spreads quietude throughout the body’s limbs.<sup>18</sup>

4, 1126–1128:

scilicet et grandes uiridi cum luce zmaragdi  
auro includuntur teriturque thalassina uestis  
assidue et Veneris sudorem exercita potat.

During his tirade at the close of Book 4, Lucretius derides women carried away by love for their extravagant behaviour and lavish expenditure *amoris causa*. In 1126–1128 we are told that such women wear great emeralds encased in gold and that ‘the sea-blue dress is continually rubbed away and, worn out, drinks up the sweat of love’. *teritur* comes as something of a surprise, since Lucretius jumps straight from the mention of the cloth to its being ‘continually chafed’. Few commentators have addressed this verb directly. Wakefield<sup>19</sup> stated “i. e. res amatoria non feliciter procedit, nisi vestes pretiosissimae, quae solummodo peculiare in occasiones induuntur, usu diurno conterantur”; similarly S. B. Smith: “‘is worn shabby’, i. e., the robe, in spite of its costliness, is worn so frequently in the course of the lovers’ dalliance that it becomes frayed and thin”.<sup>20</sup> Brown provides parallels of varying rel-

<sup>14</sup> C. Giussani (ed.), *T. Lucreti Cari De rerum natura libri sex* (Turin 1896–1898) *ad loc.*

<sup>15</sup> W. A. Merrill (ed.), *T. Lucreti Cari De rerum natura* (New York 1907) *ad loc.*

<sup>16</sup> W. E. Leonard, S. B. Smith (edd.), *T. Lucreti Cari De rerum natura libri sex* (Madison 1942) *ad loc.*

<sup>17</sup> Bailey (n. 6) *ad loc.*

<sup>18</sup> As a response to Merrill’s barely relevant comparison of 5, 67 (*et quibus ille modis congressus materiai...*) I offer 4, 1263 (*et quibus ipsa modis tractetur blanda uoluptas*).

<sup>19</sup> G. Wakefield (ed.), *T. Lucretii Cari De rerum natura libri sex* (Glasgow 21813).

<sup>20</sup> Smith (n. 16) *ad loc.*

evance and date for *terere* used of chafing clothes<sup>21</sup> but it is the abrupt mention of the verb, not its semantics, that seems to me suspicious. For, even amidst satiric hyperbole, *teritur assidue* detracts from the full force of the final damning element of the sentence (*Veneris... potat*). It therefore seems to me more probable that this particular clause concerns the daily wearing of such costly clothing (extravagant and unnecessary in itself), not its daily attrition; it is because this cloth is worn continually that it becomes worn out (*exercita*) during any sexual encounter. I therefore suggest that we read *geriturque*, 'is worn'. Lucretius uses the same verb of wearing clothes at 5, 1420.<sup>22</sup> The preceding *-tur* and subsequent *-eritur* could have led to the corruption of *g* to *t*.

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В статье предлагаются шесть эмендаций текста Лукреция, в основном к IV книге. В трех случаях рассматриваются хорошо известные текстологические трудности (I, 720; IV, 104; IV, 761); в трех случаях эмендации предложены там, где текст не вызывал (или вызывал крайне редко) сомнения у предшествующих исследователей (IV, 602; IV, 907; IV, 1127).

<sup>21</sup> R. D. Brown, *Lucretius on Love and Sex. A Commentary on De rerum natura IV, 1030–1287* (Leiden 1987) *ad loc.*

<sup>22</sup> *gerere* of wearing clothes is not given sufficient space in *OLD*; for due treatment see *TLL* s. v. I A1 a (i. e. VI.2 col. 1930, 43–79).

## SENECA'S LANGUAGE AND STYLE. II

### Linguistic differences and connections between Seneca's philosophical works and his tragedies\*

We have verse as well as prose from Cicero, Columella, Petronius (and from many Christian authors), but the corpus of Seneca's tragedies is especially extensive (the *Octavia* and the disputed *Hercules Oetaeus* are not considered here).<sup>1</sup>

Although some features in Seneca's style may be called 'baroque' (e. g. 'abundant' expression), this aspect should not be overemphasized. Actually, even in his tragedies, 'classicizing' features can be detected. As had done Varius and Ovid, Seneca as a playwright prefers classical models viewed through the prism of the normative poetics of the Alexandrian age. Artistic οἰκονομία is a governing principle.<sup>2</sup> This is an important general background even to Seneca's use of language. Seneca's deliberate use of poetic vocabulary has been discussed in the first part of the article.

Between Seneca's philosophical works and his tragedies there are differences of approach to language and style. Whereas the epistles are supposed to be rather 'useful' than 'delightful' ("Our words should aim not to please, but to help": *Epist.* 75. 5), in the tragedies there is no such theoretical restriction. But even in the *Epistles* Seneca makes concessions to rhetoric (*ibid.*; see part I of this article, p. 81–82; 88–89). As will be shown, rhetoric is not an otiose adornment, but conditions the structure of the texts and the methods of meditation.

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\* Loeb translations were gratefully used here, but not always followed literally: *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales*. Transl. by R. M. Gummere (London – Cambridge, Mass. 1917–1925); *Moral Essays*. Transl. by J. W. Basore (London – Cambridge, Mass. 1928–1935); *Naturales quaestiones*. Transl. by T. H. Corcoran (London – Cambridge, Mass. 1971–1972); *Tragedies*. Transl. by J. G. Fitch (London – Cambridge, Mass. 2002); Transl. by F. J. Miller (London – Cambridge, Mass. 1917).

<sup>1</sup> On the language and style of these works: M. Billerbeck, *Senecas Tragödien. Sprachliche und stilistische Untersuchungen* (Leiden 1988) 145–173; 174–181.

<sup>2</sup> Thus he observes the division of plays into five acts, the use of three actors, and the unity of the place of action. He even eliminates "superfluous" persons found in his models, such as Aegeus in the *Medea*. Moreover, he reduces the musical solo scenes (monodies) cherished by early Latin dramatists (while choruses are found in all plays, *cantica* sung by soloists are absent from *Phoenissae*, *Oedipus Rex*, and *Hercules furens*). See part I of this article, pp. 89–90.

Nor is poetry excluded from the *Epistles*: actually, the philosophical works are interspersed with poetic quotations (which, of course, serve a didactic purpose, as explained by Seneca in *Epist.* 108. 8–12).<sup>3</sup> In *Epist.* 108. 6 the difference between a philosopher's lessons and the theatre is stressed.<sup>4</sup> In *Epist.* 80. 7 Seneca compares human life to a theatrical play: *vitae humanae mimus* (*Epist.* 80. 7). He quotes lines from tragedies and measures what they say against the performer's real life: He who is acting a king's role is actually a poor slave. The same applies to our lives (*Epist.* 80. 10): Theatrical plays, therefore, can serve as a mirror helping us to analyze our own situation. This does not mean, however, that the plays pursue a didactic purpose. Although the degree to which Seneca shared a Platonic view of poetry as ἐνθουσιασμός is a matter of dispute,<sup>5</sup> Seneca the philosopher warns his readers against the power of poetry to raise emotions (*Epist.* 115. 12 *adfectibus nostris facem subdant*), for instance, by praising bad or irrelevant things. He reports that when the onlookers of a Euripidean drama protested vehemently against a passage commending wealth and greed, the poet asked them to suspend their judgement until the end of the play. Seneca, therefore, perfectly knew that readers of dramas should take into account the context. This explains the – otherwise surprising – fact that Seneca himself in a tragedy (*Thyestes* 207 f.) paraphrased a line which he repeatedly condemned in his philosophical writings: the famous words from Accius' *Atreus*: *oderint dum metuant* "Let them hate, if only they fear".<sup>6</sup> In such cases Seneca subscribes to a standard objection of philosophers to poets:<sup>7</sup> Poetry fosters and nurtures emotions, which philosophy

<sup>3</sup> See M. v. Albrecht, *Wort und Wandlung. Senecas Lebenskunst* (Leiden 2004) 85; G. Mazzoli, *Seneca e la poesia* (Milano 1970) 108.

<sup>4</sup> "Certain of them come to hear and not to learn, just as we are attracted to the theatre to satisfy the pleasures of the ear, whether by a speech, or by a song, or by a play".

<sup>5</sup> Affirmative: Mazzoli (n. 3) and J. Dingel, *Seneca und die Dichtung* (Heidelberg 1974); see, however, A. Setaioli, "Seneca e lo stile", *ANRW* II. 32. 2 (1985) 857, 801–811. "For whether we believe with the Greek poet that 'sometimes it is a pleasure also to rave' (Menander, *fr.* 421 Kock; cf. Hor. *Carm.* 4. 12. 28) or with Plato (*Phdr.* 245 a) that 'the sane mind knocks in vain at the door of poetry' or with Aristotle (*Probl.* 30. 1) that 'no great genius has ever existed without some touch of madness' – be that as it may, the lofty utterance that rises above the attempts of others is impossible unless the mind is excited" (*Dial.* 9 = *Tranq.* 17. 10 f.)

<sup>6</sup> Seneca calls these words *magnas, sed detestabiles* (*Clem.* 2. 2. 2), *dira et abominanda* (*Dial.* 3 [= *De ira* 1] 20. 4), *exsecrabilis* (*Clem.* 1. 12. 4). In the same spirit, Maecenas is criticized, not for the style, but for the content of one of his poems (*Epist.* 101. 10 f.), and a line from Virgil is used as a 'remedy' (*Epist.* 101. 13).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Dial.* 10 (= *Brev. vit.*) 16. 5 *Inde etiam poetarum furor, fabulis humanos errores alentium ... quid aliud est vitia nostra incendere, quam auctores illis inscribere*

tries to dominate or even eradicate. So it does not come as a surprise that emotions are even developed deliberately by several figures in Senecan drama (see below, p. 137–142). Seneca is fully aware of the difference between poetry and philosophy. Allegorical interpretation of poetry in a philosophical key is explicitly rejected in a passage criticizing philosophers of widely divergent schools all referring to Homer as a precedent (*Epist.* 88. 4 f.): “No one of these doctrines is to be fathered upon Homer, just because they are all there; for they are irreconcilable with one another”. Instead, “we should learn what made him wise”.<sup>8</sup> In this sense, moral interpretation of poetry is often found in Seneca (e. g., *Dial.* 12 [= *Polyb.*] 11. 5). Whether such a philosophical reading should be called ‘allegorical’ or not may be left open.<sup>9</sup> However, recourse to allegorical interpretation is evident, when Seneca uses Virgil’s description of a male colt to characterize a “great man” (*magno viro*). Here even Seneca’s terminology (*Epist.* 95. 67 *ex alio in se transferre* and 69 *dum aliud agit*) alludes to the standard definition of allegory (Quintilian, *Inst.* 9. 2. 92, tr. Butler): *aliud dicere, aliud intellegi velle* “saying one thing, while intending something else to be understood”.<sup>10</sup> However, in the Senecan passage allegory is not attributed to the poet’s intention, but is limited to the critic’s mind (cf. *ego certe*). In other cases, too, Seneca uses quotations from Virgil quite independently of their literal sense.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, in Seneca’s view, a moralizing reading of a poetic text must be methodically separated from the assumption of a moralizing intent of the author, and we are not compelled to read Seneca’s tragedies in a didactic vein.

On the other hand, the tragedies show the influence of rhetorical invention and disposition, see, for instance, the *controversia* between the nurse and the queen in the first act of *Phaedra*. Later in the drama, the nurse directs a *suasoria* to Hippolytus. The connections between the philosophical works and the tragedies were felt by Seneca’s contemporaries and even in later times: just think of Lucan, Silius Italicus, Prudentius. Christian martyrs and their deaths would be shaped into the image of Stoic martyrs, and the passion of St. Hippolytus into the image of his Senecan namesake

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*deos*. Xenophanes B 11 f. Diels–Kranz; Euripides, *Bellerophon* fr. 292. 7; Plato banished Homer from his Republic (*Rep.* 3. 398 a; cf. *Cic. Rep.* 4. 5. 5).

<sup>8</sup> On *sapere* as the basis of good writing, see below, note 75.

<sup>9</sup> Allegorical interpretation is not found here by Dingel (n. 5) 43 and Setaioli (n. 5) 857; indirectly affirmed by Mazzoli (n. 3) 113 f. and, more confidently, 223: “per la prima volta nell’antichità, se non erriamo, il criterio allegorico, tradizionale nell’esegesi di Omero, viene esplicitamente esteso alla poesia virgiliana”.

<sup>10</sup> Mazzoli (n. 3) 224 f.

<sup>11</sup> Mazzoli (n. 3) 226 f.; *Aen.* 2. 726–729; *Epist.* 56. 12–14; whereas *Benef.* 3. 37. 1 shows full awareness of the literal sense of the same passage.

(Prudentius, *Perist.* 11; Seneca, *Phaedra* 1000–1114); however, for Seneca's play there is no need to assume a didactic purpose.<sup>12</sup>

*Sententiae*. In both groups of works Seneca shows a preference for condensing his thoughts into brief and pointed statements. Seneca's striving for *brevitas* shows, for instance, from the fact that (while Greek tragic poets do not go further than giving half a line to a single speaker) our author breaks up his trimeters into even smaller units (quarters of lines). Furthermore, both his philosophical works and his dramas abound in *sententiae*. In Seneca's tragedies, *sententiae* are even more frequent than in his Greek models. While in the philosophical writings the educative purpose is paramount, in the tragedies *sententiae* frequently serve a dialectic aim in the immediate context of a discussion;<sup>13</sup> so they appear even more impressive against the background of a rich variety of themes and ideas, all the more as in this genre the author is not constrained to keep himself within the limits of 'positive thinking'.<sup>14</sup> The massive presence of *sententiae*, therefore, does not prove a didactic purpose of Seneca in his tragedies.

*Asyndeton*. In Greek tragedies (on heroes such as Oedipus, Thyestes, Alcmeon, Telephus, Peleus) the stress is laid on the passage from happiness to unhappiness. Roman dramatists from the outset stress the *pathos* of this situation by building asyndetic series of epithets, often alliterated (Accius, *Medea* 415 Ribbeck<sup>2</sup>): "An exile among enemies, hopeless, destitute, abandoned, wandering".<sup>15</sup> Seneca follows this pattern in *Medea*'s malediction to Jason (*Medea* 20 f.) "May he live. May he wander through unknown cities in want, in exile, in fear, hated and homeless" (tr. Fitch) *Vivat*;<sup>16</sup> *per*

<sup>12</sup> According to M. Fuhrmann ("Die Funktion grausiger und ekelhafter Motive in der lateinischen Dichtung", in: H. R. Jauss [ed.], *Die nicht mehr schönen Künste* [München 1968] 45–50), Seneca insists on the contrast between Hippolytus' 'Stoic' attitude and the panic of the others; in my view Fuhrmann stresses too much the exclusively didactic aim of this passage, whereas Seneca tries to raise the listeners' admiration for Hippolytus as a character.

<sup>13</sup> B. Seidensticker (*Die Gesprächsverdichtung in den Tragödien Senecas* [Heidelberg 1969] 85–199) studies, among other aspects of *sententia*: condensation, ambivalence, allusion, transition from mimesis to interpretation.

<sup>14</sup> M. Armisen-Marchetti, *Sapientiae facies. Etude sur les images de Sénèque* (Paris 1989) 349 f.

<sup>15</sup> *Exul inter hostis, expes, expers desertus vagus*; cf. also Accius, *Eurysaces* 333 f. *Nunc per terras vagus, extorris, / regno exturbatus* ("Now wandering over the earth, an exile, driven from my kingdom"; paratragic, cf. Lucilius 82 f. Marx: *Non dico: vincat licet, et vagus exulet, erret, / exlex*).

<sup>16</sup> Life appears sometimes as a punishment more cruel than death: cf. also Seneca, *Herc. f.*; this view is in accord with contemporary life experience: Suetonius, *Tiberius* 61. *15 morivolentibus vis adhibita vivendi*.

*urbes erret ignotas egens / exul pavens invisus incerti laris.* Dido's curse against Aeneas was certainly known to Seneca (Verg. *Aen.* 4. 615–620: “May he be harried in war by adventurous tribes, and exiled from his own land; may Ascanius be torn from his arms...” [tr. C. Day Lewis]).<sup>17</sup> Interestingly, Virgil is not satisfied with a mere series of epithets (*vexatus... extorris... avolsus*), but fills each of them with detailed information and builds a rounded-off sentence, perhaps in order to avoid mere repetition of a worn-out pattern). In the case of this type of asyndeton, Seneca is much closer to Accius than to Virgil (therefore, one should not exclude too apodictically the influence of old Latin on Seneca).<sup>18</sup>

The “unfolding” of an idea by way of subdivision into its partial aspects (μερισμός) is a rhetorical procedure known to us from the philosophical writings. It is found in the tragedies as well. Antithesis, “polarity” of expression, catalogue, asyndeton, aprosdoketon have been described by Billerbeck (n. 1). The same is true for gradation (in monologues), rhetorical questions, *correctio* with verbal *polyptoton*, and comparatives (omitting the second member of the comparison). Whereas antithesis, gradation and abundance (from verbal variation to explicit elaboration, especially in passages competing with epic style)<sup>19</sup> determine the structure of paragraphs, there is a pronounced striving for brevity within the single sentence: at the end of sentences or after a significant word, an appended participle can appear (“While I plant my last kisses on my children as their mother – perhaps a dying mother” [tr. Fitch] *dum extrema natis mater infigo oscula, fortasse moriens* [*Med.* 290]; “His face is that of Jove, – but when hurling thunder” [tr. Fitch] *Vultus est illi Iovis, / sed fulminantis* [*Herc. f.* 724 f.]), a name (“There is an even greater threat than these: – Medea” [tr. Fitch] *est et his maior metus: / Medea* [*Med.* 516 f.]), an infinitive (“The only safety for Oedipus is not to be saved” [tr. Fitch] *Unica Oedipodae est salus / non esse salvum* [*Phoen.* 89 f.]) or brief exclamation may serve as a conclusive comment: “O impious crime, grim and horrid sight” (tr. Miller) *scelus nefandum, triste et aspectu horridum!* (*Herc. f.* 1004).

Philosophical influence in Seneca's dramas is by no means limited to *sententiae*, even in the field of style.<sup>20</sup> There are entire developments com-

<sup>17</sup> The same is true for passages from the *Aeneid* which dwell on sufferings on land and sea (*Phoen.* 504 f. [Iocasta:] *Te maria tot diversa, tot casus vagum / egere*), cf. Verg. *Aen.* 1. 3; 6. 83 f.

<sup>18</sup> For a different view, Billerbeck (n. 1) 141 (“sozusagen nichts”).

<sup>19</sup> “Abundant, superfluous” elements, therefore, should not be banished from the text: Billerbeck (n. 1) 140.

<sup>20</sup> Billerbeck (n. 1) 141 underrates the stylistic parallels between Seneca's tragedies and his philosophical prose.

parable to philosophical protreptics or constructed as negative companion pieces to the latter ones (see below).

As for metre,<sup>21</sup> Seneca does not use the senarius, but the iambic trimeter and handles the latter according to strict rules. In his choruses anapaests prevail, but there are other metres as well. Seneca shows a marked preference for shortening final *-o*: in this regard he is “omnium poetarum negligentissimus”<sup>22</sup> – this is a “modernist” feature. (For more details, see part I, pp. 89–90.) Some stylistic differences have metrical reasons: *Magis ac magis* is used by Seneca only in his prose works – its last three syllables can be considered a cretic – , whereas *magis magisque* is iambic and therefore appears both in drama (*Thy.* 992) and prose (*Nat.* 3. 27. 7). If Seneca in messengers' reports shows a preference for the use of nouns,<sup>23</sup> whereas Euripides prefers verbs, this might be owing to his striving for a ‘monumental’ style.<sup>24</sup> On philosophical terms, see part I, pp. 75–76.

Second - person prohibitions are frequent in Seneca's prose and verse. In prose Seneca uses the standard constructions (*noli/te* with the infinitive and *ne* with perfect subjunctive, but *non est, quod* with subjunctive is much more common).<sup>25</sup> The first two are absent from Seneca's tragedies, the third is found at *Thyest.* 414–416, where “any prosaic tone is not inappropriate”.<sup>26</sup> In the tragedies the common form of prohibition is *ne* with imperative (originally it is “inhibitive”: “stop doing this”); where it appears in prose, it might retain this old meaning (e. g. *ne timete; ne metue*). In Seneca's prose it is attested only once (*Dial.* 2 [= *Const. sap.*] 19. 4): *Ne repugnat vestro bono et hanc spem... alite, ... meliora*

<sup>21</sup> W. Marx, *Funktion und Form der Chorlieder in den Seneca-Tragödien*, Diss. Heidelberg (Köln 1932); R. Giomini, *De canticis polymetricis in Agamemnone et Oedipode Annaeanis* (Roma 1959); J. D. Bishop, “The Meaning of the Choral Meters in Senecan Tragedy”, *RhM* 111 (1968) 197–219; N. Catone, “Metro e lingua nella *Phaedra* di Seneca”, *Atene e Roma* n. s. 16 (1971) 19–29; J. G. Fitch, *Seneca's Anapaests. Metre, Colometry, Text and Artistry in the Anapaests of Seneca's Tragedies* (Atlanta 1987).

<sup>22</sup> R. Hartenberger, *De o finali apud poetas latinos ab Ennio usque ad Iuvenalem*. Diss. (Bonn 1911) 65.

<sup>23</sup> W.-L. Liebermann, *Studien zu Senecas Tragödien* (Meisenheim 1974) 27.

<sup>24</sup> O. Hiltbrunner, “Seneca als Tragödiendichter in der Forschung von 1965 bis 1975”, *ANRW* II. 32. 2 (1985) 999.

<sup>25</sup> R. Kühner, C. Stegmann, *Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache. Satzlehre*. Bearb. von A. Thierfelder. II (Hannover 31955) 278 f.; O. Rauschnig, *De Latinitate L. Annaei Senecae philosophi*. Diss. (Jena–Königsberg 1876) 9 f.

<sup>26</sup> H. M. Hine, “Poetic Influence on Prose: The Case of the Younger Seneca”, in: T. Reinhardt et al. (eds.), *Aspects of the Language of Latin Prose* (Oxford 2005) 225, who, however, shows that *non est, quod* is largely attested also in poetry.

*excipite... ac iuvate*. Here the use of the elevated form is justified by concinnity (cf. the following imperatives), but also by rhetoric: final paragraphs favour an impassioned appeal to the reader and the use of elevated language. In addition, the inhibitive meaning is quite appropriate here: “stop resisting...”.

#### Points of contact between Seneca’s prose and poetry<sup>27</sup>

Re - defining “exile”. Influence of philosophical prose and of Stoic and Epicurean philosophy is felt in Seneca’s tragedies, when we find a positive assessment of exile (as an occasion for a contemplative life): in the *Thyestes*<sup>28</sup> (cf. 533 f. “Let it be mine to hide amidst the throng” [tr. Miller] *Liceat in media mihi / latere turba*) and also in the *Oedipus*. Seneca gives the theme of exile a new, Stoic turn, especially in his *Thyestes* and in his *Oedipus*. Whereas the Euripidean Polynices (*Phoen.* 391) considered the loss of the freedom of speech the greatest evil of exile, in our Roman tragedian *regnum* is the supreme evil. In a chorus, the very term of “king” is re-defined philosophically with characteristic repetitions of the key-words *rex* and *regnum* (*Thy.* 344–349 “Riches do not make a king... a king is he who has laid fear aside and the base longings of an evil heart... ‘tis the upright mind that holds true sovereignty... Such kingdom on himself each man bestows” (tr. Miller) *Regem non faciunt opes... / rex est qui posuit metus / et diri mala pectoris...*; 380 *mens regnum bona possidet* <...>; 390 *hoc regnum sibi quisque dat*. The end of the chorus has an Epicurean ring [393–395]: *me dulcis saturet quies; / obscuro positus loco / leni perfruar otio*). The song of the chorus prepares for and explains the bad forebodings of Thyestes (412–420; 423–428; 446–454; 483 f.) when returning from exile to his son Tantalus (who naively believes in the magnificence of *regnum* and in the honesty of his uncle Atreus). Thus there is an inversion of traditional values – strongly influenced by philosophy. In a Stoic vein, Thyestes is not afraid of speaking in paradoxes (454): “Evil fortune is to be preferred to good” (tr. Miller) *malam bonae praeferre fortunam licet*.<sup>29</sup> The

<sup>27</sup> R. Degli’Innocenti Pierini, *Tra filosofia e poesia. Studi su Seneca e dintorni* (Bologna 1999) 23–37 (“L’esilio nelle tragedie di Seneca. Autobiografia, meditazione filosofica, modelli letterari”).

<sup>28</sup> One should not call Thyestes a Stoic sage, rather a προκόπτων; but the philosophical elements in this play are evident. V. Pöschl (“Bemerkungen zum *Thyestes* des Seneca”, in: *Latinität und Alte Kirche. Festschrift R. Hanslik* [Wien 1977] 224–234 = V. Pöschl, *Kunst und Wirklichkeitserfahrung in der Dichtung... Kleine Schriften* [Heidelberg 1979] 311–319) considered the *satelles* a representative of Seneca.

<sup>29</sup> Paradox is an appropriate way of describing a world in which right and wrong, good and bad have changed places (E. Lefèvre, “Die Bedeutung des Paradoxen in der römischen Literatur der frühen Kaiserzeit”, *Poetica* 3 [1970] 60).

reader immediately recalls the last line of the *Epistulae morales* (124, 24): “Those whom the world calls fortunate are really the most unfortunate of all”: *infelicissimos esse felices*.

**Stylistic devices:** In some respects, the style of drama is more lively, more emotional than that of the philosophical works. Apostrophes are more frequent in the tragedies (*anime*, see pp. 140 ff.). Rhetorical questions with *egone ut* are found exclusively in his dramatic works (*Herc. f.* 372; *Med.* 398; 893; 929; *Oed.* 671). The interjection *o* appears both in Seneca's prose and poetry. In the philosophical writings, ready-made phrases (often in the accusative) are preferred (*o te [virum / hominem] felicem... o tristes ineptias!.. o quam... o quando..., o quanta..., o ne* [‘indeed’]). In the tragedies *o* with vocative (or nominative) takes a place of honour (partly favoured by the example of Greek tragedy). This construction is very rare in Seneca's prose; it appears in some poetic quotations (*Epist.* 107. 11 in a versified prayer after Cleanthes; *Epist.* 73. 10; cf. *Epist.* 76. 33: from Virgil) and in especially solemn apostrophes (*Epist.* 55. 3: “O Vatia, you are the only one who knows how to live” *O Vatia, solus scis vivere!*; cf. *Benef.* 2. 13. 1: “O Pride, the bane of great fortune and its highest folly” *O superbia, magnae fortunae stultissimum malum!*; *Nat.* 1. 17. 9: “Happy the poverty...” *O felix paupertas* [nom.]; *Apocol.* 12. 3. 31: “O advocates” *o causicidi* [mock-heroic]). *O* with vocative (or nominative) is avoided by Seneca in his prose more strictly than by Cicero, even in his orations.

Likewise, the use of the imperative *age* shows that Seneca tends to reserve the stronger means of expression for the tragedies: *age*, *anime* and *hoc age* are limited to the tragedies, whereas the prose writings exhibit ready-made phrases such as *id age*, *ut*; *age tuum negotium*; *age gratias*.

#### The use of patterns of thought in both genres: gradatio; Priamel

Behind the *gradatio* of Hercules first conquering “monsters” threatening him from outside and then conquering himself there is a philosophical idea. The very principle governing the development of this motif in the *Hercules furens*<sup>30</sup> is made explicit in *Herc. f.* 1275 f.: “Now regain that spirit of yours which is a match for any trouble, now you must act with great valour. Do not let Hercules give way to anger” (tr. Fitch) *Nunc tuum nulli imparem / animum malo resume, nunc magna tibi / virtute agendum est: Herculem irasci veta*. In the play, Juno's idea of having Hercules fight against himself (*Herc. f.* 85: “Now he must war with himself” [tr. Fitch] *bella iam secum gerat*) is first developed on a negative scale in the hero's

<sup>30</sup> M. v. Albrecht, *Wort und Wandlung. Senecas Lebenskunst* (Leiden 2004) 99–119.

killing his own family, then on a positive scale: Hercules overcomes his wrath and decides to go on living for his father's sake. The continuity is stressed by the hero himself (*Herc. f.* 1316 f.): *eat ad labores hic quoque Herculeus labor: / vivamus* (translation see below).

“Priamel” (*praeeambulum*) is a term denoting a series of examples followed by one's own choice. An example is *Herc. f.* 192–201: *Alium multis gloria terris / Tradat et omnes fama per urbes / Garrula laudet caeloque parem / Tollat et astris, // Alius curru sublimis eat: / Me mea tellus lare secreto / Tutoque tegat. // Venit ad pigros cana senectus, / Humilique loco sed certa sedet / Sordida parvae fortuna domus: / Alte virtus animosa cadit.* “Another may be carried to many countries by Renown; garrulous Rumour may praise him through every city, and raise him equal with the starry heavens; another may ride high in a chariot. For me, let my own land hide me in a safe and secluded home. White-haired old age comes to homebodies, and the ignominious fortunes of a small house have a lowly but firm foundation. Spirited valour falls from great height”.

This is how Seneca in a tragic chorus develops a stylistic pattern we know from Tibullus 1. 1 and Horace, *Carm.* 1. 1, for instance. As the last line shows, the theme is deliberately introduced as a contrast to the subject of the tragedy: the fall of the greatest hero.

A similar type of argument is found e. g. in *Epist.* 68. 10 f.: “Then you say: ‘Is it retirement, Seneca, that you are recommending to me? You will soon be falling back upon the maxims of Epicurus!’ I do recommend retirement to you, but only that you may use it for greater and more beautiful activities than those which you have resigned; to knock at the haughty doors of the influential, to make alphabetical lists of childless old men, to wield the highest authority in public life, – this kind of power exposes you to hatred, is short-lived, and, if you rate it at its true value, is tawdry. One man shall be far ahead of me as regards his influence in public life, another in salary as an army officer and in the position which results from this, another in the throng of his clients; but it is worth while to be outdone by all these men, provided that I myself can outdo Fortune”.

Both passages find their climax in a *sententia*. In the dramatic chorus, the *sententia* looks like a proverb; its character is contemplative (although it prepares the listener for the catastrophe to come, it is not meant to incite anyone to immediate action). While in the chorus the personal pronoun *me* stands in the centre of the text to underline the chorus' distance from political life, in the letter, the personal pronoun *a me* reinforces the final *sententia*. The *ego* takes a polemical stance towards other life-styles. In the drama, the course of events cannot be stopped, and the chorus does not try to do this; it only takes a resigning view of life in general. In the letter, Seneca insists on the scarcity of time and on the importance of making a

decision by now. While the singers of the chorus accept their own “poor” condition (*sordida*), in the letter the lifestyle of the others polemically gets the same epithet. Clearly in the letter the first step towards a metamorphosis of oneself through language is done by realizing the philosophical change of the significance of words.

On the other hand, in the letter, Seneca's language is more rational; in the dramatic chorus there is vivid description. In the letter, Seneca overtly discusses differences of philosophical schools (cf. “falling back upon the maxims of Epicurus”). In the letter, as is expected in prose, the grammatical subjects are mostly persons. Not before the last sentence is *fortuna* quasi personified, but even then only in the passive voice. In the drama *fortuna* (though poor) stands with the speaker; in the letter it is an enemy to be conquered. In the tragic chorus there is much more personification: abstract nouns are most frequently used as grammatical subjects and seem to act as allegorical figures: *gloria*, *fama*, *senectus*, *fortuna*, *virtus*. Liveliness is obtained here through *evidentia*, whereas the text of the letter is enlivened by means of dialogue, discussion, even polemic.

The use of linguistic and stylistic means for self-instruction:  
positive and negative

**Positive (“philosophical”) use:** The positive aim to be achieved is independent thought and an individual's construction of an inner world of his own.

(1) Words are the most important medium for Seneca's self-instruction.

(2) A first step is to change the meaning of words by philosophical reflection. These re-definitions – which in the view of Stoicism re-establish the true and original meaning<sup>31</sup> of a word – are often rather far from *consuetudo* (ordinary linguistic usage) and therefore may be shaped stylistically as paradoxes.<sup>32</sup> This is true, e. g., for the notions of “slave” and “free” (*Epist.*

<sup>31</sup> A. Setaioli, *Seneca e i greci* (Bologna 1988) 29.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum* 1, 4: *Quae quia sunt admirabilia contraque opinionem omnium – ab ipsis etiam παράδοξα appellantur – temptare volui possentne proferri in lucem et ita dici, ut probarentur ... – eoque hos locos scripsi libentius, quod mihi ista παράδοξα quae appellant maxime videntur esse Socratica longeque verissima.* Seneca uses the term twice. One instance is *Epist.* 87. 1. 2: *ne et hoc putes inter Stoica paradoxa ponendum, quorum nullum esse falsum nec tam mirabile quam prima facie videtur, cum volueris, adprobabo, immo etiam si nolueris* (this whole letter is on Stoic paradoxes concerning the true meaning of “good”, “richness”, “poverty”). The other instance of *paradoxum* is *Benef.* 2. 31. 1. 1: *Hoc ex paradoxis Stoicae sectae minime mirabile, ut mea fert opinio, aut incredibile est: eum, qui libenter accipit, beneficium reddidisse.* What counts is *voluntas*; if you expect a recompense for a good deed, this is no longer a *beneficium*, but an affair (*negotiatio*).

47. 17): “‘He is a slave’. His soul, however, may be that of a freeman. ‘He is a slave’. But shall that stand in his way? Show me a man, who is not a slave; one is a slave to lust, another to greed, another to ambition, and all men slaves to hope and fear. I will name you an ex-consul who is slave to an old hag, a millionaire who is slave to a serving-maid... No servitude is more disgraceful than that which is self-imposed”.<sup>33</sup> The same applies to “happiness” and “unhappiness”. The point of the very last letter of the collection is this (*Epist.* 124. 24): “the fortunate are most unfortunate” *infelicissimos esse felices*. The same, of course, is true of “richness” (“riches are no good” *divitiae bonum non sunt: Epist.* 87. 28; “in whose minds bustling poverty has wrongly stolen the title of riches” *apud quos falso divitiarum nomen invasit occupata paupertas: Epist.* 119. 12) and “poverty”,<sup>34</sup> “friendship”,<sup>35</sup> “greatness” which should be inseparable from “being good” (*aut et bonum erit aut nec magnum: Clem.* 1. 20. 6 criticizing Livy *fr.* 66 Weissenborn–Müller),<sup>36</sup> also of “good”<sup>37</sup> and “evil”:<sup>38</sup> the only good is virtue (*unum ergo bonum ipsa virtus est: Epist.* 76. 21), and the term *malum* is wrongly applied to pain, imprisonment, exile, death. Actually these are only seeming evils (*Epist.* 82. 15 *habent mali speciem*), not real evils (*Epist.* 85. 25; 85. 30 and 41; cf. *Dial.* 1 (= *Prov.*) 3. 14 “These things of which I have deemed Cato worthy are not real ills”; they are indifferent, neither good nor bad (*Epist.* 82. 10). It is up to the philosopher to distinguish true evils from seeming ones (*Epist.* 90. 28; 110. 8). The change of the meaning of words causes a change in the philosopher’s perception of the world and of his life, to the point of reshaping his opinions and his mind.

(3) From the single word Seneca proceeds to the application of various stylistic means based on rhetorical forms of self-admonition and self-education. There are “logical” and “emotional” means of persuasion.

(3a) The first group encompasses deductive and inductive conclusions. The deductive form can be represented by a syllogism, which in its complete form is conclusive: All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore

<sup>33</sup> The passage is unified by words of the same root: *servus... servus... servit... servientem... servitus*.

<sup>34</sup> See v. Albrecht (n. 30) 33–52.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 55; I. Lana, “L’amicizia secondo Seneca”, in: G. Garbarino, I. Lana (eds.), *Incontri con Seneca. Atti della giornata di studio...* (Bologna 2001) 19–27.

<sup>36</sup> Seneca, however, does not always follow his own rule: *voces magnaе, sed detestabiles* (*Clem.* 2. 2. 2); *magna in illo ingenii vis est, sed iam tendentis in pravum* (*Epist.* 29. 4); *magnum... ingenium* of Antony (*Epist.* 83. 2), of Maecenas (*Epist.* 114. 4; cf. 92. 35 *grande*).

<sup>37</sup> For instance, *Epist.* 34. 3; 42. 1; 74. 16–17; 98. 9; *Dial.* 11 (= *Helv.*) 5. 6; 9. 2.

<sup>38</sup> E. g., *Epist.* 82. 2; *Dial.* 1 (= *Prov.*) 6. 1; *Dial.* 11 (= *Helv.*) 5. 6.

he is mortal. If we omit the second part ("Socrates is a man"), we get an abbreviated form, which is stylistically more elegant, but not compelling logically: the so-called enthymema, a rhetorical substitute for the syllogism.

The complementary method is induction: Romulus is mortal, Tullus is mortal, Servius is mortal, Tarquinius is mortal, etc. etc... All these are men. Therefore, all men are mortal. Since complete induction is never fully achieved anyway, the orator shortens this tiresome procedure by limiting himself to mentioning one example. Needless to say, the examples may impress the audience but prove nothing. However, more often than one would expect, Seneca uses complete syllogism (e. g. *Epist.* 82. 9 f.) and even raises pertinent objections against a syllogism of Zeno himself ("No evil is glorious; but death is glorious; therefore death is no evil"): as Seneca rightly objects, death is not glorious as such, but only if one dies courageously. When working on his *Moralis philosophiae libri* (cf. *Epist.* 106. 2; 108. 1; 109. 17; Lactantius, *Inst.* 1. 16. 10; 6. 17. 28), Seneca used his later letters increasingly as "preliminary exercise(s)" and "preliminary studies in dialectics".<sup>39</sup>

On the other hand, "what the world wants is strength of utterance, not precision of utterance".<sup>40</sup> Seneca feels that mere syllogisms are not liable to persuade living persons in a given situation (*Epist.* 82. 19): "But I for my part decline to reduce such questions to a matter of dialectical rules or to the subtleties of an utterly soulless system. Away, I say, with all that sort of thing, which makes a man feel, when a question is propounded to him, that he is hemmed in, and forces him to admit a premise and then makes him say one thing in his answer when his real opinion is another. When truth is at stake, we must act more frankly; and when fear is to be combated, we must act more bravely". He wants to persuade and convince people, not just compel them to confess something against their will: To conquer the fear of death, forget syllogisms; you had better remember *exempla* (such as the 300 Fabii) or brief maxims like the words of Leonidas before the battle at Thermopylae.

(3b) This brings us to the emotional means of persuasion: *ethos* and *pathos*. *Ethos* is largely extra-linguistic, based as it is on the relationship between teacher and pupil, on the mutual belief, that both sides are doing their best. So the teacher has to believe that the student is willing to learn, and the student has to believe firmly that the teacher does his best to in-

<sup>39</sup> A. D. Leeman, "Seneca's Plans for a Work *Moralis Philosophia* and their Influence on his later Epistles", *Mnemosyne* 6 (1953) 307–313.

<sup>40</sup> Jack London, justly quoted by A. Traina, *Lo stile drammatico del filosofo Seneca* (Bologna 1995) 25.

struct him. Otherwise, a learning process is not possible. (This is an important lesson from *Epist.* 108;<sup>41</sup> cf. also *Epist.* 118. 1: “However, I shall not be disagreeable; I know that it is safe to trust you” *sed non ero difficilis: bene credi tibi scio.*) Here, the teacher’s example and his behaviour in real life is even more important than what he says. These are certainly the best means to enhance the student’s respect for the teacher and for philosophy. However, *ethos* can and must find linguistic expression as well: To create a good atmosphere for learning, Seneca does not shrink from using religious speech<sup>42</sup> and conjuring up the poetic vision of a sacred grove (*Epist.* 41. 25), thus evoking a touch of *horror sacer*, though not to the point of frightening the student. Other linguistic means of *ethos* appear in Seneca’s friendly and patient ways of correcting the student’s errors without impairing his human dignity. Occasionally Seneca goes even further: in order not to intimidate Lucilius, he even avows his own imperfection, e. g. (*Epist.* 7. 1): “I shall admit my own weakness, at any rate; for I never bring back home the same character that I took abroad with me”.<sup>43</sup> And there is more (*Dial.* 7 [= *Vit. beat.*] 17. 3): “I am not a wise man, nor – to feed your malevolence – shall I ever be”.

Even *pathos* – linguistic and stylistic means liable to excite strong emotions – can be used in instruction, as Seneca shows. The teacher of philosophy is called in this context *advocatus* (*Epist.* 108. 12). And a sermon of the philosopher Attalus is described in terms of rhetoric as a “peroration” against vices (*Epist.* 108. 13: *Attalum... in vitia... perorantem*). In the following example (as referred by Seneca from Sotion) rhetorical devices such as anaphora and rhetorical questions abound (*Epist.* 108. 20): *non credis...? non credis...? non credis?* And the play on the same root goes on: *crediderunt... credulitatis*.

While such explicit forms of rhetoric are especially appropriate at an early (“exoteric”) stage when it is the teacher’s task to attract pupils to the study of philosophy, later on, in everyday personal advice and guidance (“esoteric” teaching), simple and straightforward speech is required. But even here, artistic elements are not excluded, especially brief, “condensed” statements<sup>44</sup> which can be learned and remembered easily: such *sententiae* are explicitly recommended, even in poetic form, as early as Cleanthes (translated by Seneca, *Epist.* 108. 10): “As our breath produces a louder sound when it passes through the long and narrow opening of the

<sup>41</sup> See v. Albrecht (n. 30) 88 f.

<sup>42</sup> *Videntem, ex aequo deos; vis... divina; caelestis potentia; numinis; sacer.*

<sup>43</sup> *Ego certe confiteor imbecillitatem meam: numquam mores, quos extuli, refero.*

<sup>44</sup> Examples are the quotations from Epicurus and others, as used in the first group of letters (1–29).

trumpet and escapes by a hole which widens at the end, even so the fettering rules of poetry clarify our meaning".<sup>45</sup> Seneca (who quotes poets frequently)<sup>46</sup> observes that the strictness of poetic form adds to the efficiency of the message (*Epist.* 108. 10): "When metre is added and when regular prosody has compressed a noble idea, then the selfsame thought comes, as it were, hurling with a fuller fling".<sup>47</sup> In this context he uses strong metaphors: "Our minds are struck" *feriuntur animi* (*Epist.* 108. 11), "strike home, charge them with this duty" *hoc preme, hoc onera* (*Epist.* 108. 12) to the point of belittling the importance of "double-meanings, syllogisms, hair-splitting and other side-shows of ineffective smartness".

Nor are other elements of rhetoric absent from this most private sphere of education, the dialogue between teacher and student and the student's dialogue with himself. An example is the first letter.<sup>48</sup> On a larger scale, there is *gradatio*.<sup>49</sup>

Negative use (*Medea*). Medea as a self-educator, a shaper of herself (or, if the reader prefers, of her self) applies a method quite similar to that adopted by the student of philosophy.

(1) Words are, again, a crucial means of self-instruction.

(2) Verbal procedures used here include re-definition of terms: In view of what she is planning now, Medea calls her previous crimes *pietas* (*quidquid admissum est adhuc / pietas vocetur: Med.* 904 f.). In the same perspective her (hitherto still moderate) hatred against Jason must be called 'love' (*amas adhuc: Med.* 897). This inversion of the original meaning of the word is a parallel procedure to what the philosopher is saying, e. g. about poverty and richness. A slightly more lenient way of changing one's attitude is the exchange of epithets. This way of manipulating one's own opinion is equally found both in the writings and the tragedies, though used to achieve contrary aims: Medea's former misdeeds (among which, not to forget, the murder of her brother) are "light" (*levia*) and "common" (*vulgaris notae: Med.* 906), "girlish" (*puellaris furor: Med.* 909), "preludes",

<sup>45</sup> *Quemadmodum spiritus noster clariorem sonum reddit, cum illum tuba per longi canalis angustias tractum patientiore novissime exitu effudit, sic sensus nostros clariores carminis arta necessitas efficit.*

<sup>46</sup> Especially Virgil is used to illustrate essential points (e. g. *Epist.* 76. 33 on the *praemeditatio futurorum malorum*; *Epist.* 78. 15 on remembering positive experiences; *Epist.* 108. 24–29 on the importance of time; *Epist.* 12. 3 on a dignified death (*vixi*); *Epist.* 48. 11 and 73. 5 on the true way to the stars). Another source of *sententiae* is, of course, Publilius Syrus (e. g. *Epist.* 108. 9).

<sup>47</sup> *Ubi accessere numeri et egregium sensum adstrinxere certi pedes, eadem illa sententia velut lacerto excussiore torquetur.*

<sup>48</sup> See v. Albrecht (n. 30) 9–23.

<sup>49</sup> For a comparative study of tragedy and prose see e. g. *ibid.*, 112–119.

mere finger-exercises (cf. *prolusit... manus rudes: Med. 907 f.*). This is the perfect companion piece to the way the philosopher belittles pain (*Epist. 78. 13*: “Pain is slight if opinion has added nothing to it... ‘It is nothing, a trifling matter at most; keep a stout heart and it will soon cease’; then in thinking it slight, you will make it slight. Everything depends on opinion... It is according to opinion that we suffer”.<sup>50</sup> Of course, in the tragedies, terms such as “greatness” are used in a non-philosophical meaning (contrary to *Dial. 3 [= De ira 1]. 20. 6*). Atreus or Medea strive to achieve something extraordinarily “great”, even “greater” – typical is the comparative: “Greater crimes become me now, after giving birth” (tr. Fitch) *maiora iam me scelera post partus decent (Med. 50)*; “Some greater (*maius*) thing, larger (*amplius*) than the common and beyond the bounds (*supra fines*) of human use is swelling in my soul, and it urges on my sluggish hands – I know not what it is, but ‘tis some mighty thing (*grande quiddam*)” (*Thy. 267–270*, tr. Miller).

Since in philosophical admonition the idea is crucial that there is no time to be lost, Seneca even uses similar phrases in both genres: “Now break off sluggish delays” (tr. Fitch)  *rumpe iam segnes moras (Med. 54)*. Adjectives denoting idleness appear in tragic self-addresses and in the philosophical writings, e. g. *Dial. 10 [= Brev. vit.] 9. 3*: “Why... do you stretch before yourself months and years in long array, unconcerned (*securus*) and slow (*lentus*) though time flees so fast?” Medea addresses her *animus*: “Why are you slackening, my spirit?” *quid anime cessas? (Med. 895; cf. titubas 937)*. Iocasta addresses herself before her suicide (*Oed. 1024*): “Why are you benumbed, my soul?” *quid, anime, torpes? Dial. 10 [= Brev. vit.] 9. 2 quid cunctaris, inquit, quid cessas? Epist. 31. 7* “It is not enough if you do not shrink from work; ask for it... the very quality that endures toil and rouses itself to hard and uphill effort, is of the spirit, which says: ‘Why do you grow slack? It is not the part of a man to fear sweat’” *laborem si non recuses, parum est: posce... animi est ipsa tolerantia, quae se ad dura et aspera hortatur ac dicit: quid cessas? non est viri timere sudorem*. The fierce address to a hesitating friend is part of epic speech (Turnus to Drances: *Verg. Aen. 11. 389*; the Sibyl to Aeneas: *Aen. 6. 51 f.* “What? Slow to pay your vows and say your prayers?” (tr. C. Day Lewis) *cessas in vota precesque*: this rare Virgilian construction is the model for Seneca, *Med. 406*: “My rage will never slacken in seeking revenge” (tr. Fitch) *numquam meus cessabit in poenas furor*) or to a strong enemy; thus Hecuba provokes Pyrrhus to go on slaughtering old people and

<sup>50</sup> *Levis est dolor, si nihil ei opinio adiecerit... nihil est aut certe exiguum est, duremus; iam desinet: levem illum, dum putas, facies. Omnia ex opinione suspensa sunt... tam miser est quisque quam credit.*

kill her: “Pyrrhus, why hesitate?” (tr. Fitch) *Pyrrhe, quid cessas? Tro.* 1000. Likewise the philosopher provokes Fortune: cf. *Epist.* 64. 4 “Why keep me waiting, Fortune? Enter the lists! Behold, I am ready for you!” *quid cessas, fortuna? congregere: paratum vides* (an example of Seneca’s “dramatic” style in his prose). Fierce admonition to commit a crime may also be part of a moralizing sermon; see the speech of the *nutrix* to Phaedra (*Phaedr.* 173 f.): “Go on, overturn nature with your wicked fires! Why do monsters (or: monstrous actions) cease?” (tr. Fitch/Miller, modified) *Perge et nefandis verte naturam ignibus; / cur monstra cessant? Cf. Tro.* 1002 “Unite the parents-in-law (of Achilles). Proceed, you butcher of the aged” (tr. Fitch) *coniunge soceros. perge, mactator senum...* This pattern often contains the imperative *i!*: this is the case in Juno’s sardonic address to Hercules (*Herc. f.* 89 “Go ahead, proud man, aspire to the gods’ abodes” (tr. Fitch) *i nunc, superbe, caelitum sedes pete*) and Medea’s to Jason (*Med.* 1007: “Go on now, arrogant man, seek out virgins’ bedrooms” *i nunc, superbe, uirginum thalamos pete*. Oedipus’ self-addresses with *i!* express utmost despair (*Oed.* 880 f.: “Go, get you to the palace with hurrying feet; congratulate your mother” (tr. Miller, modified) *i, perge, propero regiam gressu pete: / gratare matri...*; *Oed.* 1051: “Go, speed you, fly! – but stop, lest you stumble and fall on your mother” (tr. Miller, modified) *i profuge vade – siste, ne in matrem incidas*).

In his prose, Seneca is equally ironical<sup>51</sup> about the scholar Didymus, who wrote 4000 books on irrelevant stuff (*Epist.* 88. 37: “Come now, do not tell me that life is long!” *i nunc et longam esse vitam nega!*), about a certain Hostius, who used mirrors during his sexual orgies (*Nat.* 1. 16. 3: “Go on now and say that the mirror was invented to touch up one’s looks!” *i nunc et dic speculum munditiarum causa repertum*), about people who wish their benefactors mischief in order to get a great occasion to show them their gratitude (*Benef.* 6. 35. 5 “But go now and suppose that this is gratitude” *i nunc et hoc esse grati puta*), and about a snob who, after having been placed on a chair by his slaves, asked: “Am I sitting already?” (*Dial.* 10 [= *Brev. vit.*] 12. 8): “After this imagine that the mimes fabricate many things to make a mock of luxury!” *i nunc et mimos multa mentiri ad exprobrandam luxuriam puta*). A more friendly nuance is found in the same expression when – after a long series of proofs – a current prejudice is definitively dismissed; this is true of the fears of death and of poverty in *Dial.* 12 (= *Helv.*) 6. 8: “What folly, then, to think that the human mind... is troubled by journeying and changing its home” *i nunc et humanum animum (...) moleste ferre puta transitum; ibid., 10. 10* “What folly then to think that it is the

<sup>51</sup> A slightly different case is *Benef.* 4. 38. 2 in view of an exemplary punishment: *i, ostende, quam sacra res sit mensa hospitalis*.

amount of money and not the state of mind that matters” *i nunc et puta pecuniae modum ad rem pertinere, non animi*. For a similar use of *nunc*: *Epist.* 101. 14. Interestingly in most of the prose passages the lively imperative *i!* has been replaced by the translator with less colloquial expressions (“after this,” “what folly”).

The imperative *perge* has a similar function. *Medea* (566 f.) exhorts herself: “Press on! Now is the time for daring, and for undertaking all that *Medea* can do and all that she *cannot* do” (tr. Fitch) *perge, nunc aude, incipe / quidquid potest Medea, quidquid non potest*. Juno kindles her own rage by addressing it (*Herc. f.* 75: “Onward, my anger, onward! Crush this overreacher!” [tr. Fitch] *perge, ira, perge et magna meditantem opprime*).<sup>52</sup> *Atreus* exhorts himself to reveal everything to *Thyestes* (*Thy.* 892): “On! While heaven is tenantless” *dies recessit: perge dum caelum uacat*. The same imperative is found in philosophical exhortation (*Epist.* 76. 5): “Proceed then, *Lucilius*, and hasten, lest you yourself be compelled to learn in your old age, as is the case with me” *perge, Lucili, et propera, ne tibi accidat quod mihi, ut senex discas*. Further warnings against procrastination are found in *Epist.* 1. 3; *Dial.* 10 (= *Brev. vit.*) 4. 2. The imperative *occupa* (*Thy.* 270 *Hoc, anime, occupa*) can be compared to *Dial.* 10 (= *Brev. vit.*) 9. 2 *Nisi occupas, fugit*.

An effective means of stimulating oneself to action is self-address. Before declaring her incestuous love to *Hippolytus*, *Phaedra* speaks to her *animus*: *Phaedr.* 592 f.): *aude, anime, tempta, perage... constant; 599 incipe, anime!* So does *Phaedra*’s nurse before falsely accusing *Hippolytus* (*Phaedr.* 719): *anime, quid segnis stupes?* Similarly, before committing their crimes, *Medea* and *Atreus* direct to their *animus* entire series of imperative and hortative verbal forms (*Med.* 895–905); moreover, there appear rhetorical questions (*quid anime cessas?.. pars... quota est?: Med.* 895 f.; cf. also 908 f.; cf. *Thy.* 196–199). In *Medea* and *Thyestes* the self-addresses (*Thy.* 192 *anime*) come back later at crucial moments, when some hesitations emerge (*Thy.* 324 *male agis, recedis, anime; Med.* 937 *quid, anime, titubas?*). On the other hand, in such situations heroes bid virtues good-bye: *excede, pietas* (*Thy.* 249). Furthermore, when urging himself to commit his deed, *Atreus* uses an entire chain of adjectives in vocative form (*Thy.* 176–178): *ignave*,<sup>53</sup> *iners, enervis et... inulte*. *Neronian* gigantism ravel in generalizing notions like (*Thy.* 180–188) *totus... orbis... agros et urbis... undique... tota... tellus... totus... populus... quisquis*. On a more general scale, *gradatio* is used (*Thy.* 193–195) *nefas / atrox, cruentum*

<sup>52</sup> The situation is different in *Tro.* 630 *bene est: tenetur. perge, festina, attrahe*.

<sup>53</sup> Similarly, *Clytaemnestra* blames herself as *pigra* (*Ag.* 193).

(and what is much more): *tale quod frater meus / suum esse mallet*. Exaggeration can border on absurdity: here *frater* is no longer the epitome of love, but of murderous, even suicidal hatred: by re-defining words and turning values upside down, Seneca presents us here an inverted mirroring of edifying philosophical re-definitions. Determined as he is to annihilate his brother Thyestes, Atreus does not even shrink from self-destruction (*Thy.* 190 f.): “This mighty palace itself, illustrious Pelops’ house, may it even fall on me, if only on my brother, too, it fall” (tr. Miller) *Haec ipsa pollens incliti Pelopis domus / ruat vel in me, dummodo in fratrem ruat*. The same is true of Clytaemnestra (*Ag.* 202): “death has no pang when shared with whom you would” (tr. Miller, modified) *mors misera non est commori cum quo velis*. In this line of thought, *scelus* becomes something desirable (*Thy.* 203). Passion takes possession of the entire person: the leading emotion (*ira*) is made an epithet (*iratus Atreus: Thy.* 118); Atreus is completely imbued with anger. Even reason falls under the sway of rage: a ‘rational’ excuse for yielding to destructive emotions is the idea of a “preventive war” (*Thy.* 201–204): “Therefore, ere he strengthen himself or marshal his powers, we must begin the attack, lest, while we wait, the attack be made on us. Slay or be slain will he; between us lies the crime for him who first shall do it” (tr. Miller) *proinde antequam se firmat aut vires parat, / petatur ultro, ne quiescentem petat. / Aut perdet aut peribit: in medio est scelus / positum occupanti*. Cf. *Ag.* 193 *scelus occupandum est*. Interestingly, in Seneca’s tragedies an irrational state of mind is often obtained and artfully maintained by means of rational techniques of meditation. Seneca’s tragedies are not “didactic plays”; what they give, is a sober analysis of the vast potentialities of the human mind.

In both genres, prose and tragedy, Seneca’s use of similar stylistic means is based on analogous rhetorical techniques. However, explicit address to the *animus* is limited to the tragedies – with only one exception (*Dial.* 1 [= *Prov.*] 2. 10): “Essay, my soul, the task long planned; deliver yourself from human affairs” *aggredere, anime, diu meditatatum opus, eripe te rebus humanis*. Actually, there is no exception: Cato is imagined here as the hero of a tragedy. This accounts for the use of tragic speech. On the other hand, reflexive use of *eripere* is also found in the Letters (*Epist.* 19. 1): “If possible, withdraw yourself from all the business of which you speak; and if you cannot do this, tear yourself away” *si potes, subduc te istis occupationibus, si minus, eripe*; *Epist.* 80. 4 “But what better thing could you wish for than to break away from this slavery, a slavery that oppresses us all?” *quid autem melius potes velle quam eripere te huic servituti, quae omnes premit*.

To see how self-admonition is shaped individually in each single case, let us look at an example in more detail (*Med.* 41): “My spirit, if you are

alive, if there is any of your old energy left” (tr. Fitch) *si uiuis, anime, si quid antiqui tibi / remanet vigoris*. Medea wants to fill her *animus* with strength (*Med.* 42 f.): “Drive out womanish fears, and plant the forbidding Caucasus in your mind” (tr. Fitch) *pelle femineos metus / et inhospitalem Caucasum mente indue*. These are specific admonitions to a woman from Colchis: she should forget her female nature, but on the other hand remember the roughness of her homeland. In an important *gradatio* she exhorts herself to surpass the misdeeds of her youth (*Med.* 49 f.): “I did all this as a girl. My bitterness must grow more weighty (*gravior*): greater (*maiora*) crimes become me now, after giving birth” (tr. Fitch). This is a systematic mental exercise in *ira* and *furor*. As for content, we are here at the antipodes of the philosophical writings, which strive to overcome such emotions. But the rhetorical methods of self-manipulation are very much the same as those of philosophical self-education.

Further apostrophes to *animus* are found before and in the last scene. In line 976 f. Medea encourages herself to make her crime publicly known: “To work now, my spirit! You must not waste your valour in obscurity” (tr. Fitch) *nunc hoc age, anime: non in occulto tibi est / perdenda virtus*. Involuntarily, Medea reveals here the anti-philosophical aim of her actions: *perdenda virtus*.

The next address to *animus* comes at a moment when Medea’s wrath has begun to calm down (*Med.* 988 f.): “Why delay now, my spirit? Why hesitate? Has your powerful anger already flagged?” To light anew the dying flame of hatred, she appeals to a further strong emotion: cruelty. Against the voices of shame and repentance, Medea stubbornly persists in her pursuit, relishing in the terrible pleasure of torturing the unhappy father of her children (*Med.* 991 “A great sense of pleasure steals over me unbidden” [tr. Fitch] *voluptas magna me invitam subit*). The numerous apostrophes to *animus* in this tragedy are crowned towards the end by two addresses to *dolor* (*Med.* 1016 f. “Relish your crime in leisure, my pain, do not hurry” [tr. Fitch] *perfruere lento scelere, ne propera, dolor*), a line very close in content to the above description of *voluptas*, and 1019 f. “I had no more to offer you, my pain, in atonement” (tr. Fitch) *plura non habui, dolor, / quae tibi litarem* (note the ritual vocabulary). An instructive parallel from the writings is Seneca’s apostrophe to Pain (*dolor*): “Slight thou art, if I can bear thee; short thou art, if I cannot bear thee” *levis es, si ferre possum; brevis es, si ferre non possum* (*Epist.* 24. 14). In the philosophical writings, passion has to be overcome, whereas in the tragedies it is even an object of cult (cf. the sacrificial vocabulary in *Med.* 1020).

Similarly, other emotions or virtues may be personified and addressed. In Seneca’s tragedy, Hercules apostrophizes his *virtus* (*Herc. f.* 1315): “Give way, my valour, endure my father’s command” (tr. Fitch) *succumbe*

*virtus, perfer imperium patris*. Here the hero suppresses what in everyday speech is called *virtus* (“manly behaviour”) for the sake of *pietas*, which is combined with a nobler type of *virtus* (cf. the chorus’ words: *Herc. fur.* 1093 f. “may the hero’s goodness and heroism return” (tr. Fitch) *redeat pietas / virtusque viro*).

In Seneca’s as in Greek tragedies the philosophical point of view is often articulated by the chorus or by ordinary people (a nurse, a guardian). In Jason’s case the philosophical advice he gives to Medea<sup>54</sup> is especially tedious, since it is he who caused her hopeless situation. Sometimes Seneca goes further than Greek tragedy, including, for instance, Stoic or Epicurean ideas. All this serves as a foil and brings to the fore the contrary orientation of the protagonists’ mind (Atreus, Medea, Phaedra), their dedication to committing crimes unheard of.

The distortion of the philosophical path into its opposite is ironically spelled out in Medea’s words (*Med.* 1022): “A path has opened to heaven” (tr. Fitch) *patuit in caelum via*. In a literal sense, this is true for Medea: she flees through the air on her magic chariot. A close parallel is Theseus, who says about himself (*Phaedra* 1213): “Was a path opened to the upper world?” *patuit ad caelum via?* The context implies, of course, that his return from the netherworld was useless. When Hercules in his madness wants to attack the mansions of the skies (*Herc. f.* 972), this irrational attempt is doomed to failure. Instead, the conqueror of monsters – as a next step – must conquer himself. The questionable “way to heaven” through glory on earth (*Herc. f.* 194 f. “and raise him equal with the starry heavens” [tr. Fitch] *caeloque parem / tollat et astris*) had been belied by the Epicurean wisdom of the chorus in the same play (see above p. 132). As Seneca puts it in several letters,<sup>55</sup> the true path to the skies – accessible from the

<sup>54</sup> *Med.* 537–558; on this, v. Albrecht (n. 30) 120–122.

<sup>55</sup> *Epist.* 31. 11 *subsilire in caelum ex angulo licet. Exsurge modo ‘et te quoque dignum / finge deo’*. *Finges autem non auro nec argento: non potest ex hac materia imago deo exprimi similis; cogita illos, cum propitii essent, fictiles fuisse*. Cf. also *Epist.* 67. 7 *calix venenatus, qui Socratem transtulit e carcere in caelum*. *Epist.* 72. 9 *hic deprimitur alternis et extollitur ac modo in caelum adlevatur, modo defertur ad terram*. *Epist.* 73. 12: *te compendiaro in caelum voco. Solebat Sextius dicere Iovem plus non posse quam bonum virum*. Philosophy is *otium, quod inter deos agitur, quod deos facit* (*Epist.* 73. 11). Cf. *Epist.* 86. 1: *Animum quidem eius (scil. Scipionis) in caelum, ex quo erat, redisse persuadeo mihi, non quia magnos exercitus duxit, ... sed ob egregiam moderationem pietatemque*. Furthermore, *Epist.* 92. 30 f. *Quemadmodum corporum nostrorum habitus erigitur et spectat in caelum, ita animus, cui in quantum vult, licet porrigi, in hoc a natura factus est, ut paria diis vellet. Et si utatur suis viribus, ac se in spatium suum extendat, non aliena via ad summa nititur*. (31) *Magnus erat labor ire in caelum: redit*. Here enters the re-definition of power and riches.

farthest nook, even from prison – is shown by philosophy: transformation of words and meanings – in order to shape oneself (*te ... finge: Epist.* 31. 11) – by means of a rational approach. And there is more: *Ratio* is supported by *pietas* (“and mold thyself to be worthy of godhead” Verg. *Aen.* 8. 364 f. *et te quoque dignum / finge deo* quoted *Epist.* 31. 11; cf. *Epist.* 86. 1 on Scipio’s *pietas*); in the case of Hercules, the humane aspect of *pietas* appears in his loving obedience to his father, which rightly leads him to reject even what might seem to be heroic *virtus* (*Herc. f.* 1315–1317). Thus he avoids suicide – a great temptation indeed for a Stoic – and chooses the thorny path of humanity and humility. *Pietas*, so grievously hurt by Hercules’ murders, is finally re-established. This ending is all the more moving as it lacks the usual Stoic bravery and boastfulness. As Seneca, for his caring father’s sake, gave up the idea of killing himself, so does Hercules in his play (*Herc. f.* 1315–1317): “Give way, my valour, endure my father’s command. This labour must be added to the Herculean labours: to live” (tr. Fitch).<sup>56</sup> This passage finds a clear parallel in *Epist.* 78. 2, where Seneca speaks of his chronic sickness, the sufferings of which drove him almost to suicide (a step allowed by Stoic philosophy): “I often entertained the impulse of ending my life then and there; but the thought of my kind old father kept me back. For I reflected, not how bravely I had the power to die, but how little power he had to bear bravely the loss of me. And so I commanded myself to live. For sometimes it is even an act of bravery to live”.<sup>57</sup> The elderly father’s inability to bear his son’s death is graphically expressed in the drama (*Herc. f.* 1308–1313): “I am holding on my very lips this fragile life of mine, wearied with old age and no less wearied with troubles: Can anyone be so slow in granting his father life? (*Taking a sword*) I shall not endure further delay, I shall set my breast against the deadly blade and thrust it in. Here, here shall I lie – the crime of a *sane* Hercules” (tr. Fitch/Miller). The parallel is instructive not so much for the biographical background it reveals as for the fact that we find a similar idea

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*Animum impleri debere, non arcam. Hunc imponere dominio rerum omnium licet, hunc in possessionem rerum naturae inducere, ut sua orientis occidentisque terminis finiat deorumque ritu cuncta possideat.* There follows a re-definition of freedom (*Epist.* 92. 33): *Nemo liber est, qui corpori servit.*

<sup>56</sup> *Succumbe, virtus* [another address to *virtus: Herc. f.* 1156], *perfer imperium patris. / eat ad labores hic quoque Herculeus labor: / vivamus.*

<sup>57</sup> *Saepe impetum cepi abrumpendae vitae: patris me indulgentissimi senectus retinuit. Cogitavi enim non quam fortiter ego mori possem, sed quam ille fortiter desiderare non posset. Itaque imperavi mihi, ut viverem: aliquando enim et vivere fortiter facere est.* The idea recurs in *Medea* (1018). *Iason: Infesta, memet perime. Medea: Misereri iubes.* For Jason, life is a more cruel punishment than death. This is an intriguing case of “re-definition” – in a negative vein.

expressed in two different genres. Actually there is a marked difference in style. In the drama, the father's resolution to kill himself in his turn, should his son die, is amply developed in a speech and underlined by a theatrical gesture, which, in its turn, provokes the son's decision to take upon himself the burden of living, a decision expressed in the drama by an apostrophe to *virtus* (1315). We know that apostrophe is more frequent in Seneca's dramas than in his philosophical writings. This dramatic dialogue is absent from the philosophical text. Instead, the father's and the son's thoughts are condensed into a single antithesis: *Cogitavi enim non quam fortiter ego mori possem, sed quam ille fortiter desiderare non posset*. Seneca the philosopher incapsulates in one sentence the quintessence of his father's and his own reflections. In this case, the avoidance of theatrical apparatus for the sake of a more intellectual approach is quite evident. Therefore, the general description of Seneca's style as "dramatic" – though helpful in many cases – should be modified.

#### Epilogue: Seneca's ideas on language and style<sup>58</sup>

A general problem behind Seneca's use of language and style is addressed in two contrary ways: Traina<sup>59</sup> maintains that Romans were unsystematic in their approach to life (which is true even of their special field: Roman Law), whereas according to Maurach,<sup>60</sup> Seneca carefully hides his systematic approach behind an unsystematic facade. Each of them, in his way, overstates a true principle. Seneca's use of language and style in the service of his philosophical aims is so deliberate that more general reflections on his part cannot be excluded reasonably, though it would be an exaggeration to term them 'systematic,' as far as we can judge from the writings that have come down to us. As for ethics, it would be helpful if we had the *Moralis philosophiae libri*. For style, his scattered remarks in the *Letters to Lucilius* are sometimes contradictory, but not irreconcilable.<sup>61</sup>

What Seneca thought about style appears rather clearly from his statements on "imitation" ("intertextuality"). In his view, a writer may be learned and original at the same time: although bees collect pollen from all kinds of flowers, the honey they produce is all their own (*Epist.* 84. 3–5, esp. 5). Lucilius wrote about Aetna, as had done Virgil, Ovid, and Cornelius Severus (*Epist.* 79. 5–6);<sup>62</sup> in Seneca's view, this epigonal situation is even

<sup>58</sup> Basic: Setaioli (n. 5).

<sup>59</sup> Traina (n. 40) 102.

<sup>60</sup> G. Maurach, *Der Bau von Senecas Epistulae morales* (Heidelberg 1970) 177–179.

<sup>61</sup> Setaioli (n. 5).

<sup>62</sup> *Epist.* 79 mentions many aspects of the theory of *imitatio* prevailing in antiquity; cf. H. Flashar, "Die klassizistische Theorie der Mimesis", in: *Le classicisme à Rome*

an advantage: “And those who have gone before seem to me not to have forestalled all that could be said, but merely to have opened the way”... (6) “He who writes last has the best of the bargain; he finds already at hand words which, when marshalled in a different way, show a new face. And he is not pilfering them, as if they belonged to someone else, when he uses them, for they are common property”. For Seneca, the use of material from earlier writers is no impediment to originality, even in a purely literary sense.

*Sententiae*. The same is even more true in a moral sense (*Epist.* 16. 7): “All that has been said well by anyone, is mine”. His use of quotations from Epicurus, Virgil, or whomever, is not merely a question of literary imitation or ‘intertextuality’; striking *sententiae* from poetry or prose are a first-rate instrument of philosophical education. But how does one make a quoted sentence or maxim really “one’s own”? One should live it, not just pronounce it (*Epist.* 108. 38). Style, therefore, is ultimately a problem of character.<sup>63</sup> Of course, Seneca keeps his distance from slavish imitators (*Epist.* 114. 18). Contrary to an inveterate prejudice, our author (at least in theory) is an enemy of authors who are fond of mannerisms (*ibid.*, 21): “They put up even with censure, provided that they can advertise themselves. That is the style of Maecenas and all the others that stray from the path, not by hazard, but consciously and voluntarily”. This is an evil that springs from the mind. Inappropriate style bespeaks a weak *animus* (*ibid.*, 22 f.). Such a moralistic approach to style shows also from his criticism of Ovid (*Nat.* 3. 27. 13–15). Of course, similar objections could be – and have been – raised against Seneca.<sup>64</sup>

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*aux I<sup>ers</sup> siècles avant et après J.-C.*, Entretiens Fondation Hardt 25 (Vandœuvres – Genève 1979) 79–111.

<sup>63</sup> Scholars are again and again suprised that Seneca notes in others the stylistic defects he does not avoid himself. Given human nature the contrary would be more of a surprise.

<sup>64</sup> On Seneca’s style: “Luxus verdirbt den Stil, sagt Seneca. / Er mußte es wissen”. Durs Grünbein, *Seneca Thyestes deutsch* (Frankfurt a. M. 2002) 172. Ancient critics: Caligula apud Suet. *Calig.* 53. 2 *arena sine calce*. Quint. *Inst.* 10. 1. 125–131 *ex industria Senecam in omni genere eloquentiae distuli propter vulgatam falso de me opinionem, qua damnare eum et invisum quoque habere sum creditus. quod accidit mihi, dum corruptum et omnibus vitiis fractum* (cf. *Dial.* 7 [= *Vit. beat.*] 13. 4 *qui voluptatem sequitur, videtur enervis, fractus* and *Epist.* 112. 1 [*amicus tuus*] *consuetudine mala ac diutina fractus*) *dicendi genus revocare ad severiora iudicia contendo*. (126) *tum autem solus hic fere in manibus adulescentium fuit. quem non equidem omnino conabar excutere, sed potioribus praeferri non sinebam, quos ille non destiterat incessere, cum diversi sibi conscius generis placere se in dicendo posse iis, quibus illi placent, diffideret. amabant autem eum magis quam imitabantur tantumque ab eo defluebant, quantum ille ab antiquis descenderat*. (127) *foret enim optandum pares ac*

On a more general scale, Seneca discusses the problem *talis oratio qualis vita*<sup>65</sup> in his *Epist.* 114 and 115. Behind Seneca's evaluations of the styles of Fabianus<sup>66</sup> and Maecenas,<sup>67</sup> there is the Stoic idea of "following nature".<sup>68</sup> Both these examples illustrate two contrasting aspects of what could be called "natural style". Fabianus was "not one of those modern theorizers, but a philosopher of the true and old kind" (*Dial.* 10 [= *Brev. vit.*] 10. 1); his discourse was free from rhetorical adornments. Such a view of "natural"<sup>69</sup> style is in harmony with old Stoicism. A totally different case is Maecenas' style, which (while reflecting his individual nature, i. e. his imperfections and

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*saltem proximos illi viro fieri. sed placebat propter sola vitia et ad ea se quisque dirigebat effingenda quae poterat; deinde cum se iactaret eodem modo dicere, Senecam infamabat. (128) cuius et multae alioqui et magnae virtutes fuerunt, ingenium facile et copiosum, plurimum studii, multa rerum cognitio; in qua tamen aliquando ab his, quibus inquirenda quaedam mandabat, deceptus est. (129) tractavit etiam omnem fere studiorum materiam. nam et orationes eius et poemata et epistolae et dialogi feruntur. in philosophia parum diligens, egregius tamen vitiorum insectator fuit. multae in eo claraeque sententiae, multa etiam morum gratia legenda; sed in eloquendo corrupta pleraque atque eo perniciosissima, quod abundant dulcibus vitiis. (130) velles eum suo ingenio dixisse, alieno iudicio. nam si obliqua [coni. Wölfflin : simile quam B ; si aliqua manus secunda], contempsisset, si parum recta [add. Peterson] non concupivisset, si non omnia sua amasset, si rerum pondera minutissimis sententiis non fregisset, consensu potius eruditorum quam puerorum amore comprobaretur. (131) verum sic quoque iam robustis et severiore genere satis firmatis legendus vel ideo quod exercere potest utrinque iudicium. multa enim, ut dixi, probanda in eo, multa etiam admiranda sunt, eligere modo curae sit; quod utinam ipse fecisset. digna enim fuit illa natura, quae meliora vellet; quod voluit effecit. Fronto, p. 149. 13 f. Van den Hout (Leiden 1954) *Senecae mollibus et febriculosus prunuleis*; Gell. 12. 2. 1 *de Annaeo Seneca partim existimant ut de scriptore minime utili, cuius libros adtingere nullum pretium operae sit, quod oratio eius vulgaria (sic) videatur et protrita, res atque sententiae aut inepto inanique impetu sint aut levi et quasi dicaci argutia, eruditio autem vernacula et plebeia nihilque ex veterum scriptis habens neque gratiae neque dignitatis. alii vero elegantiae quidem in verbis parum esse non infitias eunt, sed et rerum, quas dicat, scientiam doctrinamque ei non deesse dicunt et in vitiis morum obiurgandis severitatem gravitatemque non invenustam.**

<sup>65</sup> M. Möller, *Talis oratio – qualis vita. Zu Theorie und Praxis mimetischer Verfahren in der griechisch-römischen Literaturkritik* (Heidelberg 2004).

<sup>66</sup> Chrysippus (while stressing the importance of rhetorical performance / *actio*) was indifferent to stylistic niceties, admitting hiatus and even soloecism (*apud* Plut. *De Stoic. repugn.* 28. 1047 A–B = *SVF* 2. 297–298).

<sup>67</sup> *Epist.* 101. 10–15 criticizes lines of Maecenas only for their content (adherence to life, fear of death).

<sup>68</sup> Setaioli (n. 5) 812 f. (on a Stoic doctrine expounded and criticized by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De compositione verborum* 4–5).

<sup>69</sup> Fabianus' words were not *huius saeculi more contra naturam suam posita et inversa* (*Epist.* 100. 5).

affectations) was monstrous, and therefore ultimately unnatural (*orationis portentosissimae deliciis: Epist.* 114. 7). However, being natural is not a synonym of artlessness. In the Stoics' view, the individual's nature is perfected by art, thus getting closer to Nature (with a capital letter), that is to say, *ratio*.<sup>70</sup> There is analogy, therefore, between ethics and literature, and in Seneca's view a careful style is not to be condemned a priori.

Had Seneca possessed only ability and imagination, and not, in addition, a more severe taste than Quintilian was prepared to admit, he would neither have become the "second founder"<sup>71</sup> of Latin prose nor the father of the European tradition of the essay.<sup>72</sup> More significantly still, once rediscovered by Justus Lipsius as a Stoic and as a writer, Seneca, the 'classic' of non-classical prose, became the patron saint of the liberation of modern languages from 'periodic style'.

Seneca's reflections on language and style go beyond older rhetorical traditions; unlike Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Quintilian, Seneca does not recommend the reading of many authors of all kinds.<sup>73</sup> Some points are strikingly 'modern'; most of them are probably in agreement with Panaetius:<sup>74</sup> no insistence on unattainable ideals, a high evaluation of individual features even against an established model, avoidance of blind imitation, care for developing one's own nature. It should be kept in mind, however, that for Seneca 'nature' is not irrational, but rational. The fact that in Seneca *imitatio* amounts to organic cultural education recalls Panaetius' idea of *sapere* as the source of good oratory and poetry.<sup>75</sup> The same is true of the value placed on the relationship between literature and ethics.

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<sup>70</sup> The human soul is part of the cosmic fire or of the cosmic *pneuma* (*Epist.* 41. 2 *sacer intra nos spiritus*) which possesses *logos* and is therefore able to strive 'homeward' (*Dial.* 11 [= *Helv.*] 11. 6–8; *Epist.* 65. 16; 79. 12); but it needs to be admonished.

<sup>71</sup> A.-M. Guillemin, "Sénèque, second fondateur de la prose latine", *REL* 35 (1957) 265–284.

<sup>72</sup> H. Cancik, *Untersuchungen zu Senecas epistulae morales* (Hildesheim 1967) 91–101.

<sup>73</sup> *Epist.* 2; v. Albrecht (n. 30) 24–30; *Dial.* 9 (= *Tranq.*) 9. 4–7 (books as ornaments of walls); *Epist.* 27. 5 (learned slaves – a substitute for education?); 88 (*de liberalibus studiis*); 106. 11–12 (*litterarum ... intemperantia laboramus*); Mazzoli (n. 3) 11–14.

<sup>74</sup> Setaioli (n. 5) 856.

<sup>75</sup> Cic. *Orator* 70; Hor. *Ars* 309; G. T. A. Krüger in his edition of Horace's *Satires and Epistles* (Leipzig <sup>8</sup>1876, ad loc., p. 330 f.) comments: "richtige Einsicht in allen nur denkbaren Beziehungen; also nicht der von den Genieaffen für das Höchste gehaltene *furor poeticus*" (cf. Hor. *Ars* 295–301).

Детальный обзор языка и стиля Сенеки Младшего (часть I см. *Hyperbo-reus* 14:1) подводит итоги их изучения в научной литературе последних десятилетий и исследований самого автора. Основываясь на суждениях теоретического характера в произведениях Сенеки и одновременно проверяя их его собственной писательской практикой, автор показывает ошибочность или упрощенность многих устоявшихся суждений: так, трактовка стиля Сенеки как сознательно антицицероновского требует многих поправок – расхожее противопоставление кратких предложений Сенеки периодам Цицерона не учитывает особенностей стиля не только писем, но и поздних речей последнего. Преувеличено и представление о злоупотреблении поэтической лексикой в прозе Сенеки. Даже изобилие буквальных повторений, вызывавшее обвинения в монотонности, служит в действительности средством соединения кратких предложений и нередко создает, вместе с тем, эмоциональный эффект. Стиль Сенеки на поверку показывает разнообразие – и в синтаксическом, и в лексическом плане – даже в рамках одного и того же произведения. Несмотря на склонность к разговорным выражениям в прозе, сохраняющей личный тон, Сенека избегает “низкого стиля”, возвышенного же достигает не выпяченными выражениями, но самим содержанием и кажущейся простотой.

Применительно к письмам правильнее было бы говорить о тоне не проповедника, а личного советчика, избегающего риторических приемов, каскада слов и чрезмерного напора. Наличие теоретических оснований (*decreta*), в согласии со стоическим принципом, отличает философские наставления Сенеки от моральной парэнезы, содержащей лишь правила поведения (*praescepta*) и имеющей пропедевтическое значение. Сознательное отношение к выбору слов у Сенеки неразрывно связано с теоретической составляющей его наставлений.

Влияние риторики, в соответствии со вкусами той эпохи, заметно в “драматическом” синтаксисе, характерном и для трагедий, и для прозы Сенеки, и в обилии сентенций; эпиграмматический стиль прозы (предварительная часть длиннее, чем неожиданное разрешение) восходит к литературной и философской традиции. Обилие синонимов и квази-синонимов – не стилистическая прихоть, но часть стратегии убеждения, их расположение следует принципу “градации” и оказывается частью арсенала риторических средств, использующихся для достижения философских целей.

Сопоставляя стиль философских произведений Сенеки и его трагедий (часть II), автор указывает на единство риторической техники в обоих жанрах, особенно заметной там, где речь персонажей или автора направлена на убеждение. Между трагедией и философией точки соприкосновения обнаруживаются и в форме, и в содержании, при этом сходные стилистические средства нередко преследуют в двух этих жанрах различные цели. Так, сентенции, в прозе имеющие воспитательное значение, в драмах служат лишь диалектическим средством в полемике. Стоиче-

ские и эпикурейские идеи играют большую роль в трагедиях Сенеки в сравнении с его предшественниками, в их свете нередко подвергаются пересмотру господствующие представления. Разнообразие языковых и стилистических средств, основанных на риторической технике, является общим для поэзии и прозы. Детальный анализ показывает, однако, типичные для каждого из двух жанров предпочтения. Так, для философии характерно переосмысление обыденных понятий, использование умозаключений в соединении с эмоциональными средствами воздействия (“этос” и “пафос”) для воспитания подопечного. В трагедии, напротив, аналогичные приемы рациональной медитации используются для стимулирования героем в самом себе иррациональных состояний и основанных на них поступков (Медея, Федра). В этом плане трагедии Сенеки скорее являются картину возможностей человеческой психологии, чем являются “дидактическими драмами”, как их обычно понимают. Само понятие “драматического” стиля прозы Сенеки требует уточнения в свете сопоставления с его трагедиями: то, что передается в трагедии посредством эффектных описаний, в философской прозе достигается посредством емкой формулировки (ср. отказ Геракла от самоубийства и аналогичное решение самого Сенеки в молодости).

## ПОСВЯТИТЕЛЬНОЕ ГРАФФИТО ИЗ НИМФЕЯ

В 1984 году при раскопках боспорского города Нимфея, в слое III в. – первой половины II в. до н. э., был обнаружен фрагмент стенки чернолакового канфара с граффито.<sup>1</sup> Максимальная ширина фрагмента составляет 8 см, высота – 6 см, примерный диаметр тулова сосуда – 10,5 см. Судя по пропорциям обломка и орнаменту из амфоровидных подвесок, выполненному в технике резьбы и росписи жидкой глиной, канфар можно отнести к типу *baggy* и датировать 2-й половиной III в. до н. э.<sup>2</sup>

Надпись состоит из двух строк: [...]ΜΑΧΟΣΒ / [...]ΝΠΙΩΙ. Между ними проходит, опоясывая сосуд, неглубокий врезанный желобок, характерный для канфаров такого типа. Начало обеих строк отбито. Последняя буква первой строки сохранилась не полностью, однако она с уверенностью восстанавливается как *бета*. Расстояние от *беты* до скола несколько превышает межбуквенные интервалы граффито и позволяет предположить, что *бета* являлась последней буквой верхней строки; однако с полной уверенностью утверждать этого нельзя. В нижней строке представлено окончание надписи, так как после *йоты* сохранилось около полутора сантиметров незакрытой буквами поверхности.

В целом граффито выполнено аккуратно, линии букв четкие, довольно глубокие и широкие (до 0,05 см). Высота букв варьируется в пределах от 0,5 см (*омикрон*) до 1,1 см (*альфа*). Палеографические особенности надписи (маленькие, по сравнению с другими буквами, размеры *омикрона* и *сигмы*, их расположение по центру строки, а также курсивная форма *сигмы* и *омеги*; параллельные гасы *мю*; правая гаса *пи*, уступающая по длине ле-

<sup>1</sup> Граффито хранится в Государственном Эрмитаже (инв. № НФ.84.167). С прорисовкой и фотографией оно публикуется впервые; текст надписи с кратким комментарием издан в тезисах докладов конференции: А. Namoilik. A Graffito from Nymphaeum // *Third International Congress on Black Sea Antiquities. Abstracts of papers and posters* (Prague 2005) 69–70.

<sup>2</sup> Ср.: S. I. Rotroff. Hellenistic Pottery. Athenian and Imported Wheelmade Table Ware and Related Material // *The Athenian Agora XXIX*, 1–2 (1997) 58–59, 103–105, nos. 237, 239, 258, figs. 16, 17 pls. 22, 24.

вой; апексы и утолщения на концах букв) позволяют датировать ее III в. до н. э.<sup>3</sup>

Таким образом, принимая во внимание археологический контекст находки, форму и орнаментацию сосуда, а также особенности шрифта надписи, граффито можно отнести ко второй половине III в. до н. э.

В первой строке сохранился конец слова [...]ΜΑΧΟΣ в nom. sg. Далее процарапана *бета*, которая, возможно, является последней буквой строки. Во второй строке, судя по окончанию, представлено слово II склонения в dat. sg.


Именительный падеж первого слова и дательный падеж второго указывают на то, что надпись носит посвятельный характер. Чаще всего такие надписи процарапывались на венчиках или стенках сосудов<sup>4</sup> и могли содержать имя божества, которому посвящался сосуд, и/или имя дедиканта.<sup>5</sup> В нашем граффито, вероятно, присутствуют оба имени.

<sup>3</sup> Датировка граффито по шрифту производится в первую очередь на основании исследования А. И. Болтуновой и Т. Н. Книпович, посвященного лапидарному письму Боспора (А. И. Болтунова, Т. Н. Книпович. Очерк истории греческого лапидарного письма на Боспоре // *НЭ* III [1962] 13–18, табл. II. 4–5), поскольку специальных работ, в которых рассматривался бы шрифт граффити Северного Причерноморья, пока не существует. По совокупности особенностей шрифта нашему граффито близки следующие лапидарные надписи: *КБН-альбом 27* (Пантикапей, II в. до н. э.), 254 (Пантикапей, III–II вв. до н. э.), 257 (Пантикапей, III–II вв. до н. э.), 1071 (Гермонасса, вторая половина III в. до н. э.). К сожалению, среди этих надписей нет ни одной, которая бы содержала указание на дату, однако ряд палеографических особенностей позволяет относить их к эллинистическому времени: Болтунова, Книпович. *Указ. соч.*, 15–16.

Нимфейское граффито находит немало аналогий по шрифту среди других граффити, относящихся преимущественно к III в. до н. э.: В. П. Яйленко. Посвятительные граффити Пантикапея и округи // *ДБ* 9 (2006) 392, № 35 (Пантикапей, III в. до н. э.); О. В. Горская. Культы Нимфея по материалам граффити // *Боспорский феномен*. Ч. 1 (СПб. 2002) 116–117, № 11 (Нимфей, III в. до н. э.); И. И. Толстой. *Греческие граффити древних городов Северного Причерноморья* (М.–Л. 1953) № 30 (Ольвия, III в. до н. э.); В. П. Яйленко. Граффити Левки, Березани и Ольвии // *ВДИ* 1980: 3, 77, № 67, табл. IX. 24 (Ольвия, III в. до н. э.); Э. И. Соломоник. *Граффити античного Херсонеса* (Киев 1978) № 1690, табл. XXIX (Херсонес, III–II вв. до н. э.) и др. Таким образом, по палеографическим особенностям граффито можно датировать III–II вв. до н. э. Учитывая, что на дату II в. до н. э. указывают в основном лапидарные надписи, которые в отношении шрифта гораздо более консервативны, чем граффити, наиболее вероятной датировкой нашего граффито представляется III в. до н. э.

<sup>4</sup> В. П. Яйленко. Граффити Левки, Березани и Ольвии // *ВДИ* 1980: 2, 76.

<sup>5</sup> И. А. Емец. *Граффити и дипинти из античных городов и поселений Боспора Киммерийского* (М. 2005) 108–110.



Графито из Нимфея. Государственный Эрмитаж, инв. № НФ.84.167

Слово во второй строке является, по-видимому, именем божества, которому сделано посвящение. Форма [...]НΠΩΙ позволяет восстановить имя Асклепия (Ἄσκληπιός) в dat.: [Ἄσκλη]πιῶι.<sup>6</sup>

В Северном Причерноморье культ Асклепия был наиболее популярен в Херсонесе, где в первые века новой эры он приобрел общегосударственный статус.<sup>7</sup> Об этом свидетельствуют херсонесские монеты конца II – III в. н. э., изображающие Асклепия и Гигию.<sup>8</sup> В городе обнаружены фрагменты двух декретов I – II вв. н. э., в которых упоминаются храм Асклепия,<sup>9</sup> скульптурные фигуры богов-врачевателей и другие предметы с их изображениями.<sup>10</sup> Возможно, имя Асклепия в сокращенном виде представлено в граффито ΑΣΚΛΗ ΦΙ (I в. н. э.),<sup>11</sup> а также в граффити ΑΣΚΛΑ и ΑΣ, относящихся к более раннему времени – IV – III вв. до н. э.<sup>12</sup> Основываясь на указанных свидетельствах эпиграфики и ономастики (наличие теофорных имен, производных от имени Асклепия), Э. И. Соломоник предположила, что бога врачевания в Херсонесе почитали уже в эллинистическое время,<sup>13</sup> хотя, по мнению К. В. Голенко и А. Н. Щеглова, археологическими и нумизматическими источниками это не подтверждается.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>6</sup> F. Dornseiff, B. Hansen. *Rückläufiges Wörterbuch der griechischen Eigennamen* (Berlin 1957) 240.

<sup>7</sup> А. С. Русяева. *Религия понтийских греков в античную эпоху* (Киев 2005) 435.

<sup>8</sup> В. А. Анохин. *Монетное дело Херсонеса (IV в. до н. э. – XII в. н. э.)* (Киев 1977) №№ 266, 277–279, 284, 291, табл. XVIII–XX.

<sup>9</sup> *IosPE* 2 376; И. А. Макаров. Новые надписи из Херсонеса Таврического // *ВДИ* 2006: 4, 83–87.

<sup>10</sup> А. Н. Щеглов. Скульптурные изображения Асклепия // *СХМ* 1 (1960) 9–16; Н. В. Пятышева. Мраморная статуэтка Гигиной из Херсонеса (К вопросу о культе богов-врачевателей в Северном Причерноморье) // *ВДИ* 1971: 2, 71–77; М. Максимова. Античные печати Северного Причерноморья // *ВДИ* 1937: 1, 261, рис. 4; В. А. Анохин. Кувшин с рельефными изображениями Асклепия и Гигиной // *КСИА* VIII (Киев 1957) 166–168.

<sup>11</sup> Э. И. Соломоник. *Граффити с хоры Херсонеса* (Киев 1984) № 71, табл. IV (Инкерманская долина).

<sup>12</sup> Э. И. Соломоник (прим. 3) №№ 355, 356–361, табл. IV. Концом IV – началом III в. до н. э. датируется также надпись на чернолаковом канфаре с Маякского поселения: Ὑγείας – “(Я – канфар) Гигиной”: И. В. Яценко. Кубок Гигиной // Г. А. Кошеленко (ред.), *Проблемы античной культуры* (М. 1986) 226–231.

<sup>13</sup> E. I. Solomonik. Neues um Asklepioskult in Chersonessos // *Klio* 57/2 (1975) 433–442; Э. И. Соломоник *Древние надписи Крыма* (Киев 1988) 57–58.

<sup>14</sup> К. В. Голенко, А. Н. Щеглов. О культе Асклепия в Херсонесе Таврическом (по нумизматическим и археологическим данным) // *Dacia. Revue d'archéologie et d'histoire ancienne* IX (1965) 373.

В Ольвии тоже поклонялись Асклепию, однако там его культ не приобрел такого значения, какое имел в Херсонесе.<sup>15</sup> Среди находок, связанных с культом бога врачевания, – несколько мраморных голов Асклепия и Гигиен, <sup>16</sup> костяной алтарик со змеей,<sup>17</sup> а также votivный рельеф с изображением ритуальной сцены в культе Асклепия (*IosPE* II 272); фрагменты скульптур и алтарик относятся к эллинистическому времени, рельеф – к римскому. При Александре Севере в Ольвии был построен храм с тремя целлами для разных божеств, в том числе с одной из них – для Асклепия и Гигиен (*IosPE* II 184).

О почитании Асклепия на Боспоре известно относительно немного. Из раскопок Пантикапея происходит торс статуи Асклепия (конец IV – начало III в. до н. э.) и голова статуэтки молодой девушки, возможно, Гигиен (III в. до н. э.).<sup>18</sup> Согласно Страбону (II, 1, 16), в Пантикапее существовал храм Асклепия, однако его остатки пока не обнаружены (или не идентифицированы). К северо-востоку от столицы Боспора, на склоне Темир-Горы, был открыт древний колодец с подземной наклонной галереей, ведущей к целебному источнику, а недалеко от колодца найдена мраморная плита II в. н. э. с посвящением Асклепию (*КБН* 957). Это позволило сделать предположение о существовании здесь святилища бога врачевания.<sup>19</sup>

В материалах из раскопок Нимфея культ Асклепия ранее засвидетельствован не был: ни в лапидарных надписях, ни в граффито его имя не упоминалось.<sup>20</sup> Не встречалось также ни одного антро-

<sup>15</sup> А. С. Русяева. *Религия и культы античной Ольвии* (Киев 1992) 130–132.

<sup>16</sup> Г. И. Соколов. *Античное Причерноморье. Памятники архитектуры, скульптуры, живописи и прикладного искусства* (Л. 1973) №№ 77–78; М. М. Лесницкая. Голова Асклепия из Ольвии // *ВДИ* 1973: 3, 87–92. Возможно, статуе Асклепия принадлежала еще одна мраморная голова из Ольвии: М. М. Кобылина. *Античная скульптура Северного Причерноморья* (М. 1972) 9, табл. VII; Соколов. *Указ. соч.*, № 20. Она датируется IV в. до н. э.

<sup>17</sup> А. С. Русяева. *Земледельческие культы Ольвии догетского времени* (Киев 1979) 33, рис. 16.

<sup>18</sup> М. М. Кобылина. Новые находки скульптуры в Пантикапее // *МИА* 103 (1962) 180–182; она же (прим. 16) 10, табл. XIV. 2.

<sup>19</sup> В. Ф. Гайдукевич. *Боспорское царство* (М.–Л. 1949) 170. В более позднем немецком издании этой книги В. Ф. Гайдукевич на основании результатов археологических работ высказал предположение, что вблизи колодца располагалась винодельческая усадьба эллинистического времени: V. F. Gaidukevič. *Das Bosporanische Reich* (Berlin 1971) 183. Для выяснения вопроса о существовании здесь святилища необходимо дальнейшее проведение раскопок.

<sup>20</sup> В Пантикапее было обнаружено граффито [ ]ΚΑΙΑΣ, которое И. И. Толстой дополнял как [Ἄπολλωνι] καὶ Ἀσκληπιῶνι и датировал IV в. до н. э.:

понима, производного от имени Асклепия, хотя на Боспоре такие имена известны.<sup>21</sup>

Таким образом, подавляющее большинство свидетельств почитания Асклепия в Северном Причерноморье относится к первым векам новой эры. В это время культ богов-врачевателей становится одним из главных во многих понтийских греческих городах. Распространение культа в большой степени было связано с влиянием Рима: Асклепий пользовался популярностью среди римских легионеров, служивших в понтийских провинциях.<sup>22</sup> Однако Асклепию поклонялись и ранее, в эллинистическое время; одним из свидетельств этого является нимфейское граффито.

Слово в первой строке в пом. sg., вероятно, представляет собой имя дедиканта. Из так называемого списка нимфейских граждан III в. до н. э. известны имена Ἰπλόμαχος и Καλλιμαχος (КБН 912, 2, 4. 11). На -μαχος могут также оканчиваться нарицательные существительные (е. г. σύμμαχος, μονόμαχος) и прилагательные (е. г. ἀξιόμαχος, φιλόμαχος), но такая трактовка для данного граффито маловероятна.

Если верно предположение о том, что *бета* была последней буквой первой строки, то ее можно интерпретировать как цифровое обозначение. По алфавитной системе β = 2.

Среди надписей середины III в. до н. э., процарапанных на штукатурке стен святилища Аполлона и Афродиты в Нимфее,<sup>23</sup> есть граффито, состоящее из имен и цифровых знаков: Ἀγαθᾶς χόα(ς) ή, Ἀγαθᾶς χόα(ς) θ́, Χεσοχειεφεύς χό(α)ς ς́, Βοστακίων χόα(ς) ζ́, Ναпорὸς χόα(ς) ζ́, Εὐφρόν(ι)ος χόα, Χρηστᾶς χόα(ς) ζ́. По мнению В. П. Яйленко, в надписи идет речь о количестве вина, пожертвованного в святилище: “Агатас (пожертвовал) 8 хоев, Агатас 9 хоев, Хесохейефеус 6 хоев, Бостакион 7 хоев, Напор 7 хоев, Евфроний хой, Хрестас 7 хоев”.<sup>24</sup> Издатель отмечает, что Евфроний, чей

Толстой. *Указ. соч.*, № 182. Такая трактовка надписи возможна, однако не бесспорна.

<sup>21</sup> Ἀσκληπιόδης: КБН № 491 (Пантикапей, I в. н. э.), № 996 (Фанагория, I в. н. э.), № 676 (Пантикапей, II в. н. э.), № 1001 (Фанагория, II в. н. э.), №№ 1276–1278, 1280, 1282, 1287 (Танаис, III в. н. э.); Ἀσκληπιᾶς: КБН № 947 (Феодосия, III в. н. э.); Ἀσκληπιός: КБН № 1029 (Ахиллий, II в. н. э.). Как видно из надписей, эти имена стали популярными в первые века новой эры.

<sup>22</sup> Русяева (прим. 7) 435–442; Голенко, Щеглов (прим. 14) 380.

<sup>23</sup> Н. Л. Грач. Открытие нового исторического источника в Нимфее // *ВДИ* 1984: 1, 81–88; N. Graß. Ein neu entdecktes Fresco aus hellenistischer Zeit in Nymphaion bei Kertsch // Н. Franke u. а. (Hg.) *Skythika* (München 1987) 87–95.

<sup>24</sup> В. П. Яйленко. Женщины, Афродита и жрица Спартокидов в новых боспорских надписях // Л. П. Маринович, С. Ю. Сапрыкин (ред.), *Женщина в античном мире* (М. 1995) 267–269, рис. 17. ф.

вклад в коллективное приношение составил лишь один хой, скорее всего, пожертвовал не вино, а более дорогое масло. О том, что греки приносили в храмы вино, масло для светильников, мед и другие дары, свидетельствуют надписи из разных регионов античного мира. Так, согласно декрету конца V в. до н. э. из Эпидавра, в святилище Асклепия приносили вино и ячмень; на Косе в IV в. до н. э. Гераклу, помимо прочего, жертвовали четыре котилы меда и три котилы вина; аттический декрет II в. н. э. предписывал эранистам посвящать в храм хой вина и котилу масла.<sup>25</sup> В надписи из Фанагории, датирующейся II в. н. э., говорится о четырех котилах масла: ἐλάϊου κοτ(ύλας) δ' (КБН 1005, 13).<sup>26</sup>

Емкость канфара, на котором процарапано наше граффито, составляла около 0,5 л, что соответствует примерно двум котилам по аттической системе.<sup>27</sup> Таким образом, *βετα* могла означать две котилы жидкости, которые вмещал в себя посвящаемый сосуд. Скорее всего, это было масло или мед, поскольку, судя по надписям, вино приносили в храмы в гораздо больших количествах. О том, что такие приношения могли совершать в чернолаковых открытых сосудах, свидетельствуют граффити μέλι ('мед') и πόμα ('напиток') на донцах чернолаковых канфара и чаши, обнаруженных в Херсонесе. По мнению Э. И. Соломоник, эти надписи обозначали продукты, подносимые в дар божеству.<sup>28</sup> О приношении в храм Асклепия горшка с кашей упоминает Аристофан (*Plut.* 673).

Э. И. Соломоник выделила группу херсонесских граффити на чернолаковой керамике, где представлено сокращение имени наряду с цифровыми знаками, и трактовала эти знаки как "сумму, приносимую в храм, с указанием имени бога или дарителя": например, Ἄρ ΔΔΔ – "Артемиде 30", Ἀχ ΔΠΙ – "Ахиллу 13", Ποι ΔΠΙ – "е. г. Поймен 16" и др.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>25</sup> F. Sokolowski. *Lois sacrées des cités grecques* (Paris 1969) nos. 60, 18–27; 151 C, 11–15; 55, 22–23.

<sup>26</sup> В граффити указания на то, что и в каком количестве приносили в дар тому или иному божеству, очень редки, но иногда встречаются, как, например, в ольвийском граффито IV в. до н. э.: Ἀναπέρρης Ἀναχυρσῶ Εκ(ο)λόττη(ς) Ἀπόλλωνι Βορέηι μέλι πατρ(ώιον) (?) ἀνέθηκεν – "Анаперр, (сын) Анахирса, сколот (?), Аполлону Борею мед отеческий (?) (посвятил)": Ю. Г. Виноградов, А. С. Русяева. Граффити из святилища Аполлона на западном теменосе Ольвии // *ХСб* XI (Севастополь 2001) 136–137, № 8, рис. 1. 16.

<sup>27</sup> F. Hultsch. *Griechische und römische Metrologie* (Berlin 1882) 703, tab. X. A: 1 κοτύλη = 0,2736 Liter.

<sup>28</sup> Соломоник (прим. 3) 13, № 1209, табл. XX (вторая половина IV в. до н. э.) и № 1406, табл. XXIII (около середины IV в. до н. э.).

<sup>29</sup> Соломоник (прим. 3) 12–13, № 345, табл. IV (IV в. до н. э.), № 401, табл. V (IV в. до н. э.), № 1403, табл. XXIII (IV в. до н. э.).

В книге А. С. Русяевой опубликовано посвящение Коре: Κόρα ΔΔ, где *дельты*, скорее всего, являются цифровыми обозначениями приношений богине.<sup>30</sup> Эти надписи по характеру близки нашему граффито, однако, скорее всего, цифры в них обозначают денежные пожертвования, так как они слишком велики для того, чтобы указывать на объем.

В греческих лапидарных надписях, в том числе боспорских, *бета* употреблялась также для обозначения патронимика, совпадающего с именем.<sup>31</sup> Этот прием использовали в целях экономии места и работы резчика, чаще всего в длинных списках имен. Пример такого употребления есть в нимфейской надписи второй половины I – первой половины II в. н. э.: Ἀπολλωνίδην β' (= Ἀπολλωνίδην Ἀπολλωνίδου). Однако примеры использования *беты* в случаях омонимии не известны ранее II в. до н. э., а чаще всего встречаются во II–III вв. н. э.;<sup>32</sup> в связи с этим подобная трактовка нашего граффито маловероятна.

Если после *беты* в первой строке на несохранившейся части канфара все же утрачены какие-то буквы, то это были, скорее всего, *омикрон* или *омега*, так как они невелики по размеру, имеют округлые очертания и располагаются по центру строки (у букв с вертикальными гасами была бы видна нижняя часть).<sup>33</sup> В таком случае *бета*, вероятно, являлась начальной буквой патронимика. В Нимфее засвидетельствованы имена Βοσπόριχος, Βιάνωρ, Βοστακίων.<sup>34</sup> В Северном Причерноморье известны посвященные граффиты, содержащие имя и патронимик дедиканта, а также имя божества: Διονύσιος Διοδώρου Ἀγαθῶι Δαίμονι – “Дионисий, сын Диодора, Доброму Гению”, Διοσκούριδης Ἡφαιστικῶντος Διοσκού[ροις] – “Диоскурид, сын Гефестиконта, Диоскурам”.<sup>35</sup>

Итак, нимфейское граффито допускает несколько толкований. Это вызвано, прежде всего, плохой сохранностью сосуда: невозможно с точностью определить, были ли в первой строке после *беты* другие буквы или нет. Однако, судя по пропорциям букв, рас-

<sup>30</sup> Русяева (прим. 17) 47, рис. 28. 1.

<sup>31</sup> R. Koerner. *Die Abkürzung der Homonymität in griechischen Inschriften* (Berlin 1961) 14–16, 98–99.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 136–137.

<sup>33</sup> Восстановление *сигмы* маловероятно, поскольку сочетание βσ- в греческом языке вряд ли было возможно: перед -σ- всякий звонкий взрывной согласный оглушался (βσ- > πσ-), а πσ- передавалось посредством ψ-: M. Lejeune. *Traité de phonétique grecque* (Paris 1947) 62.

<sup>34</sup> КБН 916 (вторая половина V – первая половина IV в. до н. э.), 912, 3, 6 (III в. до н. э.); Яйленко (прим. 24) 267, рис. 17. φ (середина III в. до н. э.).

<sup>35</sup> Толстой (прим. 3) № 14 (Ольвия, V в. до н. э.), № 30 (Ольвия, не ранее III в. до н. э.).

стояниям между ними и сохранившемуся после *беты* пространству, окончание строки все же дошло до нас полностью. Поэтому наиболее вероятным представляется следующий вариант восстановления надписи: [...]μαχος β' / [Ἄσκλη]ηπιῶι – “Такой-то (посвятил) Асклепию 2 (котилы масла)”.

Данное граффито является первым и пока единственным свидетельством почитания Асклепия в Нимфее, а также одним из немногих свидетельств его почитания на Боспоре.

А. С. Намойлик

*Государственный Эрмитаж*

This article represents a graffito found during the excavations of the Bosporan city of Nymphaeum in 1984. It is incised on the wall fragment of hellenistic black-glazed kantharos of *baggy* type with amphora-shaped ornament made in technique of carving and dilute clay painting. The graffito consists of two lines situated one above the other: [...]ΜΑΧΟΣΒ / [...]ΗΠΙΩΙ. The beginnings of both lines are lost. Space after *iota* in the lower line exceeds average intervals between letters of the inscription, so the ending of this line has been completely preserved. *Beta* is likely to be the last letter of the upper line, though it is impossible to make sure of this. The palaeography of the inscription, shape and figuration of the vessel as well as archaeological context of the find suggest a date of the second half of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC.

Nominative case of the first word and dative case of the second one indicate the dedication purpose of the inscription. The word in the first line seems to be the name of dedicator. The word in the second line is presumably a name of a God to whom the graffito was devoted. The ending [...]ΗΠΙΩΙ enables us to restore the name of Asclepios in dative case: [Ἄσκλη]ηπιῶι. *Beta*, if being the last letter of the first line, can be interpreted as a figure (β = 2). Inscriptions containing names of dedicators and gods as well as quantity of liquid or amount of money brought to sanctuaries are known in Greece and its colonies. *Beta* probably signified two kotylai of the liquid that the kantharos stored, for example, olive oil or wine. If there still were any letters after *beta*, it is likely to be the first letter of the patronymic. Thus we interpret the graffito as [...]μαχος β' / [Ἄσκλη]ηπιῶι – (so-and-so) dedicated to Asclepios 2 (kotylai of oil) or [...]μαχος e. g. Βοσπορίχου / [Ἄσκλη]ηπιῶι – (so-and-so) son of e. g. Bosporikhos dedicated to Asclepios (this kantharos).

This graffito is considered to be the first and still the only evidence of Asclepios being worshipped in Nymphaeum. It is one of the rare evidences of his cult all over the Bosphoros.