HYPERBOREUS

STUDIA CLASSICA

ναυσὶ δ' οὔτε πεζὸς ἰών κεν εὕροις
ἐς Ὑπερβορέων ἀγῶνα θαυμαστὰν ὁδόν

(Pind. *Pyth.* 10. 29–30)

PETROPOLI

Vol. 9 2003 Fasc. 2

BIBLIOTHECA CLASSICA PETROPOLITANA
VERLAG C. H. BECK MÜNCHEN

HYPERBOREUS: Классическая филология и история

Выходит два раза в год

Редакция:	Н. А. Алмазова, А. Л. Верлинский, Д. В. Панченко, С. А. Тахтаджян
Ассистент редакции:	С. К. Егорова
Консультанты:	А. К. Гаврилов, Томас Гельцер, Мартин Хенгель

Адрес:

Античный кабинет (HYPERBOREUS)
Малый пр. П. С., 9/6
197198 С.-Петербург

Факс: (812) 235-1302
E-mail: hyperbor@bicl.spb.ru

По вопросам подписки обращаться по адресу редакции

HYPERBOREUS: STUDIA CLASSICA

HYPERBOREUS wurde im Jahre 1994 durch die Bibliotheca Classica Petropolitana gegründet.

Der Vertrieb außerhalb Rußlands erfolgt durch den Verlag C. H. Beck (Oskar Beck), Wilhelmstr. 9, D-80801 München, Postfachadresse: Postfach 400340, D-80703 München.

Die Zeitschrift erscheint ab 1996 in zwei Halbjahresschriften. Abonnementpreis jährlich ab Vol. 2 € 34,90 (in diesem Betrag sind € 2,28 Mehrwertsteuer enthalten), für das Einzelheft € 19,50 (Mehrwertsteueranteil € 1,28), jeweils zuzüglich Vertriebsgebühren; die Kündigungsfrist des Abonnements beträgt sechs Wochen zum Jahresende. Preis für Vol. 1, 1994/5, auf Anfrage bei dem Verlag C. H. Beck.

Herausgeber:	Nina Almazova, Dmitri Panchenko, Souren Takhtajan, Alexander Verlinsky
Assistenz:	Sofia Egorova
Wissenschaftlicher Beirat:	Alexander Gavrilov, Thomas Gelzer, Martin Hengel

Alle für die Redaktion bestimmten Manuskripte – wenn möglich mit IBM-kompatiblen Disketten – und Einsendungen sind zu richten an:

Bibliotheca Classica Petropolitana (HYPERBOREUS)
Malyi pr. P. S. 9/6
197198 St. Petersburg, Russia
Fax: (812) 235-1302
E-mail: hyperbor@bicl.spb.ru

Die Publikationssprachen im HYPERBOREUS sind Russisch, Englisch, Französisch, Deutsch, Italienisch und Lateinisch; den Beiträgen wird jeweils eine Zusammenfassung in einer westeuropäischen Sprache oder auf Russisch hinzugefügt.
Entgegnungen werden im HYPERBOREUS nur ausnahmsweise aufgenommen. Eingegangene Druckschriften werden nicht zurückgeschickt. Mit Namen gezeichnete Artikel geben die Auffassung des Verfassers, nicht der Redaktion wieder. Alle Nachrichten werden nach bestem Wissen, aber ohne Gewähr gegeben.

ISSN 0949-2615

CONSPECTUS

Все статьи сопровождаются резюме по-русски

DAS MITLEID DER GÖTTER UND DER PHILOSOPHEN

Dass Menschen untereinander Mitleid empfinden, dürfte allgemein als eine Fähigkeit und Haltung angesehen werden, die unmittelbar zu unserer menschlichen Existenz gehört. Dabei wendet das Mitleid sich Menschen zu, die sich in einem üblen Zustand befinden, sei es durch Krankheit, durch seelische Bedrängnisse, durch soziale Misèren, Armut, Verfolgtsein oder dergleichen, und auch Tieren kann das Mitempfinden gelten. Seit den Anfängen der griechischen Literatur, seit Homer, werden in Dichtung wie Prosa Beispiele des menschlichen Mitleidens vorgeführt, das sich in Worten und vor allem in tätiger Hilfe äußert. Von Phokion, einem attischen Feldherrn des 4. Jahrh. v. Chr., wird (in einer späten Quelle, Stobaeus III S. 20, 51 Hense) das Wort überliefert, man könne weder einem Heiligtum den Altar noch der menschlichen Natur das Mitleid entreißen (οὔτε ἐξ ἱεροῦ βωμὸν οὔτε ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἀφαιρετέον τὸν ἔλεον), und ein Philosoph des 2. Jahrh. n. Chr., Alkinoos, bezeugt in seinem Abriss der platonischen Lehren, dem *Didaskalikos* 32 (S. 186, 22 Hermann), das Mitleid sei zugehörig zur Philanthropie, zum Humanum, zum mitmenschlichen Verhalten (ὁ δὲ ἔλεος οἰκεῖος φιλανθρωπίᾳ). Die griechischen Begriffe sind ἔλεος und οἶκτος, jeweils mit den abgeleiteten Verben und Adjektiven, und beide bedeuten Mitleid, Erbarmen und davon motiviertes Handeln; das entsprechende lateinische Wort ist *misericordia.* Trotz der allgemeinen Akzeptanz dieser Vorstellung gibt es in der antiken Tradition gewisse Besonderheiten und auch Einschränkungen in der Bewertung des Mitleids, und von solchen Phänomenen soll hier die Rede sein. Dabei handelt es sich einerseits um die Götter, wie ihr Verhalten in der Darstellung der Dichter, gelegentlich auch in Reflexionen der Philosophen sich bekundet, andererseits aber um die Haltung der Philosophen selber, die sich zum Mitleid positiv, aber auch mit spezieller Begründung ablehnend äußern können.[1]

---

[1] Das Thema des Mitleids wird in Darstellungen der antiken Ethik berührt; generelle Behandlungen gibt es in der neueren Literatur wenig und im Sinne des Überblicks zum Mitleid der Götter und der Philosophen gar nicht. Genannt seien die Artikel "Eleos", *RE* 5 (1905) 2320 f., "Barmherzigkeit", *RAC* I 2 (1950) 1200–1208 und die wenigen Zeilen zu "Eleos" im *Neuen Pauly* 3 (1997) 981, die fast nur die Personifikation betreffen; ferner W. Burkert, *Zum altgriechischen Mitleidsbegriff.* Diss. (Erlangen 1955).

In den homerischen Epen werden die Götter in ihrer Parteinahme für Griechen oder Troer dargestellt, weshalb sie die Menschen der einen Seite begünstigen, die der anderen aber hassen und zu vernichten planen; darauf ist hier nicht näher einzugehen. Diese Götter können aber auch Erbarmen empfinden und diesem Gefühl entsprechend handeln. So hören wir gegen Ende der *Ilias*, dass Mitleid die Götter erfasste, als sie sahen, wie Achill den Leichnam Hektors in maßlosem Wüten misshandelte (τὸν δ' ἐλεαίρεσκον μάκαρες θεοί, *Il.* 24, 23), und dass Apollon Achill beschuldigte, er habe das Mitleid verloren und sei ohne Ehrfurcht (ὡς Ἀχιλλεὺς ἔλεον μὲν ἀπώλεσεν, οὐδέ οἱ αἰδὼς γίγνεται, *Il.* 24, 44 f.). Auf Veranlassung des Zeus wird danach Achill in seinem Zürnen besänftigt und zur Begegnung mit Hektors altem Vater Priamos bewogen. – Bei den einzelnen Göttern, deren Mitleid und daraus folgendes Reagieren erwähnt wird, handelt es sich einmal um Hera, die vereint mit Athene den bedrängten Griechen zu Hilfe kommen will, in den übrigen Fällen (es sind vier in der *Ilias*, einer im *Aphrodite-Hymnus*) ist es der höchste Gott Zeus, der beim Anblick einer bestimmten Situation oder eines gefährdeten Menschen, durch Mitleid zum Handeln bewegt wird (Hera: *Il.* 8, 350; Zeus: *Il.* 15, 12; 16, 431; 17, 441; 19, 340; [Hom.] *H. Aphrod.* 210). Dabei heißt es etwa: "Als diesen der Vater der Menschen und Götter erblickte, erfasste ihn Mitleid" (τὸν δὲ ἰδὼν ἐλέησε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε) oder "der Sohn des Kronos erbarmte sich" (ἐλέησε Κρονίων, ἐλέησε Κρόνου παῖς). Zweimal raten auch Menschen einander, man wolle zu Zeus beten, "ob er sich denn erbarme" (αἴ κ' ἐλεήσῃ, *Il.* 9, 172; 24, 301).

Von den verschiedenen Situationen, die das Mitleid des Zeus erregen, seien hier zwei aus der *Ilias* angeführt. Einen quälenden Schmerz erfuhr der höchste Gott, als sein Sohn Sarpedon vom Tod auf dem Schlachtfeld bedroht wurde. Einmal konnte es dem Gott gelingen, das Todeslos von ihm abzuwehren (πατὴρ δ' ἔτι λοιγὸν ἄμυνεν, *Il.* 5, 662), spätere aber, beim Kampf zwischen Patroklos und Sarpedon, schien für diesen das Schicksal besiegelt (*Il.* 16, 431–461). Trotzdem erbarmte sich Zeus (τοὺς δὲ ἰδὼν ἐλέησε Κρόνου παῖς) und erwog noch, ob die Rettung möglich wäre; er sprach zu Hera: Wehe, wenn nun das Schicksal ihn, der mir der liebste Mensch ist, durch die Hände des Patroklos bezwingt! Ich schwanke in meinem Herzen und bedenke in meinem Sinn: soll ich ihn lebend aus der Schlacht in seine Heimat Lykien entrücken – oder lasse ich ihn nun bezwingen von Patroklos? Hera erwiderte voller Zorn: Wie kannst du so sprechen! Willst du diesen Sterblichen dem Tod entreißen, dem längst das Todesgeschick bestimmt ist? Tue es nur, doch wird kein Gott dies billigen! Aber wenn du ihn so sehr liebst, so lasse ihn als Toten in seine Heimat

Lykien von Tod und Schlaf geleiten, dass er dort ein ehrenvolles Grab erhalte. Zeus willigte ein; das Schicksal erfüllt sich in der *Ilias* immer in Übereinstimmung mit dem Willen des Zeus.

In einer anderen Situation gilt das Mitleid des Zeus zwei Pferden. Freilich sind es unsterbliche Rosse, die zum Gespann des Achill gehören: *Il.* 17, 426–458 (Mitleid des Zeus 441). Noch war Achill nicht wieder in die Kämpfe zurückgekehrt, doch hatte er seinen Freund Patroklos mit seiner Rüstung und mit seinen Pferden in die Schlacht ziehen lassen. Patroklos war gefallen, und die verlassenen Pferde jammerten und weinten um ihren toten Lenker und ließen sich nicht von der Stelle bewegen. Da fühlte Zeus Erbarmen: Warum nur, fragte er, haben wir euch Unsterbliche einst dem Peleus geschenkt? Etwa damit ihr zusammen mit den sterblichen Menschen leiden sollt? Zeus hauchte ihnen Mut und Kraft ein, und sie kehrten mit ihrem Wagen zu den Griechen zurück. Hier also hat das Erbarmen des Zeus Erfolg, im Falle des Patroklos war es vergebens.

Bevor an einigen Beispielen die Frage des Götter-Mitleids in der griechischen Tragödie beleuchtet werden soll, sei auf eine negative Einschätzung des Mitleids in einzelnen Texten aus der Zeit um 500 (oder dem frühen 5. Jahrh.) hingewiesen. Dabei wird das Mitleid in Kontrast zum Neid gesehen. Der Komödien-Dichter Epicharm erwägt: "Wer möchte nicht gerne beneidet werden ...? Ein Mann gilt doch nichts, wenn er nicht beneidet wird! Wer einen Blinden sieht, bemitleidet ihn, aber keiner beneidet ihn" (τυφλὸν ἠλέησ' ἰδών τις, ἐφθόνησε δ' οὐδὲ εἷς, *VS* 23 B 34 DK). Ähnlich äußert sich Pindar: "Besser als Mitleid (Bedauern) ist der Neid" (κρέσσον γὰρ οἰκτιρμοῦ φθόνος, *Pyth.* 1, 85), man wird lieber beneidet als bemitleidet. Thales schließlich, den man zu den Sieben Weisen zählte, denen man gnomische Spruchweisheit zuschrieb (dies frühestens seit dem 4. Jahrh. v. Chr.), soll gesagt haben: "Erfahre eher Neid als Mitleid" (φθονοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκτίρου, *VS* 10, 4 [S. 64, 9] DK).

Die homerische Götterwelt lebt in der griechischen Tragödie des 5. Jahrh. fort, wenn auch vielfach mit neuer Akzentuierung. Gelegentlich treten Götter als Personen der Handlung auf. Dass sie von Mitleid mit den Menschen berührt würden, wird nirgends gesagt, auch nicht, wenn sie etwas zugunsten der Menschen tun. Häufig wirkt ihr Hass als treibende Kraft für die Handlung, vor allem bei Euripides, so der Hass Aphrodites im *Hippolytos*. Sophokles zeigt im Prolog der *Aias*-Tragödie, wie Athene in Gegenwart des Odysseus den in Wahnvorstellungen befangenen Aias erbarmungslos befragt und bloßstellt; er hatte die griechischen Anführer ermorden wollen, Athene aber hatte seinen Sinn verstört, so dass er die Herdentiere im Glauben, es seien seine menschlichen Feinde, folterte und

hinschlachtete. Am Ende dieser grausamen Szene äußert sich Odysseus, der ein geplantes Mordopfer des Aias war, tief erschüttert (121–133): "Ich habe Mitleid mit ihm, dem Unglücklichen, obwohl er mein Feind ist" (ἐποικτίρω δέ νιν δύστηνον ἔμπας, καίπερ ὄντα δυσμενῆ). Athene aber erwidert nur: Bedenke immer, dass du als Mensch dich nicht überhebst und kein Wort gegen die Götter sagst. Sind auch die Götter ohne Mitleid, so findet das Erbarmen unter Menschen in Tragödien wiederholt seinen Ausdruck. So fleht z. B. Philoktet im gleichnamigen Drama des Sophokles den jungen Neoptolemos um Hilfe und Mitleid an (501, 507): "Du rette mich, du habe Mitleid" (σὺ σῶσον, σύ μ' ἐλέησον) und der Chor stimmt zu: "Hab Erbarmen, Herr" (οἶκτιρ, ἄναξ). Bei Euripides rühmt in der *Taurischen Iphigenie* (345) die Titelheldin sich selber, dass sie immer voller Mitleid gewesen sei, φιλοικτίρμων ἀεί, und Menelaos jammert in der *Iphigenie in Aulis* (491 f.), dass er Iphigenie nicht retten konnte: "Vergeblich hatte ich Mitleid mit dem unglücklichen Mädchen" (ἄλλως τέ μ' ἔλεος τῆς ταλαιπώρου κόρης εἰσῆλθε). Götter aber lassen sich nicht von Mitleid bewegen. Als in den *Troerinnen* (57–86) Athene dem Poseidon eröffnet, sie wolle von jetzt ab gemeinsam mit ihm für Troja und gegen die Griechen agieren, fragt Poseidon: "Hast du nun Erbarmen mit der Stadt, da sie rußig ist vom Feuerbrand?" (νῦν ἐς οἶκτον ἦλθες;). Aber Athene fühlt kein Mitleid, sondern der Hass auf die Griechen treibt sie, die sie verletzt haben: "Den Troern, die mir bisher verhasst waren, will ich nun wohltun, dem Griechenheer aber eine bittere Heimkehr bereiten". Dafür braucht sie die Mitwirkung des Meeresgottes, der einen Seesturm entfesseln soll. In der Tragödie *Ion* bleibt die Athenerin Kreusa, die nach einer Vereinigung mit Apollon einen Sohn geboren und diesen ausgesetzt hatte, in völliger Ungewissheit über dessen Geschick; sie vermutet seinen Tod.[2] Apollon aber hatte – wovon sie nichts ahnte – das Kind gerettet und im Heiligtum von Delphi aufwachsen lassen. Er hat also für seinen Sohn gesorgt, doch zeigt er von Mitgefühl und Mitleid mit der trostlosen Mutter nicht die leiseste Spur. Bei deren späterem Orakel-Besuch in Delphi verursacht der Gott vielmehr neue Wirrnisse, die schließlich bis zu einem Mordanschlag Kreusas auf den Ion genannten jungen Tempeldiener, ihren unerkannten Sohn, führen. Zwar scheitert der Anschlag und es gibt endlich eine Wende zum Guten, Mutter und Sohn erkennen einander und kehren nach Athen zurück, wo Ion herrschen wird. Der Gott aber, der mit den Nöten Kreusas kein Erbarmen hatte, bleibt im Hintergrund; als Deus ex machina erscheint

[2] Zu Apollons Wirken vgl. den Prolog des Hermes, *Ion* 8–75, zur weiteren Handlung die ganze Tragödie.

nicht er am Ende der Tragödie (1553–1605), weil er den Tadel der Beteiligten fürchtet, sondern er sendet Athene, die alles Nötige erklärt.

Von Göttern solcher Art kann der Mensch wohl wenig erhoffen, auch wird er nicht um ihr Mitleid beten, wie es homerischen Menschen möglich war. In den Bedrängnissen der *Helena*-Tragödie (894–943; 1441–1450) wird die wissende Seherin Theonoe von Helena um Rettung und Hilfe angefleht, und diese gewährt ihren Beistand. Menelaos wendet sich an Zeus, aber er bittet nicht um Mitleid, sondern betont seine Ansprüche: "Zeus, du heißt Vater und weiser Gott; schaue auf uns und wende unser Unglück ... Genug haben wir gelitten ... Es steht mir doch zu, nicht immer im Unglück zu sein" (ὀφείλω δ' οὐκ ἀεὶ πράσσειν κακῶς). Göttliches Mitleid ist hier also nicht mehr vorstellbar, aber umso mehr ist das Mitempfinden unter Menschen wichtig. Dies bezeugen auch Aussagen in den Komödien des Aristophanes (*Acharn.* 705, *Pax* 400); ferner wird in den *Epitrepontes* (578 f.), einer Komödie Menanders, gesagt, ohne Mitleid sei man ein Barbar (βάρβαρος ἀνελεής). Schließlich erfahren wir auch, dass Mitleid, Ἔλεος, eine Gottheit sei: Der Komiker Timokles, ein Zeitgenosse Menanders, bezeichnet das Mitleid als eine "geziemende Gottheit" (ἐπιεικὴς θεός), freilich für die Toten (für die Lebenden nennt er den Neid!).[3] Obendrein berichtet Pausanias im 2. Jahrh. n. Chr. von einem Altar des Mitleids, Ἐλέου βωμός, auf der Agora zu Athen und erklärt, die Athener seien unter allen Griechen die einzigen, die diese Gottheit verehrten (1, 17, 1). Später erwähnt Libanios wiederholt das Mitleid, Ἔλεος, als einen Gott wie auch dessen Altar als einen Asylort.[4] Konnten die Menschen im Umfeld der traditionellen Religion nicht mehr auf göttliches Mitleid rechnen, so begegnet uns eine derartige Hoffnung bei einer gänzlich anderen religiösen Vorstellung und Todeserwartung: das Goldblättchen aus Hipponium, das in die Zeit um 400 v. Chr. datiert wird, lässt die Seele, die in den Hades gelangte, sagen, dass sie vor Durst vergehe und um Wasser bitte; sie erfährt: "Die Könige der Unterwelt erbarmen sich deiner und werden dir zu trinken geben" (καὶ δή τοι ἐλεοῦσιν[5] ὑποχθόνιοι βασιλεῦ[...). Offenbar sind Götter der Unterwelt gemeint.

---

[3] Timocles fr. 33 K.–A. (*PCG* VII [1989]); man vergleiche die Alternative Neid–Mitleid in den oben (S. 215) genannten Stellen.

[4] Libanios, *Declam.* 11, 35, 5 (ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐλεήσατε καὶ δείξατε πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὅτι τὸν Ἔλεον ὡς ἀληθῶς νενομίκατε θεόν); 15, 31, 9 etc.; zum Altar *ibid.* 13, 34, 3; 22, 10, 12 etc. Ferner wird der Altar erwähnt bei Diodor 13, 22, 7; Lukian, *Demonax* 57; Apollodor 2, 8, 1 (167); Philostrat, *Vitae soph.* 2, 12, 2 (593).

[5] Der Text zitiert nach G. Zuntz, "Die Goldlamelle von Hipponion", *WSt* 89 (1976) 132 f.; ähnlich bei R. Janko, "Forgetfulness in the Golden Tablets of Memory", *ClQ* N.S. 34 (1984) 99. Dagegen schreibt Chr. Riedweg, "Initiation-Tod-Unterwelt", in:

Wenden wir uns nun der Philosophie und primär Platon zu. Die erste Stelle, die zu nennen wäre, eine Aussage des Sokrates in der *Apologie*, weist dabei auf einen nicht-philosophischen Bereich, die Rhetorik. Der platonische Sokrates, der schon zu Beginn seiner Verteidigungsrede betont hatte, dass er kein gewandter Redner sei, statt dessen aber die Wahrheit sagen werde, distanziert sich später von dem Anschein, sein eigener Antrag auf ein Strafmaß, mit dem er die Athener provoziert hatte, betreffe das Erregen von Mitleid und Flehen (περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ ἀντιβολήσεως, 17 b – 18 a; 37 a 3 ff.). Dabei wird deutlich, dass eben dies, das Zielen auf Mitleid und das Anflehen der Richter, damals zur gewohnten Gerichtspraxis gehörte. Bereits aus Texten des 5. Jahrh. lässt sich dies illustrieren. Der Redner Gorgias zeigt in seiner *Rede auf Helena*, dass man diese Frau, die ihren Gatten Menelaos verließ, viel mehr bemitleiden als schmähen solle, und auch in seiner *Apologie für Palamedes* spricht er von Mitleid und Flehen (*VS* 82 B 11, 7 und 8; B 11 a 32 und 33 DK). Für den Redner Thrasymachos ist bezeugt, dass er eine Schrift *Über das Mitleid* verfasst und gelehrt habe, wie man die Richter zu Erbarmen und Mitleid bewegen könne (*VS* 85 B 5 und 6 DK). Platon selber nennt im *Phaidros* 272 a bei der Aufzählung dessen, wofür ein Redner den rechten Zeitpunkt kennen müsse, neben der "Kürze des Ausdrucks", βραχυλογία, und anderem auch die "Mitleid-erregende Rede", die ἐλεεινολογία (ein nur hier belegtes Wort).

Im gewohnten Sinn des mitmenschlichen Empfindens findet sich der Mitleids-Begriff bei Platon im *Phaidon*. Der Referent und Zeuge der letzten Lebensstunden des Sokrates beschreibt seine Verwunderung darüber, dass ihn gegenüber Sokrates kein Mitleid überkam (οὔτε ... με ... ἔλεος εἰσήει), und er begründet dies folgendermaßen: Dieser Mann erschien, in seiner Haltung wie in seinen Worten, von Glück erfüllt zu sein (εὐδαίμων), er war ohne Furcht und würdig und vermittelte die Gewissheit, sein Weg in den Tod geschehe nicht ohne eine göttliche Schickung (μηδὲ... ἄνευ θείας μοίρας). Am Ende freilich, als Sokrates den Giftbecher nahm, brachen alle Anwesenden in Tränen aus, und Sokrates musste sie zur Ruhe mahnen (58 e; 117 d).

Philosophisch äußert Platon sich zum Phänomen des Mitleids nur wenig. In den *Nomoi* XI, 936 b–c; 926 e legt er dar, dass Mitleid nicht verdiene, wer Hunger oder dergleichen erleide, sondern wer große menschliche Vorzüge besitze und dabei von schlimmem Geschick betroffen werde. In einem gut verwalteten Staatswesen müsse aber dafür gesorgt werden, dass

---

F. Graf (Hrsg.), *Ansichten griechischer Rituale* (Stuttgart–Leipzig 1998) 396 ἐρεοῦσιν (nach Lazzarini).

keiner in größte Not gerate und zum Bettler werde. Sollte dennoch einer sich mit Bettelei und ständigem Bitten das Lebensnotwendige zu verschaffen suchen, solle man ihn aus der Stadt vertreiben. Besondere Fürsorge aber sollten die Waisenkinder erhalten, damit ihr Unglück möglichst wenig Mitleid hervorrufe (ὡς ἥκιστα ἔλεον ἕξει τῆς συμφορᾶς).

Bei zwei anderen Erörterungen, ebenfalls in den *Nomoi*, spricht Platon von Mitleid und Hilfe, die den Menschen von göttlicher Seite zuteil werden. Im einen Fall handelt es sich um das Einwirken des persönlichen Schutzgeistes, des Daimon (*Leg.* IX, 877 a), den nach Platons Darstellung in der *Politeia* eine jede Seele sich im Jenseits vor ihrer neuen Inkarnation wählt und der ihr im Erdenleben beisteht (*Resp.* X, 617 e; 620 d). Über die Art dieses Beistands von Seiten des Daimon hat Platon sich nirgends sonst geäußert als in dieser Passage der *Nomoi*, und zwar in einem juristischen Kontext. Behandelt wird die Rechtslage, wenn ein geplanter Mord lediglich zu einer Verwundung des Opfers führt. Hier wird gefordert, man solle Rücksicht darauf nehmen, dass das Geschick des Täters es nicht so schlecht mit ihm gemeint und sein Daimon aus Mitleid mit ihm wie mit seinem Opfer das Schlimmste verhütet habe (ἐλεήσας ἀπότροπος αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο), nämlich dass er für das Opfer den Tod vermied, für den Täter aber, dass dieser von einem fluchbeladenen Geschick (des Mordes) und Unheil betroffen würde. Gegen ihn solle daher die Verbannung auf Lebenszeit, nicht aber der Tod verhängt werden, aus Dankbarkeit für den Daimon.

Gilt hier das Mitleid eines speziellen höheren Wesens einem einzelnen Menschen (oder zweien), so wird in anderem Zusammenhang das Mitleid der Götter generell mit den Menschen in ihrer mühevollen Lebenssituation erwähnt. Zu lesen ist, wiederum in den *Nomoi* (II, 653 c – 654 a):

> Die Götter erfasste Mitleid (θεοὶ δὲ οἰκτίραντες) mit dem von Mühen geplagten Menschengeschlecht, und darum setzten sie als Ruhepausen (ἀνάπαυλαι) zur Erholung die abwechslungsreiche Folge der Feste ein, welche die Menschen für die Götter begehen, und sie gaben ihnen die Musen und Apollon als den Musenführer und auch Dionysos für das Feiern der Feste, damit die Menschen wieder aufgerichtet und durch das Feste-Feiern mit den Göttern gebildet würden. ... So führten die Götter unsere Reigentänze an, ... und man kann feststellen, dass der Beginn unserer Bildung (παιδεία) durch Apollon und die Musen geschah.

Etwas später wird derselbe Gedanke bekräftigt (*Leg.* 665 a):

> Wir sagten, dass die Götter aus Mitleid mit uns (ἐλεοῦντες ἡμᾶς), als Helfer beim Chorreigen und Chorführer uns Apollon und die Musen gaben und dazu den Dionysos.

In deutlichem Anklang an gewisse homerische Aussagen handeln hier die Götter aus Mitleid zum Wohle der Menschen. Mag für uns eine leise Ironie in solchen Formulierungen aufscheinen,[6] so bleibt für Platon doch dies gültiger Ernst, dass unsere Weltordnung von göttlichem Wirken geprägt ist, was offenbar das Feiern der Feste einschließt.

Während Platon nirgends etwas darüber aussagt, was das Mitleid sei und wie es philosophisch einzuordnen wäre, finden wir bei Aristoteles Definitionen. Er äußert sich zum Phänomen des Mitleids in verschiedenen Themenbereichen, in der *Rhetorik*, der *Nikomachischen Ethik* und der *Poetik*. Auf die spezielle Problematik, wie Furcht und Mitleid, φόβος und ἔλεος, in der *Poetik* zu erklären seien, ist hier nicht einzugehen. Doch sei eine Definition aus der *Poetik* zitiert: das Mitleid betreffe den, der unverdientermaßen im Unglück ist (περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιόν ἐστι δυστυχοῦντα, *Poet.* 13, 1453 a 3). Ähnlich heißt es in der *Rhetorik*, das Mitleid sei ein Schmerz (λύπη) angesichts eines offenbaren Übels, das verderblich oder schmerzhaft ist und den trifft, der dies nicht verdient (II, 8, 1385 b 13 ff., vgl. II, 9, 1386 b 14 ff.). Für die Gerichtspraxis lehnt Aristoteles strikt ab (anders als die Redner des 5. Jahrh.), dass man Zorn, Neid oder Mitleid beim Richter hervorzurufen suche (*Rhet.* I, 1, 1354 a 25 f.). Wichtig ist, dass Aristoteles in der *Nikomachischen Ethik* das Mitleid neben verschiedenen seelischen Regungen wie Begierde, Zorn, Furcht, Kühnheit, Neid, Freude, Freundschaft, Hass, Verlangen, Eifersucht unter die Emotionen der Seele (πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς) einordnet (ähnlich ebenfalls in der *Rhetorik*).[7] Gelegentlich wird das Mitleid auch mit dem Verzeihen, συγγνώμη, verbunden, welches unverschuldeter Verfehlung gilt, und wir lesen ferner, dass ein Blinder (den schon Epicharm als Exempel gebrauchte), zu bemitleiden und nicht zu tadeln sei.[8] Schließlich sei noch eine Anekdote angeführt, die Diogenes Laertios zu Aristoteles überliefert (V, 17): "Als ihn jemand schalt, weil er einem schändlichen Menschen eine Gabe des Mitleids (ἐλεημοσύνη) schenkte, habe er erwidert: 'Mitleid hatte ich (ἠλέησα) nicht mit dem Charakter, sondern mit dem Menschen' ".

---

[6] Deutlich ironisch wird das Mitleid des Zeus im Aristophanes-Mythos *Symp.* 191 b 5 f. erwähnt: ἐλεήσας δὲ ὁ Ζεὺς ἄλλην μηχανὴν πορίζεται καὶ μετατίθησιν αὐτῶν τὰ αἰδοῖα εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν.

[7] Arist. *Nic. Eth.* II, 4, 1105 b 23 ff., vgl. II, 6, 1106 b 15 ff.; *Rhet.* I, 1, 1354 a 17 f., vgl. III, 19, 1419 b 25 ff. Vgl. dazu: D. Konstan, "La pitié comme émotion chez Aristote", *REG* 113 (2000) 616–630.

[8] Arist. *Nic. Eth.* III, 1, 1109 b 32 ff. und 1111 a 1 f.; III, 5, 1114 a 27 f.; zu Epicharm vgl. oben S. 215.

Bevor hier die weitere Entwicklung bei der Bewertung des Mitleids von Seiten der Philosophen, insbesondere der Stoiker, zu verfolgen ist, soll kurz etwas zu den Maximen und dem Verhalten Epikurs zu diesem Thema gesagt werden. Dafür sind wir allerdings auf den späteren Bericht des Diogenes Laertios angewiesen. Demnach gehörte es zu den ethischen Regeln Epikurs, dass man seine Diener nicht züchtigen, sondern ihnen Mitleid erweisen solle und den Rechtschaffenen unter ihnen auch verzeihen. Epikur selber erhält von seinem Referenten und Biographen Diogenes das höchste Lob für sein Wohlwollen (εὐγνωμοσύνη), seine Dankbarkeit gegenüber den Eltern, Wohltätigkeit für die Brüder, seine Milde (ἡμερότης) für die Diener und generell für seine mitmenschliche Haltung (φιλανθρωπία) zu allen Menschen (X, 118 sowie 9–10).

Wird das Mitleid philosophisch betrachtet, so sahen wir, dass es bei Aristoteles zu den Emotionen, πάθη der Seele zählt. Der griechische Begriff πάθος, hier mit 'Emotion' wiedergegeben, umfasst Verschiedenes, ebenso die rein passive Erfahrung wie das schmerzliche Erleiden und auch die heftige Leidenschaft. In der griechischen Psychologie wird dieser Bereich des Seelischen in Kontrast zu dem der Vernunft, zu λόγος und νοῦς, gesehen. Die Emotionen gehören zum vernunftlosen Teil der Seele, zum ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς, sie sind selber vernunftlos, ἄλογα, wie Aristoteles in der *Nikomachischen Ethik* betont (III, 3, 1111 b 1; IX, 1168 b 20), und erfahren damit eine Abwertung. Bereits Platon lehrt die Unterteilung der Seele in drei Teile: der Vernunft stehen die vernunftlosen Bereiche von Mut sowie Begierden gegenüber, die zu zügeln und zu beherrschen die Aufgabe der Vernunft ist. Bildhaft wird dies im Mythos des *Phaidros* 246 a ff. dargestellt: die Seele, so heißt es, sei zu vergleichen mit einem Gespann, dessen Lenker zwei ungleiche Pferde, ein folgsames (den Mut) und ein widerspenstiges (die Begierden) zu bändigen habe. Nach Platons Lehre sollen also die unvernünftigen Triebe in Schranken gehalten, beherrscht, aber nicht etwa eliminiert werden (was wohl die menschliche Natur überfordern dürfte). Hier setzt nun mit der Philosophie der Stoa eine veränderte Menschensicht und Zielvorstellung ein. Das Ideal für die Stoiker ist, dass der Mensch sich gänzlich den geistigen Kräften in sich zuwendet, da er nur darin die Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung finden und unabhängig werden kann von allem, was ihn von außen trifft und erregt. Darum soll er bestrebt sein, jegliche Emotionen, die πάθη, zu überwinden und den Zustand des völligen Unberührtseins, die ἀπάθεια, zu erlangen (die etwas anderes meint als unser Begriff der 'Apathie', nämlich absolute geistige Freiheit). Da die Stoiker nun, im Anschluss an Aristoteles, das Mitleid als Emotion verstanden, so mussten sie diese Regung ebenso wie Zorn oder Neid als etwas Negatives aus der Seele zu verbannen suchen.

Für die Lehren der ältesten Vertreter der stoischen Philosophie besitzen wir nur spätere Referate griechischer oder lateinischer Autoren, diese aber bezeugen deutlich, dass schon Zenon, der Begründer der stoischen Schule, das Mitleid zu den Lastern und Krankheiten rechnete (*inter vitia et morbos misericordiam ponit*) und meinte, dass niemand als nur ein Tor sich mitleidig verhalten könne.[9] Von Chrysipp wird berichtet, nach seiner Lehre gehöre das Mitleid wie auch Neid, Eifersucht und verschiedene Formen des Unangenehmen zum Komplex von λύπη, von Leiden und Schmerzen; dabei sei das Mitleid der Schmerz über einen, der unverdient zu leiden scheine[10] (wie dies ähnlich schon Aristoteles formuliert hatte[11]); ergänzend wird erklärt, ein jeder Schmerz sei ein Übel für die eigene Seele, von dem der philosophische Mensch, der sich mit Gott verbunden hat, unberührt bleiben werde (ὁ ... θεωρητικὸς ἀπαθὴς ἔσται).[12] Untangiert (ἀπαθής) zu sein, ist das zu erstrebende Ziel.

Von den späteren Stoikern, von Seneca und Epiktet, besitzen wir klare authentische Aussagen zu diesem Thema. So äußert Seneca, das Mitleid, das die meisten Menschen als Tugend betrachten, sei vielmehr ein Laster der Seele (*vitium animi*) und eine Krankheit (*aegritudo*), die besonders schwache Naturen wie alte Weiber und zu Tränen neigende Frauen betreffe, die noch von den Tränen der Missetäter gerührt würden. Ein weiser Mann wird daher nicht dieser Krankheit verfallen, weil sie ohne seelisches Leiden nicht möglich ist (*quia id sine miseria animi non fit*). Freilich bedeutet dies für Seneca nicht etwa mitmenschliche Verweigerung und Härte, denn er betont: Der Weise wird nicht Erbarmen zeigen, aber er wird den Tränen des anderen Hilfe bringen, ohne sich dessen Kummer anzuschließen; er wird ruhigen, unberührten Geistes bleiben (*tranquilla mente*) und ohne mitleidvolle Regung Beistand und Nutzen erweisen (*succurret, proderit*). Man leistet also Hilfe, bleibt dabei aber innerlich unberührt (*De clementia* II, 4, 4; 5, 1 und 4; 6, 1–4).

Epiktet, ein freigelassener Sklave und bedeutender stoischer Philosoph, lehnt ebenfalls das Mitleid ab und stellt es neben Zorn, Neid und andere aufwühlende Emotionen. So schreibt er, man solle keinen Groll empfinden, keinen Zorn, keinen Neid, kein Mitleid (*Diss.* III, 22, 13, vgl. II, 17, 26). Wer freilich der göttlichen Ordnung sich nicht einfüge, der möge nur als

---

[9] *SVF* I Zenon fr. 213 (Lactanz); 214 (Cicero); vgl. Dionysius Heracleota fr. 434.

[10] *SVF* III Chrysipp fr. 394 (Stob.), 412 (Diog. Laert.), 413 (Stob.), 414 (Andronikos); vgl. fr. 450–452, 641.

[11] Vgl. oben S. 220.

[12] *SVF* III Chrysipp fr. 416 (Nemesios).

Sklave und in Schmerz und Mitleid und generell in Unglück und Jammer existieren; aber, so fragt er: Wer möchte wohl in Schmerz und Angst leben, erfüllt von Neid, Mitleid und unstillbaren Begierden? Gewiss keiner (III, 24, 43; IV, 1, 4). Dem Umstand, dass man nicht gerne Mitleid erfährt, widmet er einen eigenen Traktat mit dem Titel: "Für jene, die bekümmert sind, weil man sie bemitleidet" (πρὸς τοὺς ἐπὶ τῷ ἐλεεῖσθαι ὀδυνωμένους, IV, 6); er gibt ihnen Ratschläge, wie sie sich darüber hinwegsetzenert und diejenigen verlachen, die sich mitleidig zeigen. Wie Seneca verweig er wohl das Mitleid, nicht aber die tätige Hilfe; er zitiert einen Ausspruch: "Hilfe wollte ich von dir haben, aber kein Erbarmen" (ἐγὼ βοηθῆναί τε ὑπὸ σοῦ ἤθελον, οὐχὶ ἐλεηθῆναι, I, 9, 28). Helfen also solle man, nicht aber sich vom Unglück anderer beunruhigen lassen. Epiktet schreibt:"Du bist nicht dazu da, gemeinsam mit anderen niedergedrückt und unglücklich zu sein (συνατυχεῖν), sondern mit ihnen glücklich zu sein (συνευτυχεῖν). Denn der Gott hat alle Menschen zum Glücklichsein, εὐδαιμονεῖν, geschaffen" (III, 24, 1–2; vgl. II, 16, 27). Und an anderer Stelle heißt es: wenn man jemanden in Kummer und Tränen sieht, soll man nicht zögern, ihm mit Worten beizustehen und, wenn es sich ergibt, auch mit ihm zu seufzen, aber man hüte sich davor, auch im Inneren zu seufzen (*Encheiridion* 16). Immer gilt als Ziel, die eigene Seele untangiert von äußeren Geschehnissen und von Emotionen, frei also auch vom Mitgefühl für die Not anderer zu bewahren. Hierbei wird vorausgesetzt, dass das Empfinden von Mitleid keine nur oberflächliche Regung ist, sondern eine die Seele aufwühlende Emotion, die den Menschen seiner Ruhe und inneren Balance beraubt.

Gegenüber dieser generellen Haltung der Stoiker zum Mitleid als zu vermeidender seelischer Störung bildet der Philosoph auf dem Kaiserthron, der Stoiker Mark Aurel, eine Ausnahme, indem er das Mitleid positiv einordnet. In seinen Selbstbetrachtungen kommt er (einmal nur) darauf zu sprechen; er schreibt (VII, 26): "Verfehlt sich jemand gegen dich, so bedenke, was er dabei als gut oder schlecht ansah; wenn du dies erkennst, wirst du ihn bemitleiden und weder dich wundern noch erzürnen ..., du musst ihm verzeihen" (ἐλεήσεις αὐτὸν καὶ οὔτε θαυμάσεις οὔτε ὀργισθήσῃ ... δεῖ οὖν συγγιγνώσκειν). Dieser Kaiser bekundet in seinen Texten immer erneut seine hohe Menschlichkeit.

Häufig hat man darauf hingewiesen, dass die Lehren Epiktets in mancher Hinsicht eine Nähe zum Christentum aufweisen; nach dem hier Dargelegten ist offenkundig, dass bezüglich des Mitleids und des inneren Engagements für andere Menschen der Abstand größer nicht sein könnte. Wie sehr im *Neuen Testament* das Mitleid, die Barmherzigkeit eine zentrale

Stelle einnehmen, bedarf keiner Erörterung und gehört auch nicht zum Thema dieser Abhandlung. Darum sollen nur wenige Angaben dazu folgen. Doch sei zuvor darauf hingewiesen, dass bereits Philon von Alexandria wiederholt vom Mitleid und speziell vom Mitleid und Erbarmen Gottes spricht. So sagt er (*De sacrific. Abr.* 42, nach einem Zitat von *Gen.* 33, 11): "Denn im Erbarmen Gottes ist alles begründet" (ἐν γὰρ τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐλέῳ τὰ πάντα ὥρμεῖ). In anderem Zusammenhang ist zu lesen, dass Gott sich des Menschengeschlechts erbarmte (ὁ θεὸς ... ἐλεήσας ἡμῶν τὸ γένος), weil er sah, dass es aus einer reichen Fülle von Übeln bestand; darum ließ er als Hilfe und Beistand für die Krankheiten der Seele die Tugend, die zur Erde gehört, hier verwurzelt sein als ein Abbild der himmlischen (*Leg. alleg.* I, 45). Ferner wird einmal, freilich in metaphorischem Sinn, ein "Altar des Mitleids" (ἐλέου βωμός) erwähnt (*De exsecrat.* 154).[13]

Im *Neuen Testament* (dessen Passagen hier in der Übersetzung Luthers zitiert werden) hören wir Christi Lehre in der Bergpredigt: "Selig sind die Barmherzigen, denn sie werden Barmherzigkeit erlangen" (μακάριοι οἱ ἐλεήμονες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἐλεηθήσονται, *Matth.* 5, 7). Dabei wird das Erweisen von Mitleid immer zugleich als tätige Hilfe und innere Anteilnahme verstanden. Im Gleichnis vom barmherzigen Samariter wird auf die Frage, wer für den Verwundeten der Nächste gewesen sei, geantwortet: "Der die Barmherzigkeit an ihm tat" (ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔλεος μετ' αὐτοῦ, *Luk.* 10, 37). Jenen aber, die kein Erbarmen üben, wird im *Jakobus-Brief* ein hartes Gericht angekündigt (*Jakob.* 2, 13). Jesus betont den Vorrang des Mitleids vor der Opferhandlung: "Ich habe Wohlgefallen an der Barmherzigkeit, nicht am Opfer", ἔλεον θέλω καὶ οὐ θυσίαν (wobei er auf eine Prophetenwort des Hosea zurückgreift: διότι ἔλεον θέλω ἢ θυσίαν, καὶ ἐπίγνωσιν Θεοῦ ἢ ὁλοκαυτώματα, *Matth.* 9, 13 und 12, 7; *Hosea* 6, 6). Vorbild für das menschliche Verhalten ist die Barmherzigkeit Gottes; Jesus mahnt: "Darum seid barmherzig, wie auch euer Vater barmherzig ist" (γίνεσθε οὖν οἰκτίρμονες, καθὼς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν οἰκτίρμων ἐστίν); und von Paulus wird Gott als der Vater der Barmherzigkeit (πατὴρ τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν) gepriesen (*Luk.* 6, 36; *2. Kor.* 1, 3). Auch spätere christliche Autoren heben die Bedeutung mitleidvollen Handelns hervor. Im *2. Clemensbrief* (um 150) heißt es: "Wir bekennen Gott in unseren Werken, dadurch dass wir einander lieben, dass wir beherrscht, erbarmungsvoll (ἐλεήμονες) und gut sind, und wir sollen miteinander füh-

[13] Zum Mitleid vgl. u. a. auch *Quod deus sit immut.* 75; *De somn.* I, 147; *Leg. ad Gaium* 367.

len (συμπάσχειν)"; etwas später wird die Barmherzigkeit als Reue gegenüber der Sünde und Erleichterung von dieser bezeichnet, ἐλεημοσύνη ὡς μετάνοια ἁμαρτίας (4, 3) und κούφισμα ἁμαρτίας (16, 4). Dass Liebe und Erbarmen zueinander gehören, liegt nahe; etwas sonderbar allerdings lautet die Erklärung in einer *Homilie* der Pseudo-Klementinen (verfasst nach einer Vorlage von ca. 250 im 4. Jahrh.), die Philanthropie sei mannweiblich, wobei ihr weiblicher Teil die Barmherzigkeit, ἐλεημοσύνη, der männliche aber die Liebe, ἀγάπη, sei (XII, 26, 6 Rehm). – Es ist verständlich, dass man von christlicher Seite den Abstand zu gewissen philosophischen Vorstellungen hervorhebt. So schreibt Clemens von Alexandria nach einem Zitat aus der Bergpredigt, das Mitleid sei nicht, wie manche Philosophen behaupten, der Schmerz über das Unglück anderer, vielmehr etwas menschlich Gutes, wobei er sich auf den Propheten Hosea beruft, der zur Barmherzigkeit mahne (*Strom.* IV, 38, 1–2; ferner II, 72, 1–2).[14] Auch Origenes argumentiert gegen die irrige Mitleids-Auffassung der Philosophen, die ἔλεος definieren als den Schmerz über das Missgeschick des Nächsten; noch heftiger wendet sich Lactanz gegen jene, welche das Mitleid aus dem Menschen auszutilgen versuchten und meinten, ein weiser Mann könne sich nicht erbarmungsvoll zeigen[15] (wie Seneca dies betont). Die Distanz zwischen Christentum und Stoa ist evident.

In den Jahrhunderten nach Christi Geburt war unter den philosophischen Richtungen der Griechen am bedeutendsten die der Platoniker. Auch wenn diese einige Vorstellungen mit den Stoikern teilten, so hielten sie sich doch bei zentralen Lehren strikt von deren Schule getrennt; dies gilt primär für die platonische Annahme einer transzendenten geistigen Welt und rein geistiger göttlicher Wesen, deren Existenz die Stoiker verneinten. Auch bezüglich des Mitleids vertraten jedenfalls die Philosophen des 1. und 2. Jahrh., die man als Mittelplatoniker bezeichnet, andere Positionen und lehnten das Ideal der völligen Emotions-Freiheit der Seele, der ἀπάθεια, ab. Plutarch erwähnt das Mitleid gelegentlich in verschiedenen Schriften und wertet es positiv. So lobt er die Athener dafür, dass sie sich zwar leicht zum Zorn bewegen, aber leicht auch zum Mitleid umstimmen ließen (*Praec. ger. reipubl.* 3, 799 C).[16] An anderer Stelle sagt er (*De virtute morali* 12, 451 E):

---

[14] Zu Hosea vgl. oben S. 224.

[15] Origenes, *Comm. in Ezech.* c. 8; Lactanz, *Div. Inst.* VI, 10–11 (beide Passagen *SVF* III Chrysipp fr. 451, 450).

[16] Zur Verehrung der Gottheit "Mitleid" in Athen vgl. oben S. 217.

> φιλίας δὲ φιλοστοργίαν ἢ φιλανθρωπίας ἔλεον ἢ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ συναλγεῖν εὐνοίας ἀληθινῆς οὐδὲ βουλόμενος ἄν τις ἀποσπάσειεν οὐδ' ἀποτήξειεν.
>
> Keiner könne, auch wenn er es wolle, von der Freundschaft die zärtliche Zuneigung oder von der Mitmenschlichkeit das Mitleid oder die Mitfreude und das Mitleiden vom wahren gegenseitigen Wohlwollen abtrennen oder abschmelzen.

Ferner wendet Plutarch sich gegen die Jagd, die nicht, wie bei gewissen Tieren, des Hungers wegen, sondern zum Vergnügen erfolge, denn sie bestärke jenes, was in der Menschennatur an Mörderischem und Tierischem angelegt sei; sie mache unerbittlich gegenüber dem Mitleid und schwäche weitgehend das Sanfte im Menschen. Und er fügt hinzu: darum hätten auch die Pythagoreer das milde Verhalten gegenüber den Tieren als Übung für die Menschlichkeit und für die Neigung zum Mitleid (φιλοίκτιρμον) aufgefasst (*De sollertia animalium* 2, 959 E–F). In der Trostschrift, die unter Plutarchs Namen überliefert ist, aber wohl von einem Imitator herrührt, soll einem Freund zum Tode von dessen Sohn philosophischer Trost gespendet werden. Darin distanziert sich der Verfasser klar von jenen, welche die grausame und harte Unberührtheit der Seele, die ἀπάθεια, preisen; diese sei außerhalb des uns Möglichen und Zuträglichen, denn sie entreißt uns das Wohlwollen für einander, das darin beruht, dass wir Freundschaft empfangen und erweisen. Gewiss solle man nicht über das Maß sich dem Schmerz hingeben, aber ein maßvolles Betroffensein vom Leiden, μετριοπάθεια, sei doch nicht zu verwerfen, bliebe man dagegen gänzlich unberührt, so wäre dies eher tierisch, θηριῶδες ([Plut.] *Consol. ad Apollonium* 3, 102 C–D). – Hier wird also das maßvolle Erschüttertsein gegen die nun negativ bewertete stoische Forderung der inneren Unberührbarkeit, der ἀπάθεια, gestellt als sinnvolle menschliche Reaktion.

Eine ähnliche Auffassung findet sich in dem Handbuch der platonischen Lehren, dem *Didaskalikos* des Alkinoos (2. Jahrh.). Hier werden drei Möglichkeiten des Verhaltens beim Tod der Eltern genannt: wer keinen Schmerz empfindet, ist unberührt, ἀπαθής, wer vor Schmerzen nahezu hinschwindet, leidet übertrieben und maßlos, wer aber den Schmerz mit Maßen erfährt, der leidet maßvoll, μετριοπαθής (*Did.* 30 [S. 184, 24–28 Hermann]). In derselben Schrift wird vom Mitleid gesagt, es gehöre unmittelbar zur Mitmenschlichkeit (ὁ δὲ ἔλεος οἰκεῖος φιλανθρωπίᾳ, 32 [S. 186, 19–22]).[17] So wird das Mitleid hier unbedingt positiv

[17] Diese Stelle wurde schon zu Beginn zitiert, vgl. oben S. 213.

gesehen wie ebenfalls das maßvolle Betroffensein von seelischen Schmerzen.

Aus der Phase des Mittelplatonismus sei noch eine Bemerkung aus einer Schrift des Maximos von Tyros angeführt, der kein Philosoph war, sondern ein umherreisender Redner, der in seinen Reden jedoch Themen der platonischen Philosophie behandelte. Er nimmt an, dass die Seele nach dem Tod im Jenseits zu einem Daimon geworden ist; in dieser gewandelten Existenzform empfindet sie Mitleid (οἰκτείρουσα) mit ihrem eigenen früheren Leben, aber auch mit den verwandten Seelen, die noch als Menschen auf Erden weilen, und sie möchte ihnen aus Menschenfreundlichkeit beistehen und sie, wenn sie straucheln, wieder aufrichten (*or.* 9, 6 [147 ff. Trapp]). Hier fühlt also ein höheres Wesen, ein Daimon, der einst als Mensch gelebt hat, Mitleid mit den inkarnierten Seelen und sucht ihnen zu helfen.

Vor dem Eingehen auf die Haltung neuplatonischer Philosophen zum Phänomen des Mitleids sollen kurz einige Passagen aus einer religiösen Lehre betrachtet werden, die viele platonische Elemente absorbiert hat und in ihren Texten aufweist, die aber auch manche Berührungen mit christlichen Vorstellungen zeigt. Gemeint ist die Hermetik, deren Schriften (die wir besitzen) zum großen Teil in die Periode des Mittelplatonismus gehören. Dabei spricht jeweils ein göttliches Wesen, häufig der Gott Hermes, der als Trismegistos, der dreifach Größte, benannt wird. Sein Gegenüber ist sein Sohn Tat oder ein anderer als Initiand aufzufassender Hörer. Im ersten Traktat des *Corpus Hermeticum*, dem *Poimandres*, eröffnet eine göttliche Instanz, die sich als Geist (Νοῦς) vorstellt, einem Menschen den Heilsweg; dieser göttliche Geist verspricht seinen Beistand den Guten, Reinen, Mitleidvollen (ἐλεήμοσι) und Frommen (*Corp. Herm.* I, 22 [S. 14, 13 f. N.–F.]). Wird hier das Mitleid beim frommen Menschen vorausgesetzt, so ist in einer anderen hermetischen Schrift das Mitleid Gottes (ἔλεος θεοῦ) im Sinne von Erbarmen und Gnade dominant. Da spricht Hermes zu seinem Sohn und erklärt: derjenige, dem das Erbarmen Gottes zuteil wird, erlebt die göttliche Schau, alle Schlechtigkeit entweicht von ihm und er erfährt die geistige Wiedergeburt. Hermes mahnt sein Gegenüber zum Schweigen, damit das Erbarmen von Gott her nicht ende. Schließlich verheißt Hermes: wer in der geistigen Wiedergeburt die Vergöttlichung durch das Erbarmen Gottes (ἔλεος) erlangt, werde sich selbst erkennen, aus welchen Kräften er besteht, und er werde von Freude erfüllt sein (*Corp. Herm.* XIII, 3 [S. 201, 15]; 7 [S. 203, 17 f.]; 8 [S. 203, 20]; 10 [S. 204, 23 ff.]). – In diesen beiden Texten ist das Mitleid bedeutsam einerseits für die menschliche Haltung, zum anderen aber für die Hilfe, die der Gott gnädig gewährt für den geistigen Aufstieg des Menschen, der dazu bereit und fähig ist.

Der herausragende Philosoph in der Entwicklung der späteren platonischen Philosophie ist Plotin, den wir als den Begründer des Neuplatonismus ansehen. Er stammte aus Ägypten und lehrte seit seinem 40. Lebensjahr in Rom. Zentral in seinem Denken ist die Frage, wie der Mensch, dessen Herkunft aus höheren geistigen Bereichen für ihn evident ist, sich dieser geistigen Welt auch in der Gebundenheit des Erdendaseins zuwenden, den inneren geistigen Aufstieg vollziehen könne, um als höchste Möglichkeit die Vereinigung mit Gott, das mystische Einswerden (ἕνωσις θεῷ), zu erreichen. Es ist verständlich, dass für eine solche Intention die absolute Konzentration auf das Geistige und das Freiwerden von allem, was die Seele stört oder aufwühlt, die Voraussetzung bildet. So mag es nicht verwundern, dass im Unterschied zu den Mittelplatonikern, die das Mitleid als menschliche Regung bejahen und die stoische Forderung des Unberührtseins ablehnen, Plotin seinerseits eben dieses Unberührtsein, die ἀπάθεια, als den wahren und höchsten Zustand der Seele versteht und mit aller Geisteskraft erstrebt. Der Begriff des Mitleids (ἔλεος) findet sich nur einmal in seinem umfangreichen Werk. Dabei stellt er das Mitleid neben Neid und Eifersucht und erklärt alle diese Emotionen für Laster (κακίαι). Man wird bei dieser krassen Formulierung an Seneca erinnert, der die *misericordia*, das Erbarmen, zu den *vitia*, Lastern zählt.[18] Für Plotin gilt es, die Seele rein zu halten von allem, was sie tangiert; nur wenn sie ganz bei sich selbst ist in geistiger Aktivität, ist sie frei von jeder Emotion, ἀπαθής, und erreicht die Angleichung an Gott, die ὁμοίωσις πρὸς τὸν θεόν, wie er in dem Traktat *Über die Tugenden* (I, 2 [19]) darlegt. Insofern erweist sich diese Wendung nach innen, zum Geist, auch als Tapferkeit, die sich im seelischen Unberührtsein, der ἀπάθεια, bekundet (I, 2 [19] 3, 11 Henry–Schwyzer [OCT]). Das Freisein von Emotionen impliziert, dass die Seele nicht – etwa bei Schmerzen – mitfühlt mit dem eigenen Körper, nicht ὁμοπαθής ist, aber auch mit sich selber nicht mitleidet, συμπάσχειν, wie auch dass sie die Furcht gänzlich austilgt, denn sie hat nichts zu fürchten, und ebenso die Begierden überwindet; sogar ihren vernunftlosen Teil, τὸ ἄλογον, wird sie reinigen. Auch die übrigen Tugenden der Seele beruhen darin, dass sie in ihrem Wirken vollkommen auf den Geist ausgerichtet ist und die Unberührbarkeit, ἀπάθεια, erlangt, indem sie nicht mit dem Geringeren, das in ihr als ihr "Mitbewohner" ist, mitempfindet (ἵνα μὴ συμπαθῇ τῷ χείρονι συνοίκῳ, 5, 5 ff. und 22 ff.; 6, 12–27).

---

[18] Plotin I, 1 [53] 10, 14; zu Seneca vgl. oben S. 222, ferner zu Zenon oben S. 222. – Zu Mitleid und Sympatheia bei Plotin vgl.: R. Ferwerda, "Pity in the Life and Thought of Plotinus", in: *Plotinus amid Gnostics and Christians*, ed. D. T. Runia (Amsterdam 1984) 53–72.

Wird hier gefordert, dass die geistig orientierte Seele nicht von den niederen Kräften in ihr selbst tangiert werden solle, so wendet Plotin sich in der Schrift *Über die Glückseligkeit* (*Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας* I, 4 [46]) generell dagegen, dass Schmerz und Leid die Seele berühren und den Zustand des Glückes mindern könnten. Er schreibt, der philosophische Mensch werde auch vom Tod seiner Verwandten und Freunde nicht berührt, denn er wisse ja, was der Tod ist; so könnten solche Betrübnisse nicht sein eigentliches Selbst treffen, sondern nur jenes in ihm, das ohne Vernunft sei (νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον). Glückselig könne demnach ein Mensch auch sein trotz schweren Krankheiten und Schicksalsschlägen, auch bei Zerstörung seiner Vaterstadt, selbst wenn er in Gefangenschaft gerät oder getötet wird (I, 4 [46] 4, 32 ff. und 5–7). Bemitleidenswert (ἐλεεινός) aber ist man auch nicht beim Erleiden äußerster Schmerzen, denn ein inneres Licht werde leuchten wie bei einer Lampe im Sturm. Jedoch bei den Leiden anderer Menschen mitzuempfinden, dies wäre nur eine Schwäche unserer Seele (ἀσθένεια ... ψυχῆς), was sich ja darin zeige, dass wir (so meint er) es gut finden, wenn wir von den Schmerzen anderer nichts erfahren oder wenn diese erst nach unserem Tode einträten, denn wir möchten von solchem Kummer verschont bleiben. Und wenn jemand behauptet, wir würden mit dem Unglück unserer Nächsten mitleiden (ὥστε ἀλγεῖν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν οἰκείων συμφοραῖς), so sei zu bedenken, dass dies nicht für alle Menschen gelte. Die Aufgabe der Tugend, ἀρετή, des Strebens nach Vollkommenheit aber sei es, das Gewöhnliche, generell Menschliche in unserer Natur (τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως) hinzuleiten zum Besseren und Edleren, im Unterschied zum Verhalten der Menge. So könne die Tugend die Seele dazu bringen, fast nicht erschütterbar und berührbar zu sein (ἀρετὴν ... δυσκίνητον καὶ δυσπαθῆ τὴν ψυχὴν παρέχουσαν, 8, 2–5 und 12–30).

Diese Aussagen klingen irritierend hart, nahezu inhuman. Gemeint ist aber durchaus nicht, dass der Mensch sich von seinem sozialen Umfeld abschotten und nur seinem eigenen Heilsweg zuwenden sollte, wie Plotin dies in seiner eigenen Lebenspraxis bewies. Wir erfahren von Porphyrios, der eine Biographie seines Lehrers Plotin verfasste, dass dieser in seinem Hause Waisenkinder aufnahm und deren Ausbildung wie die finanziellen Belange gewissenhaft überwachte, damit ihre Besitzungen unangetastet blieben. Auch das Amt eines Schiedsrichters hat er in Rom ausgeübt. Porphyrios schreibt: "Obwohl er so vielen Menschen in den Sorgen und Geschäften des Lebens hilfreich zur Seite stand, ließ er doch niemals, solange er wachte, in der auf den Geist gerichtete Anspannung nach". Offenbar vermochte er es, die konzentrierte geistige Aktivität, die außer in seinen kurzen Schlafphasen nie erlahmte, mit der Regelung alltäglicher Dinge

zu vereinen (Porph. *Vita Plotini* 9, 5–22; 8, 12–23 Henry–Schwyzer). Auch seine diffizile Menschenkenntnis hebt Porphyrios hervor, die ja eine innere Hinwendung zu anderen Menschen, auch deren Nöten, bedeutet. Sie hat sich nicht nur bei den Waisenkindern und dem Hausgesinde erwiesen, sondern bei Porphyrios selbst: Plotin erkannte dessen depressiven Zustand und legte ihm die Abreise von Rom nahe (11, 11–15). Ferner hatte Plotin die Gründung einer Stadt geplant, die Platonopolis heißen sollte und in der er mit seinen Schülern zu leben gedachte, was jedoch an fehlender kaiserlicher Unterstützung scheiterte (12, 3–12). Soziales Engagement, sogar politisches Wirken waren also dem Dasein dieses Philosophen keinesfalls fremd. – Schließlich ist noch hinzuzufügen, dass Plotin in seiner schweren Krankheit die Aufnahme auf dem Landgut eines Freundes und die nötige Hilfe und Betreuung erfahren durfte. Aber auch dort galten, wie überliefert wird, seine letzten Worte vor dem Tod allein dem seelischen Aufstieg des Menschen zum Göttlichen (2, 15–27).

Porphyrios scheint seinerseits keine ganz eindeutige Position zur Frage der Unberührbarkeit der Seele, der ἀπάθεια, vertreten zu haben. In den *Sententiae*, einer Schrift, die weitgehend die Gedanken Plotins wiedergibt, betont er die Bedeutung der Emotionslosigkeit, der ἀπάθεια, und wertet sie höher als die μετριοπάθεια, das maßvolle Betroffensein (7; 21; 32 passim), das die Mittelplatoniker als vernünftige menschliche Haltung betrachteten. Vielfach betont Porphyrios den Rang der Mitmenschlichkeit, φιλανθρωπία. In der Schrift *De abstinentia*, die für die fleischlose Ernährung und gegen das Töten von Tieren plädiert, wendet er sich, im Anschluss an Plutarch (dessen Ausführungen er benutzt und abwandelt) gegen die Grausamkeit, mit der man im Theater wie auf der Jagd Tiere tötet, wodurch das Mörderische und Tierische im Menschen gestärkt werde und insofern das Immunsein gegen das Mitleid (τὸ πρὸς οἶκτον ἀπαθές), und er lobt die Pythagoreer, die das milde Verhalten zu den Tieren als Übung für die Menschlichkeit und Mitleids-Bereitschaft ansahen, μελέτην … τοῦ φιλανθρώπου καὶ φιλοικτίρμονος, (*De abst.* III, 20, 7 [S. 211, 5–12 Nauck]).[19] Auch in seiner späten Schrift, dem *Brief an Markella*, hebt Porphyrios den Wert mitmenschlichen Verhaltens hervor. Seiner Frau, mit der ihn philosophisches Streben eng verbindet, rät er, sie möge den Dienern gegenüber nicht ungerecht sein, sie nicht bei Vergehen im Zorn strafen, sondern ihnen die Chance der Verteidigung geben. Auch möge sie viele Arbeit selber erledigen, denn man solle andere nicht unnötig belasten und sie nie nur zum

[19] Zu Plutarch vgl. oben S. 225 f.

eigenen Vergnügen in Anspruch nehmen; und den besten Dienern solle man auch Ehren erweisen. Die Grundlage der Frömmigkeit aber sei die Menschenliebe, die Mitmenschlichkeit (κρηπὶς εὐσεβείας ... φιλανθρωπία, *Ad Marcellam* c. 35).

Über den unterschiedlichen Mitleids-Lehren der Philosophen, die das Mitleid befürworten oder ablehnen, ist hier das Mitleid der Götter in den Hintergrund geraten. Es soll nun nochmals zur Sprache kommen, und zwar insofern es bei neuplatonischen Philosophen Erwähnung findet. Porphyrios spricht in der Schrift *An Nemertios* (fr. 280 Smith) davon, dass der Gott manche Menschen frühzeitig aus dem Leben herausnehme, einige aus Mitleid, ἐλεών, wegen künftiger heilloser Unglücksfälle, die er voraussieht. Jamblich, der zeitweise Schüler des Porphyrios war, benennt das göttliche Mitleid einmal in seiner Schrift, die unter dem Titel *De mysteriis* überliefert ist; sie behandelt religiöse Phänomene wie Kult, Gebet, Opfer und vor allem die Nähe des Menschen zum Göttlichen und den Aufstieg der Seele. Für diesen Seelenweg ist bei Jamblich ein Zusammenwirken von göttlichen Kräften und menschlich-geistigem Bemühen entscheidend. Als spezielle Weise dieses Ineinanderwirkens ist für ihn die Theurgie grundlegend wichtig, ein kultisch-geistiges Geschehen, das deutlich von Formen der Magie unterschieden wird. Denn es erfolgt dabei keine Beeinflussung der Götter etwa durch Zauber-Praktiken; vielmehr agieren die Götter allein von ihrem eigenen Willen her, wie Jamblich betont. Er schreibt: Die Götter und andere den Menschen weit überlegene Wesen schenken aus der Fülle ihrer Güter den Reinen, Heiligen durch ihr Wohlwollen, εὐμένεια, was diesen gebührt, da sie, die Götter, sich der Mühen erbarmen, οἰκτείροντες, die den Priestern (den Theurgen) obliegen (*De myst.* IV, 1 [181, 8–13 De Places]). – Sind es hier die Mühen, πόνοι, herausragender Menschen im religiösen Geschehen, denen das Mitleid der Götter zuteil wird, so sind es in zwei Texten anderer Autoren generell die Mühen der Menschen, die apostrophiert werden, und zwar in deutlichem Rückgriff auf die Aussage Platons in den *Nomoi*, nach welcher die Götter aus Mitleid für die Menschen die Feste eingerichtet haben.[20] Kaiser Julian, wegen seines Abfalls vom Christentum der Abtrünnige, Apostata genannt, war ein Verehrer Jamblichs und in neuplatonischer Philosophie hochgebildet. Unter seinen zahlreichen Schriften findet sich eine hymnische Preisrede auf den König Helios, den Sonnengott. Darin beruft sich Julian auf Platons Bemerkung, dass die Götter für uns die Feste begründet haben, referiert sie teilweise,

[20] Zu Platon vgl. oben S. 219 f.

dass nämlich die Götter aus Mitleid mit unserem mühebeladenen Geschlecht uns den Dionysos und die Musen schenkten, er fügt aber hinzu: Für uns (d. h. für Julian) hat sich ergeben, dass Helios für sie gemeinsam ihr Führer ist, gefeiert als der Vater des Dionysos, als Anführer der Musen und als Mitregent Apollons (Julian, *Or.* XI [IV] c. 38 [152 CD] Lacombrade). – Hier kombiniert Julian mit der Platon-Reminiszenz seine eigene Vorstellung einer Sonnen-Theologie, nach der Helios einen überragenden Rang einnimmt.

Abschließend soll nun um ein Jahrhundert zurückgegangen und noch einmal Plotin zitiert werden, der ebenfalls diese Platon-Passage aufgreift, zugleich aber noch weiter in die Vergangenheit bis zu Homer schaut und das Mitleid nicht der Götter, sondern des Zeus anführt (wie in der *Ilias*).[21] In Plotins Philosophie steht der Name des Zeus wiederholt für die hohe göttliche Instanz, die unsere Welt ordnet und lenkt. Dem Platon-Text verleiht Plotin nun eine überraschende neue Deutung; er schreibt: Der Vater Zeus hatte Mitleid mit den mühebeladenen Wesen, den inkarnierten Seelen, und darum machte er ihre Fesseln, die ihnen Mühen bereiten – dies sind die Körper – sterblich; so gab er ihnen Ruhepausen, indem er sie, die Seelen, von Zeit zu Zeit frei sein ließ von ihren Körpern, damit sie immer wieder (zwischen den Inkarnationen) im Jenseits weilen können, wo die Weltseele sich ewig befindet (IV 3 [27] 12, 8–12 Henry–Schwyzer [OCT]):

> Ζεὺς δὲ πατὴρ ἐλεήσας πονουμένας θνητὰ αὐτῶν τὰ δεσμὰ ποιῶν, περὶ ἃ πονοῦνται, δίδωσιν ἀναπαύλας ἐν χρόνοις ποιῶν σωμάτων ἐλευθέρας, ἵν' ἔχοιεν ἐκεῖ καὶ αὖται γίνεσθαι, οὗπερ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴ ἀεὶ οὐδὲν τὰ τῇδε ἐπιστρεφομένη.

Von den Ruhepausen, ἀνάπαυλαι, spricht Plotin ebenso wie Platon;[22] dienen die Pausen bei Platon den Menschen im Erdenleben zur Erholung bei den Festen, so bedeuten sie für Plotin die absolute Ruhezeit im Freisein der Seelen vom körperlichen Dasein, freilich nur bis zur neuerlichen Verkörperung (sonst wären dies keine Pausen). – So endet der Bogen dieser Betrachtung über das Mitleid, der bei Homer begann und über verschiedene Stufen bis zu Plotin führte, bei einer gewandelten Möglichkeit, die Welt

---

[21] Zu Homers Mitleid des Zeus vgl. oben S. 214 f.

[22] Plotin, *ibid.* Z. 10; Platon, *Leg.* II, 653 d 2 (vgl. oben S. 219). – Ferwerda (o. A. 18) 66 irrt, wenn er meint, Plotin beziehe sich hier auf Plat. *Symp.* 191 b (zur Stelle s. Anm. 6). Plotins Aussage ist eindeutig eine intendierte Abwandlung der *Nomoi*-Passage, welche Ferwerda gar nicht erwähnt.

und das Menschendasein zu verstehen. Hatte in der *Ilias* Zeus aus Mitleid bedacht, ob er einen Menschen, seinen Sohn Sarpedon, vom Tod, dem Weg in das Dunkel des Hades, erretten könnte (was nicht gelang), so erweist sich für Plotin das göttliche Erbarmen darin, dass wir sterben dürfen, denn der Tod bedeutet hier die Befreiung von den Bedrängnissen der Erdenexistenz, er ist der Durchgang zum wahren Leben und Licht.

Karin Alt
Freie Universität Berlin

Сострадание как сочувствие и действенная помощь, оказываемая людьми друг другу, оценивалось античной традицией в целом положительно, однако есть и особенности, проявляющиеся в позиции некоторых философов, а кроме того – в отношении богов к людям, как их изображают поэты или философы.

Если в гомеровском эпосе боги могут сочувствовать людям и из сострадания помогать им, то в греческой трагедии подобные порывы обитателям Олимпа чужды; тем важнее сострадание и взаимная поддержка между людьми. В некоторых (преимущественно поздних) текстах речь идет о божестве Ἔλεος, упоминается даже его алтарь. В риторике V в. до н. э. вызвать сострадание – обычная цель судебного красноречия, но Сократ у Платона и позже Аристотель не приемлют эту практику.

Кто заслуживает сострадания в глазах философов? Для Платона это те, кто, несмотря на свои достойные качества, попали в беду, а также дети-сироты. В "Законах" Платон говорит о сострадании как божественной функции. В одном случае его воплощает даймон, личный дух-защитник, спасающий человека от злой судьбы (задуманное убийство приводит лишь к ранению жертвы). В другом месте Платон говорит, что боги из сострадания к тяжелой жизни людей для передышки устроили им праздники и поручили их Музам, Аполлону и Дионису. Определение сострадания впервые дает Аристотель: его вызывает тот, кто незаслуженно попал в беду, а относится оно – наряду с вожделением, гневом, завистью – к эмоциям (πάθη) души. Об Эпикуре традиция сообщает (в изложении Диогена Лаэрция), что он положительно оценивал сострадание. Для стоиков, как и для Аристотеля, сострадание принадлежит к эмоциям; но так как они считали высшей целью невозмутимость (ἀπάθεια), то сострадание, как порок и болезнь души, ими осуждалось. Так полагали Зенон, Хрисипп, Сенека, Эпиктет; исключение являет собой только Марк Аврелий, позитивно оценивающий сострадание. У христиан, в противоположность стоикам, сострадание и жалость как между людьми, так и со стороны бога имеют решающее значение; в подобном духе высказывался уже Филон Александрийский. Такие философы-платоники I–II вв., как Плутарх

и Алкиной, одобряют сострадание как естественное чувство по отношению к ближнему. Напротив, неоплатоник Плотин (как и стоики) видит в нем беспокойство души, ведь каждая эмоция мешает людям достичь основной для Плотина цели – всецело обратиться к духовному, вплоть до слияния с богом. Несмотря на подобный ригоризм, в жизни Плотин с готовностью помогал ближним и брался за общественные и политические задачи. Его ученик Порфирий в своих сочинениях частично примыкает к позиции Плотина, но чаще отмечает, что гуманное, сострадательное поведение неотделимо от человеческой природы.

В заключение рассматривается божественное сострадание в трактовке некоторых философов-неоплатоников. Помимо Порфирия и Ямвлиха интересны прежде всего Юлиан и Плотин: оба они опираются на высказывание Платона в "Законах", что боги основали для нас праздники как целительную передышку. Юлиан придает этому месту новое звучание, причисляя к богам Гелиоса, который важен для его теологических воззрений. Плотин же перетолковывает платоновский пассаж совершенно по-другому: как он пишет, Зевс из сострадания дал людям – воплотившимся душам – смертные тела, чтобы они в потустороннем мире (между инкарнациями) могли отдохнуть от тягостного пребывания на Земле. Смерть здесь – не путь во тьму Аида, как у Гомера, а переход к жизни и свету.

NAUKRATIS REVISITED

The last three decades have seen the publication of a number of key studies on Naukratis (Kom Ge'if), the earliest known Greek colony in Egypt. Foremost are the reports of the surveys and excavations carried out at Naukratis during 1977–1978 and in three seasons between 1980 and 1982.[1] In a special volume of the series Venit has brought together all the painted Greek pottery from the site in Egyptian museums.[2] No less important are the recent papers by Bowden on the shrines and pottery dating,[3] the new discussion by Gorton of the scarabs,[4] the volume by Möller on Naukratis as a trading centre[5] and the proceedings of a conference held in 1999.[6]

Inevitably, though to differing degrees, these studies touch on the long-standing and tangled question of chronology – one that arose almost as soon as Petrie discovered the site in 1884. The main difficulty has always been to reconcile the literary evidence for the early history of Naukratis (principally Herodotus) with the results of excavation. While most archaeologists since Petrie have tended to date the earliest Greek pottery at the site to the mid or late 7th century BC, Herodotus stated that Naukratis was given to the Greeks as a trading colony by Pharaoh Amasis, whose reign began in 570 BC. This raises a clear philosophical dilemma, neatly characterised by Bowden: should the pottery dating correct Herodotus, or Herodotus correct the pottery dating? The present article will review the problem and place it in the wider context of an ongoing debate over Archaic Greek chronology.

---

[1] A. Leonard, *Ancient Naukratis: Excavations at a Greek Emporium in Egypt. Part I: The Excavations at Kom Ge'if* (Atlanta, GA 1997); W. D. E. Coulson, *Ancient Naukratis II: The Survey at Naukratis and Environs. Part I: The Survey at Naukratis* (Oxford 1996); A. Leonard, *Ancient Naukratis: Excavations at a Greek Emporium in Egypt. Part II: The Excavations at Kom Hadid* (Boston, MA 2001).

[2] M. S. Venit, *Greek Painted Pottery from Naukratis in Egyptian Museums* (Winona Lake 1988).

[3] H. Bowden, "The Chronology of Greek Painted Pottery: Some Observations", *Hephaistos* 10 (1991) 49–59; idem, "The Greek Settlement and Sanctuaries at Naukratis: Herodotus and Archaeology", in: M. H. Hansen, K. Raaflaub (eds.), *More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis* (Stuttgart 1996) 17–38.

[4] A. F. Gorton, *Egyptian and Egyptianising Scarabs* (Oxford 1996) esp. 91–131, 177–180.

[5] A. Möller, *Naukratis: Trade in Archaic Greece* (Oxford 2000).

[6] U. Höckmann, D. Kreikenbom (eds.), *Naukratis. Die Beziehungen zu Ostgriechenland, Ägypten und Zypern in archaischer Zeit: Akten der Table Ronde in Mainz 2.–27. November 1999* (Möhnesee 2001).

HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

After his excavations of 1884–1885, Petrie offered a date of c. 650 BC for the origin of the Greek settlement at the site.[7] It was not long before Hirschfeld raised the obvious objection that this conflicted with the testimony of Herodotus (2. 178):

> Φιλέλλην δὲ γενόμενος ὁ Ἄμασις ἄλλα τε ἐς Ἑλλήνων μετεξετέρους ἀπεδέξατο καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖσι ἀπικνεομένοισι ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἔδωκε Ναύκρατιν πόλιν ἐνοικῆσαι· τοῖσι δὲ μὴ βουλομένοισι αὐτῶν ἐνοικέειν, αὐτόσε δὲ ναυτιλλομένοισι ἔδωκε χώρους ἐνιδρύσασθαι βωμοὺς καὶ τεμένεα θεοῖσι. Τὸ μέν νυν μέγιστον αὐτῶν τέμενος καὶ ὀνομαστότατον ἐὸν καὶ χρησιμώτατον, καλεόμενον δὲ Ἑλλήνιον, αἵδε πόλιές εἰσι αἱ ἱδρυμέναι κοινῇ· Ἰώνων μὲν Χίος καὶ Τέως καὶ Φώκαια καὶ Κλαζομεναί, Δωριέων δὲ Ῥόδος καὶ Κνίδος καὶ Ἁλικαρνησσὸς καὶ Φάσηλις, Αἰολέων δὲ ἡ Μυτιληναίων μούνη. Τουτέων μέν ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ τέμενος, καὶ προστάτας τοῦ ἐμπορίου αὗται αἱ πόλιές εἰσι αἱ παρέχουσαι· ὅσαι δὲ ἄλλαι πόλιες μεταποιεῦνται, οὐδέν σφι μετεὸν μεταποιεῦνται. Χωρὶς δὲ Αἰγινῆται ἐπὶ ἑωυτῶν ἱδρύσαντο τέμενος Διός, καὶ ἄλλο Σάμιοι Ἥρης, καὶ Μιλήσιοι Ἀπόλλωνος.
>
> Amasis became a lover of the Greeks, and besides other services which he did to some of them he gave those who came to Egypt the city of Naucratis to dwell in, and to those who voyaged to the country without desire to settle there he gave lands where they might set altars and make holy places for their gods. Of these the greatest and most famous and most visited precinct is that which is called the Hellenion, founded jointly by the Ionian cities of Chios, Teos, Phocaea, and Clazomenae, the Dorian cities of Rhodes, Cnidus, Halicarnassus, and Phaselis, and one Aeolian city, Mytilene. It is to these that the precinct belongs, and these are they that appoint wardens of the port; if any other claim rights therein they have no part or lot. The Aeginetans made a precinct of their own, sacred to Zeus; and so did the Samians for Here and the Milesians for Apollo.

Hirschfeld argued that this passage gives us a firm *terminus post quem* of 570 BC for the Greek settlement at Naukratis.[8] Petrie left the job of replying to his successor Gardner, who directed work at the site during 1885–1886. Gardner's reply largely concentrated on a stratigraphical question concerning the "Scarab Factory" identified by Petrie, to which we will return later. In Gardner's opinion it provided "indisputable evidence" that the Greek colony was founded before the reign of

---

[7] W. M. F. Petrie, *Naukratis I* (London 1886).

[8] G. Hirschfeld, "Die Gründung von Naukratis", *RhM* 42 (1887) 209–225.

Amasis.[9] Yet the subsequent excavations of Hogarth and colleagues [10] were to raise serious questions about the "indisputable" evidence from the Scarab Factory and Petrie's wider understanding of the site. Indeed, Hogarth preferred a Herodotean date (post 570 BC) for the founding of the colony.

After Hogarth, excavation ceased for over seventy years, during which research "moved into the library".[11] From a study of the Greek pottery Prinz concluded that the colony did indeed date to the 7th century BC.[12] Later Price studied the individual ceramic types, classifying them by provenance, and concluded that "the general consensus of archaeological opinion... had completely veered round in favour of a seventh century dating, that one authority now differs from another only in putting the date in the third or fourth quarter of the century".[13]

However, the next major study, that of Swedish archaeologist Gjerstad, took a very different approach, eschewing the alleged consensus as both premature and dependent on circular reasoning.[14] Gjerstad proceeded with a detailed analysis of the *only* part of the site where Petrie had left a detailed record, including a section diagram (rare in the 19th century). This was a pit (actually *favissa*) discovered by Petrie in the *temenos* of the Apollo temple in the northern (Greek) part. It was filled with broken pottery and other objects which had been periodically cleared out of the temple; as votive gifts they required burial on hallowed ground to avoid desecration. The finds formed strata separated by layers of sand (either deliberate burial or natural accumulation) or building debris from the temple. Gjerstad painstakingly collated every scrap of information given by Petrie in order to interpret the stratigraphy within the pit. This done, he translated Petrie's pottery descriptions into contemporary terminology and came up with a significant result. The ceramic sequence matched that known from elsewhere in the Greek world, reassuring Gjerstad that he had correctly interpreted the stratigraphy. The finds from the pit could also be correlated with the remains of the temple itself, as described by Petrie.

---

[9] E. A. Gardner, *Naukratis II* (London 1888) 70–73.

[10] D. G. Hogarth, "Excavations at Naukratis", *BSA* 5 (1898–99) 26–97; D. G. Hogarth, H. L. Lorimer, C. C. Edgar, "Naukratis 1903", *JHS* 25 (1905) 105–136.

[11] See the lucid summary of earlier work in Leonard (n. 1, 1997) 17–19.

[12] H. Prinz, *Funde aus Naukratis: Beiträge zur Archäologie und Wirtschaftsgeschichte des 7. und 6. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. Geb.* (Leipzig 1908) 37 f.

[13] E. Price, "Pottery of Naucratis", *JHS* 44 (1924) 180–222, esp. 181; cf. M. Kerschner, "Perspektiven der Keramikforschung in Naukratis 75 Jahre nach Elinor Price", in: Höckmann, Kreikenbom (n. 6) 69–94.

[14] E. Gjerstad, "Studies in Archaic Greek Chronology. I. Naukratis", *Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology* 21 (1934) 67–84, esp. 67.

Gjerstad's interpretation – involving a sequence of four temple buildings instead of two – was different from that of Petrie, and appeared to resolve a number of anomalies in his model. Finally, Gjerstad assigned dates to the sequence by using the sculptural and architectural remains from the pit and temple. Thus, for example it seemed that the fragments of Apollo temple IV were no earlier than about 520 BC, postdating the Persian invasion of Egypt in 525 BC. The beginning of Apollo temple I could be dated by a Cypriot head found at the very bottom of the pit. Gjerstad dated it no earlier than 570 BC, basing this on his excavation of the stratified layers of sculptures found in the temple of Ajia Irini, Cyprus. The dating was supported by a Greek capital from Apollo temple I which belonged stylistically to "about the middle of the sixth century BC".[15] Gjerstad concluded that while a date of 600 BC was possible, the Apollo I temple had most likely been constructed c. 570 BC. As it was built on clean mud and associated with the earliest stratified pottery styles from the site, he saw nothing to conflict with the Herodotean date for the founding of the colony. By implication some of the widely accepted dates for Archaic pottery were too high – a conclusion which did not worry Gjerstad as his own researches on Cyprus and elsewhere were leading him in a similar direction.[16]

Despite their elegance, Gjerstad's arguments fell largely on deaf ears. Cook briefly dismissed Petrie's data from the Apollo *temenos* as "unsatisfactory", and Gjerstad's conclusions as therefore "suspect".[17] On the grounds that some sherds occurred "too late" in the stratification (by his own reckoning), Cook concluded: "If Gjerstad is right in his interpretation of Petrie's classes – and he would seem to be right – the strata of the Apollo site must have been seriously disturbed". Cook's own view, based on his dating of the Greek pottery from other sites, was that the Greeks settled Naukratis in the late 7th century and that the Herodotean date was thus wrong.

In 1951 Egyptologist von Bissing made his own survey of the relevant authorities regarding the architectural remains from Greek Naukratis. His conclusion (in broad agreement with Gjerstad) was that none need be earlier that the 6th century BC. He also added a new dimension to the controversy – against Petrie, von Bissing could find no clear scarab evidence at the site for any Pharaoh earlier that Psammetichus II (595–

---

[15] Gjerstad, *op. cit.*, 82, 77.

[16] See e. g. idem, "Studies in Archaic Greek Chronology. II. Ephesus", *Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology* 24 (1937) 15–34.

[17] R. M. Cook, "Fikellura Pottery", *BSA* 34 (1933/34) 1–98, esp. 86 n. 2.

589 BC).[18] He concluded that Naukratis had been founded in the reign of this Pharaoh, a date midway between the positions of Gjerstad (c. 570 BC) and Cook (late 7th century BC).

Gjerstad returned to the fray in 1959, augmenting his original arguments. He also provided a detailed rebuttal of Cook's position regarding the stratigraphic evidence from the Apollo temple, fully answering his claim that "no stratification is possible".[19] And there remained an overriding point unexplained by Cook. If the site had been "seriously disturbed" it would have been impossible for Gjerstad to produce a scheme matching the known succession of Greek pottery styles. Cook himself admitted that Gjerstad's analysis of Petrie's pottery types was correct, even accepting some of the dates arrived at.[20] Leonard acknowledges the brilliance of Gjerstad's synthesis,[21] yet unfortunately he – and most other scholars since – have overlooked the importance of Gjerstad's detailed response to Cook.[22]

At this point we need to ask why there was such reluctance to accept the apparently straightforward case offered by Hirschfeld, Hogarth and Gjerstad, and why there was such eagerness by others (Gardner, Prinz, Price, Cook) to prefer a 7th-century date? Setting aside for the moment Petrie's alleged evidence from the Scarab Factory, some brief observations on the early development of Archaic chronology need to be made.

First, around the turn of the 19th-20th centuries the dating of Greek pottery was very much in its infancy. Understandably, this period also saw the halcyon days of a tendency to which archaeologists are often prone – to exaggerate the antiquity of their discoveries. It is conspicuous in Petrie's writings on Naukratis, which are replete with phrases such as "the oldest", the "earliest Greek", etc. The Greek settlements at Naukratis (650 BC) and Daphnae (which he set even earlier, at 665 BC) were heralded by him as the first of a series of "steps" (provided by Egyptian evidence) which ultimately demonstrated the great age of Mycenaean civilization.[23] Similarly, the

---

[18] F. W. von Bissing, "Naukratis", *Bulletin de la Société Royale d'Archéologie d'Alexandrie* 39 (1951) 32–82, esp. 65–66.

[19] E. Gjerstad, "Naukratis Again", *Acta Archaeologica* 30 (1959) 147–165, esp. 156–157.

[20] Cook (n. 17): "The Fikellura he dates after 550 BC: this may well be true".

[21] Leonard (n. 1, 1997) 33 n. 42.

[22] See the rather negative view of the Apollo temple stratigraphy *ibid.* 32–33 n. 40 and Möller (n. 5) 90–92.

[23] W. M. F. Petrie, "The Egyptian Bases of Greek History", *JHS* 11 (1890) 271–277, esp. 271–273; for the 19th-century debate on the dating the Mycenaeans see

chronology then available for the East Greek sherds from Naukratis (as discussed by Prinz and Price) was largely a matter of guesswork, also with a tendency towards high dates.[24]

A new stage came with the advent of a more methodical chronology for the Archaic. Its erstwhile chaotic state was brought into order, principally, by two classic studies – Beazley's work on Black-figure and Red-figure styles and more importantly here, Payne's definitive study in 1931 of the classification of Protocorinthian and Corinthian. To provide fixed points for his relative chronology Payne drew on the evidence from the Greek colonies on Sicily. Their foundation dates could be calculated from information given by Thucydides, and their earliest Greek pottery dated accordingly. Thus Payne set the beginnings of Protocorinthian in the last decades of the 8th century, mainly from the evidence of Syracuse and Megara Hyblaea. The chronology of the Protocorinthian/Corinthian transition, however, was a much disputed point, with some scholars arguing a date c. 580 BC. Payne refuted this by reference to Selinus, whose foundation Thucydides gave as 628 BC.[25] As Protocorinthian was absent from the site, but Early Corinthian well represented, Payne set the transition between these styles c. 625 BC, where it has effectively remained ever since.

Payne used Naukratis to control the conclusions derived from Selinus. Though he felt that the "exact date of the foundation of Naukratis is doubtful", he assumed (as "is now generally recognised") that the earliest Rhodian vessels from the site date to the late 7th century BC. Noting the absence of Protocorinthian, and the occurrence of a few Early Corinthian pieces, he took this as confirmation of his chronology, with the transition from Protocorinthian to Corinthian complete by c. 625 BC.[26] This led to a major reduction to Petrie's date for the colony. Largely through the agency of Cook, Payne's chronology came to provide the modern, conventional dating for the arrival of the Greeks at Naukratis, c. 615/610 BC.[27] It was still too high, of course, for the Herodotean date – as stressed by Gjerstad. He was confident that if other means than the Greek pottery could establish its foundation

conveniently P. James, I. J. Thorpe, N. Kokkinos, R. Morkot, J. Frankish, *Centuries of Darkness* (London 1991) 15–17, 93–94.

[24] R. M. Cook, *Greek Painted Pottery* (London ³1997) 296: "...by a series of prejudiced errors the chronology of East Greek was set some thirty to forty years too high..."

[25] H. Payne, *Necrocorinthia* (Oxford 1931) 4, 22–23.

[26] *Ibid.*, 25, 32, 56.

[27] R. M. Cook, "Amasis and the Greeks in Egypt", *JHS* 57 (1937) 227–237; cf. J. Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas* (Harmondsworth ¹1964) 138.

date, then Naukratis would provide "a fixed point for dating that pottery. There are such means: literary sources, the date of the Cypriote sculptures found in Naukratis and epigraphical evidence".[28] Since Naukratis was founded, in his opinion, no earlier than c. 570 BC, he concluded that the conventional dates for Early Corinthian (c. 625–600 BC) were "somewhat too high", drawing attention to Payne's own admission that the lower limit might be reduced to c. 590 BC.[29] He ended with the promise of a further study on the dating of Corinthian pottery – unfortunately unrealised. Gjerstad was already preoccupied with the chronological problems regarding the foundation of another city – Rome.[30] The main champion of a low dating for Naukratis had moved on, and by default the Payne/Cook model became the norm.

Nevertheless, the problem of Naukratis has stubbornly refused to "go away". Recently it has received increasing mention in the literature.[31] Its return to the limelight is largely due to the challenge to the conventional Archaic chronology initiated by Francis and Vickers.[32] In a series of articles they challenged the prevailing archaeological chronology of the 8th to 5th centuries BC, offering reductions (at points) as great as 80 years. It is fair to say that their overall proposals are generally considered too extreme. Nevertheless, their critical forays have played a key role in prompting a wider review of the foundations of Greek Iron Age chronology.

For most of the 20th century it was thought that the chronology of the western colonies derived from Thucydides was supported by the Near Eastern contexts of Protogeometric and Geometric pottery. However, at each site in question the evi-

---

[28] It is beyond my competence to assess the significance of the earliest inscriptions from Naukratis. Needless to say they have been a subject of dispute – see e. g. Gardner, *op. cit.* (n. 9) 72–74; Edgar in: Hogarth (n. 10) 51–52; Hogarth et al., *op. cit.* (n. 10) 108; Gjerstad (n. 19) 161 and n. 42; M. M. Austin, *Greece and Egypt in the Archaic Age* (Cambridge 1970) 24; Möller (n. 5)

[29] Payne 57.

[30] For various bibliographies of Gjerstad see P. Åström, "Einar Gjerstad's Cypriote Publications", *Archaeologia Cypria* 1 (1985) 9–14, esp. 9.

[31] E. g. M. Vickers, "Early Greek Coinage: A Reassessment", *Numismatic Chronicle* 145 (1985) 1–44, esp. 18; A. M. Snodgrass, "Greek Archaeology and Greek History", *Classical Antiquity* 4 (1985): 2, 193–207, esp. 200; D. W. J. Gill, "The Temple of Aphaia on Aegina: The Date of the Reconstruction", *BSA* 83 (1988) 169–177, esp. 174 n. 28; R. M. Cook, "The Francis-Vickers Chronology", *JHS* 109 (1989) 164–170, esp. 165; Bowden (n. 3, 1991); idem (n. 3, 1996) 24–28; J. Whitley, *The Archaeology of Ancient Greece* (Cambridge 2001) 67, 74.

[32] Vickers, *op. cit.*; E. D. Francis & M. Vickers, "Greek Geometric Pottery at Hama and Its Implications for Near Eastern Chronology", *Levant* 17 (1985) 131–138; for further bibliography and discussion see Cook (n. 31); W. R. Biers, *Art, Artefacts, and Chronology in Classical Archaeology* (London 1992) 82–85, 99–101.

dence/context has proved to be unclear or problematic, while the value of the Thucydides' calculations has also been challenged.[33] Even if Thucydides' dates are accurate, it is clear that their consequences have not been logically or systematically followed through. This is conspicuous in the case of Selinus. The problem was frankly admitted by Cook in 1969[34] and restated by him in 1972: "It now appears that Transitional or even Late Protocorinthian too was excavated there".[35] Cook rejected the logical upshot – "simply to lower the dates of the phases by fifteen or twenty-five years" – as "impracticable", and suggested that Eusebius' date for the colony (650 BC) might be preferable to Thucydides' (628 BC). In 1997, while repeating his cautions about Thucydides, Cook changed his answer to the problem, noting that the graves with Transitional and Protocorinthian also contained indigenous pottery: "So the cemetery may have been a native pre-colonial one – natives elsewhere imported Greek pots – and the accepted chronology can be justified without the shifty device [*sic*] of preferring Eusebius here to Thucydides".[36] Yet the presence of (an unquantified amount of) Sicilian pottery in the cemetery does not necessarily prove that the cemetery was a native one. Further, Selinus cannot be treated in isolation on an *ad hoc* basis; it is far from being the only problem site among the western colonies.[37]

Further discussion of the dating of Protocorinthian and the related question of when Late Geometric ended is beyond the scope of the present article. Suffice to say that debate continues.[38] The present writer and colleagues have suggested that a provisional lowering of the end of the Late Geometric from

---

[33] Francis, Vickers, *op. cit.*; M. D. Herrera, J. Balensi, "More about the Greek Geometric Pottery at Tell Abu Hawam", *Levant* 18 (1986) 169–171; P. James, I. J. Thorpe, N. Kokkinos, J. Frankish, "Bronze to Iron Age Chronology in the Old World: Time for a Reassessment?", *Studies in Ancient Chronology* 1 (1987) 1–147, esp. 34–39; V. Hankey, P. Warren, *Aegean Bronze Age Chronology* (Bristol 1989) 167; James et al. (n. 23) 99–110; Bowden (n. 3, 1991) 49–50; I. Morris, "Geometric Greece", *Colloquenda Mediterranea* A/2 (1993) 29–38, esp. 31; cf. A. Fantalkin, "Low Chronology and Greek Protogeometric and Geometric Pottery in the Southern Levant", *Levant* 33 (2001) 117–125.

[34] R. M. Cook, "A Note on the Absolute Chronology of the Eighth and Seventh Centuries", *BSA* 64 (1969) 13–15, esp. 14. Then his conclusion was that "... we are left with the unedifying reflection that a wrong use of the wrong date somehow gave the right result".

[35] R. M. Cook, *Greek Painted Pottery* (London ²1972) 263.

[36] R. M. Cook, *Greek Painted Pottery* (London ³1997) 253.

[37] See James et al. (n. 23) 102–103, 360 n. 24.

[38] See J. C. Waldbaum, "Early Greek Contacts with the Southern Levant, ca. 1000–600 B.C.: the Eastern Perspective", *BASOR* 293 (1994) 53–66; J. C. Waldbaum, J. Magness, "The Chronology of Early Greek Pottery: New Evidence from Seventh-Century B.C. Destruction Levels in Israel", *AJA* 101 (1997) 23–40; Fantalkin (n. 33). Some of the recent debate has focussed on the significance of the Bocchoris scarab from Pithekoussai, found with EPC vessels – see D. W. J. Gill, M. Vickers, "Bocchoris the Wise and Absolute Chronology", *MDAI(R)* 103 (1996) 1–9; D. Ridgway, "The Rehabilitation of Bocchoris: Notes and Queries from Italy", *JEA* 85 (1999) 143–152.

c. 700 BC to c. 675 BC can make better sense of both the Western and Near Eastern evidence.[39] The reduction was accepted as "plausible" by Ian Morris, who adduced further supporting arguments.[40] And Sarah Morris has since argued that the "Geometric period lasted well into the seventh century".[41] A lowering of terminal Late Geometric by a quarter of a century would not necessarily have a knock-on effect on Corinthian in the "relay chronology" (as Gjerstad called it); nor need the Protocorinthian from Selinus, which Cook feared could "lower the dates of the phases by fifteen or twenty-five years", have precisely that effect. But *they may well have* – and the possibility needs to be explored with due rigour. At the very least, both the fragility and fluidity of 8th–7th ceramic dating are now clear. It is surely unrealistic to insist any longer that Payne's dating of the Corinthian sequence, based on the shaky archaeological chronology derived from Thucydides, can be safely used to control the dating of Archaic sites elsewhere in the Greek world, especially those which may have their own 'voice' regarding chronology. Pending a full reappraisal of all the fixed points for dating Corinthian pottery (including correlations with Attic), Gjerstad's assertion that Naukratis could itself provide a fixed point in Archaic chronology is surely worthy of re-examination.

THE NEW SITE REPORTS

As Leonard remarked, a final answer to the longstanding controversy can only come about through renewed excavation.[42] Unfortunately, the desire for a "true stratigraphic sequence" for Archaic Greek Naukratis is unlikely to be realised in the foreseeable future. In 1899 Hogarth had already encountered problems as parts of the site were "sodden with the infiltration of water", and the northern area is now completely submerged under a lake.[43] The new excavations were thus limited to the southern area, where no Archaic deposits were found.[44]

Yet the excavations have still been able to clarify a number of relevant matters. Notably, Petrie claimed to have excavated an enormous, square,

---

[39] James et al. (n. 23) 111.

[40] Morris (n. 33) 30–31.

[41] S. P. Morris, "Bearing Gifts: Euboean Pottery on Sardinia", in: M. S. Balmuth, R. H. Tykot (eds.), *Sardinian and Aegean Chronology* (Oxford 1998) 361–362.

[42] Leonard (n. 1, 1997) 19.

[43] Hogarth et al. (n. 10) 105; Leonard (n. 1, 1997) 20.

[44] *Ibid.*, 34 n. 69. Survey work produced surface finds of two sherds of Archaic Chian and numerous examples of Black Glazed Ware (5th–2nd centuries BC) – see Coulson (n. 1) 19 f.

brick-built structure at the southern end of the site, which he called the "Great Temenos", identifying it with the great Hellenion described by Herodotus. However, his successor Hogarth was baffled by this claim. He found no early Greek remains, but only Egyptian, in the vicinity of the "Great Temenos". Discovery of a stela of Pharaoh Nectanebo I (380–362 BC) referring to the town of *Pi-emro*[45] seemed to suggest that the southern part of the site was an Egyptian, rather than a Greek settlement. Searching for foundation deposits underneath the "Great Temenos" Hogarth was at a loss to "find any clear evidence of the existence of a Great Wall of any kind". Instead he believed he had found "an aggregate of house remains, piled up round a lower area, wherein lay the Egyptian temple and public buildings, one of which contained the Nectanebo Stela...".[46] Hogarth's suspicions have been vindicated by the modern work. Only Egyptian pottery of the Ptolemaic period was found in association with the remains of the "Temenos" while, with the possible exception of one wall, only domestic architecture was found. "Such artefactual evidence," Leonard concluded, "greatly supports the views of Hogarth (against those of Petrie and Gardner) concerning the nature and date of the architecture in the southern end of the ancient city of Naukratis".[47]

It appears that Petrie's Archaic Greek "Temenos" was neither Archaic nor Greek, and possibly not even a Temenos.[48] Though a negative result, it greatly clarifies our picture of the site as a whole. Petrie was wrong in seeing early Greek activity throughout the site, and the new excavations have confirmed Hogarth's understanding that the town effectively comprised two parts – the northern Greek (Naukratis) and the southern Egyptian (*Pi-emro*). The new excavations thus place a large question mark against Petrie's wider understanding of the site. Conversely, Hogarth's stock as an excavator/interpreter rises against that of Petrie.[49]

Given this, one might have expected the new site reports to be sympathetic to Hogarth's arguments regarding the foundation of the Greek colony. This is not the case, however. The task of assessing the historical and archaeological evidence was given to an Egyptologist, Sullivan, whose account is strongly partisan to the high Petrie dating. Indeed, he attempts to

---

[45] Hogarth et al. (n. 10) 106; for a modern translation and discussion see M. Lichtheim, "The Naukratis Stela Once Again", in: J. H. Johnson, E. F. Wente (eds.), *Studies in Honor of George R. Hughes* (Chicago 1976) 139–146.

[46] Hogarth et al. (n. 10) 111.

[47] Leonard (n. 1, 1997) 30.

[48] See *ibid.*, 34–35 n. 69.

[49] Leonard (n. 1, 1997) 14 praises Hogarth's general model of the site.

raise the now conventional date for the beginnings of the Greek colony from c. 615/610 BC to an earlier point in the reign of Psammetichus I, about 650 BC. To sustain this, Sullivan extends Petrie's unwarranted identification of the mercenary camps (στρατόπεδα) founded by Psammetichus with Daphnae (Tell Defenneh) to include Naukratis as well.[50] The only serious literary evidence[51] he invokes to support an early date is a passage from Strabo (17.1.18). This relates how Milesians, "in the time of Psammitichus" fortified a settlement on the Bolbitine mouth of the Nile; "but in time (χρόνῳ δέ)" they sailed to the Saïtic nome, fought a battle and founded Naukratis. Unrealistically, Sullivan claims that this "fixes" the origins of Greek Naukratis to the reign of Psammetichus I (664–610 BC).[52] As Gjerstad noted, the chronology of this Milesian story (with two episodes separated by an unknown period of time) is by no means incompatible with that of Herodotus.[53] In any case Strabo's account seems to be garbled with later (5th-century BC) events[54] and cannot be used to contradict Herodotus' clear statements.

HERODOTUS AND AMASIS

With respect to our primary source, Sullivan denies that Herodotus characterised Naukratis as a new town founded in the reign of Amasis: "Since he speaks of the place as a 'city' (*polis*) rather than as a 'site for settlement' or a similar expression, Herodotus is not clearly implying in this passage that Naukratis was founded at this time".[55] While Sullivan claims here to be dispensing with an "old shibboleth regarding the foundation of the city", he is merely attacking a straw man of his own making. That Amasis may have

---

[50] Petrie (n. 23) 272; R. D. Sullivan, "Psammetichus I and the Foundation of Naukratis", in: Coulson, *op. cit.* (n. 1) 177–202, esp. 187–188. There is no suggestion in Hdt. 2. 154 that he identified the στρατόπεδα with either Daphnae or Naukratis. The impossibility of confusing them was forcefully explained by Cook, *op. cit.* (n. 27) 234–236).

[51] While mentioning statements by late chronographers to the effect that Naukratis was in existence by the 23rd Olympiad (688–685 BC), or even the fourth year of the 7th Olympiad (749 BC), Sullivan (*op. cit.*, 177) fortunately agrees that such references "sustain little reliance". On the absurdity of such dates see A. R. Burn, "Dates in Early Greek History", *JHS* 55 (1935) 130–146 and James et al. (n. 23) 328.

[52] Sullivan, *op. cit.*, 178; cf. 186.

[53] Gjerstad (n. 14) 69.

[54] Petrie, *op. cit.* (n. 7) 4; Gjerstad, *op. cit.* (n. 14) 68; Bowden, *op. cit.* (n. 3, 1996) 25.

[55] Sullivan, *op. cit.*, 178.

given a pre-existing town to the Greeks has been generally accepted by both 'high' and 'low' chronologists from Petrie to Gjerstad.[56] The important question is whether Herodotus was mistaken in stating that it was Amasis who gave the town (or part of it) to the Greeks. *Prima facie*, this seems unlikely. The origin of Naukratis forms an integral part of his Amasis narrative; and had he misidentified the city's patron, there would doubtless have been Naukratites able to correct him by reference to local memories. (Amasis' reign ended in 526 BC, some three generations before Herodotus' visit to Egypt.)

Here we need to remember that where Herodotus' other statements about Naukratis can be compared with archaeological evidence, they have always proved accurate. At a general level, "Herodotus... relates that Naukratis was founded almost exclusively by East Greek city states, so it is not surprising that most of the pottery excavated at Naukratis was made in the Greek centers of western Anatolia and the islands that lie off its coast".[57] In more detail, his lists of Ionian and Dorian *poleis* involved in the colony are headed respectively by Chios and Rhodes – matching the large quantities of pottery from these islands among the earliest finds. Other *poleis*, such as Clazomenae and Mytilene, have been identified ceramically.[58] Again, as Bowden notes, the earliest stratified pottery at the site comes from several different contexts, including the temples of Apollo and Aphrodite[59] – supporting Herodotus' account of how the sanctuaries were founded together with the settlement.

Because of his dating of the Greek pottery, Cook had to assume that Herodotus was mistaken regarding the Pharaoh who gave Naukratis to the Greeks. Yet he admitted that this was "surprising",[60] and tried to find an explanation in an idea mooted by Petrie – that Amasis had 'reorganised' an already existing Greek settlement. To provide a rationale for such a reorganisation, Petrie recast Amasis as an anti-hellenic pharaoh; thus the grant of Naukratis was not a generous gift to his commercial and political allies, but a way of implementing "strong measures against Greek trading" by restricting the Greeks to one site.[61] The reorganisation model re-

---

[56] Petrie (n. 7) 4; Gjerstad (n. 14) 68.

[57] Venit (n. 2) 1.

[58] See Austin (n. 28) 24–27 and J. Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas* (London [4]1999) 122–125; for more detail see von Bissing (n. 18) 41–48; Venit (n. 2); Kerschner (n. 13).

[59] Bowden (n. 3, 1996) 27.

[60] Cook (n. 27) 233.

[61] See Petrie (n. 7) 7–8.

mains the preferred solution to the apparent conflict between Herodotus and the archaeological dating,[62] while its corollary that Amasis was initially anti-hellenic has taken on a life of its own.[63] Thus a modern myth has grown that Amasis' rebellion against his predecessor Apries was part of a nationalist uprising against increasing Greek influence.[64] The idea is strange, given Herodotus' description of Amasis as a φιλέλλην. So it has to be assumed that that his pro-hellenic stance was the result of a change of policy late in his reign.

Two arguments have been offered to show that Amasis was originally antagonistic toward the Greeks. First, Hdt. 2. 162 – 164 is cited to the effect that his rival Apries defended himself with a large army of Greek mercenaries. Second, a reading of Amasis Elephantine Stela appeared to show that, as late as his Year 3, Apries was attempting a comeback at the head of a large Greek force. Both points can be evaluated in the light of the corrected reading of the Stela.[65] It confirms Apries' reliance on mercenaries in the Year 1 (Amasis) as it talks of him manoeuvring with "boats filled with Greeks (*ḥ3w-nbw*)". Yet the idea of Apries returning with Greeks in the Year 3 has now been scotched. The year involved is actually 4, and the invading foreigners (*Sttyw* or "Asiatics") are now agreed to be the army of the Babylonian king Nebuchadrezzar.[66] This changes the picture considerably. Apries' reliance on Greek troops at the beginning of the civil war may simply have been by default – as (according to Herodotus) the native Egyptian armies had united under Amasis to oust him. This is very different matter from the simplistic notion that Apries (who had attacked Cyrene!) was pro-hellenic and Amasis anti-hellenic. The importance of East Greek

---

[62] Or "usual way out" to use the expression of Bowden (n. 3, 1996) 24. For examples see Boardman (n. 58) 117 and the following note.

[63] H. R. Hall (in *CAH* III [^{1}1954] 302) described Amasis as head of "a nationalist and anti-foreign revolution". Cook (n. 27) 235; cf. 232 stated that "The Amasis of the Egyptian records rose to power as the head of an anti-Greek movement". A. B. Lloyd (*Herodotus Book II*, vol. 3 [Leiden 1988] 178) called him "the champion of national interests", while N. Grimal (*A History of Ancient Egypt* [Oxford 1992] 363) portrayed Amasis as "confronting the problem of the Greeks... by concentrating the foreigners in the city of Naukratis". Sullivan (n. 50) 187 described Naukratis as "an appropriate location for restricting Greek settlement".

[64] As a further development, Grimal (*op. cit.*, 363) casts the civil war between Apries and Amasis as *originating* in a conflict between the regular Egyptian army and the Greek mercenaries.

[65] E. Edel, "Amasis und Nebukadrezar II", *Göttinger Miszellen* 29 (1978) 13 – 20; A. Leahy, "The Earliest Dated Monuments of Amasis", *JEA* 74 (1988) 183 – 199.

[66] Edel, *op. cit.*; Leahy, *op. cit.*, 191.

mercenaries to the stability of the dynasty does not allow us to think in such terms. On the defeat of Apries, Amasis must have immediately come to terms with the mercenaries, 30 000 in number according to Herodotus (though allowing for casualties). To imagine that they were left in a political vacuum, while Amasis faced the aggressive Neo-Babylonian Empire on his borders, is absurd.

Fortunately we do not have to speculate. The Year 4 entry on the Elephantine Stela is matched by a cuneiform text describing Nebuchadrezzar's attack on Egypt in his 37th Year (= 567 BC = Year 4 Amasis). Though the Babylonian record is fragmentary, enough survives to show that Amasis "called on" troops not only from Egypt, but from "the town Putu-Iaman" (agreed to be Cyrene) and "distant regions amidst the sea" (manifestly the Aegean in this context).[67] As Putu-Iaman (literally "Libya of the Ionians/Greeks") was an ally in 567 BC, Leahy argues that Amasis' marriage-alliance with a Cyrenian princess belongs early in his reign.[68] He dates to the same period Amasis' removal of the Greek mercenaries from the "Camps" (στρατόπεδα) founded near Bubastis by Psammetichus I, to new barracks at Memphis (Hdt. 2. 154). Remarkably this too has often been cited as evidence of Amasis' 'anti-hellenic' reorganisations. Herodotus wrote that Amasis transferred his Aegean mercenaries from Bubastis to Memphis to protect him from his *Egyptian* subjects! (Petrie omitted the last words.)

So much for Amasis the arch-nationalist whose only role at Naukratis was to "restrict" the Greeks. From a historian's perspective it is fair to say that the efforts to gainsay the plaintext of Herodotus seem like gratuitous complications. Moreover, they only seem to have been attempted because Greek pottery dating has 'confidently' placed the beginnings of Naukratis some 30 years before the reign of Amasis.

CYPRIOT AND EGYPTIAN EVIDENCE

Other controls than the accepted Greek pottery chronology can be brought to bear on the Herodotean date for the foundation of Greek Naukratis. These are provided by the non-Aegean evidence, namely Cypriot, Egyptian and Phoenician.

---

[67] J. B. Pritchard (ed.), *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament* (Princeton 1969) 308; for the identifications see Edel, *op. cit.*, 15–16, Leahy, *op. cit.*, 191–192.

[68] *Ibid.*, 192–193.

The earliest Cypriot finds from the site are the sculptures from the Apollo temple. As noted earlier, Gjerstad identified a head from the bottom of the *temenos* pit as early Neo-Cypriot in style, hence dating to c. 560 BC. Möller objects to this: "The oldest Cypriot terracotta head cited by Gjerstad may be compared with Proto-Cypriot examples from the Heraion on Samos, enabling a dating, in accordance with Samian chronology, to the end of the seventh century". From this she flatly concludes: "In the light of Schmidt's better-established chronology for Samos, Gjerstad's chronology for the Cypriot sculptures would appear to be set about 40 years too late".[69] Matters, however, are not so simple.

First, the head is classified by Gjerstad as belonging not to the Proto-Cypriot, but to the Neo-Cypriote Style (his dating: 560–520 BC). It is one of four such sculptures associated with the Naukratite Apollo I temple, for each of which Gjerstad found almost exact parallels in stratified examples from Cyprus. Nevertheless, Gjerstad did identify, from less certain contexts at the temple, some pieces of the 2nd Proto-Cypriot style, which he dated to c. 580–560 BC.[70] Schmidt's Samian chronology would date the Neo-Cypriot examples to 610/600–560/550 BC and the 2nd Proto-Cypriot to 670/660–610/600 BC.[71] This would indeed raise considerably Gjerstad's *terminus post quem* for the Apollo temple finds. Yet it should be remembered that Schmidt's "better-established chronology" is of course based on the conventional dates for the Greek pottery found at the Heraion.[72] To cite it without qualification, as Möller does, merely reverts us to the circular argument Gjerstad identified in 1934 – use of the accepted chronology for Archaic pottery, through cross-dating, to reinforce itself. Further, the Samian chronology is far from being accepted by the majority of experts on Cypriot sculpture. Refinements and adjustments have been made to Gjerstad's chronology, the net result of which would be to *lower* rather than raise his dates. Using careful comparison with Greek, Egyptian and Phoenician sculpture, Vermeule and Markoe have lowered the beginning of the 2nd Proto-Cypriot Style to c. 560 BC (from Gjerstad's suggested date of c. 600), and the beginning of Neo-Cypriot by ten years, from 560 to 550 BC.[73] Through her extensive

---

[69] Möller (n. 5) 91.

[70] Gjerstad (n. 18) 161.

[71] G. Schmidt, *Samos VII: Kyprische Bildwerke aus dem Heraion von Samos* (Bonn 1968) 94. For the differing views on the chronology of Archaic Cypriot sculpture see Table 3 of A. T. Reyes, *Archaic Cyprus: A Study of the Textual and Archaeological Evidence* (Oxford 1994) 161.

[72] Further, P. Gaber-Saletan (*Regional Styles in Cypriote Sculpture: The Sculpture from Idalion* [New York 1986] 70 n. 14) has raised a number of questions about the stratigraphic evidence from Samos, criticising the lack of detail in publication of the find spots and sections, which make it "difficult to assess these finds in context". Many of the sculptural finds come from a pit cut through a floor dated by the excavators to c. 600 BC. The context cannot be earlier than the floor, and the contents are "most probably later" (Pers. comm. Pamela Gaber-Saletan).

[73] C. Vermeule, "Cypriote Sculpture, the Late Archaic and Early Classical Periods: Towards a More Precise Understanding", *AJA* 78 (1974) 287–290; G. E. Markoe, "Egyptianising Male Votive Statuary from Cyprus: A Reexamination", *Levant* 22 (1990) 111–122. They have also simplified Gjerstad's complicated sequence of overlapping styles, by scrapping his "Cypro-Egyptian" Style (c. 570–545 BC). Cf. A. Hermary, "Naucratis et la sculpture égyptisante à Chypre", in: Höckmann, Kreikenbom (n. 6) 27–38.

studies of regional styles in Cypriot sculpture, Gaber-Saletan has arrived at the following dates for the relevant periods: 1st Proto-Cypriot (600–560); 2nd Proto-Cypriot (560–540 BC); Neo-Cypriot (550–520 BC).[74] Not forgetting regional variations, it is dates of this order, rather than the Samian, which are currently preferred. Thus, depending on whether it belongs to the 2nd Proto-Cypriot or Neo-Cypriot styles, the head from the bottom of the *temenos* pit should date no earlier than about 560–550 BC.

So, far from contradicting Gjerstad, recent studies of Cypriot sculpture have tended to reinforce his case that the Apollo temple was built not earlier than the second quarter of the 6th century BC. The conflict with the Samian dates remains unresolved, but this only serves to illustrate the dichotomy between Greek and Cypriot Archaic chronologies.[75] It is particularly conspicuous at Naukratis. For example, as Möller points out, the Cypriot head from the bottom of the *temenos* pit was found beneath an East Greek vessel.[76] It belongs to the 'Wild Goat Middle II' style, usually thought to have ended c. 600 BC,[77] some 40 years before the head was sculpted according to the preferred Cypriot chronology.

Unfortunately, uncertainty about the Cypriot dates continues.[78] Less equivocal evidence should be provided, surely, by the dateable Egyptian finds from early Naukratis. The chronology of Egypt in the pre-Persian period has never been influenced by the Greek – only the other way around.[79] How, then,

---

[74] Gaber-Saletan, *op. cit.*; eadem, "Regional Styles and the Chronology of Sculpture", in: P. Åström (ed.), *Acta Cypria* (Jonsered 1992) 224–227.

[75] The tensions between the two chronologies are well set out by L. W. Sørenson, "Early Archaic Limestone Statuettes in Cypriote Style", *Report of the Department of Antiquities Cyprus* 1978, 111–121.

[76] Petrie (n. 7) 14, 18, 20; Möller (n. 5) 91.

[77] R. M. Cook, P. Dupont, *East Greek Pottery* (London 1998) 10.

[78] Möller, contradicting her own definitive pronoucement that Gjerstad was "wrong", also states: "As yet, no absolutely certain dating is available for Cypriot sculpture" ([n. 5] 156). Karageorghis has been cautious, citing both the Gjerstad and Schmidt chronologies in his series on Cypriot sculpture (e. g. *The Coroplastic Art of Ancient Cyprus: III. The Cypro-Archaic Period Large and Medium Size Sculpture* [Nicosia 1993] xi). A recent work (idem, *Early Cyprus* [Los Angeles 2002] 183) follows Schmidt while pointing out that Lewe, who prefers a lower chronology, "does not accept the Samian dating as absolutely valid".

[79] While there may be grounds for dispute over the dating of earlier Egyptian dynasties (see James et al., *op. cit.* [n. 23]; P. James, N. Kokkinos, I. J. Thorpe, "Mediterranean Chronology in Crisis", in: M. S. Balmuth, R. H. Tykot [eds.], *Sardinian and Aegean Chronology* [Oxford 1998] 29–43), there is none at all concerning the 26th (Saite) Dynasty (cf. L. Depuydt, "On the Consistency of the Wandering Year as Backbone of Egyptian Chronology", *JARCE* 32 [1995] 43–58). Egyptian dates for this period can be safely back-calculated by collation of numerous documents, back from the Persian invasion of Egypt in 525 BC, and cross-checked

does the evidence of pharaonic dating stand with regard to the history of the Greek colony at Naukratis? Little Egyptian pottery from the northern, Greek area of the site was published by the early excavators and does not lend itself to precise dating. Fortunately the site offers a more diagnostic dating tool: numerous scarabs, many bearing royal names. They were mainly locally made, and Petrie identified a deposit (in the middle, "town" area of the site) as the remains of a "Scarab Factory". It contained not only hundreds of (largely faience) scarabs, but moulds for their manufacture.

Petrie gave the impression that a great number of scarabs were found bearing the cartouche of Psammetichus I (664–610 BC).[80] However, von Bissing insisted that there was only one scarab of this pharaoh from Naukratis, bearing his prenomen Wahibre (*uah-ib-Re*).[81] Gorton is only slightly more generous. She notes "a very few scarabs" from the site which might belong to this Pharaoh and specifies two (both with Wahibre).[82] Even these are problematic. While the prenomen of Psammetichus I, Wahibre was also the nomen of Apries (589–570 BC). Petrie himself was aware of this difficulty and admitted that the Wahibre scarabs from Naukratis "probably [belong] to the latter".[83]

By contrast Psammetichus II (595–589 BC) is well attested at Naukratis, indeed the best attested there of any 26th-dynasty pharaoh. There are many with his distinctive Horus name *men-ib-Re*.[84] The nomenclature on the scarabs is not always so diagnostic, however, and those bearing the nomen "Psamtek" might belong to any of the three 26th-dynasty pharaohs of this name. So to be fair to Psammetichus I, it is unfortunate that his nomen and prenomen were used by other 26th-dynasty pharaohs (Psammetichus II and III, and Apries respectively). Thus a simple count of the scarabs which can *definitely* be attributed may be biased against him (compared, say, to Psammetichus II). In the absence of clear nomenclature the attribution of scarabs to individual pharaohs is not an exact science and depends on other clues such as iconography, style and fabric. It also becomes particularly difficult during the Saite period, when scarabs were increasingly manufactured by non-Egyptians.

Given this, all one can do is review specialist opinion. Petrie offered little in support of a major presence of Psammetichus I at Naukratis. Its only

---

with the astronomically-fixed chronology of 7th–6th century Assyria and Babylonia.

[80] "Now many [scarabs] of Psamtik I are found, and some of Psamtik II..." (Petrie [n. 7] 5).

[81] Von Bissing (n. 18) 41, 65–66.

[82] Gorton (n. 4) 178.

[83] Petrie (n. 7) 5; idem, *Scarabs and Cylinders with Names* (London 1917) 32. To arrive at his "many [scarabs] of Psamtik I", it seems Petrie relied heavily on those decorated with a lion and a sun disk, on the assumption that this combination was adopted as a "badge" by Psammetichus I. But his badge theory is by no means universally accepted – for alternative interpretations see Gorton (n. 4) 106.

[84] *Ibid.*, 101, 102, 130; cf. Petrie (n. 7) 32.

recent adherent, Sullivan, though an Egyptologist, shied away from analysing the scarab finds in detail, remarking that they have "not commanded a consensus".[85] Gorton's cautious summary seems fair: "Since the only Egyptian rulers reliably named on the scarabs from the factory are Psamtek II and Apries it seems possible that its main period of operation, that is to say of mass production... was in the years of these Pharaohs (595–570)". Her conclusion – "it seems unlikely that the factory could have been in production before the beginning of the 6th cent."[86] – agrees with that of von Bissing, with no recent studies to the contrary. Their assessment is also supported by a negative argument. The idea that the Scarab Factory may have begun in the reign of Psammetichus I faces a problem, raised long ago: there are no scarabs of the powerful (Greek and Phoenician-friendly) pharaoh Necho II (610–595 BC) from the site.[87] Unless we develop an *ad hoc* model – involving the vicissitudes of taphonomy or excavation – to explain their absence, it is safest to accept von Bissing and Gorton's assessment that the output of the Factory essentially dates to the reigns of Psammetichus II and Apries (595–570 BC).

RECONSIDERING THE SCARAB FACTORY

Prima facie the absolute dates provided by the scarab evidence might suggest a 6th-century date for the Greek foundation of Naukratis, though one earlier than Amasis. But this presupposes certain knowledge about the chronological relationship between the Greek *polis* and the Scarab Factory. Actually, their relative dating has never been properly agreed. Four models have been suggested:

1. The Greek colony and the scarab factory were both founded in the reign of Psammetichus I. The factory was closed by Amasis [Petrie].

2. The Greek colony and the scarab factory were founded simultaneously in the reign of Psammetichus II [von Bissing].

3. The Greek colony was founded in the late 7th century BC. The scarab factory may have been founded later under Psammetichus II [Boardman].[88]

---

[85] Sullivan (n. 50) 194 n. 72 merely contrasts the views of Petrie and von Bissing and acknowledges that the latter "dismissed all but one of the scarabs for Psammetichus I".

[86] Gorton (n. 4) 178, cf. 91.

[87] Von Bissing (n. 18) 41, 66.

[88] Boardman (*op. cit.* [n. 27] 138–143) was sympathetic to von Bissing's argument re the scarabs, and though he dated the arrival of the Greeks at Naukratis to c. 620, he placed the Scarab Factory in the 6th century BC. See Möller, *op. cit.* (n. 5) 153 n. 528.

4. The scarab factory was founded (by Phoenicians) in the reign of Psammetichus II and closed when the Greek colony was founded in the reign of Amasis [Hogarth, Edgar].

Using Gorton's understanding of the scarab evidence, von Bissing's and Boardman's models (2 and 3) are an improvement on Petrie's (1). Yet Hogarth's model (4) accounts better for the overall scarab distribution, including the lack of evidence for both Necho II and Amasis. Further, it should be clear that while von Bissing's interpretation (3) comes close, it is only Hogarth's (4) that accommodates the testimony of Herodotus as well as the scarab evidence.

The key question is of course the archaeology of the Scarab Factory, subject of the major disagreement between Petrie and Hogarth noted at the beginning of this article. Petrie's assumption that the Factory was an integral part of the Greek colony was based on the following arguments: [89]

A. Numerous sherds of Greek pottery were found with the remains of the Factory. Yet the context, as discovered by Petrie, was highly disturbed and almost destroyed by the diggings of Arab treasure-hunters.[90] For the Greek sherds found there, the observations of Hogarth's pottery expert Edgar should need no further comment:

> The fact that a good deal of Naukratite pottery was found along with the scarabs is far from being a proof that the two were contemporary. It is clear that the pottery was part of the refuse from the neighbouring temple of Aphrodite discovered in the following season. One of the fragments in fact bore a dedication to Aphrodite...; and this year again, near the same spot, we found among a great number of scarab moulds several fragments of the same ware dedicated to the goddess... It is not difficult to see how broken pottery thrown out of the temple could become intermixed with the earlier *débris* round about... *It is unnecessary to attach the slightest weight to this particular item of evidence.*[91]

B. Petrie claimed that a burnt stratum was found through a large area of the southern part of the site, that it lay below the Factory and that it contained the earliest Greek pottery. Taken at face value this would indeed seem to be "indisputable" evidence, as Gardner saw it, that the arrival of the Greeks preceded the Factory (with its scarabs of Psammetichus II and Apries). Yet in open contradiction to Petrie, Hogarth and Edgar asserted that

---

[89] Conveniently summarised in Gardner (n. 9) 71; cf. Leonard (n. 1, 1997) 10.

[90] Von Bissing (n. 18) 66; Petrie (n. 7) 22; cf. 36.

[91] Edgar in: Hogarth (n. 10) 50 – my emphasis. Many modern scholars (e. g. Gorton [n. 4] 178) seem to have overlooked Edgar's statement and taken the Greek pottery finds at face value.

they did not find any Greek material in the burnt stratum, only rough kitchen ware not necessarily Greek in character.[92] We seem to be left with Petrie's word against that of Edgar and Hogarth, but there are other ways of seeing the matter.

Petrie was one of the great pioneers of scientific archaeology, and his preoccupation with measurement was exemplary when recording weights, dimensions, etc. However, he also placed an undue stress on the spot-heights of his finds. This is his report on the burnt layer:

> Below the bottom of the stratum in which the scarabs were found, there lies two feet lower a black burnt stratum full of charcoal and ashes, which forms almost the earliest stratum of the whole southern half of the town. According to the average rate of accumulation of earth during Greek times this bed of two feet would represent about half a century. And about half a century before the beginning of the scarab factory would lead us to about the middle of the seventh century B.C.[93]

Modern archaeologists might see Petrie's calculations regarding "average rate of accumulation during Greek times" as rather quaint. In the same way that he was misled by his belief that brick dimensions could be used as a means of absolute dating,[94] his trust in absolute height may have deceived him. He himself admitted that spot-heights were "more or less doubtful" when it came to deciding the "precedence in time" of various levels across the site,[95] and rightly ignored them when they were irrelevant (e.g. in the case of the Apollo *temenos* pit). With respect to the burnt stratum he noted a two-foot difference between the heights for points reported as "at Scarabs" (lowest) and "on S[outh]" near the alleged Great Temenos (highest).[96] The problem is that Petrie gave no evidence for the topographical relationship between this burnt layer and the Factory.[97] When he stated that the burnt layer was "below" that

---

[92] Hogarth et al. (n. 10) 107.

[93] Petrie (n. 7) 5. Apart from a brief mention of three different spot-heights for the burnt stratum (*ibid.* 88, 89), this is his sole account of its stratigraphy. Cf. the 12 pages, numerous plates and even a drawing of the stratigraphic section, given for the pit in the Apollo *temenos*.

[94] Petrie (n. 7) 6 expressed his belief that Egyptian bricks decreased by "about an inch in length, per century". He used these brick measurements to support his dating of the "Great Temenos" to the early 26th Dynasty. In fact the bricks are almost certainly Hellenistic in date (see Leonard [n. 1, 1997] 8).

[95] Petrie (n. 7) 21.

[96] *Ibid.*, 88.

[97] Matters are further complicated by Petrie's mention of *another* level with "burnt ash and bone" (only vaguely reported) below the Apollo temple, which he dated ("by

of the Factory he only seems to have meant lower in terms of absolute height – a very different matter from "underlying". His reports give no hint that he actually dug *through* the Factory bed to see what was underneath. (Nor for that matter do those of Gardner or Hogarth.) Conversely, it is implied in Hogarth's account that the burnt stratum lay *strictly between* the Scarab Factory and the Great Temenos and no further: "the thick burnt bottom stratum, which Mr Petrie dated before all other human remains on the site, was found wherever we sank pits between Mr Petrie's 'Scarab Factory' and his 'Great Temenos', but nowhere either north or south of this area".[98]

It seems that Petrie may have merely *deduced* that the burnt layer underlay the Factory. With regard to the ceramic finds, von Bissing noted that Petrie published only *one* vase from the burnt level. It was Greek (a Chian amphora).[99] He also made a very important observation with respect to the conflict between Petrie and Hogarth over the nature of the pottery from the burnt stratum. This concerns a wider problem in Petrie's excavation management. Much of his data collection relied on local farmers, who simply reported their findspots to him. As he paid them for Greek ceramics, but not for Egyptian, it is understandable that they 'found' much early Greek ware in the southern part, where Hogarth and Edgar could discover none.[100] As it happens, even the one vessel, the Chian amphora, that he published "from" the burnt layer spoils his argument. He found two very similar vessels at Tel Defenneh, adding the "strange fact" that they were sealed with the cartouche of Amasis.[101] A "strange fact" indeed: the Tel Defenneh amphorae are presently dated to the third quarter, and the Naukratis example to the first half of the 6th century.[102] Such a vessel can-

---

the ordinary rate of accumulation") to c. 800 BC, or even earlier (*ibid.*). Despite Hogarth's insistence that the burnt layer did not extend north of the Scarab Factory, there remains a nagging doubt as to which of these *two* burnt levels Petrie identifed "at" the Scarab Factory.

[98] Hogarth et al. (n. 10) 107.

[99] Petrie (n. 7) 21 & Pl. XVI, 4; von Bissing (n. 18) 36.

[100] Von Bissing (n. 18) 49. Petrie (n. 7) 35 was commendably frank about the limitations of his research in this area of the site: "Comparatively little was done in excavating the town, the three places which took up nearly all our work being the gateway building in the Great Temenos, the large block of chambers in the same, and the temenos of Apollo. Most of the objects from the town were therefore obtained from Arabs digging there for earth... Hence I seldom knew the details of a find, and even the site of it was often not known...".

[101] W. M. F. Petrie, *Tanis II* (London 1888) 64.

[102] Dupont's Chian amphora types 1g, and 1e-f, respectively. See Cook, Dupont (n. 77) 148–150, 210 nn. 44, 46.

not have underlain (with half a century's accumulation of debris) the Factory with its scarabs of Psammetichus II.

In short, the evidence for the "burnt stratum" presented by Petrie is highly equivocal. Poorly published and self-contradictory, it would seem that Hogarth was justified in rejecting it as a means of relative dating between the Scarab Factory and the earliest Greek settlement.

C. Petrie's final argument concerned the ethnicity of the scarab manufacturers. First, he argued, the Factory was engaged in commercial relations with Rhodes. Second, the errors sometimes committed by the scarab-makers in attempting to render Egyptian hieroglyphics show that they were not Egyptian. The combination of these points shows that the scarab-makers were Greek.

That the Factory was producing for a Greek market seems likely, as apparently Naukratite scarabs have been found on Rhodes and elsewhere in the Aegean.[103] But that does not tell us that the scarab-manufacturers were Greeks. Hogarth argued that they were Phoenicians, actually a more serious candidate. The Phoenicians – rather than the Greeks – were experts at producing egyptianising artworks, replete with imperfect hieroglyphics. Gorton has identified a number of Phoenician scarab workshops (e. g. in the Levant, Carthage, Sardinia) producing similar products to those of Naukratis.[104] Indeed, a Phoenician identity for the Naukratite craftsmen is accepted by Sullivan. In lieu of firm evidence for Greek colonists as early as c. 650 BC, he argues that they used the material culture of an already present Phoenician settlement. Following Hogarth, Sullivan sees a Phoenician colony at Naukratis as responsible for the scarabs, the finds of decorated tricadna shells and the glazed sandy ware Hogarth found in layers below those with painted Greek pottery of local manufacture.[105] Similar glazed ware found at Kameiros (Rhodes) has long been recognised as Phoenician.[106]

Regarding the carved tricadna shells, Möller notes that "current trend would seem to favour their Syro-Phoenician origin".[107] Yet while the style is (Assyrianising) Phoenician, their place of manufacture was likely to have been Naukratis itself, shown by the occurrence of undecorated examples.[108]

---

[103] Boardman (n. 58) 127; Gorton (n. 4) 92.
[104] Gorton (n. 4) 132–137, 183–184.
[105] Sullivan (n. 50) 187; Hogarth et al. (n. 10) 107.
[106] Edgar in: Hogarth (n. 10) 49.
[107] Möller (n. 5) 165.
[108] Petrie (n. 7) 35; Edgar in: Hogarth (n. 10) 49.

As to the dating, Möller cites Stucky as placing their production between c. 675 and 600 BC: "In this case, the shells would be among the oldest finds in Naukratis".[109] More specifically Stucky argued that "the end of the third quarter of the seventh century B.C. may be considered the earliest time for the import of Tricadna shells to Naukratis".[110] Brandl's more recent study sets out in detail a strong case for placing the entire carved Tricadna industry in a limited period between 630 and 580 BC.[111] Thus they would still be "among the oldest finds in Naukratis". The date range allowed by Brandl overlaps with that of the scarabs of Psammetichus II and Apries (595–570 BC) – arguably another product of the Phoenician residents at Naukratis.

It is significant that the earliest firmly datable evidence from the site (scarabs and tricadna shells) is better interpreted as evidence of a Phoenician than a Greek presence. By helping to document this, Sullivan unwittingly assisted in removing the *only* absolutely-dated objection to the Herodotean dating – namely the scarabs of Psammetichus II and Apries. In the absence of sound stratigraphic evidence to the contrary, there is no good reason to reject Hogarth and Edgar's model for the earliest activity at the site. In their view a small Phoenician factory preceded the Greek colony; when the town was given over to the Greeks by Amasis, the Factory was closed: "It appears... that shortly after the death of Apries the Phoenicians for some reason either gave up their Egyptian business or removed it elsewhere".[112] This remains the most economic way to explain the pattern of scarab evidence – including the otherwise puzzling absence of any from the reign of Amasis, when all parties agree that the site was occupied by the Greeks.

It also makes good sense in terms of mid-26th-dynasty international affairs. To counter the nascent Babylonian empire, Egypt became increasingly reliant on professional troops from the Aegean (the well-known Carians and Ionians). At the same time it was a longstanding Egyptian policy to maintain commercial ties with the Lebanon, principally to secure supplies of timber needed for temple construction. This Phoenician

---

[109] Möller (n. 5) 165.

[110] R. A. Stucky, *The Engraved Tricadna Shells* (São Paulo 1974) 92.

[111] B. Brandl, "Two Engraved Tricadna Shells from Tel Miqne-Ekron", *BASOR* 323 (2001) 49–62, esp. 58–60. Excluding the Greek findspots (Cyrene, Samos and Naukratis), to avoid circularity of argument, there are four Mesopotamian contexts (Nimrud, Assur, Babylon, Warka) to confirm his date range. As Brandl remarks, the dating of the last three disproves Stucky's contention (*op. cit.*, 95) that "in Mesopotamia no fragments occur in clearly Post-Assyrian levels...". Actually, they show that a slightly later end for the range, a decade or so after 580 BC, is probable.

[112] Hogarth (n. 10) 50.

policy continued through the mid-26th Dynasty, when we find Necho II using Phoenician sailors to explore the Red Sea. His successor Psammetichus II visited Byblos personally in 592/1 BC.[113] According to Hdt. 2. 161, Apries fought naval battles with Tyre and Sidon, though this is usually interpreted as a garbled report of conflicts with Nebuchadrezzar's forces, during their long siege of Tyre between 586–574 BC.[114] The Egyptians are thought to have supported, or even instigated, the rebellion which led to the siege. It is against this background that we can envisage the establishment of Phoenician trading/manufacturing concern at Naukratis about 600 BC, or slightly earlier. However, the political map was about to be sharply redrawn. In the early years of the Babylonian empire Phoenicia, under the kings of Tyre, had retained a measure of independence. But, as Freedy and Redford put it: "at the conclusion of the thirteen-year siege in 574 or 573 B.C. Tyre was definitely in the Chaldaean camp... When next an Egyptian king would consider foreign alignments to counter Asiatic initiatives, it would be to Greek freebooters and to Greek tyrants that he would turn".[115] Indeed, when Nebuchadrezzar attacked Egypt in 567 BC (by sea as well as land), Phoenicians would have been pressganged into service in the same way they were a century earlier by the Assyrians in their successful attack on Egypt. Thus the suggested closure of a Phoenician commercial foundation at the site in favour of the Greeks can be seen as a reflex to the dramatic changes in international relations at the very time of Amasis' succession.

In conclusion, the evidence from the Scarab Factory provides no support for the foundation of Greek Naukratis as early as the 7th century BC. The evidence for Psammetichus I is uncertain, while scarabs of Necho II are absent. The only pharaohs seriously represented are Psammetichus II and Apries (595–570 BC). The Factory belongs either to the earliest Greek settlement (following von Bissing) or, more likely (following Hogarth), to a short-lived Phoenician venture that was closed when Amasis gave Naukratis to the Greeks (c. 570–565 BC). Such a model might clarify the longstanding question of the *polis* that Amasis gave over to the Greeks. Herodotus implies the existence of a non-Greek town before Amasis (see above). Firm evidence has always been elusive; certainly no substantial Egyptian remains have been found which would fit the bill. If we envisage the pre-Greek town as a Phoenician factory and harbour with an attached Egyptian village then we may – at long last – have an answer.

NAUKRATIS AND OLD SMYRNA

Finally the question of the earliest Greek pottery at Naukratis needs to be addressed. Bowden notes that it comes from many parts of the site, "but

---

[113] K. S. Freedy, D. B. Redford, "The Dates in Ezekiel in Relation to the Biblical, Babylonian and Egyptian Sources", *JAOS* 90 (1970) 462–485, esp. 478–480.

[114] Freedy, Redford, *op. cit.*, 481–484; T. G. H. James, *CAH* III (³1991): 2, 725; Grimal (n. 70) 362–363.

[115] Freedy, Redford, *op. cit.*, 484.

where the original location is known it is mostly from the various sanctuaries. Most of the material therefore is from dedications, and ought thus to reflect the fortunes of the city reasonably well".[116] So he proposed a simple experiment to compare the conventional and Herodotean chronologies against the pottery finds. He quantified the pottery as catalogued by Venit, according to conventional dates (within five years), plotting it into a simple graph of numbers of sherds against time. Using the conventional dates, there is a massive increase in the amount of pottery at the end of the 7th century BC. Then there is a sharp downturn c. 525 BC at the time of the Persian invasion of Egypt. Both swings on the graph conflict with the clear statements of Herodotus, not only regarding the date of the settlement, but also with respect to 525 BC, which he depicts (3. 139) as a 'boom time' for the Greeks in Egypt: "when Cambyses, son of Cyrus, invaded Egypt, many Greeks came with the army, some to trade and some to see the country itself".

Bowden argued that if the pottery chronology is reduced by a hypothetical 40 years, the ceramic pattern then corresponds to Herodotus' narrative at three points: (1) the sharp upswing is now at c. 565 BC, matching the settlement under Amasis; (2) there is no decline at Cambyses' invasion, c. 525 BC; (3) and instead the downturn reflects the effects of Xerxes' punitive repression of the Egyptian revolt in 485 BC (Hdt. 7. 7). There is much to be said for Bowden's quantitative approach. He hints at a methodology which, though it may be uniquely applicable to Naukratis, may circumvent the circular arguments concerning 'pre-colonial' Greek pottery seen at Selinus and other western sites.[117]

But is such a model possible or likely? Taking Bowden's correspondences in reverse order, the last (3) would involve a shift in dating from 525 to 485 BC. This is problematic. Francis and Vickers argued that Greek pottery chronology can be revised as late as the mid-5th century BC, but despite growing appreciation of the fragility of the conventional Archaic chronology, their proposals (especially for such late dates) have found no

---

[116] Bowden (n. 3, 1991) 53.

[117] NB. The limited number of sherds dated earlier than the end of the 7th century are not from known contexts and allow for the limited importation of Greek ware into the site before the reign of Amasis, during the time of the Scarab Factory. It is also possible that some Greek (and Cypriot) traders were present in an essentially Phoenician settlement; but this would not affect the argument here, which concerns the major pottery trends associated with the buildings. It would be inconceivable that Greeks could have built sanctuaries at Naukratis without the pharaonic permission that Herodotus describes.

support. A major stumbling block is provided by the Attic pottery from the Mound built for the warriors who fell at Marathon in 490 BC.[118] The fixed point provided by these finds has never been dealt with adequately by Francis and Vickers.[119] As it would cross this threshold, Bowden's proposal (1) seems unlikely. Any possible compression in the dating must reach near minimum (say ten years or so) by 490 BC. Nevertheless, Bowden's experimental model could be improved by considering a smaller reduction (25 years) at this point. Rather than the suppression of Xerxes in 485 BC, the sharp drop in Greek imports at Naukratis might be better associated with the Ionian Revolt against Darius I (499–494 BC). The Revolt extended to embroil Cyprus, involved naval warfare of Greek versus Phoenician and Egyptian fleets, and ended with the enslavement of Miletus and other calamitous developments – these events would surely have had severe repercussions for trade between East Greece and Naukratis.

However, Bowden's earlier correspondences are extremely plausible. Without specifying a particular reduction, the invasion of Cambyses (2) would no longer correspond with a 'crash' at Naukratis but to one of the prosperous decades of the mid-6th century BC. With respect to the massive upswing in Greek pottery (3), associated with the first temples, this naturally fits Herodotus' account of the settlement under Amasis. Here a large reduction (of up to 40 years) is more reasonable. It is far less drastic than the Francis & Vickers model, which would involve a reduction of some 60–80 years at this point. It is also close to the conclusion arrived at independently by the present author and colleagues on other (partly Near Eastern grounds), recommending a chronology approximately halfway between the Francis and Vickers and conventional models[120] – a notional revision of some 35 years.

A lowering of Archaic chronology (at c. 600 BC) by three decades or so is in step with the 25-year reduction for Late Geometric discussed above. And while speculative, it should be noted that similar low datings for the Corinthian (and related) sequences have long formed a respectable "undercurrent" in the literature. In establishing his dates for Early Corinthian (625–600 BC), Payne had to dismiss the opinions of Pottier, Rumpf and others who saw the preceding Protocorinthian style lasting as late as 580 BC,[121] a difference of some 45 years. Maintaining his earlier position, Langlotz proposed that Payne's start date for Middle Corinthian should be lowered from 600 BC

[118] As stressed in James et al. (n. 23) 97.
[119] See the criticism of Biers (n. 32) 101.
[120] James et al. (n. 23) 359 n. 11; 372 n. 65.
[121] Payne (n. 25) 22.

by 20 to 30 thirty years, i.e. 580 or 570 BC.[122] Gjerstad suggested lowering Middle Corinthian by 25 and Ducat by 15 to 20 years.[123]

The Early to Middle Corinthian transition is particularly important at Naukratis. There are a few pieces of Early Corinthian without firm context, but the succeeding Middle Corinthian and contemporary East Greek styles are well attested – hence the conventional dating of the settlement close to the EC/MC transition. Lowering the "600 BC" of the Payne/Cook chronology by 35 years would bring it to c. 565 BC, early in reign of Amasis. Such a reduction would not apply evenly to every site, pottery style or even dating-scheme and indeed only applies to the Payne/Cook chronology. In her monumental study of Corinthian pottery Amyx has already lowered the EC/MC transition to 595/590 BC.[124] Taking this as the "norm", as most scholars now do, the notional reduction from the conventional chronology need only involve 25 years to bring us to 570/565 BC. A modest revision of this length would restore harmony between the Greek pottery and the account of Herodotus, as well as the dating of the Cypriot sculptures.

Another focus of dispute between Herodotean and archaeological chronologies is Old Smyrna, the key site for the dating of Corinthian pottery after Selinus. Hdt. 1. 16 states that Alyattes the Lydian conquered Smyrna, and a destruction level generally thought to reflect this event has been identified at the site. It was evidently destroyed during EC, "and well before the end of that period".[125] Herodotus should thus provide us with a fixed point within EC. The problem is, at which point in the long reign of Alyattes (c. 618–560 BC) did Smyrna fall? Cook and Dupont state that "it should have been early, though after his five seasons of campaigning at Miletus" and dated the sack to c. 600 BC.[126] Yet neither they, nor anyone, has produced historical evidence that the siege occurred soon after the Milesian campaign or that it was "early". Against this is an observation (of

---

[122] E. Langlotz, Review of H. Payne, *Necrocorinthia*, *Gnomon* 10 (1934) 418–427.

[123] E. Gjerstad, *The Swedish Expedition to Cyprus IV:2* (Stockholm 1948) 208 n. 1; J. Ducat, "L'archaisme à la recherche de points de repère chronologiques", *BCH* 86 (1962) 165–184, esp. 181. For these and other scholars who have argued for "extremely low" Corinthian dates see R. J. Hopper, "Addenda to *Necrocorinthia*", *BSA* 44 (1949) 162–257 and D. A. Amyx, *Corinthian Vase-Painting of the Archaic Period: Vol II, Commentary: The Study of Corinthian Vases* (California 1988) 403–413.

[124] Amyx, *op. cit.*, 428.

[125] J. K. Anderson, "Old Smyrna: The Corinthian Pottery", *BSA* 53–54 (1958–1959) 138–151, esp. 148.

[126] Cook, Dupont (n. 77) 9.

Langlotz and others) recently revived by Bowden. In Herodotus' digest (1. 16) of Alyattes' four great campaigns (other than Miletus), the conquest of Smyrna is listed after the war against Cyaxares the Mede. If we understand his list to mean consecutive events, then Herodotus thought Smyrna was captured after the Median war (Hdt. 1. 73–74). This culminated famously – partly due to the occurrence of the eclipse allegedly predicted by Thales – in the treaty of 585 BC.[127] Consequently Langlotz dated the sack of Old Smyrna to c. 580 BC.

John Cook, the excavator of Old Smyrna, rejected the idea "as it conflicts with the archaeological evidence and would entail a drastic revision of Corinthian pottery". Appealing to Payne's date from Selinus, he added: "It would be hazardous to interpret the literary evidence in a way which would make it necessary to bring down the lower limit of the Early Corinthian style to a date considerably after 585 B.C.".[128] It would seem, once again, that the conventional Archaic Greek chronology has been used to influence our understanding of Herodotus. Of course the argument from Herodotus' clipped account is far from conclusive. But the point remains that there is nothing in his account to prevent a date after 580 BC and nothing to support a date early in Alyattes' reign – only a clue suggesting it occurred late. Thus apart from the 'known' pottery dating, there is no objection to Langlotz's date of c. 580 BC – or even 575 BC. Ironically this was the range originally preferred by Robert Cook; in the very paper where he dismissed Gjerstad's Naukratis chronology he stated that Old Smyrna was "destroyed late in the first quarter of the century"![129]

Old Smyrna also provides a control on the Francis and Vickers model. They argued that its destruction date could be lowered from c. 600 BC to c. 540 BC, by linking it with the campaign of Harpagus the Mede who subdued the Ionian cities for the Persian conqueror Cyrus (Hdt. 1. 162). In support, Vickers argued for greater respect for the Herodotean tradition concerning Naukratis and noted an apparent anomaly.[130] The Chian amphora which Petrie published from his notorious burnt stratum is similar both to examples from Old Smyrna (conventionally before 600 BC) and those from Tel Defenneh sealed with the cartouche of Amasis already mentioned. Cook

---

[127] See D. Panchenko, "Democritus' Trojan Era and the Foundations of Early Greek Chronology", *Hyperboreus* 6 (2000): 1, 31–78, esp. 67 n. 85.

[128] J. M. Cook, "Old Smyrna, 1948–1951", *BSA* 53–54 (1958–1959) 1–34, esp. 26.

[129] Cook (n. 17) 89.

[130] Vickers (n. 31) 18–19.

acknowledged this as a "positive argument" for a revision, but he had to point out that their dating of the sack of Smyrna as late as 540 BC would make the observation "backfire" – as the amphorae from the Old Smyrna destruction are "early in the [Chian] series, the Amasis ones late".[131] But, as we have seen, we are not restricted to the choices of 600 BC and 540 BC for the fall of Smyrna – a date around 575 BC is also plausible. The chronology argued here would bring the Smyrna and Naukratis amphorae much closer in time, but also keep them in their correct relative order: the former deposited before c. 575 BC, the latter after 570 BC.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

An Archaic chronology can be developed which harmonises the fixed points offered by Herodotus (Alyattes and Smyrna; Amasis and Naukratis; Cambyses and Greeks in Egypt) with the relative ceramic dating.[132] If we allow that the Scarab Factory at Naukratis was a Phoenician concern, closed when the site was granted to the Greeks near the beginning of the reign of Amasis, the same chronology does justice not only to the testimony of Herodotus but to the Egyptian (scarab) evidence, the stratigraphic observations of Gjerstad and the generally accepted dating of the Cypriote sculptures.[133]

Such a model is attractive, especially as it allows Herodotus' account and the Egyptian evidence to intertwine at different levels, both historical and archaeological. It would not seem to face any concrete obstacles in the Aegean world or in Egypt.[134] The only apparent conflict with such a Herodotean/pharaonic chronology concerns the Palestinian sites with finds of Corinthian and East Greek pottery similar to that of Old Smyrna and Naukratis. However, the dating of these Palestinian sites remains *sub judice*. There are major uncertainties about the local pottery chronology, compli-

---

[131] Cook (n. 31) 165, citing Dupont. See n. 102 above.

[132] Bowden (n. 3, 1991) 51; (n. 3, 1996) 28 n. 61 touches on a further case, Tocra in Cyrenaica, where he feels the conventional dating of the earliest settlement (with EC pottery) can only be maintained at the expense of distorting Hdt. 4. 1. 59.

[133] It is significant that Gjerstad's low chronological scheme for Cyprus was itself based on scarab dating – for comment and references see Sørenson (n. 75); James et al. (n. 23) 153–154, 367 n. 37.

[134] There is not space here for a full discussion of all the proposed 'fixed' points for late 7th–6th century Greek pottery. But see e. g. J. Boardman, ("Dates and Doubts", *Archäologischer Anzeiger* [1988] 423–425) who allows that a compression of 25 years in the internal chronology of 6th-century Attic vase painting would be biologically feasible in terms of the life-spans of the known painters.

cated by circularity of argument with borrowing from the Greek dates. I hope to address this question in detail elsewhere.

In his incisive review of the Francis and Vickers chronology Cook stressed the value of their critical work and concluded: "The conventional absolute chronology is much less sure than is often supposed... There is continuing need for minor modifications of the relative chronology, for example that of much East Greek pottery; and stylistically determined sequences are always liable to be too rigid".[135] As it has now done for well over a century, a combination of literary and archaeological evidence from Naukratis strongly argues for such a modification. Its promise as a fixed point in Archaic chronology – perceived long ago by Hogarth and Gjerstad – has never been realised. The time may now be ripe for the evidence from Naukratis to come into its own.[136]

Peter James
London

Геродот относит возникновение греческой колонии в Навкратисе ко времени фараона Амасиса (570–526 гг. до н. э.). Обычно считается, что археология опровергла Геродота, поскольку из принятой системы датировки архаической керамики следует, что колония была основана в конце VII в. до н. э. Однако рассмотрение совокупности археологических и исторических данных подводит к выводу, что Геродот прав, а в системе датировки по керамике кроется ошибка. Материалы Навкратиса (а также Селинунта и Смирны) побуждают заключить, что основанная на керамике хронологическая система должна быть сдвинута вниз от рубежа VII–VI вв. на 25–35 лет.

[135] Cook (n. 31) 170.

[136] For help and encouragement I would like to thank Alan Griffiths and Dmitri Panchenko, and for reading various sections and providing specialist comments Robert Morkot (Egyptology), Pamela Gaber (Cypriot sculpture), Nick Thorpe (archaeological methodology) but especially Nikos Kokkinos (for many years of joint research and discussion of Greek chronology). All errors of judgement are naturally my own.

ENCORE UNE FOIS À PROPOS DE L'ORIGINE DE LA FORMALISATION DU RAISONNEMENT CHEZ LES GRECS *

Dans mon livre "L'éclosion culturelle dans la Grèce ancienne aux VIII^e–V^e siècles av. J.-C." [1] je m'efforçai de défendre contre l'opinion maintenant prédominante la suggestion de T. Gomperz que la construction d'un discours en chaîne de syllogismes avait pris naissance dans les mathématiques grecques d'où elle fut empruntée par les philosophes et orateurs. Maintenant je me propose de réfuter quelques objections contre ma thèse et de l'appuyer par un examen de l'histoire de l'usage des termes αἴτημα, ἀξίωμα, ὁμολόγημα et surtout θεώρημα, qui sont communs aux discours philosophique et mathématique. Je pense qu'un tel examen plaide en faveur de la priorité de l'usage mathématique. Si mes considérations sont justes, c'est encore un exemple frappant de l'influence que la science grecque a exercée, dès ses débuts, sur les idées et les formes de l'expression de la philosophie préhellénistique.

* * *

Les lois de la logique aristotélicienne semblent régler la pensée d'*homo sapiens* dans les occupations pratiques dès le bas paléolithique, et dans la culture grecque déjà les poèmes d'Homère abondent en conclusions correctes,[2] y compris en telle forme plus compliquée qui est la preuve par le contraire: par exemple, *Il.* I, 163–171; *Od.* VIII, 159–165; Hes. *Opp.* 213–218).[3] Mais la formulation explicite de ces lois a été préparée seulement au

---

* Nous publions le texte de l'exposé de A. I. Zaicev au X^e Congrès de la FIEC (Quebec 1994). Les éditeurs de l'*Hyperboreus* remercient profondement M. Leonid Zhmud qui a révu de manuscript et préparé la version imprimée, ainsi que Mme et M. Te Riele et M. Vsevolod Zeltchenko qui ont corrigé le texte français.

[1] En russe: Leningrad 1985 (St-Pétersbourg ²2001); traduction allemande: A. Zaicev, *Das Griechische Wunder. Die Entstehung der griechischen Zivilisation* (Konstanz 1993) 172 f.

[2] A. Phalet, "Het ontstaan van het bewijs in het Griekse denken", in: *Anamnesis. Gedenkboek prof. dr. E. A. Leemans* (Brugge 1970) 269–289; J. Waszkiewicz, A. Wojciechowska, "On the origin of the reductio ad absurdum", *AAHung* 33 (1990–1992) 229–235.

[3] Waszkiewicz, Wojciechowska, *ibid.*

cours du "miracle grec" et achevée par Aristote.[4] On commence à former les chaînes de syllogismes pour mieux prouver la thèse soutenue. Mais les détails de ce développement sont discutés avec animation. Dans quelle sorte d'argumentation a-t-on pour la première fois eu recours à l'explicitation du raisonnement: dans les constructions philosophiques, dans les discours judiciaires et politiques ou dans des démonstrations mathématiques? C'est la première réponse qui semble être la plus en vogue aujourd'hui[5] et prédomine absolument en Russie.[6] Son promoteur principal est l'érudit hongrois A. Szabó.[7]

Plusieurs font prévaloir la priorité des mathématiques dont les époux Kneale et T. Gomperz.[8] Certains savants semblent supposer le développement parallèle dans les diverses branches de l'évolution culturelle.[9] O. Gigon et mon maître S. Luria cherchaient les débuts de la logique

---

[4] W. C. Kneale, "Priority in the Use of reductio ad absurdum", in: *Problems in the Philosophy of Mathematics*. Ed. by I. Lakatos (Amsterdam 1967) 9–10; J. R. Lucas, "Plato and the Axiomatic Method", *ibid.*, 11–14; P. Bernays, "Some Doubts about the Eleatic Origin of Euclid's Axiomatics", *ibid.*, 14–16; W. Kneale, M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford 1962) 1 ff.

[5] A. Szabó, *The Beginnings of Greek Mathematics* (Budapest–Dordrecht 1978); J. Waszkiewicz, "The Influence of Cultural Background on the Development of Mathematics", *Organon* 16/17 (1980–1981) 93–113; W. Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge, Mass. 1972) 425–426; voir aussi: G. Cambiano, "La démonstration géométrique", in: *Les savoirs de l'écriture en Grèce ancienne*. Sous la dir. de M. Detienne (Lille 1988) 251–272 (v. 263).

[6] Voir, par exemple: *Начала Евклида ("Les Eléments" d'Euclide)*. Пер. Д. Д. Мордухай-Болтовского. I (М.–Л. 1950) 262; В. Т. Ополев, *Процедура аргументации в период формирования науки: философские проблемы аргументации* (V. T. Opolev, *Les procédés d'argumentation à l'époque de la formation de la science: Les problèmes philosophiques de l'argumentation)* (Ереван 1986) 77–86; С. С. Купцов, *Развитие логических идей в древнегреческой философии (период ранней и средней классики)* (S. S. Kouptsov, *Le developpement des idées logiques dans la philosophie grecque de l'époque classique)* (Минск 1987) 14.

[7] Résumé court: A. Szabó, "Greek Dialectic and Euclid's Axiomatics", in: *Problems in the philosophy of mathematics*, 1–8.

[8] T. Gomperz, *Griechische Denker* I (Leipzig ^{4}1922) 139; A. Rey, *La jeunesse de la science grecque* (Paris 1933) 191, 202 sv.; H. Cherniss, "The Characteristics and Effects of Presocratic Philosophy", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 12 (1951): 3, 319–345 (v. 336) = idem, *Selected Papers* (Leyden 1977) 62–88 (v. 79); F. M. Cornford, *Principium sapientiae: The Origins of Greek Philosophical Thought* (Cambridge 1952) 117; K. Reidemeister, *Das exakte Denken der Griechen* (Leipzig 1949) 10 ff.; B. L. van der Waerden, *Science Awakening* II: *The Birth of Astronomy* (Leyden 1974) 247; W. Kneale, M. Kneale (n. 4) 8.

[9] Waszkiewicz, Wojciechowska (n. 2).

dans la discussion judiciaire et politique, mais cette position est rarement défendue.[10]

La position des participants de cette controverse est déterminée souvent par la foi dans le rôle décisif de la philosophie dans l'évolution de toute culture intellectuelle de l'humanité. W. Burkert écrit notamment:

> In discussing Being, Parmenides discovered the independence of thought; and deductive mathematics as well as logic took rise from this beginning; from the point of view of the development of thought, ontology is prior to the formal schematism.[11]

Mais l'influence des schémas formels sur la philosophie est indéniable: par exemple, notre siècle a éprouvé l'influence renversante du théorème de Gödel. Un événement pareil a été possible aux confins du VI^{e} et V^{e} siècles aussi.[12] Il nous faut suivre la piste.

Je pense que l'argumentation discursive explicite a pris sa source dans le seul domaine où elle est vraiment effective, c'est-à-dire, dans les mathématiques et du même coup avec la naissance même des mathématiques comme science, c'est-à-dire les mathématiques déductives. Dans l'atmosphère de compétition universelle, qui favorisait n'importe quel succés, y compris intellectuel,[13] est née l'ambition de rendre incontestables en premier lieu les acquisitions de la géométrie empirique. Thalès de Milet a le premier pris cette voie.

Je ne partage ni le scepticisme radical de D. R. Dicks[14] sur les connaissances mathématiques de Thalès ni l'estimation très optimiste de B. L. van der Waerden.[15] La position plus nuancée de Caveing me semble préfé-

---

[10] O. Gigon, *Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie* (Basel–Stuttgart ^{2}1968) 251; С. Я. Лурье, *Теория бесконечно малых у древних атомистов* (S. Luria, *La théorie des infinement petits chez les atomistes anciens)* (M. 1935) 160–162; idem, *Архимед* (Archimède) (M.–Л. 1945).

[11] Burkert, *op. cit.*, 426.

[12] W. R. Knorr, "On the Early History of Axiomatics: The Interaction of Mathematics and Philosophy in Greek Antiquity", in: J. Hintikka et al. (ed.), *Theory Change, Ancient Axiomatics, and Galileo's Methodology* I (Dordrecht 1981) 145 ff.

[13] J'ai essayé de décrire cette atmosphère dans mon livre: Zaicev, *Das Griechische Wunder*, 77 ff. V. aussi: P. Lorenzen, *Die Entstehung der exakten Wissenschaften* (Berlin 1960) 41: "Der agonale Mensch dieser Jahrhunderte, von –800 bis –500, ist es, dem wir das Wunder der Entstehung der exakten Wissenschaft im heutigen Sinne verdanken".

[14] D. R. Dicks, "Thales", *ClQ* 9 (1959) 294–309.

[15] B. L. van der Waerden, *Science Awakening: Egyptian, Babylonian and Greek Mathematics* (Groningen 1954 = New York 1963) 88–90.

rable.[16] Selon la tradition, que nous n'avons pas de motif à rejeter, Thalès a démontré ou trouvé les premières propositions géométriques.[17] Mais parmi ces propositions les deux premières semblent être évidentes, de sorte qu'on ne peut pas comprendre qu'entend notre tradition par la démonstration ou l'invention, sinon la déduction pas-à-pas. Certes, il ne faut pas prêter à Thalès la preuve stricte selon les normes du temps d'Euclide, mais quand on allègue qu'Eudème de Rhode dit que Thalès ἔδειξε sa proposition (littéralement "montré"), non ἀπέδειξε ("démontré"), il faut rappeler qu'Eudème se servit du même mot δείκνυμι en parlant des démonstrations exactes d'Hippocrate de Chios (fr. 140, p. 59. 20 Wehrli).[18] À Thalès appartenait sans aucun doute un discours qu'il croyait être une preuve définitive et, selon toute vraisemblance, ses interlocuteurs le croyaient aussi.

Je crois avec van der Waerden malgrè l'avis contraire de J. Goodfield and S. Toulmin,[19] que l'ingénieur Eupalinos, qui a construit un tunnel droit dans Samos ca. 530, se servit déjà des premiers résultats de la géométrie en développement.[20] Et, comme dit Ch. Kahn, sans doute les rudiments de géométrie étaient la part essentielle de formation d'Anaximandre à l'école de Thalès.[21] Il est très improbable que son maniement du gnomon ne fût pas influencé par les découvertes géométriques.

Parallèlement était construit peu à peu un système d'assertions de départ: ὅροι, αἰτήματα, κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι.[22] C'est pourquoi je ne crois pas que la théorie du pair et impair fût "le plus ancien morceau des mathématiques déductives connu par nous", comme maintient Szabó, qui s'appuie ici sur les recherches de O. Becker sur l'arithmétique pythagoricienne.[23] Les débuts de la géométrie semblent être plus anciens, quoique nous les connaissions

---

[16] M. Caveing, *La constitution du type mathématique de l'idéalité dans la pensée grecque* II (Lille 1982) 20–525, 529 svv.; v. aussi: E. Stenius, "Foundations of Mathematics: Ancient Greek and Modern", *Dialectica* 32 (1978) 255–289 (v. 258).

[17] Eudem. Rhod. Fr. 134–135 Wehrli; cf. fr. 133, p. 54. 18–21 Wehrli.

[18] Caveing, *op. cit.*, 698.

[19] J. Goodfield, S. Toulmin, "How was the Tunnel of Eupalinos Aligned?", *Isis* 56 (1965) 46–55.

[20] Van der Waerden (n. 15) 142–144; Caveing, *op. cit.*, 715–716; W. A. Heidel, "The Pythagoreans and Greek Mathematics", *AJP* 41 (1940) 1–33 (v. 30).

[21] Ch. H. Kahn, *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology* (New York 1960) 77.

[22] Szabó (n. 5) 260.

[23] *Ibid.*, 266. Voir: O. Becker, "Die Lehre von Geraden und Ungeraden im Neunten Buch der Euklidischen Elemente (1934)", in: idem (Hg.), *Zur Geschichte der griechischen Mathematik* (Darmstadt 1965) 125–145.

remaniés dans le livre I d'Euclide. Le présomptif manuel pythagoricien de géométrie[24] doit avoir été déjà bâti comme une chaîne de théorèmes. Tel était certainement le manuel d'Hippocrate de Chios (ca. 430). Si, comme affirment plusieurs savants,[25] le manuel pythagoricien n'existait pas en fait, le développement de l'argumentation géométrique était néanmoins tellement impétueux de Thalès à Hippocrate qu'il nous faut présumer un progrès considérable déjà dans la première génération après Thalès, au milieu du VI[e] siècle,[26] c'est-à-dire avant Parménide. Je suis heureux de pouvoir m'appuyer sur la conclusion de Caveing: "Il faudrait conclure que toute la première partie du I[er] livre d'Euclide que Proclus arrête après I, 26 n'est que la mise en forme de l'apport de la géométrie ionienne primitive".[27]

Que savons-nous sur le développement de l'argumentation discursive chez les philosophes? La preuve par le contraire peut être reconstruite pour Xénophane (fr. 23–26, 14, 15, 11 DK), pour Héraclite (fr. 40, 91, 110, 127 DK), mais elle n'est pas explicite. N. Hartmann a vu une argumentation indirecte chez Anaximandre,[28] mais faut-il croire qu'elle a été explicite? Nous voyons la méthode de démonstration discursive, y compris la preuve par le contraire, déjà achevée chez Zénon d'Elée. Le fragment renommé de son maître Parménide sur l'ὄν et μὴ ὄν (28 B 2 DK) est déjà à la limite d'être un syllogisme disjonctif explicite:[29]

> ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι,
> πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος· ἀληθείῃ γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ·
> ἡ δ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι,
> τὴν δή τοι φράζω παναπευθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπόν·
> οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐόν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν)
> οὔτε φράσαις...

Au fond à ce syllogisme disjonctif ne manque que la conclusion: la première voie est donc la vraie. Mais les preuves par le contraire dans la

---

[24] P. Tannéry, *La géométrie grecque* (Paris 1887) 81 sv.; van der Waerden (n. 15) 116 f.

[25] T. L. Heath, *A History of Greek Mathematics* I (Oxford 1921) 166.

[26] Cf. Caveing (n. 16) 521.

[27] Caveing, *op. cit.*, 556; cf. B. L. van der Waerden, "Die Postulate und Konstruktionen in der frühgriechischen Geometrie", *Archive for History of Exact Sciences* 18 (1978) 343–357.

[28] N. Hartmann, *Platos Logik des Seins* (Giessen 1909) 13–19.

[29] Un syllogisme disjonctif chez Parménide: J. Mansfeld, *Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt.* Diss. (Utrecht – Assen 1964) 58–59. Cf. Gigon (n. 10) 250; Szabó (n. 5) 309.

géométrie prennent naissance non seulement avant Zénon, mais aussi avant Parménide. Déjà la génération de géomètres après Thalès semble pratiquer la preuve par le contraire. D'habitude on cite en exemple de l'ancienne preuve par le contraire la proposition X, 117 d'Euclide (peut-être une interpolation) sur l'incommensurabilité de la diagonale d'un carré avec son côté, prouvée sans doute dans l'école de Pythagore.[30]

Mais la proposition Eucl. I, 6 "Si dans un triangle deux angles sont égaux, les côtés situés vis-à-vis ces angles sont égaux aussi" est prouvée par la méthode apagogique aussi, qui semble ici facile et naturelle. Ce théorème est inverse à la proposition que les angles à la base du triangle isocèle sont égaux, proposition prouvée par Thalès, et elle aurait été démontrée tout de suite après le théorème droit de Thalès. Nous ne connaissons pas d'autres preuves antiques de ce théorème. La proposition Eucl. I, 26 prouvée chez Euclide par le contraire aussi était prouvée déjà par Thalès même, mais probablement par supposition.[31] A. Phalet dit en citant T. Heath que ce théorème peut être facilement prouvé par des méthodes directes.[32] Mais Heath note que les autres voies de la preuve, voies droites, dépendent de la proposition I, 26, dont la preuve stricte donnée par Euclide est par le contraire aussi:[33] il semble qu'il serait très difficile de bâtir même le premier massif de la géométrie naissante sans recours à la preuve par le contraire.[34]

Parménide ne fait aucune allusion à ses devanciers géomètres, nous dit Burkert, qui argumente en faveur de l'école d'Élée.[35] Mais cela ne prouve rien! L'explicitation d'une démonstration, une fois atteinte, pouvait sembler une chose sans importance, connue depuis longtemps. Parménide peut-être ne s'aperçut même pas de son emprunt. Et de plus la forme même de son discours – la révélation d'une déesse, en hexamètres – se conforme mal à la citation des sources.

Et maintenant sur la terminologie. Bernays, qui n'accepte pas la thèse principale de l'influence éléatique sur le développement de la preuve mathématique, concède néanmoins que la terminologie de la preuve en mathématiques, comme nous assure Szabó, provient en fait de souche dialectique.[36] Voyons!

---

[30] W. Kneale, M. Kneale (n. 4) 8.

[31] Phalet (n. 2).

[32] *The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements*. Transl. with comm. by T. L. Heath. I (New York ²1956) 258.

[33] *Ibid.*, 258; 301–305.

[34] *Начала Евклида* I, 262–264.

[35] Burkert (n. 5) 426.

[36] Bernays (n. 4) 14–16.

Malheureusement l'œuvre admirable de Ch. Mugler[37] ne nous vient pas en aide, parce qu'il ne traite pas les origines prégéométriques des termes. Mais aujourd'hui nous sommes équipés par le TLG dans l'ordinateur, et voici quelques observations. Il faut rejeter l'idée que les termes généraux de la construction déductive (ἀξίωμα, αἴτημα, θεώρημα) aient été empruntés par les mathématiciens aux philosophes. Les mathématiciens grecs ont formé cette terminologie en s'appuyant sur la langue commune et, peut-être, sur la langue poétique aussi, comme ont fait leurs confrères les médecins grecs. Le terme ὅρος "définition", commun aux mathématiques et à la philosophie, provient évidemment de la vie quotidienne. Le mot ὑπόθεσις se présente dans l'"Éducation de Cyrus" de Xénophon dans le contexte des relations humaines: τὴν ἐν φίλοις δικαιοτάτην ὑπόθεσιν ἔχω ὑποτιθέναι (V, 5, 13). Le même chez Isocrate (6, 90; 1, 48; 7, 28; 8, 18) et dans le Corpus Hippocraticum (*VM* 13 Heiberg: τῶν ... τὴν τέχνην ζητεύντων ἐξ ὑποθέσιος λόγων – "arguments seeking to derive the medical art from an assumption"; *VM* 1 Heiberg: ὑπόθεσιν αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ὑποθέμενοι τῷ λόγῳ; *VM* 15 Heiberg: ἄγοντες ... ἐπὶ ὑπόθεσιν τὴν τέχνην).

La provenance quotidienne des mots ὁμόλογος et ὁμολογέω semble évidente. Le terme grec mathématique pour *postulatum* αἴτημα se rencontre pour nous pour la première fois chez Platon (*Rep.* 566 b, cf. Arist. *An. Post.* I, 10, 76 b 27–35), mais non comme un terme philosophique, mais dans la signification commune de demande (un tyran exige du peuple une garde). Le mot αἴτημα rappelle certes l'atmosphère d'un dialogue, non pas nécessairement dialectique parmi les philosophes, mais aussi parmi les collègues mathématiciens ou entre le maître de géométrie et son élève, comme nous dit Proclus.[38] Le mot ἀξίωμα émerge pour nous pour la première fois dans l'"Œdipe à Colone" (v. 1451) comme ἀξίωμα δαιμόνων – la demande des dieux: mais cette acception dans la langue commune ou poétique est le meilleur point de départ pour le développement du terme mathématique ἀξίωμα (cf. Arist. *An. Post.* I, 2, 72 a 14–18); c'est pourquoi je suis d'accord avec Szabó: ἀξίωμα était primordialement le synonyme exact du αἴτημα.[39]

Et enfin le mot θεώρημα, dérivé du θεωρέω, appartenait aussi à la langue commune. Par exemple, Demosthène se servit de ce mot dans sa harangue "Sur la couronne" pour désigner la contemplation des monu-

---

[37] Ch. Mugler, *Dictionnaire historique de la terminologie géométrique des Grecs* I–II (Paris 1958–1959).

[38] Procl. *In Eucl.*, 76. 17 sq. Friedlein; Stenius (n. 16) 255–289.

[39] *Ibid.*, 287.

ments de la gloire ancienne d'Athènes (§ 68). Platon (*Leg.* 953 a) dans le contexte à demi sacré parle de μουσῶν θεωρήματα sans aucune allusion philosophique. Mais la quête générale dans toute littérature grecque par l'ordinateur avec l'aide du programme "Musaeus" a mis à notre disposition trois relativement anciens endroits où θεώρημα prend l'acception intermédiaire entre les acceptions de la langue commune et le sens du théorème mathématique. Voici ces endroits: Aristote dans ses "Météorologiques" dit que la Terre est beaucoup moins grande que certaines étoiles et ajoute que cela ἤδη... ὦπται διὰ τῶν ἀστρολογικῶν θεωρημάτων (I, 3, 339 b 8): c'est-à-dire est déjà vu par les θεωρήματα astronomiques. Mais ces θεωρήματα peuvent être seulement la combinaison d'observations et d'un raisonnement mathématique. La même valeur se trouve dans un autre passage des "Météorologiques": καθάπερ δείκνυται νῦν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀστρολογίαν θεωρήμασιν (I, 8, 345 b 1–2), "comme on prouve dans les théorèmes astronomiques", cette fois que le Soleil est plus grand que la Terre et la distance de la Terre jusqu'aux étoiles fixes est plus grande que la distance jusqu'au Soleil. Le verbe δείκνυμι est employé ici dans le sens intermédiaire entre commun "montrer" et mathématique "démontrer". Et enfin dans les "Mécaniques" pseudo-aristotéliciennes nous lisons κοινὰ τῶν τε μαθηματικῶν θεωρημάτων καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν (847 a 18–19), – la même combinaison de l'expérience sensuelle et du raisonnement mathématique.

Le mot ὁμολόγημα se rencontre dans nos textes pour la première fois chez Platon, mais ce substantif est un derivé automatique du verbe ὁμολογέω, qui était employé par Hérodote, Thucydide, Xénophon et comptait certes parmi les mots du langage ordinaire.

Et encore une considération: L'emprunt de la méthode de la preuve par les géomètres à Parménide ou Zénon est extrêmement improbable pour raisons générales. Faut-il croire que les géomètres du V^e^ siècle acceptassent les conclusions métaphysiques de Parménide ou l'impossibilité de mouvement que prêchait Zénon? Sinon, à quoi bon emprunter la méthode de raisonnement qui aboutit aux conclusions manifestement fausses? Je puis accepter seulement que les géomètres grecs, comme nous dit Szabó, ont introduit certains axiomes nouveaux pour se défendre contre les attaques de Zénon, mais c'est toute autre chose.[40] Je crois que l'emprunt de la preuve déductive a eu lieu dans la direction contraire, c'est-à-dire de la géométrie, où elle avait déjà donné les résultats éclatants, à la philosophie,

[40] Voir aussi: Bernays (n. 4) 14–16.

où presque tout dépend non du procédé de l'argumentation, mais des prémisses de départ. En effet, en Europe nouvelle le prestige des mathématiques, la confiance en des preuves mathématiques étaient autant inébranlables que plusieurs générations de philosophes de Spinoza jusqu'aux épigones de Leibniz et Wolf essayaient de construire des systèmes philosophiques *more geometrico*, comme a dit Spinoza. Je suis sûr qu'une pareille influence des mathématiques sur la philosophie, sur l'école d'Élée particulièrement, a eu lieu déjà au seuil du V^{e} siècle à l'aube de la géométrie grecque.

† Alexander Zaicev

В публикуемом посмертно докладе, прочитанном на конференции FIEC в 1994 г., автор приводит ряд дополнительных соображений в защиту ранее высказанной им в монографии "Культурный переворот в Древней Греции VIII–V вв до н. э." точки зрения, согласно которой первыми начали строить цепочки силлогизмов греческие геометры. Примитивные дедуктивные доказательства можно обнаружить уже у Фалеса, хотя противники защищаемой точки зрения ссылаются на то, что во фрагменте Евдема Родосского о Фалесе сказано, что он ἔδειξε свои теоремы, а не ἀπέδειξε. Этот аргумент нельзя считать состоятельным: Евдем употребляет глагол ἔδειξε и в отношении строгих доказательств Гиппократа Хиосского.

Поддерживается также соображение М. Кавена: если не принять открытия Фалеса в первой половине VI в., остается слишком мало времени для развития геометрии до того очень высокого уровня, который мы видим у Гиппократа Хиосского в середине V в.

Наконец, обследование всего корпуса текстов греческой письменности, которое стало возможным с помощью электронного "Тезауруса греческого языка", подводит к выводу, что основные термины геометрических доказательств восходят к обыденной и поэтической лексике и, скорее всего, взяты геометрами именно из нее, а не возникли в ходе философских дискуссий, как пытался показать А. Сабо.

SCYLAX' CIRCUMNAVIGATION OF INDIA AND ITS INTERPRETATION IN EARLY GREEK GEOGRAPHY, ETHNOGRAPHY AND COSMOGRAPHY, II*

THE MONSOONS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS FOUND IN THE SEA SOUTH OF AFRICA

It is said in the *Meteorologics* of Aristotle (363 a 5):

> περὶ τὴν ἔξω Λιβύης θάλατταν τὴν νοτίαν ... εὖροι καὶ ζέφυροι διαδεχόμενοι συνεχεῖς ἀεὶ πνέουσιν.
>
> In the sea south of Libya east and west winds alternate with each other continuously.

This striking assertion has not received the attention that it deserves. The one point worth noting is that Aristotle, while speaking about the sea south of Libya, claims to know something that was not in Herodotus' story of the Phoenician circumnavigation of Africa and that came from the books and not from a new circumnavigation. But it is the characterisation of the winds that is directly relevant to our purpose. While other commentators remain silent about this, H. D. P. Lee notes: "Perhaps the Trade Winds in the Indian Ocean". His hesitation is quite understandable. What Aristotle says about the winds is wrong as applied to the sea south of Africa ("Libya"). However, it is basically correct in respect to the sea east of Africa. The question is, then, of how the monsoons of the Indian Ocean could have been misplaced in the sea south of Africa.[1]

One can hardly doubt that the *Meteorologics* was written before Alexander's return to Babylon and Nearchus' naval expedition. Scylax is the

---

* The Part I, devoted mostly to the route of Scylax' expedition, see in *Hyperboreus* 4 (1998): 2, 211–242. See also my papers in *Hyperboreus* 5 (1999): 2, 341–345; 8 (2002): 1, 5–12. English translations of the Greek and Latin authors quoted in this paper come from the *Loeb Classical Library;* minor modifications are not specified.

[1] It would be groundless to assume that Aristotle means in fact something like "the sea far in the south, east of Libya". One might object that since the passage describes the conditions of the northern hemisphere, the sea in question cannot be south of Africa. But Aristotle's idea of how far Africa ('Libya') stretches towards the south was very different from ours. One may recall Strabo for whom it is a matter of course that the equatorial area is occupied by the ocean (2. 3. 3; cf. 2. 5. 35). Nor can I approve the assertion by A. Rehm, "Etesiai", *RE* 6 (1907) 713–717, esp. 716: "vom Monsun des Indischen Ozeans hat ja Aristoteles noch keine Kunde".

only plausible source for early Greek knowledge of the monsoons. But Scylax never sailed south of Africa and he could not place the monsoons there. A simple explanation to the paradox is available. The Ethiopians were known at the late sixth century BC as the black (Xenophanes B 16 DK) and the "farthermost of men" (*Od.* 1. 23) and also as dwelling in the extreme east (Mimn. 5. 9 Gentili–Prato; *Od.* 1. 24). When Scylax saw the black people of India, he could easily treat them as the Ethiopians and their country as Ethiopia. It is also possible that these names were applied to India and its population by Hecataeus who used Scylax' account and whose work was better known and more influential than the latter. As a matter of fact, Herodotus speaks of the "Ethiopians of the east" who "served with the Indians" in Xerxes' army (7. 70). Ephorus cites "the ancient view" according to which "the nation of the Ethiopians stretches from the winter sunrise to sunset", thus occupying the whole southern part of the oikumene (*FGrH* 70 F 30; Strab. 1. 2. 28). It was natural for a writer who held such a view to refer to the monsoons of the Indian Ocean as the alternating winds in the sea south of Ethiopia. Now, the ancient citations from the work by Hecataeus imply that he divided the oikumene into two parts, Europe and Asia. Later on the division into three parts, Europe, Asia, and Libya became predominant, as attested to already in Herodotus (4. 42–45). On such a new division, Ethiopia was attached to Libya. Accordingly the sea south of Ethiopia became the sea south of Libya.

ETHIOPIA, INDIAN AND LIBYAN

Scholars have repeatedly observed that our sources locate the same phenomena in India, Ethiopia or Libya.[2]

Herodotus places the horned asses and the dog-headed people in western parts of Libya (4. 191). Ctesias locates both in India and has much to say about them (*FGrH* 688 F 45. 37 ff.; 45 ff.). In the same passage Herodotus mentions "the headless that have their eyes in their breasts", and "the wild men and women". Also Pliny mentions among the peoples of Africa the Blemmyae who "are reported to have no heads, their mouth and eyes being attached to their chests" (5. 45), but elsewhere he uses Ctesias to refer to Indian people "without necks, having their eyes in their shoulders" (7. 23;

[2] E. A. Schwanbeck, *Megasthenis Indica* (Bonn 1846) 1–5 n. 1; A. Dihle, *Antike und Orient: Gesammelte Aufsätze* (Heidelberg 1984) 50 f. n. 6; K. Karttunen, *India in Early Greek Literature* (Helsinki 1989) 137 n. 6. Many of the examples cited below are borrowed from these books.

FGrH 688 F 51). Herodotus' "wild men and women" are apparently Pliny's Satyrs, the inhabitants of Libya which "have nothing of ordinary humanity about them except human shape" (5. 45). But these Satyrs, "sometimes going on all fours and sometimes standing upright, like human beings", are again found in India (Plin. 7. 24, cf. Ctesias, F 51). Herodotus (3. 102) made famous Indian gold-digging ants, but Sophocles mentioned them in his play called *Aethiopes* (F 29 Radt); Philostratus (*Vit. Apoll.* 6. 1) unambiguously placed them in Ethiopia. There were rumours about hyenas able to imitate human speech; Agatharchides associates them with Ethiopia (Phot. *Bibl.* 456 a 3), but Porphyrius (*Abst.* 3. 4) locates them in India. Herodotus assures that there are no wild boars in Libya (4. 192); Ctesias makes the analogous statement about India (F 45. 27; cf. Ael. *NA* 16. 37). Aelian says: "Among the people called Psylli in India (there are other Psylli in Libya also) the horses are bigger than rams, the sheep look as small as lambs, etc." The Libyan Psylli appear in Herodotus according to whom, however, they all perished in the sand (4. 173); Hecataeus (F 332) mentioned Ψυλλικὸς κόλπος in Libya. Ctesias (F 51; cf. Scylax F 6 and 7 a) locates the Cave-dwellers (the *Troglodytae*) in India, but Herodotus (4. 183) and Pliny (5. 45) place the Cave-dwellers in Libya. Already Homer speaks of the Pygmies (*Il.* 3. 3 ff.). Philostratus places them in Ethiopia (*Vit. Apoll.* 6. 25), yet the same author makes the Pygmies dwell in India beyond the Ganges (3. 47). Megasthenes knows of the Pygmies in India too (*FGrH* 715 F 27, 29; Strab. 2. 1. 9; 15. 1. 57; Plin. 7. 26, cf. 6. 70).[3] Diodorus (2. 15. 1; 3. 9. 3) and Strabo (17. 2. 3) say that the Ethiopians pour glass over dead bodies; the story is apparently known already to Herodotus (3. 24) who has, however, transparent stone instead of glass. Lucian (*Luct.* 21) ascribes the same custom to the Indians. Indian Gymnosophists were famous in antiquity; however, we find Ethiopian ones as well (Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* 6. 6; Heliod. *Aeth.* 10. 2 ff.). Already Hellanicus (*FGrH* 4 F 190) and later on Megasthenes (*FGrH* 715 F 10 a; Strab. 15. 1. 38) reported on the Indian river Silla (or Sila), where the water is so light that nothing can float on it.[4] Herodotus also refers to such water in Ethiopia (3. 23). The Ethiopians of Herodotus are μακρόβιοι, but long-living people are repeatedly mentioned in connection with India too (Strab. 15. 1. 34, 37; Plin. 6. 91, 7. 27–30). Again, the Ethiopians were reputed to have been four to five cubits high (Ps.-Sc. 112); but

[3] According to Hdt. 7. 70 the eastern Ethiopians in the army of Xerxes had the skins of cranes instead of shields, which can be an echo of geranomachy.

[4] Strabo specifies that neither Democritus nor Aristotle admitted that the report could be true.

Philostratus (*Vit. Apoll.* 2. 4) knows black Indians of the same height. According to Arrian, the Indians are "the tallest men of Asia, mostly five cubits, or very little less, darker-skinned than all other men except the Ethiopians" (*Anab.* 5. 4. 4).[5] Onesicritus says that in southern India "there are men five cubits and two spans high, and people live a hundred and thirty years, and do not grow old but die middleaged" (*FGrH* 134 F 11; Plin. 7. 28).

Scholars tend to interpret the situation in terms of arbitrary locations of marvellous things in extremities of the oikumene.[6] The ancient descriptions of the northern edges of the oikumene would not fit well with such an interpretation. Moreover, the monsoons hardly belong with *mirabilia*, so their appearance in the sea south of Libya should not be explained in terms of arbitrary displacement of marvellous things. And since this case is analogous to the other confusions mentioned above, it is natural to venture an analogous explanation: *Ethiopia,* as a country of the dark-skinned people found by Scylax in Hindustan, was subsequently interpreted by some writers as India and by others as a part of Libya; some simply retained the name.

As a matter of fact, we are told that Scylax located the Sciapodes in India (F 7; as also Ctesias, F 51), but Hecataeus placed them in Ethiopia (F 327; as also Philostratus, *Vit. Apoll.* 6. 25), and Antiphon in Libya (87 B 47 DK; as also almost certainly schol. in Aristoph. *Aves* 1553).[7] The silent trade is also located by various sources in India[8] (Mela 3. 60; Plin. 6. 88), Ethiopia (Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* 6. 2), and Libya (Hdt. 4. 196). A further confirmation comes from Athenaeus (110 e): "Sophocles in *Triptolemus* mentions *orindes* bread, *i. e.* the bread which is made with rice, a seed which grows in Ethiopia and resembles sesame". Rice belongs properly to India, and if Athenaeus was correct interpreting the words of Sophocles, we have a clear case of substituting Ethiopia for India.[9]

---

[5] Also *Periplus Maris Erythraei*, 41 knows very high black people in India. Indian kings Sophites and Porus are said to have been four and five cubits high respectively (Diod. 17. 91. 7; 88. 4; Arr. *Anab.* 5. 19. 4). According to Herodotus 2. 106, four cubits and the half is the height of two figures of a warrior cut in relief, with the equipment that is "both Egyptian and *Ethiopian*".

[6] E. g. A. Dihle, "Arabien und Indien", in: *Hérodote et les peuples non grecs* (Genève 1990) 41 ff., esp. 56; cf. J. S. Romm, *The Edges of the Earth in Ancient Thought* (Princeton 1992) 91.

[7] It was African Ethiopia if Stephanus is correct that Hecataeus spoke of the Sciapodes ἐν Περιηγήσει Αἰγύπτου.

[8] Near India, to be precise, but see the discussion below.

[9] As also Karttunen (n. 2) 87 supposes; cf. Schwanbeck, *loc. cit.*: "Ctesias martichoram Indicam memoraverat ... Plinius, dum Aethiopiam describit, ibi esse

One may consider the possibility of a special role of the stories about the Pygmies in exchanging Indian scenery for Ethiopian. In a passage in which he cites Scylax, Philostratus describes the Pygmies as ὑπόγειοι (*Vit. Apoll.* 3. 47). He says that they dwell beyond the Ganges. The Pygmies identified as ὑπόγειοι or the Troglodytae appear not only in Philostratus, but also in Aristotle who locates them, however, above Egypt.[10] While Aristotle, and Hecataeus before him (*FGrH* 1 F 328), accepted the very existence of the Pygmies, their orthodox location became Ethiopia and not India. The reason for that is easy to see. The Pygmies were mentioned in Homer in connection with the cranes that "flee from wintry storms and measureless rain ... toward the streams of Ocean, bearing slaughter and death to Pigmy men". It was clear that the cranes, to avoid the harshness of winter, fly south and not east. If the Pygmies were recognised as the real people, then their fight with the cranes no longer seemed utterly incredible, and then they were to be located in Ethiopia.[11]

Including the Pygmies among the real people is an instance of the continuity between Greek poetry and science. This became possible because the myth was supported by real knowledge: the reports on African tribes of very small people had reached the fathers of Greek science (Hdt. 2. 32; 4. 43).[12] In the case of the Ethiopians, the influence of poetry upon early science was of a somewhat similar nature: already the myth contained a grain of real knowledge, namely that there are dark-skinned people far in the south.[13]

---

martichoram dicit, ad ipsum Ctesiam auctorem provocans, in qua re vix potest dubitari, quin voce Aethiopiae de India Ctesias usus est".

[10] Aristot. *Hist. an.* 597 a 9 on the Pygmies: τρωγλοδύται δ' εἰσὶ τὸν βίον. Cf. Scylax F 6: Harpocr. s. v. ὑπὸ γῆν οἰκοῦντες· λέγοι ἂν τοὺς ὑπὸ Σκύλακος ἐν τῷ Περίπλῳ λεγομένους Τρωγλοδύτας.

[11] Strab. 1. 2. 28 testifies that the orthodox view located the Pygmies among "the Ethiopians of Egypt". In the words of Aristotle, "the cranes move from the Scythian plains to the marshes above Egypt from where the Nile flows; this is the region whereabouts the Pygmies live" (*Hist. an.* 597 a 5).

[12] Many scholars believe that the myth itself "was inspired by tales which the Greeks heard during their travels to and contacts with Egypt" – G. Ahlberg-Cornell, *Myth and Epos in Early Greek Art* (Jonsered 1992) 139, with references. It is more likely, however, that the myth of geranomachy, known throughout Eurasia, originated in the north rather than south – see: D. Sinor, "The Myth of Languages and the Language of Myth", in: *The Bronze Age and Early Iron Age Peoples of Eastern Central Asia*, ed. by V. H. Mair, 2 (Philadelphia 1998) 729–745.

[13] A. Lesky, "Aithiopika", *Hermes* 87 (1957) 27–38, esp. 33 is prone to derive the colour of the Ethiopians from the belief that the sun burns stronger those who dwell near the place where it rises. This means to see mythical imagination working as scientific speculation of a bad kind. It is likely, moreover, that the location of the Ethiopians near

The question, however, arises as to whether we are dealing with a number of similar, ever recurring mistakes or rather with a single construction. The former can be true in some cases, especially when the competing locations are India and Ethiopia.[14] But there are facts that suggest another explanation for the cases in which competing locations are India and Libya. First, two contemporary authors, Herodotus and Antiphon, locate Indian phenomena in Libya. Second, the whole Herodotus' passage that includes competing locations involves only *western* Libya. The Sciapodes of Libya are located it its south-*western* parts too.[15] We shall shortly see that we are dealing most probably with a conscious work of a theorist.

THE KINGS AND THE CROCODILES

We are told that Scylax' expedition originated with the Great King's desire to make an inquiry into the habitat of the crocodiles. He was perplexed by

---

the sunrise, well attested to by poets, is in fact secondary and postdates the core of the myth. I suppose that the myth of the blessed Ethiopians originated far north from Balkan Greece, among the people who experienced severe winters and for whom those who never did were the blessed (that is, dark-scinned people far in the south). For the people who lived in the climate of Greece and were better aware of the conditions of the far south, this no longer made sense. The association between the Ethiopians and the sun was preserved, but the blessed people were now to be found near the sunrise and (less emphatically) sunset. Whatever the origin of this myth, I find very misleading the main idea of Lesky's elegantly written essay: "Die mythischen Elemente ... sind in vielfacher Veränderungen – fast möchte man von Tarnung sprechen – in das wissenschaftlich fundierte Weltbild späterer Zeiten eingegangen" (38). Since there is no place here to discuss epistemological matters, I will only note that one should not underestimate the difference between myth and science just because both science and tales can be found within a single work composed by one author. It is remarkable that Lesky (35 n. 2) does not see the essential difference between Herodotus' description of the Αἰθίοπες μακρόβιοι (3. 17 ff.) and his passage on nomad Ethiopians (2. 29), while the latter contains nothing of *mirabilia* and belongs to geographical rather than ethnographic genre (it is characteristic that Meroe – "the capital of Ethiopia" – appears only in 2. 29).

[14] Some cases are difficult to interpret. For instance, Cerne, an island located by Hanno, Pseudo-Scylax and Eratosthenes in the Atlantic Ocean against the shores of the Ethiopians, appears in Ephorus (Plin. 6. 198 f.) as situated opposite the Persian Gulf; moreover, in both Pseudo-Scylax and Ephorus the sea is no more navigable beyond Cerne, though for different reasons. It is worth noting that Strab. 1. 3. 2 denies the very existence of this island. Hecateus F 281 mentions Κύρη, an island in the 'Persian sea'.

[15] Schol. in Aristoph. *Aves* 1553: γένος δέ ἐστι τῶν περὶ τὸν δυτικὸν ὠκεανόν, πρὸς τῇ κεκαυμένῃ ζώνῃ. Also those Ethiopians who are four to five cubits high are located by Pseudo-Scylax (112) in western Libya, near Cerne. Surprisingly for the times and area, they are horsemen, but cf. Hdt. 7. 70 on the eastern (that is, Indian) Ethiopians. Interestingly, Hdt. 3. 114 locates Aethiopia in the south-*west* of the inhabited world; cf. Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* 6. 1.

the curious fact that *the Indian river* is the only another river, except the well-known case of the Nile, where crocodiles can be found (Hdt. 4. 44).

This sounds a bit surprising. Darius was no doubt an outstanding person, but he hardly was a conscientious scientist. His concern with the crocodiles reflects rather Herodotus' manner of adopting the information he borrowed from a literary source (or from such its equivalent as someone's public lecture). Herodotus, the historian, knew well the deeds of the Great Kings. So he added information about Darius' military advancement and care of navigation, both points of no immediate relevance to the question of the size and disposition of continents (which is the context of Herodotus' account of Scylax' voyage). As he made Darius play an important role, it was natural for him to supply a motif. However the motif, Darius' curiosity, happened to be unnatural, for the rivers containing crocodiles came from a scientific discussion of geographical matters.

Now it is worth recalling that another renowned king, Alexander the Great, also displayed remarkable interest in the rivers that contained crocodiles. One finds the following story in Arrian's *Anabasis of Alexander*:

> He had already seen crocodiles on the Indus, as no other river except the Nile (μόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων ποταμῶν πλὴν Νείλου), and beans growing on the banks of the Acesines of the same sort as the land of Egypt produces and, having heard that the Acesines runs into the Indus, he thought he had found the origin of the Nile; his idea was that the Nile rose somewhere thereabouts in India, flowed through a great expanse of desert, and there lost the name of Indus, and then, where it began to flow through inhabited country, got the name of the Nile from the Ethiopians in those parts and the Egyptians ... (6. 1).[16]

Modern historians frequently treat this story as an amusing example of the geographical ignorance of Alexander and his officers. However, the king's mistake (abandoned soon by Alexander himself) was based on theories of his epoch. Before we turn to the best of them, it is appropriate to recount yet another story about a mighty king and a river with crocodiles. We learn from a mediaeval Latin version of Aristotelian *De inundatione Nili* that Arthaxerxes Ochos considered the possibility of suppressing an Egyptian revolt by diverting an Indian river with crocodiles. The king was told that this river *circumfluere exterius Rubrum Mare*.[17] As the Nile is thought of here to be the continuation of

---

[16] Cf. Strab. 15. 1. 25 (with a reference to Nearchus): "when Alexander saw crocodiles in the Hydaspes and Egyptian beans in the Asecines, he thought he had found the sources of the Nile and thought of preparing a fleet for an expedition to Egypt, thinking that he would sail as far as there by this river, but he learned a little later that he could not accomplish what he had hoped".

[17] *De inund. Nili*, 6: *Deceptus est autem et Rex Arthaxarxes Okhos cognominatus, quando super Egyptum debebat militare; conatus est enim avertere Indorum fluvium*

an Indian river, the idea apparently implies a land bridge connecting India with *eastern* Africa. Ptolemy has indeed such. A more elegant theory, however, assumed a land bridge between India and *western* Africa.

THE EARTH IS ROUND

Aristotle argues in the *De Caelo* that "the earth is spherical and its periphery is not large". After establishing this, he makes the following remark:

> For this reason those who imagine that the region around the Pillars of Hercules joins on to the regions of India, and that in this way the ocean is one (συνάπτειν τὸν περὶ τὰς Ἡρακλείους στήλας τόπον τῷ περὶ τὴν Ἰνδικὴν, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εἶναι τὴν θάλατταν μίαν), are not, it would seem, suggesting anything utterly incredible. They produce also in support of their contention the fact that elephants are a species found at the extremities of both lands, arguing that this phenomenon at the extremes is due to communication (διὰ τὸ συνάπτειν) between the two (298 a).

It is easy to see that Aristotle refers to the mode of argumentation already familiar to us from the story about Alexander, the only difference being that he refers to elephants rather than crocodiles. It is not so clear how one should interpret συνάπτειν in the passage. The language seems to favour Guthrie's interpretation (quoted above), but the discussion of συνάπτειν in Strabo 1. 3. 13 shows that no conclusive interpretation is possible.[18]

Regardless of what Aristotle meant here, the above quoted passage from the Arrian's *Anabasis of Alexander* implies an idea that a *land bridge* existed between India and Africa. As mentioned above, the idea that such a bridge connected Asia with *eastern* Libya is well attested. It is not the case for a theory of a bridge linking India and *western* Libya. But provided that

---

tamquam existentem eundem, audiens quia cocodrillos habet quemadmodum Nilus; mittens autem ad vocatos Onifalos audivit quia fluit fluvius in Rubrum Mare et cessavit a conatu; iterum persuasum est dicentibus Indis quia fluvius alter esset ad illas partes Indiae, fluens ex Monte vocato Aieto, ex quo quidem Indus; hunc autem dicebant habere cocodrillos et circumfluere exterius Rubrum Mare, sive veraces sint hoc dicentes sive mentientes; verumtamen Rex debebat conari hunc avertere, sed ipsum prohibuerunt quoniam ad curam hanc miserat, dicentes quia maiorem destruit regionem quam accipit dominans Egyptiis. (I am grateful to Stavros Solomou for attracting my attention to this passage.)

[18] Simplicius (548. 4 Heiberg) took συνάπτειν to mean a short distance, but the sea west of Africa was a matter of course since the first century AD. H. Berger, *Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Erdkunde der Griechen* (Leipzig ²1903) 318 f. makes too much of Simplicius' interpretation.

Aristotle speaks clearly of the proximity of India and *western* Africa, there are many signs that such a theory existed.

A hypothesis is to be checked by the consequences it entails. To assume the existence of a land bridge between India and western Africa meant to deny the reality of the Phoenician circumnavigation of Africa. And we encounter indeed a view according to which the sea *west* of Africa is no more navigable beyond some point in the south. There is a hint to this view already in Herodotus' story of Sataspes (4. 43). About the middle of the next century, it is stated in Pseudo-Scylax that the sea west of Libya is impassable beyond Cerne because of the shoals, mud and sea-weeds (112). It is, further, characteristic that post-Herodotean ancient geographical tradition never takes the circumnavigation of Libya by the Phoenicians as an established fact.

It is also worth noting that the *Indian river* of Herodotus flows *eastwards* (4. 44), while his Nile begins in the *western* parts of Libya (2. 31). Furthermore, he asserts that "among all men of whom hearsay gives us any clear knowledge the Indians dwell *farthest to the east* and the sunrise; for on the *eastern* side of India all is desert by reason of sand" (3. 98) and that in Libya there is waterless desert west and south-west of the Pillars (4. 185). Although Herodotus does not accept the idea of a land bridge (inasmuch he believes that the Phoenicians circumnavigated Africa), it is still possible that he preserves echoes of the theory that did advance this opinion. This kind of inconsistency is not without parallel in Herodotus. He assumes, on the one hand, that Europe is as long as Libya and Asia together (4. 42; 45), but insists, on the other hand, that nobody knows the eastern limits of either Europe (4. 45) or Asia (4. 40).

According to Ctesias, India was as large as the rest of Asia; it is most likely that it was such already for Democritus.[19] Also Herodotus while making Darius discover a very large part of Asia (τῆς δὲ Ἀσίης τὰ πολλὰ ὑπὸ Δαρείου ἐξευρέθη), speaks only about Scylax' exploration of India (4. 44). It is clear that an idea of India extending very far eastwards fits better with the assumption of a land bridge on the western rather than eastern side of Libya.

A remark in Strabo seems to provide another hint to a land bridge between India and western Libya: "the Maurusians are said by some to be the Indians who came thither with Heracles" (17. 3. 7).[20]

---

[19] See Part I, 236 f.

[20] It is not clear on which side of Libya a land bridge is located in Proc. *Aed.* 6. 1. 6 (Νεῖλος μὲν ὁ ποταμὸς ἐξ Ἰνδῶν ἐπ' Αἰγύπτου φερόμενος) and Vergilius'

Now, if Asia in the east and Libya in the west constitute a continuous body of land, where should one locate the various people and beasts, reported for an area populated by dark-coloured and woolly-haired people, in Asia or rather Libya for which this kind of population is characteristic? I am guessing that this approximates the reasoning of that theorist who transplanted Indian phenomena into Libya and who was followed by Antiphon and Herodotus.

A Sophocles' fragment also seems to point to a work of a theorist rather than a simple confusion of two Ethiopias. In this fragment, amber comes from a land "beyond India", where it is formed from the tears shed for Meleager by the birds *meleagrides*.[21] It was usually thought in early times that the amber came from the mouth of the Eridan river, somewhere in the far north-west; Aeschylus placed the river in Iberia.[22] On a theory of a round earth, these parts could be conceived as situated beyond India. One may admit that the evidence concerning the meleagrides is ambiguous.[23] But even then it is still remarkable that Ctesias located the Eridan river in India (F 65).

I have to specify that a round earth was not necessarily a spherical earth for our fifth-century theorist. It could be a hill-like earth or a disc-like earth with the centre at the sub-polar point. Imagine a modern map centred on the North Pole: the line through the pole connects Greece with Alaska; imagine now, say, the Punjab occupies the place normally assigned to Alaska.[24] On

---

assertion that the Nile flows *ab coloratis Indis* (*Georg.* 2. 288–93). – W. A. Heidel, "A Suggestion Concerning Plato's Atlantis", *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 68 (1933): 6, 189–228, esp. 208 believes that "in the earlier period the connection was supposed to be on the eastern side of Africa; after the acceptance of the globe earth a connection between Africa on the west with Asia was imagined". But one finds no evidence in Heidel's valuable paper for such a sequence of ideas.

[21] F 830 a Radt; Plin. 37. 40; cf. Karttunen (n. 2) 86 f.

[22] F 73 a Radt; Plin. 37. 32.

[23] There was a tradition according to which the *meleagrides* were located in the north-western Africa. Plin. 37. 38 (Mnas. fr. 44 Cappelletto): *Mnaseas Africae locum Sicyonem appelat et Crathin amnem in oceanum effluentem e lacu, in quo aves, quas meleagridas et penelopas vocat, vivere*. A very plausible emendation makes read ὄρνιθες αἱ Μελεαγρίδες instead of meaningless ὄρνιθες λιμελελιφίδες in Ps.-Scyl. 112; see Müller *ad loc.*, who also supposes that the river Crathis of Mnaseas is identical with the Κράβις of Ps.-Scyl. 112. Agatharchides, 81 mentioned the *meleagrides* on the eastern coast of Africa (the whole passage suspiciously recalls a number of descriptions of the north-western coast). See also D'Arcy W. Thompson, *A Glossary of Greek Birds* (London – Oxford 1936) 197–200.

[24] Curiously, we hear of the opinion according to which the Indian nomads reach the region of Thracian tribes: *Nomades quoque Indiae vagantur huc. Aliqui ab aquilone*

such an earth, Europe occupies an inner band, while Libya and Asia occupy the outer one. Europe cannot be surrounded by the ocean, and it is worth noting that Herodotus emphatically denies both the existence of an ocean north of Europe (4. 45) and that the river Eridan empties into the northern sea (3. 115). But this question is not to be discussed here in detail.[25] Nor will I here guess who was the first to advance the theory of a land bridge connecting India with Libya and related ideas. I will, however, point to a possibility that not only Scylax' reports about marvellous things, but his route as well became subject to quite a curious interpretation.

There is a striking detail in Herodotus' account of Scylax' expedition (4. 44). Although Scylax was sent to India by the Persian king, his point of return was not the Persian Gulf, not mentioned at all, but Egypt. Moreover, Scylax returned exactly to the starting point of those Phoenicians who had circumnavigated Africa.

How long did Scylax sail the sea? This lasted thirty months. The voyage of the Phoenicians took approximately the same time.

What lesson is drawn from Scylax' story? That Asia and Libya are almost in all respect similar or even "identical" (ὅμοια).

One may suspect that Herodotus' source made Scylax sail in fact round Africa!

To be sure, Herodotus says that Scylax sailed westwards. But this statement is a simplification in any case. Herodotus' source, however, could easily find in Scylax the indications such as: after reaching the mouth of *the Indian river* (the Ganges) we turned to the right (southwards), after long way towards the south we turned (at the Cape Comorin) towards the north, and then towards the west. Such indications were quite compatible with the alleged counter-clockwise circumnavigation of Africa.

That such an interpretation of Scylax' route was actually suggested in the fifth century remains, of course, hypothetical. Whatever the truth about that, the various data presented in this study make one suspect that the expedition of Scylax enriched the speculations of the Greeks no less than

---

contingi ab ipsis et Ciconas dixere et Brisaros (Plin. 6. 55; see also an important version in Solin. 51. 1; cf. Mart. Cap. 6. 694). The nomads of India are mentioned in Hdt. 3. 98 f. A reference to the Cicones and Brisari points to quite an early writer.

[25] For various early theories of the shape of the earth see my papers: "Anaxagoras' Argument Against the Sphericity of the Earth", *Hyperboreus* 3 (1997): 1, 175–178; "The Shape of the Earth in Archelaus, Democritus and Leucippus", *Hyperboreus* 5 (1999): 1, 22–39 and "The City of the Branchidae and the Question of Greek Contribution to the Intellectual History of India and China", *Hyperboreus* 8 (2002): 2, 244–256, esp. 251–254.

their actual knowledge. If that indeed was the case, how could that happen? What does it say about the availability of Scylax' book? What was the role of Scylax himself in the emergence of theories and constructions based on his account? I reserve the discussion of all these questions for another occasion.

THE SERES AND INDIAN UTTARAKURU: ALREADY IN SCYLAX?

It has long been clear to scholars that competing locations of the same phenomena in India and Libya have something to do with identification of the dark-skinned population of both India and Africa as the Ethiopians. Since scholars saw no particular pattern beyond such competing locations, they admitted that the ancients could easily misplace phenomena in both directions. It was suggested, however, in this paper that competing locations typically emerged, first, because of the general tendency to attach all things reported about Ethiopia to Libya rather than Asia and, second, because of a specific theory according to which Asia in the remote south-east and Libya in the south-west constitute a continuous body of land. If these suggestions are essentially justified, they entail the following principle: unless we have specific reasons for the contrary, we have to assume an originally *Indian* location for all the doublets in question. The chronological priority of a *preserved* source should not affect the matter. Thus if Herodotus locates in western Libya those things that we find in later authors located in India, we have still to start with hypothesis that in author(s) whose work predates that of Herodotus these things were located in India.

Now, Scylax is the only plausible candidate for a detailed account of India available in the fifth century – directly or indirectly.[26] Hence our additional hypothesis is that the phenomena misplaced by Herodotus in Libya were likely located in India already by Scylax.

Of all the doublets, I will discuss here only the silent trade.

---

[26] It was repeatedly argued that Hecataeus' account of India was largely based on what he learned from Scylax. One may add to the point that the probability of their personal acquaintance is very high. For a friend of Aristagoras, a Carian captain named Scylax (Hdt. 5. 33), is almost certainly our Scylax – see *Hyperboreus* 8 (2002): 1, 7 n. 10. And while Herodotus, who gives us an artistically brilliant but historically most biased portrait of Aristagoras, emphasises the points on which Hecataeus and Aristagoras disagreed, the plain fact emerging from his account is that Hecataeus participated in the revolt started by Aristagoras and either consulted its leaders or was himself among them (Hdt. 5. 36; 125 f.).

One finds its earliest mention in Hdt. 4. 196. This kind of trade is said here to be conducted by the Carthaginians with the people who dwell beyond the Pillars of Heracles. The Carthaginians are cited as the source of information. We need not go into debate of how typically Herodotean source citation is fictional. It is enough to say that sometimes it is certainly so.[27] A reference to the Carthaginians was the most appropriate for the things beyond the Pillars of Heracles and such could have easily been Herodotus' clever invention.

The silent trade in the east appears in Mela, Pliny, Solinus, Martianus Capella, and also in Ammianus Marcellinus (23. 6. 68) and Eustathius (on Dionysius Per. 752) who already notes the similarity of the account with that found in Herodotus. The Seres are the local people involved in the silent trade in all these authors.[28] The Seres of the Greek and Roman authors are silk-producing people identified, however, by modern scholars not so much with the Chinese themselves as with the people of the Tarim basin, or adjacent regions, who mediated in the silk trade. The Seres appear once in Ctesias, but scholars believe that this is an interpolated passage. If that is so, one finds the earliest mention of the Seres in Apollodorus of Artemita (*FGrH* 799 F 7; Strab. 11. 11. 1), in connection with the events of either the late third or early second century BC. Nobody seems to have ever considered the possibility that the Seres were already mentioned in a work earlier than Herodotus' *Histories*. But we will.

Mela gives us a brief characteristic of the Seres: *genus plenum iustitiae et commercio, quod rebus in solitudine absens peragit, notissimum* (3. 60). In an analogous context, Pliny makes a vague remark that the Seres *coetum reliquorum mortalium fugiunt, commercia expectant* (6. 54). But in his description of Taprobane, he provides a few details about the Seres and their trade. Taprobanian traders are cited as the eyewitness source of information. We are told that the Seres dwell *ultra montes Hemodos*, that is, beyond the Himalayas. "The people themselves are of more than normal height, and have flaxen hair and blue eyes, and they speak in harsh tones and use no language in dealing with travellers. The remainder of the envoys' account agreed with the reports of our traders – that commodities were deposited on the opposite bank of a river by the side of the goods offered for the sale by

[27] "The Medes' own account of themselves" in 7. 62 is an indisputable example.

[28] The *Periplus Maris Erythraei* 65 is frequently cited by scholars as another instance of silent barter in classical literature. It is described here how the people of Thina (i. e., the Chinese) benefit from visits of a bordering tribe called Sesatai, but the passage speaks nothing of *exchange* of the goods.

natives" (6. 88). The text appears in that part of the account of Taprobane which is presented in Pliny as recently acquired knowledge. We need not discuss here the reliability of this claim. It is enough that Pliny observes that the information about the trade with the Seres agrees with previous reports, and Mela shows that this is true. It seems to me clear that we are dealing in Pliny with the conflation of two (or more) ultimately different reports. Direct trade between the inhabitants of Taprobane, that is, Ceylon (or possibly Sumatra) and people beyond the Himalayas is most unlikely. Martianus Capella locates the same people (without calling them the Seres) and their silent barter in Taprobane itself. According to Pausanias, "Seria is known to be an island lying in a recess of the Erythrian Sea" (6. 26. 6).[29] Fa-hsien, a Chinese traveller of early fifth century AD, heard of the silent trade in Ceylon.[30] It is likely, therefore, that one of Pliny's sources had Taprobane itself as the site of mute barter. But since authorities in geography located the Seres beyond the Himalayas, the site was shifted accordingly.[31]

Philostratus (*Vit. Apoll.* 6. 2) speaks of the silent trade between the Egyptians and Ethiopians. He emphasises the moral superiority of this kind of trade. Herodotus also explicitly refers to the fairness of the silent trade, and Mela's concise formulation likewise hints at it. This lends additional credit to the hypothesis that we are dealing with one rather than three different stories.

If the mechanisms of competing locations suggested in this paper do not deviate much from the truth, one expects to find the Seres, as people involved in the silent trade, in an Indo-*Ethiopian* context. This expectation is fully justified. "The Seres are of Ethiopian race", explicitly says Pausanias who also remarks that "some say, however, that they are not Ethiopians, but a mongrel race of Scythians and Indians" (6. 26. 6). Heliodorus makes the Seres appear in the army of the Ethiopian king (*Aeth.* 9. 16. 3).[32] That the

---

[29] The continuation is also interesting: "But I have heard that it is not the Erythrean Sea, but a river called Ser, that makes this island, just as in Egypt the Delta is surrounded by the Nile and by no sea".

[30] *The Travels of Fa-hsien*, tr. by H. A. Giles (Cambridge 1923) 66 f.

[31] Although blond people with blue eyes are attested to on the frescoes excavated "beyond the Himalayas", there are also hints to their presence in southern India. – See: S. Faller, *Taprobane im Wandel der Zeit* (Stuttgart 2000) 91 n. 498. For the whole passage see also K. Karttunen, *India and the Hellenistic World* (Helsinki 1997) 341.

[32] Interestingly Heliodorus shows two fighting armies using different musical instruments to start the battle – the trumpet by the Persians and the drum by the Ethiopians. The drum was used for such a purpose in India, China, by several tribes of Eurasian steppes and was also adopted by the Parthians.

Seres were listed among the *makrobioi* (Strab. 15. 1. 37, in an Indian context) may also point to their Ethiopian affiliation.

One arrives at the conclusion that an account of the silent trade conducted with the Seres in all probability antedates a similar report by Herodotus for the same practice in the far west. However, it is not so much clear whether Scylax (or Hecataeus) had in mind a silk-trading people. Names can be deceptive. It was repeatedly suggested, in connection with Pliny's passage, that *Seres* could designate the population of Kerala, on the western coast of the southern Hindustan. It is quite possible that original report on Indian Seres was subsequently associated with the silk-trading Seres of the Tarim basin and adjacent regions just because of the similarity of the names. However, one may also consider the possibility that Indian Seres were the silk-traders of the south.[33] There were many stories about quite peculiar ways of getting rare goods of the edges of the oikumene;[34] the silent barter, accounting for how the silk reaches the known world, would fit well with this pattern.[35] It is safer, therefore, to suspend our judgement as to who the Seres of the initial account on the silent trade were.[36]

I will end this section with one more suggestion. One has to consider the possibility that even those elements in Herodotus' description of western Libya that do not share in competing locations might originally belong to an Indian context. So Herodotus (4. 184 f.) locates in north-western Libya the

---

[33] S. Faller (*op. cit.*, 91) points out that the *Periplus Maris Erythraei* 56 makes these parts of the coast export among the goods ὀθόνια Σηρικά. See also A. Diehle, "Serer und Chinesen", in his *Antike und Orient* (n. 1) 201–215, esp. 204 n. 7. On the other hand, Herrmann, "Taprobane", *RE* 2. R. 4 (1932) 2260–2272, esp. 2261 thinks that Seria of Pausanias is another name for Taprobane = Ceylon.

[34] E. g. Hdt. 3. 107–112 for the spices.

[35] In this respect the passage of *Periplus Maris Erythraei* 65 provides indeed an analogy (cf. above, n. 28).

[36] There is also no strict proof that the story entered Greek literature with Scylax, yet there is no other candidate in view. A stronger case can be possibly made for Scylax as the originator of Western tradition on the unicorn. Herodotus' horned asses of western Libya (4. 191) are clearly rhinoceros (cf. Aristot. *Hist. an.* 499 b 18; *Part. an.* 663 a 23). In the Indian part of his *Life of Apollonius*, Philostratus calls them wild asses and offers quite a reasonable description of these creatures (3. 2), and, as I argued in *Hyperboreus* 8 (2002): 1, 5–12, Scylax was an important source for Philostratus' description of India. Herodotus too knows of the wild asses of India, and when he says that the chariots of the Indians in the army of Xerxes were driven by wild asses (7. 86), this is to be taken, I guess, as an echo of the stories about marvellous Indian rhinoceros, or unicorns, rather than a piece of authentic evidence. Representation of Indian tribute, including a wild ass, on the Apadana in Persepolis (see G. Walser, *Die Völkerschaften auf den Reliefs von Persepolis* [Berlin 1966] 94 f.) can be of similar nature.

mountain Atlas: "Its shape is slender and a complete circle; and it is said to be so high that its summits cannot be seen, for cloud is ever upon them winter and summer. The people of the country call it the pillar of heaven. These men have got their name, which is Atlantes, from this mountain. It is said that they eat no living creature, and see no dreams in their sleep". Nineteenth-century commentators justly emphasised that there is no remarkable mountain in north-western Africa, and since Herodotus clearly describes a peak, his description corresponds no reality. But his description is not unlike those of Indian Meru, and people who do not eat any living thing recall Indian ascetics; and if they never have any dreams, it is probably one of the beneficial results of their asceticism, for "when a man is asleep, composed, serene, and knows no dream, that is the self, that is the immortal, the fearless; that is *Brahman*" (*Chāndogya Upanishad*, 8. 11. 1, S. Radhakrishnan's transl.).[37] It is also worth noting that an ancient tradition placed the *Atarantes* near the Atlantes.[38] Pliny speaks of the tribe of the Attacorae "sheltered by sunbathed hills from every harmful blast with the same temperate climate as that in which dwell the Hyperborei" (6. 55). It has been long recognised that the Attacorae echo Indian Uttarakuru, happy people of the remote north.[39] Ἀτάραντες, then, may reflect the shortened form of the same name, without *-kuru*, meaning "the northerners". Now, one can easily imagine how a Greek intellectual could infer from an account of a mount called 'Pillar of Heaven' that there was grain of truth in traditional stories about Atlas and locate and name such a mountain accordingly.

POSTSCRIPT

In Part I of this paper, published five years ago, I tried to show that *the Indian river* navigated by Scylax was the Ganges. My arguments were essentially as follows.

Herodotus says that Scylax and his crew "sailed down the river towards the east and the sunrise till they came to the sea", which does not fit with the Indus (this river flows south and south-west), but fits well enough with the Ganges. John L. Myres emphasised this already.

Since the Ganges was also an Indian river, it is easier to imagine confusion or misapplication of the names rather than confusion of the east and south. The confusion of the two rivers appears indeed in Pliny, who affirms

---

[37] Compare Plato's fear of impious dreams in *Rep.* 571 c – 572 b.

[38] Stephanus, s. v. Ἄτλαντες, and Eustathius on Dionys. Perieg. 66.

[39] See Karttunen (n. 2) 138 et al.

that the Indus "forms a huge island named Prasiane" (6. 71), and Prasiane is to be located on the Ganges.[40] Herodotus was quite capable of confusing different rivers, as the case of his Araxes shows.

Strabo (2. 1. 34) cites Hipparchus that the Indus was shown on early maps to flow "between the south and the equinoctial sunrise". Such a direction points to the Ganges; the name of the Indus seems to have been (mis)applied to this river. Also Aristotle (*apud* Strabo 15. 1. 23) contrasts the Nile, which "passes across many *klimata*", that is, latitudes, to the streams of India as "lingering for a long time in the same *klimata*". Such a contrast fits better with the Ganges and its tributaries rather than with the Indus and the rivers of the Punjab.

Aelian says that the Ganges "contains islands larger than Lesbos and Cyrnus" (*NA* 12. 41). The standard source in Hellenistic and Roman times for the Ganges valley was Megasthenes. However, his audience, in the early third century BC, was not interested in either Lesbos or Cyrnus. The former belonged to an area now of lesser significance, the latter was in the remote west, while common interest turned to the east. The situation was very different in the times of Scylax. Lesbos was a natural point of reference, while Cyrnus was an outstanding place in the fascinating west. One may think, then, that the comparison involving Lesbos and Cyrnus goes ultimately back to Scylax, and for similar reasons, this is likely to be the case with the comparison of tributaries of the Ganges with the Maeander (Megasthenes *apud* Arr. *Ind.* 4. 6).

Another comparison, the one used by Strabo, points to Scylax' visit to the eastern Punjab. We are told about five thousand cities between the Hypanis and the Hydaspes – "cities no smaller than Cos Meropis" (15. 1. 33; cf. Plin. 6. 59). For various reasons, such a reference is very strange for historians of Alexander, but the island of Cos was the closest big island to Caryanda, the native city of Scylax.

Onesicritus, one of Alexander's officers, says of Taprobane "that it is five thousand stadia in size, without distinguishing its length or breadth; and that it is a twenty days' voyage distant from the mainland, but that it is difficult voyage for ships that are poorly furnished with sails and are constructed without belly-ribs on both sides; and that amphibious monsters are to be found round it, some of which are like kine, others like horses, and others like other land-animals" (Strab. 15. 1. 15; *FGrH* 134 F 12). The mouth of

[40] Another obvious case of such confusion can be added: while Mela 3. 70 locates the island of Argyre near the mouth of the Ganges, Pliny 6. 80 has it "after the mouth of the Indus". Ptolemy and modern scholars support Mela's version.

the Indus, where Alexander and his fleet turned back, is very far from Ceylon. Therefore, Onesicritus' knowledge of the details of navigation in the Gulf of Bengal is very surprising. His reference to the length of voyage is especially worth noting. Ceylon comes very close to the continent, but we learn from a parallel remark in Pliny (6. 82) that "twenty days' sail was formerly believed to be a distance of Taprobane from the nation of the Prasii". Hence, the information cited by Onesicritus came from a mariner who sailed to Taprobane from the mouth of the Ganges, for the Prasii were the inhabitants of the Ganges valley. The estimate of the size of the island in terms of the *stadia* points to a Greek-speaking (and not an Indian) authority of Onesicritus. Scylax is the only plausible candidate.[41]

My hypothesis met recently a strange kind of criticism.[42] It was rejected without examining my arguments except for a brief touching upon two of them. 1) The argument of the eastwards flowing river is met with the objection that "the Ganges issues into the Gulf of Bengal in the southern direction". Do my critics really mean that the assertions "the Indus flows eastwards" and "the Ganges flows eastwards" are of comparable degree of inaccuracy? Besides, as quoted in my paper from the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, the estuary of the Ganges is "most easterly of a great number of mouths or channels", and this estuary shows rather insignificant bend towards the south. 2) My suggestion is mentioned that Megasthenes identified the river navigated and described by Scylax as the Ganges. It is said that I came to this conclusion because "Megasthenes compared the Ganges with the Maeander, 'the native river of Scylax', and since 'it is difficult to assume, that the comparison was introduced by Megasthenes himself', he had to find it in the work by Scylax. It remains unclear why it is *difficult*, and why Asia Minor could not have been the native country of Megasthenes himself or the Maeander a river well known to him". Now, according to our sources, Megasthenes compared with the Meander tributaries of the Ganges and not, of course, this mighty river itself, as correctly stated in my paper. "Родная река Скилака"

---

[41] If Scylax sailed from the mouth of the Ganges and if the names adopted by him for the Ganges valley and the southern Hindustan were *India* and *Ethiopia* respectively, one may see how could arise the enigmatic description that one finds in Strabo: "Taprobane is a large island in the open sea, which lies off India to the south. It stretches lengthwise in the direction of Ethiopia for more than five thousand stadia" (2. 1. 14).

[42] Г. М. Бонгард-Левин, М. Д. Бухарин, А. А. Вигасин, *Индия и античный мир* [G. M. Bongard-Levin, M. D. Bukharin, A. A. Vigasin, *India and the Classical World*] (Москва 2002) 66 прим. 115. The section in question is written by G. M. Bongard-Levin and M. D. Bukharin.

('the native river of Scylax') is both bad Russian and an inaccurate translation of my words. As to the difficulty that my critics do not see, it is explained right in the paragraph that they quote. I say: "Wherever he (sc. Megasthenes) was born, he was addressing the audience in Seleucia, Alexandria and Athens, and not the Carians or the Ionians". As I continue, "the opposite was the case for Scylax. The Maeander valley was not only his homeland, but also the cultural centre of the Greek-speaking world as he knew it" (222 f.).

I appreciate a prompt reaction to my work, which is no longer common nowadays, but I regret about the style adopted by my critics.

Five years later, I still think that the facts do not agree well with the assumption that Scylax sailed down the Indus and still believe that the river navigated by Scylax was the Ganges. However, I am now less certain that Scylax reached the *mouth* of the Ganges and circumnavigated India. My little doubt arises from my own proposal according to which Indian journey of Apollonius in Philostratus is patterned on the story of Scylax' voyage. Although Philostratus brings Apollonius to the Ganges valley, he offers a surprising description of his way from there to the sea. We are told that "Apollonius keeping the Ganges on his right hand, but the Hyphasis on his left, went towards the sea" and that this was a journey of ten days (3. 50). As I observed in *Hyperboreus* 8 (2002): 1, 10, a number of characteristics of the Hyphasis, both in Philostratus and in some other sources, point to the Narmada (rather than the Sutlej or Beas, one of the two rivers to be identified with the Hyphasis in the context of Alexander's story). What I did not formulate there is that the identification of the Hyphasis as the Narmada makes Philostratus' description of Apollonius route reasonable enough. If one leaves the Ganges valley near, say, Benares and turns west, one will have the Ganges on the right and the Narmada on the left. One may think accordingly that the oceanic part of Scylax' voyage started in the Gulf of Cambay. This would fit well with the view expressed by Herodotus that Arabia (and thus not India) is the southernmost country of the inhabited world (3. 107). However, such an interpretation implies that Philostratus confused two different rivers with the name *Hyphasis*. "Ten days journey" towards the sea from the region of Benares is hardly realistic even on camels, which makes the whole description of the route suspect. Moreover, Philostratus never makes Apollonius navigate any Indian river. Herodotus' geography of the passage in question, with India in the east (3. 106), Arabia in the south (3. 107), and Ethiopia in the south-west (3. 114), is suspiciously Persocentric (as in 4. 37–41); it thus may reflect quite a peculiar point of view. Scylax might have failed to recognise that

India stretches farther in the south than Arabia if he sailed along their shores in different seasons. And for the traveller or geographer for whom the country south of the Ganges valley was no longer India but Ethiopia, Arabia did stretch much farther towards the south then India.

A few remarks are appropriate on the starting point of Scylax' Indian route. It was Κασπάπυρος, a πόλις Γανδαρική, according to Hecataeus (F 295). I suggested in the Part I that "Hecataeus' Γανδαρική was quite likely the land in the eastern Punjab or the Ganges valley" (233). It can be added to the point that W. W. Tarn made a strong case for the presence of the Gandaridae east of the Beas in the time of Alexander.[43] However, I am no longer willing to defend the possibility (I did not claim more) that Scylax' starting point could have been Pataliputra. A more plausible suggestion seems available. Words by Herodotus and Hecataeus clearly imply that Κασπάπυρος was an important place, and yet it never emerges in later authors.[44] The fate of Hastinâpura may provide a solution. It was "the capital of the Kurus, north-east of Dehli, entirely diluviated by the Ganges. It was situated twenty-two miles north of Mirat and south-east of Bijnor on the right bank of the Ganges. Nichakshu, the grandson of Janamejaya of the *Mahâbhârata*, removed his capital to Kauśâmbi after the destruction of Hastinâpura".[45]

I suggested in my paper "The dark-skinned and woolly-haired Kolchoi"[46] that Herodotus' evidence, as he claims, for a Negroid population on the Black Sea shores is in fact a distorted reflection of Scylax' account of the Kolchoi of southernmost India. It seems that Herodotus was not the only author confused by allegedly identical names of two distant peoples. In a context that points to an ultimately very early source, Pliny has *regio Colica* in the south-eastern corner of the Black Sea (6. 15; cf. Ps.-Scyl. 78). According to Mela, *Colis* is that promontory in India where the eastern coast ends and the southern begins (3. 67). Pliny (6. 86) speaks in an Indian context of *promunturium Coliacum*. Further, Scylax located μακροκέφαλοι in India (F 7), while Mela (1. 107) and Pliny (6. 11) locate them in Kolchis (Ps.-Scyl. 85 places them near Trapezus). A curious fragment of Palaephatus seems to combine this confusion with that which was the main subject of our Part II. We are told that μακροκέφαλοι "dwell in Libya above the Kolchoi"

---

[43] W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great* II (Cambridge 1950) 279.

[44] The problem was justly emphasised by P. Daffinà, "On Kaspapyros and the So-Called 'Shore of Scythians'", *AAHu* 28 (1980) 1–8, esp. 5, who unjustly is prone to conclude that the place was *not* of importance.

[45] Nundo Lal Dey, *The Geographical Dictionary of Ancient and Mediaeval India* (London ²1927) 74.

[46] *Hyperboreus* 5 (1999): 2, 341–345.

(*FGrH* 44 F 2). One may suppose that Scylax located μακροκέφαλοι in that part of India which was referred to by an early authority as *Ethiopia*; and when Ethiopia was attached to Lybia, μακροκέφαλοι, and the Kolchoi as well, were transplanted accordingly.

Dmitri Panchenko
Bibliotheca Classica Petropolitana,
Smolny College

В античной литературе одни и те же реалии и псевдореалии относятся то к Индии, то к Эфиопии, то к Ливии. В основе этой путаницы лежит, по-видимому, тот факт, что эфиопами были названы индийские дравиды, о которых сообщал побывавший в Индии Скилак. Наряду с обычными недоразумениями можно отметить сознательную тенденцию локализовать в западной Ливии ряд изначально связанных с Индией сообщений о диковинных племенах и животных. Такая тенденция, очевидно, связана с географическими теориями, согласно которым Индия, поскольку Земля круглая, столь близко подходит к западной Ливии, что образует с ней единый массив суши.

HOW PROPOSITIONS BEGIN
Towards an Interpretation of ὑπόθεσις in Plato's *Divided Line*

The early meaning of the Greek word ὑπόθεσις is a familiar puzzle, with two main pieces of evidence: the Hippocratic treatise *On Ancient Medicine*[1] and Plato's discussion of mathematics (and, in extension, of dialectic) in and around the *Divided Line* passage in the *Republic*. The aim of this article is to suggest a new approach to the puzzle. In the absence of new texts or new linguistic evidence, the line of inquiry is based on the question: what was the mathematical practice familiar to Plato? I concentrate on the usage in the *Divided Line* passage alone, and the aim of this paper is not to offer a general theory of the usage of the term in Plato's time but rather an account of Plato's intention in using the term in this passage.

1. THE TEXT AND SOME POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS

The central text for Plato's use of the word ὑπόθεσις is the *Divided Line* passage, 510 c 1–511 a 1. I despair of providing an interpretation-free translation of the text and instead take as my starting point the Greek text, followed by two English translations: one relatively free of specific interpretation, the second very rich in interpretation. (In both, however, I take the liberty of re-instating transliterated *hypothesis* where the translation has some English equivalent.) While the second is much less literal, it also remains, in my view, the finest homage to Plato's *Republic* in the English language, and I shall mostly use Cornford's version as my base text.

> [ΣΩ.] Ἀλλ' αὖθις ... ῥᾷον γὰρ τούτων προειρημένων μαθήσῃ. οἶμαι γάρ σε εἰδέναι ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τό τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἴδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ' ἑκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιοῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων δ' ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη

[1] The best study remains G. E. R. Lloyd, "Who is Attacked in *On Ancient Medicine*?", *Phronesis* 8 (1963) 108–126; reprinted in his *Methods and Problems in Greek Science* (Cambridge 1991) 49–69 with some more recent literature.

διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο οὗ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὁρμήσωσι.
[ΓΛ.] Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ... τοῦτό γε οἶδα.
[ΣΩ.] Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἴδεσι προσχρῶνται καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοούμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων πέρι οἷς ταῦτα ἔοικε, τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι καὶ διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτης ἣν γράφουσιν, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως, αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα ἃ πλάττουσίν τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσίν, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι, ζητοῦντες δὲ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ.

Grube:[2]

[Socrates]: Let's try again. You'll understand it more easily after this explanation. I think you know that students of geometry, calculation, and the like *hypothemenoi* the odd and the even, the various figures, the three kinds of angles, and other things akin to these in each of their investigations, as if they were known. They make these their *hypotheseis* and don't think it necessary to give any account of them, either to themselves or to others, as if they were clear to everyone. And going from these *hypotheseis* through the remaining steps, they arrive validly at a conclusion about which they set out to investigate.
[Glaucon:] I certainly know that much.
[Socrates:] Then you also know that, although they use visible figures and talk about them, their thought isn't directed to these but to those other things that they are like. The claims they make are about the square itself and the diagonal itself, not about the diagonal they draw, and similarly with the others. These figures that they make and draw, of which shadows and reflections in water are images, they now in turn use as images, in seeking to see those others themselves that one cannot see except by means of thought.

Cornford:[3]

[Socrates:] Then we will try again; what I have just said will help you understand. You know, of course, how students of subjects like geometry and arithmetic begin *hypothemenoi* odd and even numbers, or the various figures and the three kinds of angle, and other such data in each subject. These data they take as known; and, having adopted them as *hypotheseis*, they do not feel called upon to give any account of them to themselves or to anyone else, but treat them as self-evident. Then, starting from these *hypotheseis*, they go on until they arrive, by a series of consistent steps, at all the conclusions they set out to investigate.

---

[2] Plato, *Republic*, tr. by G. M. A. Grube, rev. by C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis 1992) 184.

[3] *The Republic of Plato*, tr. by F. M. Cornford (Oxford 1941) 220.

> [Glaucon:] Yes, I know that.
> [Socrates:] You also know how they make use of visible figures and discourse about them, though what they really have in mind is the originals of which these figures are images: they are not reasoning, for instance, about this particular square and diagonal which they have drawn, but about *the* square and *the* diagonal; and so in all cases. The diagrams they draw and the models they make are actual things, which may have their shadows or images in water; but now they serve in their turn as images, while the student is seeking to behold those realities which only thought can apprehend.

This text falls into two sections (to be called "section 1" and "section 2", respectively). A part of my argument later on will depend on the question of the relationship between the two sections.

We are primarily interested in the question, what are mathematicians said to do in section 1. Jowett, for instance, had the following note:[4] "...they presuppose mathematical quantities and figures without any inquiry into the grounds of their suppositions, and end... ὁμολογουμένως – i.e., consistently..." Two things present in mathematical activity, according to Jowett, are the "presuppositions of quantities and figures" and "consistency". One thing missing is "an inquiry into the grounds of the presuppositions".

It is not altogether clear what is meant by "presupposing a quantity or a figure". Plato indeed says that the mathematicians treat as ὑποθέσεις the odd and the even, for instance, so it would seem that the transitive verb ὑποτίθημι takes abstract nouns (perhaps *qua* concepts?) as its direct object. This difficulty – that Plato and Greek philosophers in general sometimes put nouns where we find a sentence more natural – is of course familiar from elsewhere. Consider a typical example from Aristotle, when describing Leucippus' position as a compromise between Eleatic philosophy and the appearances (*GC* 325 a 25–27: "For these things he agrees with the appearances, while <agreeing> with those who support the One (τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἓν κατασκευάζουσιν) that motion is impossible without void": the Eleatics are here designated by the synecdoche 'those who support the one' (rather than: 'those who believe that only one thing exists'). But it is clear, in this case, that the noun stands for what we may paraphrase as a proposition. Is this the case here, too with Plato's ὑποθέσεις?

To interpret the passage at hand, there are several alternatives. One is to imagine a verb, unlike our 'hypothesizing', which indeed takes concepts for objects. This is what Solmsen did.[5] According to Solmsen's interpretation,

---

[4] B. Jowett, L. Campbell (edd.), *Plato's Republic* III (Oxford 1894) 309.

[5] F. Solmsen, *Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik* (Berlin 1929).

mathematicians used words such as 'odd' and 'even' without giving grounds to their usage, i. e., without defining the terms. This is a minimalist interpretation of what the mathematicians did, in a way, for, according to this interpretation, there was no special act involved in the ὑποθέσεις at all. The mathematicians simply went happily on, and this is what constituted the ὑποθέσεις.

Other interpretations typically assume that, at last partly, the verb ὑποτίθημι does not *really* take abstract nouns as its objects. It takes, besides those objects or instead of them, *propositions*, which have something to do with the noun in case.

Obviously, once we have freed ourselves from the text our imagination may run freely. Taylor, for instance, credited the mathematicians with postulates such as "all numbers are integers".[6] This is probably the maximalist interpretation for, according to this interpretation, the ὑποθέσεις certainly involve much thought and care.

It is easy to think of two less demanding interpretations, both still taking ὑποθέσεις to be propositional, while retaining the special relation with a certain noun. One is that ὑποθέσεις are definitions, and this is Mueller's view.[7] So an ὑπόθεσις would be something like "An odd number is that which is not divisible into two equal parts, or that which differs by an unit from an even number".

Another possible interpretation could be to take ὑποθέσεις as existence-assumptions. This was Ross's view,[8] and, according to this interpretation, an ὑπόθεσις is something like "Odd numbers exist".

We may therefore sum up the main available options as follows:

a. Mathematicians do not define terms (Solmsen).

b. Mathematicians define terms (Mueller).

c. Mathematicians postulate propositions of the form "X exists" (Ross).

d. Mathematicians postulate propositions of the form "X has property Y" (Taylor).

2. POSITIONING THE TEXT IN MATHEMATICAL CONTEXT

Each of the options reached above is a statement concerning Plato's impression of the mathematical practice of his, or of Socrates' time. The nature of the mathematical practice itself should therefore help us to dispose of

---

[6] A. E. Taylor, *Plato, The Man and His Work* (London [4]1937) 291.

[7] I. Mueller, "On the Notion of a Mathematical Starting Point in Plato, Aristotle, and Euclid", in: A. C. Bowen (ed.), *Science and Philosophy in Classical Greece* (New York 1991) 83.

[8] W. D. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Oxford 1951) 51.

some of the options; and we may probably start by eliminating option (a). It is indeed vastly improbable that no definitions at all were available in Plato's time; I won't go into the evidence here, but simply refer to Mueller.[9]

The evidence for the mathematics of Plato's time is difficult for options (c) and (d) as well. Here indeed we are dealing with one equation having two variables. We know that Plato refers to a certain mathematical background, but we do not know exactly how, and we do not know what exactly that background was. However, some interpretations of the passage involve a fantastic level of mathematical achievement and should therefore, I think, be excluded. I am not alluding here at the moment to the unfounded suggestions of Taylor. Any interpretation following option (d), taking ὑποθέσεις as postulates, would be as problematic. For then the result would be that in Plato's time mathematics was widely known to be based upon a certain set of postulates which were unquestioned by the mathematicians, i.e. unanimously accepted. A minute's reflection would show that this would have been impossible at any time prior to the final canonization of the *Elements* in Late Antiquity. The postulates of Archimedes are unlike those of Euclid and, when he does introduce them, he may apologize for them or even argue for them: that is, postulates are not *ipso facto* taken for granted![10] If postulates were at all circulated *before* Euclid, they must have been as hotly contested as any other item on the intellectual agenda. The only alternative would be to say that the postulates in question are taken as agreed not in the absolute sense, that everyone takes them to be true, but in the local and relative sense, that they are not questioned in the context of the particular proof or treatise. This is not in contradiction to what we may assume for Greek mathematical practice; but the point now becomes subtle and non-obvious which, as I shall argue below, is better avoided in the interpretation of this passage. I thus find option (d) highly unlikely.

The same, *a fortiori*, holds for option (c) – that the mathematicians fail to argue for existence claims. This is in fact something Greek mathematicians hardly noticed at all. Knorr[11] has shown that the assumptions of existence are largely left uncharted in Greek mathematical practice: so, for instance, the assumption of the existence of the fourth proportional, given three line segments, is never even mentioned as calling for a special postu-

---

[9] Mueller (n. 7).

[10] See the discussion of Archimedes' Axiom in, e. g., E. J. Dijksterhuis, *Archimedes* (Princeton 1987).

[11] W. R. Knorr, "Construction as Existence Proof in Ancient Geometry", *Ancient Philosophy* 3 (1983) 125–148.

late. One doubts that Plato noted this, and surely Glaucon would not have been able to understand the point.

The last remaining standard alternative, that ὑποθέσεις are definitions, is the only one plausible from the point of view of the mathematics of Plato's time, as shown by Mueller.[12] If the standard interpretation has any chance at all for survival, it is in this form.

So let us consider the emerging account: mathematicians start off with certain definitions; they do not give account of these definitions, and they are (merely?) consistent. Such is the outline of what may be considered perhaps, today, the established interpretation. Thus the mathematical practice is that of making certain definitions at the outset of... but then of what?

We should look more closely at this question. What is the situation being envisaged in the text? A certain practice is alluded to, and this practice is defined by verbs:

> Section 1: ὑποθέμενοι ... ὡς εἰδότες ... ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις ... οὐδένα λόγον ἀξιοῦσι διδόναι ... ἀρχόμενοι διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο οὗ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὁρμήσωσι.
> Section 2: προσχρῶνται ... ποιοῦνται ... διανοούμενοι ... ποιούμενοι ... γράφουσιν ... πλάττουσιν ... γράφουσιν ... χρώμενοι ... ζητοῦντες ... ἰδεῖν.

Such are the actions of the mathematicians, and the most striking thing is how *active* they are. The present of repeated action is the dominant tense (dominant in the sense of being the most frequent, and of being used in the main clauses). Mathematics is being evoked here, not in the way appropriate to the closed, static systems of concepts; rather we are meant to imagine people – many people – keeping doing things in a dynamic, open environment. They start off with an ὑπόθεσις, they go on through the rest of it, and then conclude – that is, conclude for as far as the matter at hand was concerned, and we are left to imagine them returning to do the same thing over and over again, which, in terms of the dramatic invocation, is what happens in between the two sections: they do a thing in section 1 and then they do some more in section 2. Plurality is the mark of the passage – which, after all, talks not merely of people engaged in 'geometry and calculation' but of people engaged in 'geometries and calculations' – περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμούς. Plato makes clear that he refers to many, repeated acts.

It must be pointed out that the τοῦτο οὗ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὁρμήσωσι can not be a *branch* of mathematics (with one being meant to imagine Eudoxus,

[12] Mueller (n. 7).

surrounded by a flock of disciples, heaving a sigh of relief, having finally written down the whole of his solid geometry). Branches do not end, and there is nothing to finish ὁμολογουμένως about them. By the end of a treatise, one reaches an understanding, perhaps. But agreement? As if you suspended belief through the entire book, but with the end of the final proposition you said against yourself "By god! He has convinced me now all right!". This is not a plausible way of thinking about reading *books* representing *disciplines*. A specific proof-event, taking place in a more oral exchange, seems to suit the description better.

As I will immediately argue, we should not imagine Plato here as describing some far-fetched, exotic procedure. He should be describing what was typical for mathematicians in the early part of the fourth century. Now, there is a great cloud of uncertainty surrounding the historicity of Proclus' account of the early history of Greek mathematics.[13] This account is framed, occasionally, in terms of book-production: Hippocrates of Chios, as well as Leon after him, have written books of *Elements*; Hermotimus of Colophon has written on *loci*. But from the pen of a late ancient author, writing an isagogic work, one would expect to hear much more by way of bibliography. (In fact, much of Proclus' account is framed in terms of chains of transmission, evoking not the trope of books but the trope of schools.[14]) I have argued [15] that we can see a transition occurring around Plato's time, changing mathematics in a more 'literate' direction: namely, letters were introduced into the geometrical diagram where, before, one would refer to the diagram through its qualitative features. As I have insisted there, there is no need to take on board any of the fanciful suggestions made by authors such as Havelock,[16] as if a sharp hiatus is noticeable in Greek culture at around

---

[13] The question I am alluding has especially to do with the authorship of books of *Elements*, which predated Euclid, according to some readings of Proclus (*In Eucl.* 66. 7 Friedlein). This text by Proclus has been much discussed, especially in and since W. Burkert, *Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon* (Nürnberg 1962); Engl. transl.: *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge, Mass. 1972); for a powerful restatement of the traditional view concerning Pythagoras, see L. Zhmud, *Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Religion im frühen Pythagoreismus* (Berlin 1997).

[14] For the isagogic genre in mathematics, see J. Mansfeld, *Prolegomena Mathematica from Apollonius of Perga to the Late Neoplatonists, with an Appendix on Pappus and the History of Platonism* (Leiden 1998).

[15] R. Netz, "Eudemus of Rhodes, Hippocrates of Chios and the Earliest Form of a Greek Mathematical Text", *Centaurus* (forthcoming).

[16] E. g.: E. A. Havelock, *The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences* (Princeton 1982).

Plato's time from the 'oral' to the 'literate'. Indeed, following Gavrilov's final refutation of the myth of the absence of silent reading in antiquity[17] such categorical theses should best be avoided altogether. It is clear that already Hippocrates of Chios was known, perhaps primarily, as the author of a written text, and so the oral and the written were always present, simultaneously, in early Greek mathematics. Still, it is fair to say that the overall direction of change, from Classical to Hellenistic times, was in the direction of making mathematics more of a book-activity and less of a spoken activity. Certainly at Plato's time, let alone Socrates' time, there were only a few papyrus rolls available containing mathematical contents; while, at the same time, there were a number of active mathematicians with whom Plato was familiar. If only for this reason, then, it is likely that the form of mathematical presentation Plato would be most familiar with – the paradigmatic form of mathematics – would be that of the spoken presentation.

So, to begin with, we should not expect Plato to describe the mathematical situation as a relation between written elements in books, some of which are ὑποθέσεις, some are their results; rather we should look for a relation between lived and spoken acts. A relation between lived and spoken acts is indeed what Plato's tenses seem to imply, and the impression we should get, if we read the text without heeding any prior interpretation, is that the acts of setting up ὑποθέσεις are local to the acts of proof, just as the drawing of diagrams is. This is startling, if indeed ὑποθέσεις are hypotheses. Did Greek mathematicians, as a rule, begin their proofs by setting up the postulates they required for those proofs? If indeed the ὑποθέσεις are some general statements about mathematical objects, or if they are definitions of those objects, their mention should not be local to a local proof. The text, at this point, seems to imply a strange mathematical practice, one where all stories must start from the egg. Was this really the standard Greek mathematical practice? One immediate counter-example is the only text we are familiar with from before Plato's time – once again, Hippocrates' of Chios *Quadrature of Lunules*. In this case, it seems clear that *all* the 'axiomatic' preliminaries to the text are not original, but were introduced by a later redactor of Hippocrates (see Netz,[18] following e. g. Mueller[19]).

---

[17] A. Gavrilov, "Techniques of Reading in Classical Antiquity", *ClQ* 47 (1997) 56–76 (tr. with postscript by M. F. Burnyeat).

[18] Netz (n. 15).

[19] I. Mueller, "Aristotle and the Quadrature of the Circle", in: N. Kretzmann (ed.), *Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and Medieval Thought* (Ithaca – New York 1982) 146–164.

If so a written text, than *a fortiori* any spoken proof. The standard account, then, is just unlikely to have been the standard Greek mathematical practice.

But should we take normal Greek mathematical practice as our model here? I think we should.

The point is very simple. Section 1 is Socrates' second try. Just before that, he said to Glaucon, among other things (510 b 4–6, Cornford again):

> ...The mind uses as images those actual things which themselves had images in the visible world; and it is compelled to pursue its inquiry by starting from assumptions and travelling, not up to a principle, but down to a conclusion...

whereupon Glaucon replied, obviously justified (510 b 10):

> I don't quite understand what you mean.

And the text goes on, trying to elucidate Socrates' first try. 'Elucidate' is the key word. It just won't do for Socrates' second try to be inaccessible, and in some ways Socrates' second try clearly aims at accessibility. For instance, Socrates gives much more examples than are really necessary. He says 'geometry, arithmetic, etc.' rather than 'geometry, etc.'; 'odd and even, figures, three angles, etc.' rather than 'odd and even, etc.', etc. So Plato is at least setting up a show of accessibility.

That the text is not all that crystal clear is of course true – otherwise this paper would have been redundant! – but Glaucon, at least, was satisfied. He reacted to section 1 by (510 d 4):

> Yes, I know that.[20]

Irony could not, indeed should not be excluded. Probably Glaucon does not get quite to the depths of the matter. However, Glaucon understood *something*, recognized as known *something* – and it would have been poor taste to mislead him on purpose here. Glaucon's initial perplexity did not reflect any obtuseness on his part. Probably the good reader of Plato's time would have shared Glaucon's original perplexity and ensuing understanding. Glaucon, of course, is portrayed throughout the *Republic* as the clever brother. He is the best, short of Socrates himself. Socrates' section 1 should be such as to allow Glaucon a fair chance of getting his meaning. So when a reference is being made to something

[20] Cornford's rendering here has something of the understatement about it: the original πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οἶδα seems much stronger.

which Glaucon is supposed to know from first-hand experience, we should expect this minimum, that the reference is to what Glaucon actually knows from first-hand experience. Otherwise the "explanation" offered is a pointless joke.

I think that this consideration alone should make us rethink the established interpretation of the passage. It is very difficult to see how the statement "Mathematicians do not give grounds for their definitions" could have been obviously true from the point of view of Plato's good reader, let alone from Glaucon's point of view. It is even stranger to imagine the same with the statement "Mathematicians do not give grounds for their postulates". The modern educated reader has learnt some meta-mathematics, in progressive algebra classes, in a popular book of philosophy or in college logic classes; but I refuse to believe that the Classical Greek educated reader knew anything at all about meta-mathematics. However, he may have known something about mathematics, as opposed to meta-mathematics. He may not have known the logical structure of treatises, but he may have known the shape of proofs, for he may have attended some acts of proof. And here we return to the earlier point concerning the use of verbs in section 1. To be accessible to Glaucon as an obvious example, then, what is at stake in section 1 should be something that is involved in every separate act of proof, in the same way in which diagrams are.

3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTIONS 1 AND 2

Diagrams, indeed, are the subject matter of section 2, and the relationship between the two sections merits a close inspection.

One feature which is shared by all the interpretations of the text I have come across is that, to some extent, they treat of the two sections as parallel.[21] Both sections – according to such interpretations – share the same structure: they (i) describe a state of affairs and then (ii) criticize it (criticisms that, according to some interpretations, are meant to transform mathematics, according to others – are meant to describe an inevitable feature of mathematics).

It is remarkable that the two paragraphs are actually not at all parallel, in fact they are unparallel to the point of stylistic unease. I quote again Cornford's translation of the beginning of section 2, 510 d 5–6:

---

[21] Guthrie is typical: "First, they posit certain things... Secondly, they make use of visible models..." (W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* IV [Cambridge 1975] 509).

> You also know how they make use of visible figures and discourse about them, though what they really have in mind is the originals of which these figures are images...

This is in various ways unlike a literal rendering of the original. To offer a very lame one:

> Surely [you know] also that they make use of visible figures and discourse about them, not having those [i.e. visible figures] in mind, but those of which these [figures] are images.

The literal rendering is uneasy because it is a literal rendering – but also because of the thought it contains. This has three elements:

a. Mathematicians make use of diagrams.

b. Mathematicians do not have diagrams in mind.

c. Mathematicians have the modeled things in mind.

Cornford puts (a), or rather the entire (a)–(c), under a "how". But there's no "how" in the original. Glaucon was assumed to know "that", not "how". Secondly, Cornford's "though" is misplaced: he puts the concessive connector between (a) and (b)–(c), while in reality it is placed between (b) and (c). Finally and most importantly, Cornford does not render the way in which the verbs of (b) and (c) are participles dependent upon the finite verbs of (a). In sum: according to Cornford, Glaucon is meant to affirm that mathematicians have a certain practice, made up of two elements: (1) use of diagrams; (2) having the originals of diagrams in mind. According to Plato, however, Glaucon is meant to affirm that the mathematicians' practice of using diagrams (which is in itself assumed and therefore is not to be affirmed as such) involves having in mind originals, not diagrams. Cornford's version yields a certain duality ("diagrams – yes; but having originals in mind"), superficially resembling that of section 1 ("ὑποθέσεις – yes; but 'consistency' "). Plato's version – and here arises the unease for the modern reader – bears no resemblance at all to section 1.

This is a problem because of the καί at the beginning of section 2, which invites us to assume some continuity between the two. Anyway, without some such continuity the text loses much in stylistic terms – always a valid consideration in Platonic exegesis. How is the continuity to be understood, if not in terms of parallelism?

Let's note the discontinuity between the two sections. The claim of section 1 – that mathematicians use ὑποθέσεις – is not qualified; whereas the entire thrust of section 2 is to serve as qualification of the mathematicians' use of diagrams. Section 1 is devoted to A Bad Thing, reliance upon

ὑποθέσεις as if they were known; section 2 is devoted to A Good Thing, having originals rather than diagrams in mind.[22]

Section 1 blames, section 2 praises. 1 asserts, 2 qualifies. The two should be somehow interconnected. It is supremely tempting to say that section 2 simply is a qualification of section 1. It is almost tempting to say that ὑποθέσεις are diagrams: which, I believe, is nearly the truth.

4. THE EVIDENCE OF DIALECTIC

I am about to offer my own interpretation. One of its merits, I believe, is that it makes the implications of the passage more credible, both for Plato's philosophy and for his contemporaries' mathematics. In order to make this more apparent, I would like to remark briefly on the problems of the standard interpretations from this point of view.

The most important contextual consideration, certainly from Plato's point of view, is that involving Plato's conception of dialectic. The whole of the Sun-Line-Cave set of analogies has as its goal the elucidation of the nature of dialectic (as well as the correlated "theory of Forms"). The *Divided Line*, at the end of which our text is situated, takes 'analogy' literally by using the formal and mathematical concept of 'analogy', namely that of proportion. The well-known formula is that (Reflection-mindedness):: (Objectmindedness)::(Mathematics):(Dialectics)::(Reflection-cum-Objectmindedness):(Mathematics-cum-dialectics). If three of the items are given, the fourth is given as well, so by understanding what reflections, objects and mathematics are, we can understand what dialectic is.

The problem is, of course, that there is no non-metaphorical way in which the relation between 'disciplines' such as mathematics and dialectic could be equivalent to the relation between looking at reflections and looking at objects. Whatever is said about dialectic which is non-metaphorical is due to what is directly said to distinguish it from mathematics. This means that whatever is our interpretation of the passage concerning mathematics, it should be imported, negatively, into our interpretation of Plato's dialectic. This is standardly done. However, as this involves im-

---

[22] That section 2 ascribes 'A Good Thing' to mathematicians is all the more obvious when it is realized – as many would admit today, following Burnyeat (M. F. Burnyeat, "Platonism and Mathematics: A Prelude to Discussion", in: A. Graeser [ed.], *Mathematics and Metaphysics in Aristotle* [Bern 1987] 212–240) – that diagrams, according to Plato, are an inevitable part of mathematics. Hence, the *best* mathematicians can do is to have in mind originals. This they do, according to section 2: it is therefore a section of unalloyed praise.

porting the standard interpretation of our text, several results follow which are difficult.

One is that dialectic comes to be characterized as a system of propositions. Dialectic is "where all the propositions are proved" or "a system starting from definitions which are all argued for". Mueller, using expressions characteristic of this line of interpretation, says that "We might ... view the Platonic universal science as a two-tiered system with the following structure...".[23] This, I think, must be wide off the mark. Plato's dialectic was not a 'universal science', nor was it a 'system', nor had it any 'structure'. Plato's dialectic was a method, a way of doing things with words. Plato could hardly be more explicit on this matter: expressions such as ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος are commonly used by him.[24] Dialectic is an *act*, not a *structure*. It will be seen that this is exactly parallel to the claim made above, independently, that the referent of section 1 must be a mathematical act rather than the structure of mathematics.

A further difficult result from the interpretation of dialectic as a propositional system is that it might involve Plato in the belief that everything can be proved. This results if we think that the criticism included in section 1 is to the effect that mathematicians fail to prove their first principles. Now the idea that everything can be proved was known in the Academy,[25] but Plato was deeply aware of the structure of ordered series, and there is no reason to suppose that he had any difficulties with such elementary logical observations such as those raised by Aristotle in the first chapters of *Posterior Analytics* – if anything, the *Theaetetus*' discussion of such structures is at a higher level of sophistication than that of the *Posterior Analytics*. It remains of course possible to argue (with Robinson) that the mistake ascribed to mathematicians by section 1 is not so much their failure to prove the ὑποθέσεις, but rather their very ignorance of their reliance upon ὑποθέσεις. According to Robinson's interpretation, then mathematicians are dogmatic where they should be agnostically hypothetical.[26] This would mean that the essential point made concerning dialectic and ὑποθέσεις is that dialectic, unlike mathematics, is fully aware of its use of ὑποθέσεις. Now in some ways it is clear that the difference between mathematics and dialectics is in the *way* in which the two use ὑποθέσεις: mathematics works forwards, dialectic backwards, etc. But there is another irreducible aspect of dialectic

---

[23] Mueller (n. 19) 83.
[24] See R. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic* (Oxford ²1953) 69 ff.
[25] See Aristotle, *Anal. Post.* I, 3.
[26] Robinson (n. 24) 152.

as distinct from mathematics, namely that it is in some sense *less* dependent upon ὑποθέσεις than mathematics is. Dialectic reaches an ἀνυπόθετον (Plat. *Resp.* 511 b 6); it is "destroying" the ὑποθέσεις (*Resp.* 533 c 8). It is true that in all this Plato is vague, but it is difficult to see how he can avoid the following dilemma. Either the criticism of mathematics involves the very use of ὑποθέσεις, or it involves the unreflective use of ὑποθέσεις. In the first case, the merit of dialectic would consist in its avoiding ὑποθέσεις – ridiculous! (i.e., ridiculous, as long as ὑποθέσεις are "hypotheses", for then the sense would be that everything is proved by dialectics). In the second case, the merit of dialectic would consist in its reflective use of ὑποθέσεις, which, while acceptable in itself, simply fails to characterize dialectic in anything like its projected Platonic shape – and, after all, would mean that *everything* is in principle like dialectic – all you have to do is to become aware of the "hypotheses" you use.

To make the interpretation of Plato's dialectic more credible, then, ὑποθέσεις should be the kind of thing that one could, in principle, make more or less use of; and they should be the kind of thing one makes use of, time and again, at the beginning of what one does.

5. HOW PROPOSITIONS BEGIN

I do not mean to suggest that Plato's use of ὑπόθεσις in the *Republic* is consistent (in the passages which most interest us, I suspect that Plato often wavers between the word ὑπόθεσις as referring to that kind of ὑπόθεσις which is used by mathematicians, and ὑπόθεσις as having a wider reference). But what is the general area of meaning within which the reference of the word may fluctuate?

Literally, an ὑπόθεσις is that which is put down. It is something set out and then left in one's immediate vicinity. It is not used much in concrete senses. Almost always, it is used with some abstract objects, usually those having to do with discussion and persuasion. The first translation offered by *LSJ* is 'proposal' and the similarity with the other main sense, 'supposition', as well as the generality of the word, are clear. Robinson suggests translating ὑποτίθεμαι as 'to posit as a preliminary'.[27] An ὑπόθεσις is, in the contexts which interest us, the preliminary part of a language-act, a preliminary part which may consist of a proposal or indeed an hypothesis. Besides being preliminary, some element of provisionality, of being non-final, imperfect, must be present as well. ὑπόθεσις is second rate: it is opposed to the better,

[27] Robinson (n. 24) 95.

ancient method in *On Ancient Medicine* 1; it is the tool of the Second Sailing in the *Phaedo* (100 a 3) and, analogously, it is the route taken when the direct route has exhausted itself in the *Meno* (87 a 7). Of course, this sense of ὑπόθεσις being inferior is present in our own text.

Finally, the act of ὑπόθεσις is always verbal, and the ὑπόθεσις must be, on the whole, of a propositional nature, but it need not wholly be propositional, and it is easy to see how an ὑπόθεσις could take a noun as a direct object, if it says something or refers in some way to that object.

That the preliminary part of mathematical proofs of the Greek kind could be seen as such an ὑπόθεσις is, I think, obvious.

This preliminary part consists in drawing a diagram, while making some claims concerning its elements. These would be to the effect that such and such elements in the diagram *exemplify* (not "represent": I have argued,[28] that the most natural way to interpret Greek mathematical practice is that it behaved *as if* its object was just the diagram itself) certain geometrical or arithmetical objects. Most often, this preliminary stage would include an explicit assumption, e. g. that the object of inquiry is obtainable (this is known as the method of analysis)[29] or that a certain false proposition is true (which will lead to an absurdity; this is known as the method of *reductio*). Only following that preliminary stage will the deductive chain – the proof culminating in the result – begin in earnest. This deductive chain would move on smoothly, and when the result has been obtained the audience would have nothing left to do but to assent.

As far as Greek usage goes, then, the word ὑπόθεσις as used in section 1 of the text could *mean* nothing more precise than "the preliminary parts of language-acts", while *referring* to the specific preliminary parts of mathematical proofs, namely those involved in drawing a diagram, declaring it to exemplify the case in question, and making the preliminary assumptions concerning it.

Such an ὑπόθεσις takes nouns as its objects, namely those nouns which are mentioned while drawing the diagram. It may be helpful to notice immediately that this also agrees with the Greek mathematical usage itself as in, e. g., Euclid's *Elements* I. 26:[30]

ἡ ὑπὸ ΔΖΕ τῇ ὑπὸ ΒΓΑ ὑποκεῖται ἴση.

---

[28] Netz (n. 15).

[29] Here it will be useful to remember Plato's early acquaintance with this form of argumentation, and his identifying this form as characteristically mathematical, for which see *Meno* 86 e 4 ff.

[30] J. L. Heiberg and E. S. Stamatis (ed.), *Euclidis Elementa* I (Leipzig 1972) 64. 4.

> The [angle] under ΔΖΕ was hypothesized equal to the [angle] under ΒΓΑ.

This refers back to a demand made right at the beginning of the diagram-drawing process:[31]

> ἔστω δύο τρίγωνα ... ἔχοντα ... τὴν δὲ (sc. γωνίαν) ... ὑπὸ ΒΓΑ (sc. ἴσην) τῇ ὑπὸ ΕΖΔ.
>
> Let the [angle] under ΒΓΑ be equal to the [angle] under ΕΖΔ.

This, indeed, is the only context in which the cognates of ὑπόθεσις are being used in extant Greek mathematical texts: namely, reference to acts being made in the preliminary parts of a proposition. Definitions and postulates, on the other hand, are never referred to in this way.

This interpretation fits the constraints on the interpretation we have developed above. It will be seen that the kind of ὑπόθεσις described here is a dynamic, repeated act, not a static, unique element in an abstract structure. It is also one that every educated reader with some experience of mathematics would immediately identify. And it is picked up nicely in section 2, which, while not discussing the ὑποθέσεις of mathematics in their entirety, does discuss the most conspicuous of them, and that which the Greeks associated most closely with mathematics – namely, diagrams.[32]

Dialectic could well employ ὑποθέσεις; but its ὑποθέσεις would not be as irreducible as the mathematical ones are. What mathematicians cannot hope to avoid is the statement "ΑΒΓ is a circle" when it is not. This criticism would have been not only that of Plato, based on the theory of forms: it would be known to the historical Socrates and Glaucon, in the form of Protagoras' fragment (B7 DK) (embedded in Aristotle's statement of the criticism, *Metaph.* 997 b 35 – a 4):

> Nor are the sensible lines such as the geometer says they are; for none of the sensible lines is straight or circular in this way <in which the geometer means it to be>; for the ruler does not touch the circle at a point but rather, as Protagoras said in his refutation of the geometers, <along a stretch of the circle>.

Now, why cannot the mathematicians simply avoid talking about sensible lines, in this way avoiding the Protagorean falsehood? The reason is

---

[31] *Ibid.*, 62. 9–12.

[32] I argue in R. Netz, *The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics: a Study in Cognitive History*, Synthese Historical Library (Cambridge 1999) 35–43, that, generally, diagrams were the metonyms of mathematical activity in antiquity. This is proved, for the special claim that the word διάγραμμα simply meant 'proposition', in W. R. Knorr, *The Evolution of the Euclidean Elements* (Dordrecht 1975) 69–75.

clear: the mathematicians cannot avoid such claims because they can not, being mathematicians, avoid diagrams, and so avoid making those introductory make-believe statements where the diagram is taken to be the object itself. Thinking of the triangle-in-itself as much as they would, they are bound to start over and over again with their "let the triangle ABC be taken", while it is not. But dialectic is patently different for the simple reason it does not use diagrams. There is nothing obvious preventing dialectic from talking about fully abstract things, and so no false preliminaries are required. For any wrong preliminary, there is some hope to get rid of it in the process of dialectical argumentation; you may even hope to get correct preliminaries, eventually.

We may even say the following. The structure of argumentation in Greek mathematics is to make the hypothetical claim that P is – hypothetically – true; drawing the conclusion that Q is true as well; and then concluding from this the non-hypothetical, but conditional conclusion that from P Q follows. That this is the structure of Greek mathematical argument, I have argued in my book.[33] I have shown how the results of Greek mathematics do in fact take a conditional form, and I have argued that this represents the argument from the hypothetical assertions of the setting-out in particular terms to the conclusion derived in particular terms.

To us, it seems difficult even to imagine what a valid non-conditional conclusion is like: every argument is to us true only relative to certain assumptions. (Thus, famously, Russell has defined mathematics as a class of propositions all of the form 'P implies Q').[34] This of course already represents the realignment of the philosophy of mathematics following the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry. For Plato, there would be nothing impossible about the notion that a non-conditional conclusion could be rigorously proved: for instance, it could be rigorously proved that the Good is One. Not that, e. g. 'given the hypothesis of the forms, the Good is One' but rather 'the Good is One'. Of course, Plato would realize that any chain of argumentation must start at some point; but his reasonable assumption would be that one could prove that certain statements are true independently of the starting-point taken. One reasonable way to get such a result is by showing that the starting-point would be true, regardless of which possible assumptions are made. This could hardly be the case, however, in mathematics: what is irreducible in mathematics (but not in dialectic) is the starting-point that is fundamentally false, the one tied to the diagram. Any math-

---

[33] Netz (n. 32) ch. 6.

[34] B. Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics* (London 1900 – 1903).

ematical conclusion would depend not merely on a starting-point, but on a false one at that. In summary: mathematics is as good as a form of reasoning can get, with the proviso that it is tied to provisional false assumptions, which is the case because it is tied to the diagram: the images used define the science in question and the farthest one moves from images, the closer one gets to reality. This seems to be the main argument of the *Divided Line* passage and so the role I suggest for diagrams in Plato's characterization of mathematics is appropriate.

An argument against my interpretation is that it is simple. I make Plato refer to a well-known and concrete practice. How to account for his vagueness in this passage? It was a long stretch to have "the odd and the even" as shorthand for statements such as "the odd and the even exist". Is it not a longer stretch still to have it as shorthand for statements such as "let A and B, odd and even, be taken"? To the contrary, I would say that Plato's vagueness is an argument in favour of my interpretation. The practice I describe is concrete – but it is also complex. It includes the diagram, the statements which correlate the diagram with the proof, and the preliminary assumptions of the proof. Each of the three is an ὑπόθεσις in a different way: the first is not propositional at all, the second is false, the third is tentative. Glaucon would find it difficult to disentangle all of those components; but he would easily share the overall impression that mathematics is steeped with ὑποθέσεις, largely due to its reliance upon diagrams. The overall impression is correct, but vague, and this vagueness is reflected by Socrates' "odd and even". I suspect that the central image "odd and even" is meant to evoke is an expression of the form: "let A, an odd number, and B, an even number, be taken". I think it is clear that this is an ὑπόθεσις, and that it could be called "taking the odd and the even as ὑποθέσεις". (I return in the next section to mention another, more specific suggestion for an example Plato may have had in mind.)

The force of my account should be clarified. I do believe that the simple, literal sense of Plato's words – the one intended by Plato – is to describe the practice of mathematicians at the beginning of their propositions – and not, that is, the structure of mathematics taken as a single whole. At the same time, the following caveat should be made. The central model of the *Republic*, after all, is an assumption of isomorphism between the small scale and the large scale, the microcosm and the macrocosm; such an assumption has deep metaphysical motivation for Plato as, indeed, two things which share the same structure are, for him, as similar as any two things can be: this is what the theory of the Forms asserts. So, while Plato may be talking about individual propositions, he no doubt takes it as an immediate consequence

that, whatever he finds, is thereby true of mathematics taken as a whole. Thus much of the standard interpretation of Plato's philosophy of mathematics can be salvaged even if we take the reference of ὑπόθεσις in the *Divided Line* passage to be, in itself, as narrow as I took it in this article. I have provided the main evidence for my reading above: the last, remaining section adds some further possible sources of evidence.

6. SOME POSSIBLE AVENUES

Having offered my interpretation, I now note three, more conjectural lines of argument that may perhaps be adduced in its favour, and then end by noting the possible philosophical significance of the account.

Very briefly, then, we should first of all note a textual curiousity. At the very beginning of section 2 mathematicians are said to use τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἴδεσι, 'visible forms'. The variant reading of the Codex Malatestianus (plut. XXVIII. 4), however, has τοῖς εἰρημένοις εἴδεσι, 'the forms mentioned above'. That is, to the reader of the Malatestianus, Plato would explicitly say that while mathematicians use hypotheses, they use them for the sake of the square-in-itself. The interpretation offered in this article is the text of the Malatestianus.

The text of the *Republic*, based by Burnet (mostly) on four manuscripts, has few textual discrepancies, typically trivial omissions of particles and case-endings. Thus a substantial variant reading should be taken seriously. Could this be the right text? Or should we say that the εἰρημένοις, while a mistake, reflects an ancient interpretation of the passage, similar to that offered in my paper? Of course, neither has to be the case, and no special weight should be given to this last argument. Still, it is well worth our reflection: it would suffice for the textual history of Plato to go even a little differently (suppose *two* manuscripts had reported that reading...) and the interpretation of the *Divided Line* would have *had* to be different!

This, then, is one type of conjecture, having to do with Plato's text. I move on to another conjecture, having to do with Plato's literary methods.

Platonic writing on the whole is characterized by puns and clever plays of self-reflective irony. An interpretation of Plato's doctrine is supported, therefore, if it can show how features of the text may be taken as punning and metaphorical reflections of that meaning.

An obvious example comes right at the beginning of the passage I discuss. I refer to Socrates' words in Section 1, ῥᾷον γὰρ τούτων προειρημένων μαθήσῃ (510 c 1). Curiously, both translations fail with this simple phrase – perhaps because it is so much based on a pun. What Socrates literally says is

"You shall understand this more easily, after these preliminary things are said". There is not much point to Plato's word προειρημένων as opposed to the more simple εἰρημένων: Plato could well have said "You shall understand this more easily, after these things are said", but the 'preliminary' was added in, making the task so much more difficult for the translator. The only purpose of this phrase, I believe, is as ironic pun: putting Socrates in a position akin to that of the mathematicians, namely, he is explaining things with the aid of preliminaries. But this works, of course, only if we take ὑπόθεσις to mean a 'preliminary' and not something such a 'postulate'.

Indeed – going on to an even more speculative literary suggestion – the entire structure of the text may be taken as an ironic reflection of the structure of mathematical argument, moving from statement, through preliminary hypothesis and ensuing argument, to conclusion. Prior to our two sections, Socrates has stated the general claim in general, difficult-to-follow language – which we may compare to the general enunciation of a mathematical proposition. This is followed by a preliminary translation of the general claim to terms with which Glaucon is familiar, obtaining his agreement to the hypothetical claim. (And is not Glaucon's emphatic πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οἶδα [510 d 4] ironic, following upon Socrates' ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν [510 d 1]? Is Glaucon not too quick to assent rather than question the preliminary put forward?) Following further argument in section 2, finally, Socrates can return to the general statement that preceded this exchange, as if now a proved fact, in 511 a 3–8. Now this interpretation I offer is speculative on several counts: for one thing, we do not know that the mathematical propositions Plato was familiar with were at all preceded by general statements of the kind we are familiar with from Hellenistic mathematics. If they were, however – and there is no specific reason to believe they were not – then this interpretation, provided we take on board my overall account of what ὑπόθεσις means in this passage, results in a beautiful combination: section 1, the one discussing ὑπόθεσις, also functions in this metaphorical sense as an ὑπόθεσις itself – surely an ironic, reflective structure one would wish Plato to be credited with.

A final speculative possibility, suggested to me by Dmitri Panchenko, has to do with the mathematical example Plato may have had foremost in mind. It is an obvious feature of Plato's examples in this passage – odd and even, three types of angles, and square and diagonal – that they are not meant to allow any single proof event in which all three are taken together. Plato's aim is to suggest that his comments are true of all mathematical cases. However, an author typically has some examples in mind while working, and it is tempting to suggest that Plato may have in mind here the

mathematical proof where odd and even, as well as square and diagonal, are essential – namely, the proof (as preserved in the transmitted text of Euclid's *Elements*) for the incommensurability of side and diagonal. Of course, the nature of proofs for incommensurability known to Plato – and Plato's knowledge about such proofs – are among the most vexed questions in the history of early Greek mathematics. (This, after all, is the theme of Knorr.[35]) Avoiding those questions, I just wish to mention a simple outcome: if indeed Plato has in mind the proof for the incommensurability of side and diagonal, than he has in mind *a single proof*. In the text preserved in the transmitted text of Euclid's *Elements*,[36] the hypothetical character of square and diagonal, as of odd and even, has a rich, complicated structure. The square and diagonal are mentioned as lines in the diagram, ΑΒΓΔ and ΓΑ (AB being the side; so this is ὑπόθεσις in one sense: set down in the diagram). The side and diagonal are hypothetically taken to be commensurable (ὑπόθεσις in another sense). If indeed commensurable, then they are as two numbers, here taken to be EZ and H (once again ὑπόθεσις in the sense of taking an object from the diagram to stand for an object – an especially glaring ὑπόθεσις in this case, as a line is taken to be a number). Then a complex set of ad hoc assumptions (ὑπόθεσις in yet another sense) shows that, if EZ were to be odd, an impossibility would ensue, so that it is even, from which another impossibility follows. (And so the side and the diagonal are not commensurable.) If nothing else, this example may serve to show what I mean by my interpretation of ὑπόθεσις in the *Divided Line*. And the possibility that Plato has in mind this example is indeed tempting: after all, what else does come to mind just by mentioning 'square and diagonal'?

The above considerations – from textual criticism, from literary considerations, from the text of the *Elements* – are both highly speculative. I wish to conclude with what is a much stronger consequence of the account offered in this paper. I refer now to the overall nature of Greek mathematics as opposed to medieval and modern mathematics, and its possible consequence for the philosophy of Greek mathematics.

The overall divide between ancient and modern mathematics has been the subject of debate in the 20th century, especially in the context of the debate following Unguru.[37] The debate surrounded mostly the question whether historical differences are at all of much significance for mathematics: to the

---

[35] Knorr (n. 32).

[36] Eucl. *Elem.* III, 231–233 (see n. 30).

[37] S. Unguru, "On the Need to Rewrite the History of Greek Mathematics", in: *Archive for History of Exact Sciences* 15 (1975) 67–114.

extent that history is allowed in, then it is usually agreed that the ancients differ in some fundamental way from the moderns. *How* they differ, however, is more difficult to say. The main proposal is that by Jacob Klein who argued [38] for a 'first-order' character of Greek mathematics as opposed to a 'second-order' character of modern mathematics. What this means in practice is a certain tying of the Greek mathematical proof to a local geometrical configuration, as opposed to the symbolic and more abstract approach typically taken by modern mathematics.

In a forthcoming book [39] I elaborate Klein's thesis as follows. It is not for nothing that early Greek mathematics strikes one as focused on the local geometrical configuration: it can be shown that ancient Greek mathematicians took pains to make sure their solutions to problems would differ from other solutions offered in the past. The aim was precisely that of locality: a solution was a solution for just *that* local problem. Instead of contributing to mathematics as a structure, adding on to the work produced by other mathematicians, the Greek mathematician aimed at his own individual glory to the *exclusion* of mathematical continuity. The Greek mathematical work aims to be a world to itself, wiping the slate clean from previous achievement and making itself inaccessible and singular. This is a mathematics where the aim is to endow the individual contribution with its own, special aura. We may easily see the context of this approach in the social setting of early Greek intellectual life, with the limited institutional setting and the focus on radical debate.

On the other hand, as we move on to Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, a new approach seems to take hold. The aim of intellectual work is the re-arrangement and perfection of past achievements. The question of the position of a given contribution in the wider scheme comes to the fore. Instead of individuality, the goal becomes that of all-encompassing treatment. Thus problems are systematized and come to be seen as special cases of more general problems, fitting a larger classification. The local configuration loses its importance, and the focus is now on the overall scheme of possible problems and solutions.

In short, there is a historical process whereby mathematics becomes a system – which it already is the medieval Arabic world and most certainly is in modern Europe. This image of mathematics as a single, monolith system informs, still, our own image of what mathematics is. Instead of a philosophical

---

[38] J. Klein, *Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origins of Algebra*, tr. by E. Brann (Cambridge, Mass. 1968).

[39] R. Netz, *The Transformation of Early Mediterranean Mathematics: from Problems to Equations* (Cambridge, forthcoming).

constant, this image is, I would argue, a historical construct. There is a specific historical transformation – from the classical Greek world into Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages – transforming mathematics from local configurations to overall schemes. Put succinctly: this is the transformation from mathematics with a plural *s* to Mathematics with a capital M. We would say that Mathematics *is*; but the Greeks would say that the *mathematika* – the (many diverse) things having to with the advanced studies – *are*.

If this is true for the difference between ancient and modern mathematics then we should also expect it to be a difference between ancient and modern philosophies of mathematics: that ancient philosophy of mathematics was rather more a study of individual acts of mathematics, while modern philosophy of mathematics is rather more a study of mathematics taken as a monolithic whole. The interpretative question concerning ὑπόθεσις in the *Divided Line* is primarily that – does Plato study mathematics as a monolithic whole (as the standard interpretations have it), or does he study individual acts of mathematical proof (as I suggest)? The main significance of the interpretation offered in this article, then, is to suggest how a philosophy of mathematics with the individual mathematical act as its focus would look like – in other words, what is the philosophy of mathematics with plurals.

Reviel Netz
Stanford University

Статья посвящена вопросу о значении слова ὑπόθεσις в пассаже из "Государства" Платона (510 c – 511 a). Рассматриваются прежде всего место этого рассуждения в контексте ранней греческой математики и его внутренняя логическая структура. Маловероятно, что здесь подразумевается ссылка на какие-либо сложные метаматематические качества греческой математики, взятой как целое (например, что вся она зиждется на ряде не нуждающихся в обосновании принципов): едва ли такие соображения должны быть очевидны Главкону, как и нет уверенности в том, что воззрения греческих математиков в эту эпоху были столь однородны. Далее, автор стремится показать, что две основных части пассажа более тесно связаны между собой, чем это обычно выглядит в переводах, и соответственно весьма тесной выступает связь между обращением математиков к "гипотезам" и их обращением к чертежам. Наконец, высказывается предположение, что в данном специфическом контексте ὑπόθεσις указывает на предшествующий рассмотрению каждой теоремы акт начертания определенной фигуры, сопровождаемый формулировкой относящихся к этой фигуре предварительных утверждений.

ΠΡΑΟΤΗΣ AS AN EMOTION IN ARISTOTLE'S *RHETORIC*

Having begun his analysis of the several emotions in the *Rhetoric* with anger or ὀργή, Aristotle turns next to a discussion of the emotion that he considers the opposite of ὀργή, namely πραότης. As Aristotle puts it (2. 3, 1380 a 6–12):

> Since being angry (τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι) is the opposite of τῷ πραΰνεσθαι, and ὀργή the opposite of πραότης, we must now consider in what state people are πρᾶοι, and toward whom they are πρᾶοι, and by means of what they become πρᾶοι (πραΰνονται). Let, then, πράϋνσις be a settling down and quieting of ὀργή. If, then, people are angry at those who slight them, and a slight is a voluntary thing, it is clear that people are πρᾶοι in turn toward those who do no such thing or do such things involuntarily or who seem to be such.

What does πρᾶος mean in this context?

Commentators and translators more or less universally take it to mean something like 'calm' or 'tranquil'. Thus, W. Rhys Roberts[1] renders the above: "Since growing calm is the opposite of growing angry, and calmness the opposite of anger, we must ascertain in what frames of mind men are calm, towards whom they feel calm, and by what means they are made so. Growing calm may be defined as a settling down or quieting of anger", etc. So too, Isis Borges da Fonseca entitles the chapter, "Da Calma", and renders the opening: "Como estar calmo é o contrário de estar encolerizado, e a cólera se contrapõe à calma, deve-se examinar em que estado de ânimo as pessoas sâo calmas", etc.[2] Franz Sieveke[3] translates: "Da nun die Erregung des Zornes der Besänftigung entgegengesetzt ist und der Zorn der Sanftmut", etc. Antonio Tovar[4] provides as a title for the section, "De la calma o serenidad", and renders the opening: "Puesto que a enojarse es contrario aplacarse y la ira es contraria de la calma, corresponde tratar en qué disposición están los no airados y respecto de quiénes lo son y por qué causa". H. C. Lawson-Tancred,[5] in the Penguin

---

[1] W. Rhys Roberts (tr.), "Rhetoric", in: J. Barnes (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle* II, Bollingen Series 71. 2 (Princeton 1984) 2152–2269.

[2] I. B. B. da Fonseca (tr.), *Retórica das Paixões: Aristóteles* (São Paulo 2000).

[3] F. G. Sieveke (tr.), *Aristoteles: Rhetorik* (München 1980 [^{3}1989]) 91.

[4] A. Tovar (tr.), *Aristoteles: Rhetorica* (Madrid 1953) 101.

[5] H. C. Lawson-Tancred (tr.), *Aristotle: The Art of Rhetoric* (Harmondsworth 1991) 147.

translation, has: "Now since being angry is the opposite of *being calm*, and anger the opposite of *calmness*, we must grasp in what condition men are calm", etc., and continues a little further: "*Let calming, then, be a suspension or placation of anger*" (emphasis in original). And Adolf Stahr[6] offers: "Das Zürnen ist der milden Stimmung und der Zorn der Milde entgegengesetzt", etc.

Edward Cope,[7] in his seminal commentary on the *Rhetoric*, introduces the section under discussion with the words: "Analysis of πραότης, patience", and remarks that "πραότης then, *here*, as a πάθος – in the *Ethics* it is a ἕξις or virtue – is this instinctive *affection*, feeling, emotion, in a mild, calm, subdued state (opposed to ὀργή an emotion in a state of excitement); placidity of temper". Most recently, George Kennedy[8] entitles the chapter under discussion "Πραότης, or Calmness", and translates: "Since becoming calm is the opposite of becoming angry, and anger the opposite of calmness...", etc.

Calmness, however, or mildness, gentleness, patience, good temper, to cite the list of equivalents provided by Grimaldi[9] in his epigraph to this chapter, is problematic as an emotion. Kennedy,[10] in his head-note on πραότης, defends its status as a πάθος by disputing the rendering as 'calmness', despite his own translation:

> Aristotle regards πραότης as the emotion opposite to anger. It is often translated "mildness", which seems rather a trait of character or absence of an emotion, while Aristotle views it as a positive attitude toward others and experience, involving an emotional change toward a tolerant understanding: in colloquial English, "calming down" is perhaps the closest translation, but there is no single English word that quite captures the meaning. The appearance of mildness, gentleness, patience, tractability, good temper are all aspects of it.

The variety of terms to which Kennedy resorts reflects his honest recognition that 'calming down' will not do in a good many of the illustrations of πραότης that Aristotle provides; but even if it fits more or most of them, it is not clear that the process of becoming calm is a πάθος in Aristotle's sense of

---

[6] A. Stahr (tr.), *Aristoteles: Drei Bücher der Rhetorik* (Stuttgart 1862) 125.

[7] E. M. Cope, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, rev. and ed. by J. E. Sandys, II (Cambridge 1877) 32.

[8] G. A. Kennedy, *Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* (New York – Oxford 1991).

[9] W. M. A. Grimaldi (ed.), *Aristotle, Rhetoric II: A Commentary* (New York 1988).

[10] Kennedy (above n. 8) 130.

the term, any more than the process of growing angry is one, as opposed to anger or ὀργή. Aristotle defines ὀργή as "a desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge" (for the rest of the definition, see below); this scarcely describes "an emotional change".

Cope states the case against πραότης as an emotion most clearly in his final comments on the section, and it is worth citing his words *in extenso*: [11]

> I have already hinted a doubt in the notes on the preceding chapter whether πραότης is properly ranked amongst the πάθη. I think that it can be made plainly to appear that it is not. It is introduced no doubt for the purpose of giving the opposite side to the topics of anger, because the student of *Rhetoric* is in every case required to be acquainted with both sides of a question. And this purpose it may answer very well without being a real opposite of ὀργή or indeed a πάθος at all. If we compare πραότης with the other πάθη analysed in this second book, we find that it differs from all of them in this respect – that the rest are emotions, instinctive and *active*, and tend to some positive result; whereas πραότης is inactive and leads to nothing but the allaying, subduing, lowering, of the angry passion... It seems plain therefore that it is in reality, what it is stated to be in the *Ethics*, a ἕξις, not a πάθος, of the *temper*... It is accordingly represented in the *Ethics* as a virtue, the mean between irascibility and insensibility... The true πάθος is the ὀργή, the instinctive capacity of angry feeling.

Grimaldi,[12] in his commentary, sees no difficulty in taking mildness as the opposite of anger, and, as an opposite, identifying it as an emotion: "its opposition is of the same character as the opposition found between pity and indignation, fear and confidence, shame and shamelessness, kindness and unkindness... The opposition A. speaks about in all the above is contrary opposition, i. e., two positive terms denoting extremes of difference within the same genus".[13]

---

[11] Cope (above n. 7) 42.

[12] Grimaldi (above n. 9) 49.

[13] Grimaldi adds: "There would be no reason to question this save that St. Thomas Aquinas in his extended study of the emotions ... remarks (*Summa Theologiae* I a II ae, q. 23, art. 3 q. 46, art. 1), that anger alone of the emotions has no contrary". Grimaldi goes on to concede Thomas' point, insofar as "In the other emotions the contrary is usually a possibility toward which a person can move... But this is not true of anger. In anger the move toward the contrary is effectively blocked since the evil which causes the anger is actually present in the individual... The only alternatives open to him are to accept this evil and so experience the concomitant pain and distress, or to reject the evil and so become angry" (p. 49–50). If I understand Grimaldi's argument here (I am not certain that I do), then the opposite of anger proves not to be an emotion after all.

Now, calmness, insofar as it is the negation or elimination of anger, is in fact not comparable to the opposition between pity and indignation, on which Aristotle particularly insists. Aristotle defines 'being indignant' (τὸ νεμεσᾶν) as "feeling pain at someone who appears to be succeeding undeservedly" (*Rhet.* 2. 9, 1387 a 8–9). Pity, in turn, is defined as "a kind of pain in the case of an apparent destructive or painful harm in one not deserving to encounter it, which one might expect oneself, or one of one's own, to suffer, and this when it seems near" (2. 8, 1385 b 13–16). Reduced to basics, the contrast is between pain at undeserved good fortune and pain at undeserved misfortune (2. 9, 1386 b 9–12). Both emotions, Aristotle specifies, are characteristic of good men, since people ought not to fare ill or well undeservingly. Aristotle notes, however, that some take φθόνος, commonly rendered as 'envy', as the opposite of pity, on the view that φθόνος "is related to and is indeed the same thing as τὸ νεμεσᾶν" (2. 9, 1386 b 16–17). The Stoics, indeed, characterized pity simply as pain at another's ill fortune, and envy pain at another's good fortune (e. g., Andronic. *Περὶ παθῶν* 2 p. 12 Kreuttner = *SVF* 3. 414; cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 3. 21, *Or.* 1. 185, 2. 206, 216). But in fact, Aristotle says, they are different: although φθόνος too is "a disturbing pain arising from the well-being" of another (2. 9, 1386 b 18–19; cf. 2. 10, 1387 b 22–24), it arises not because the other person is undeserving, but simply because he is our equal or similar (2. 9, 1386 b 19–20), and yet has gained an advantage over us.

Whether we take indignation or envy as the opposite of pity, the opposed pair have independent definitions; neither is described simply the absence or abatement of pity. They are incompatible with pity because the eliciting circumstances are mutually exclusive: someone is either suffering or prospering, not both simultaneously. So too of the contrast between fear and confidence or θάρσος. Fear, according to Aristotle, is "a kind of pain or disturbance deriving from an impression (φαντασία) of a future evil that is destructive or painful" (2. 5, 1382 a 21–23), whereas confidence arises when there is hope accompanied by an impression of imminent safety, and frightening things are either non-existent or remote. The things that inspire confidence (τὰ θαρραλέα) also include the prospect of amelioration and assistance, and the knowledge that one has neither wronged another nor been wronged, and that any rivals we may have are either weak or friendly, or that we have more or stronger allies on our side (2. 5, 1383 a 16–25). Here again, the contrasting emotions are conceived as responses to opposite kinds of stimuli: fear is aroused by things that portend harm, whereas confidence derives from what presages security. Of course, these are normally mutually exclusive, but while the absence of what is

frightening is a condition for confidence, confidence is not simply reducible to the suspension of fear (people with no experience of danger are ἀπαθεῖς (1383 a 28) in the sense, presumably, that they are not given to fear). The case of love and hatred, to which we shall return below, is also analogous.

Neither kindness nor unkindness is an emotion for Aristotle; the chapter in question (7), as I have argued elsewhere,[14] in fact treats rather gratitude (χάριν ἔχειν) and ingratitude (ἀχαριστία). Here, indeed, it may be doubted whether Aristotle thinks of thanklessness as a full-fledged emotion. Rendering people ungrateful (ἀχάριστοι) involves convincing them that the service they received was not a genuine favor or χάρις (1385 a 33 – b 2), and depends essentially on negative arguments. Aristotle does not describe a set of graceless acts that would elicit the contrary of gratitude, although one could perhaps fill out Aristotle's account by suggesting that a positive feeling of ingratitude is aroused by a false or pretended service that was in fact undertaken for selfish reasons. Again, Aristotle seems to treat shamelessness simply as the absence of shame: "Let shame be a pain or disturbance concerning bad things that appear to lead to a loss of reputation (ἀδοξία)..., while shamelessness is a contempt (ὀλιγωρία) and indifference (ἀπάθεια) concerning these same things" (1383 b 12–15). Aristotle goes on to indicate in some detail the kinds of circumstances that induce shame, and then concludes briskly (1385 a 14–15): "so much for shame; as for shamelessness, clearly we can deal with it on the basis of what is opposite". Once more, it is possible to imagine an opposite emotion to shame that has a more positive content: if shame results from the kinds of evils that bring about infamy, its contrary might be a πάθος resulting from those goods that are conducive to a superior reputation or δόξα (nothing prevents there being more than one opposite to a given term: cf. *Topics* 2. 7, 113 a 14–15: "It is clear from what has been said that there may be several opposites to a single thing"). In this case, one might label the emotion opposite to shame pride, as do some modern theorists of the emotions (e. g. Nathanson: "Shame, of course, is the polar opposite of pride";[15] cf. also Lewis;[16] Ben-

[14] D. Konstan, "The Emotion in Aristotle Rhetoric 2. 7: Gratitude, not Kindness", in: D. Mirhady (ed.), *The Influences of Aristotle's Rhetoric*, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 12 (New Brunswick, NJ 2003).

[15] D. L. Nathanson, *Shame and Pride: Affect, Sex, and the Birth of the Self* (New York 1992) 86.

[16] M. Lewis, "Self-Conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt", in: M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones (edd.), *Handbook of Emotions* (New York ²2000) 623–636.

Ze'ev;[17] Manstead and Fischer[18]). Why Aristotle does not include a discussion of pride or self-satisfaction among the πάθη he examines in the *Rhetoric* is too large a question to treat thoroughly in the present investigation; his discussion of ἀναισχυντία, at all events, is meager and negative.[19]

Aristotle's account of πραότης, however, is neither. On the contrary, πραότης on its own receives more discussion than gratitude and ingratitude combined, and more than is devoted to some other major passions such as envy and emulation (ζῆλος). Granted, Aristotle begins by considering ways to counter anger by redescribing the nature of the offense that has aroused it. Anger, for Aristotle, is a response to a slight or put-down (ὀλιγωρία), and only that; as he defines it, ὀργή is "a desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge, on account of a perceived slight on the part of people who are not fit to slight one or one's own" (2. 2, 1378 a 31–33). This is a very restricted conception of the stimulus to anger, not only in comparison with the range of 'anger' in English, but also in comparison with Greek usage in respect to ὀργή, which is also a typical response to injustice, irrespective of whether belittlement was involved (see below). Nevertheless, it is clearly Aristotle's view in the *Rhetoric*, and the relevant one regarding his notion of πραότης. Thus, diminishing or eliminating anger involves demonstrating that a supposed slight was not such in fact, for example, by showing that it was involuntary or unintended, or that the agents of it say or do the same things in respect to themselves ("for no one is believed to slight himself", 1380 a 13–14), or that they have confessed and are sorry. The strategy is not dissimilar to that which Aristotle recommends in regard to diminishing gratitude by redescribing the nature of the service in such a way as to show that it was selfishly motivated, unintentional, or the like, and hence not a true favor. Aristotle goes on to say that we are πρᾶοι toward those who humble themselves before us and do not contradict us, for by this "they are seen to concede that they are our inferiors, and those who are inferior feel fear, and no one who feels fear offers a slight" (1380 a 23–24). The context here is perhaps ambiguous: is Aristotle referring to apologetic behavior subsequent to some ostensible belittlement, in which the self-abasement of the offender is designed to prove that no offense could have been intended? Or

---

[17] A. Ben-Ze'ev, *The Subtlety of Emotions* (Cambridge, Mass. 2000) 491, 512.

[18] A. S. R. Manstead, A. H. Fischer, "Social Appraisal: The Social World as Object of and Influence on Appraisal Processes", in: K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, T. Johnstone (edd.), *Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research* (Oxford – New York 2001) 231.

[19] For a fuller discussion of Aristotle's conception of shame and shamelessness, see D. Konstan, "Shame in Ancient Greek", *Social Research* 70 (2003): 4, 601–630.

does he mean that a humble attitude elicits πραότης in general, irrespective of whether there has been an offense? Probably the former, since Aristotle adds that anger is allayed toward those who humble themselves, citing in evidence the fact that dogs do not bite those who sit down, though perhaps here one is not obliged to think of an abatement of a prior belligerence.

But Aristotle then affirms that people who are serious or eager about something are πρᾶοι toward those who are similarly disposed, for they believe that they themselves are being taken seriously and not being treated with contempt (1380 a 26–27); this does not obviously refer to a case in which an offender exhibits some form of contrition, but rather to respectful comportment in and of itself. So too, we are πρᾶοι toward those who have obliged us, or begged and pleaded with us, since they are humbler; or again, toward those who are never arrogant or insulting toward people like ourselves (1380 a 27–31). In these instances, we are πρᾶοι just because of the consideration, or rather the deference, of others, and not necessarily because of some supposed appeasement. Πραότης, it would appear, is elicited by reverence or other behavior that elevates our standing or esteem.[20]

Such an account of πραότης is not wholly surprising in the context of Aristotle's analysis of anger. If anger is a response to a slight, as Aristotle holds, and if, moreover a slight is the activity of a belief or δόξα about a thing's seeming to be worthless (1378 b 11), then the opposite of anger should or at least could be a response to the activity of a δόξα about a thing's (or a person's) seeming to be of great value. Πραότης, then, might be defined as "a desire, accompanied by pleasure, to treat someone kindly, on account of a perceived gesture of respect". It would derive from the sense of an increase in one's status, as opposed to its diminishment, as in the case of ὀργή. As an emotion, we might perhaps think of it as the favorably disposed elation that comes with an enhanced sense of worth.

A πάθος of this sort as the opposite of anger would be the counterpart of pride as the opposite of shame: a positive emotion deriving from an amelioration of one's reputation or status. The difference between the two would be analogous to that between ὀργή and αἰσχύνη: the one is triggered by a deliberate insult, the other by an evil or misfortune. Πραότης would differ also from affection or φιλία, which Aristotle treats next in order, in the same

---

[20] An anonymous Byzantine commentator, or rather scholiast, notes that we become πρᾶοι in respect to one who, we learn, intended the opposite of a slight because "he did it not for contempt but for my esteem" (διὰ δόξαν ἐμήν): Anonymus, *In Aristotelis artem rhetoricam commentarium*. Ed. H. Rabe, CAG 21. 2 (Berlin 1896) 93. 32–33.

way that anger differs from hatred or μῖσος. Affection, as defined in the *Rhetoric*, consists in wishing good things for another's sake and acting, to the best of one's ability, to obtain them for the other (2. 4, 1380 b 35 – 1381 a 1). It is an altruistic emotion, stimulated by an appreciation of others' character (or charm or usefulness), rather than by their obsequiousness or signs of admiration or regard. Πραότης thus occupies a distinct niche in Aristotle's system of the πάθη (once we appreciate that the subject of chapter 7 of the *Rhetoric* is gratitude rather than benevolence, it is clear that there is little overlap between it and πραότης either).

At this point in his exposition of πραότης, Aristotle reaffirms that "in general, one must investigate what makes us πρᾶοι (τὰ πραῦνοντα) from their opposites" (1380 a 31), that is, the things conducive to anger (Kassel, for no very good reason, marks this comment as a later addition by Aristotle), and he proceeds to enumerate the kinds of people with whom we are disinclined to grow angry, such as those we fear or before whom we feel ashamed, or those who feel shame before us, and also the states of mind in which we are prone to πραότης, such as when we are at play or are successful or have recently avenged ourselves on someone else. Nor do we get angry, Aristotle says, at those who are ignorant or insensible of our revenge, such as the dead. Aristotle concludes by reasserting that to render people πρᾶοι (καταπραῦνειν) one must make those with whom they are angry appear frightening or deserving of their shame or ingratiating (κεχαρισμένοι) or unwilling or remorseful in regard to what was done (1380 b 31–34).

Clearly, Aristotle's focus is on ὀργή, and his treatment of πραότης is largely conceived as a means of checking anger in others. A show of deference can have that effect, but so too can a menacing posture: as Aristotle says, "it is impossible to be frightened and angry at the same time" (1380 a 33–34). The primacy of anger is not surprising in a treatise on rhetoric, since this was the emotion that pleaders sought chiefly to arouse against their opponents, just as they solicited the pity of the jurors for themselves and their clients. As Danielle Allen puts it,[21] "The language of anger and pity defined the contours of the competition between prosecutor and defendant" (e. g. Lys. 32. 19, Dem. 21. 127). Allen adds: "Other emotional concepts could be used to flesh out the core ideas of 'anger' and of 'pity' in the process of trying to establish desert. The ideologies of hate, envy, and fear ... could be grafted onto the ideology of anger".[22] But anger, or rather ὀργή,

[21] D. Allen, *The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens* (Princeton 2000) 148.

[22] *Ibid.*, 149.

was crucial, and speakers naturally tried to direct it away from themselves in the same measure as they attempted to elicit pity for their side. Hence the importance of techniques of anger management.

Aristotle's definition of ὀργή in the *Rhetoric* is, as indicated above, rather more narrow than what may be observed in ordinary Greek. Whereas Aristotle represents anger exclusively as a response to a slight or ὀλιγωρία, in forensic contexts orators often treat anger as a reaction to a perceived injustice, irrespective of whether it affects themselves in particular. Indeed, the Stoic Chrysippus seems to have held that ὀργή is "the desire to take vengeance against one who is believed to have committed a wrong contrary to one's deserts" (*SVF* 3. 395 = Stob. 2. 91. 10; cf. Diog. La. 7. 113; cf. also Posidon. fr. 155 Edelstein–Kidd = Lact. *De ira dei* 17. 13). As William Harris[23] remarks, "'Injustice' has replaced 'slight'" in this account. I have argued elsewhere[24] that Aristotle has transferred some of the features characteristic of ὀργή in popular usage to his own conception of indignation or τὸ νεμεσᾶν. It may also be that, as the antithesis of ὀργή in the restricted sense, Aristotle's notion of πραότης too differs from that which was current in the fifth and fourth centuries BC.

In fact, Aristotle himself, as Cope points out, offers a different account of πραότης in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where it is treated as the mean between the excess of ὀργιλότης or irascibility and the deficiency of ἀοργησία, insensibility to insult (2. 7, 1108 a 4–9; 4. 5, 1125 b 26 – 26 b 10), although in fact, Aristotle concedes, the mean state has not a proper name of its own, and Aristotle imports πραότης as something of a makeshift (1125 b 27–28); he also affirms that πραότης is closer to the deficiency than the excess, and hence may serve as anger's opposite. In these contexts, where Aristotle is speaking also of such mean states as courage (ἀνδρεία), liberality (ἐλευθεριότης), and highmindedness (μεγαλοψυχία), πραότης assumes the character of a disposition rather than a πάθος: "The person who is πρᾶος tends to be unperturbed and is not led by emotion but rather as reason directs" (1125 b 33–35). So too, in the *Topics* (4. 5, 125 b 20–27), Aristotle asserts that one must not classify a disposition (ἕξις) under the genus represented by a capacity (δύναμις), and gives as examples of this error the subsumption of πραότης under the category of mastering anger or of courage under the mastery of fears: "for

---

[23] W. V. Harris, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, Mass. 2001) 61.

[24] D. Konstan, "Aristotle on the Tragic Emotions", in: V. Pedrick, S. Oberhelman (edd.), *Of Constant Sorrow. The Soul of Tragedy: Memorial Volume for Charles Segal* (Chicago, forthcoming).

a courageous or πρᾶος person is called ἀπαθής, whereas one who has mastery does experience (πάσχειν) the emotion but is not led by it". Aristotle adds that if a courageous or πρᾶος person were to experience the relevant πάθος, he would likely not be dominated by it. However, this is not what is meant by being courageous or πρᾶος, but rather being entirely insensible with respect to such things, that is, to fear or anger.

No doubt Aristotle was led to treat πραότης as an emotion in the *Rhetoric* at least in part by his habit of thinking in terms of paired opposites. His definition of the πάθη, for example, runs: "Let the emotions be all those things on account of which people change and differ in regard to their judgments, and upon which attend pain and pleasure, for example anger, pity, fear, and all other such things and their opposites" (2. 1, 1378 a 20–23). The contrast between pain and pleasure cannot be the basis of these oppositions, as the case of pity and indignation shows, since both of these emotions, which Aristotle insists are opposites, are said to be accompanied by pain. Besides the idea of opposites, however, Aristotle's system of the emotions is particularly attentive to the matter of status. Fear, shame, pity and indignation, emulousness and envy, all center on the individual's relative position or reputation in society. Jon Elster[25] describes the world evoked by Aristotle's account of the emotions as "intensely confrontational, intensely competitive, and intensely public; in fact, much of it involves confrontations and competitions before a public. It is a world in which everybody knows that they are constantly being judged, nobody hides that they are acting like judges, and nobody hides that they seek to be judged positively". Anger, in particular, was functional in this environment, "insofar as the individual citizen who was sensitive to his honor and guarded it with anger was also guarding his personal independence, greatness, and equality".[26] If anger was a response to a loss of face or δόξα as the result of an affront, then πραότης as an emotion was elicited by behavior that enhanced public respect and esteem. Not every slight, however, results in anger. As we have seen, Aristotle specifies in his definition of ὀργή that it arises "on account of a perceived slight on the part of people who are not fit to slight one or one's own". People do not necessarily react with anger when they are slighted by those who are stronger or better placed in society, in part because of fear. If this can be shown to have been the context of an ostensible impertinence, then one's self-esteem will prove not to have been damaged and the emotion

[25] J. Elster, *Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions* (Cambridge 1999) 75.

[26] Allen (above n. 21) 129.

of πραότης – the feeling of being placated in respect to an imagined attack on one's status – may ensue.

Aristotle's account of πραότης as an emotion, assuming that it works something like the way I have described it, is not wholly free of contradiction. Within the space of a short chapter, Aristotle sometimes speaks as though πραότης were simply the absence or abatement of ὀργή, a neutral state of calm free of pain or pleasure and not a πάθος in its own right. In this, Aristotle was in accord with contemporary usage. Jacqueline de Romilly[27] notes that πραότης enjoyed a particular vogue in the fourth century BC, and adds that it would eventually "lead to Polybian φιλανθρωπία and to Roman *clementia*". Indeed, Demosthenes and others had already associated πρᾶος with φιλάνθρωπος and such terms as ἐπιεικής, as indicating a patient and gentle disposition (e. g., Dem. 8. 33). But does Aristotle's account of πραότης as an emotion, as I have reconstructed it, that is, as a disposition accompanied by pleasure to treat kindly those who have shown one deference or respect, find any confirmation in the literature of his time? Is there, indeed, any evidence that such a πάθος – the active emotion associated with a gesture of placation or appeasement – for which Aristotle appropriated the term πραότης, was recognized at all (perhaps identified by other words)?

Such evidence as there is, is exiguous. In the sixth oration in the corpus of Lysias, the speaker argues that Andocides, accused of sacrilege and having surrendered himself to the verdict of the court, is now behaving like a citizen with full rights, "as though it were not because of your πραότης and want of time that he has not paid the penalty you set" (34). Πραότης here could well mean 'gentleness', as Stephen Todd[28] renders it. But might the author be intimating that the Athenians have responded to Andocides' implied humility and for that reason have adopted a generous attitude toward him? In another speech dubiously attributed to Lysias (20. 21), the speaker notes that some of the guilty have fled, while fear has induced others not to remain in Athens but rather to serve as soldiers, "so that they might render you more πρᾶοι or influence these men [i. e., the prosecutors]". The speaker adds that Polystratus, the defendant, submitted to a trial at once, though he was innocent of wrongdoing. Being πρᾶος here is not a matter of a permanent disposition, but rather a response to ingratiating behavior; by implication, the jurors ought properly to feel this way toward Polystratus himself, because of his humble behavior in presenting himself before the court, and not in fact toward the others. In the *Memorabilia* of

[27] J. de Romilly, "Fairness and Kindness in Thucydides", *Phoenix* 28 (1974) 100.
[28] S. C. Todd (tr.), *Lysias* (Austin 2000) 71.

Xenophon (2. 3. 16), Socrates urges reconciliation with one's brother: "Do not shrink back, my good man, but try to render the man πρᾶος (κατα-πραΰνειν), and very soon he will heed you; don't you see how concerned for honor and magnanimous he is?" A few other passages are perhaps subject to a similar interpretation (e. g., Plat. *Euthd.* 288 B, *Rep.* 572 A, Hdt. 2. 121 δ). But the passages I have examined do not demonstrate conclusively, so far as I can judge, that πραότης is understood as an emotion elicited by deference and appeasement.

Aristotle's system of the emotions invites, I believe, or at least allows a place for a positive πάθος opposed to anger that takes the form of a pleasurable response to a gesture that enhances one's self-esteem. I think that there are hints of such a meaning in Aristotle's exceptional treatment of πραότης, which is conditioned by his definition of ὀργή. But even if the analysis I have proposed is not quite Aristotle's, I venture to hope that it is at least Aristotelian.[29] Why Aristotle did not develop such an account further is a question for future investigation.[30]

David Konstan
Brown University, Providence

В посвященный эмоциям обзор во II книге "Риторики" Аристотель включил раздел о πραότης. Это психологическое состояние он описывает как противоположность гневу. Обычное понимание πραότης как 'спокойствие' (или как 'обретение спокойствия') вызывает недоумение: каким образом 'спокойствие' можно считать эмоцией? Автор статьи стремится показать, что πραότης подразумевает состояние, проистекающее из возросшего самоуважения, когда разгневанное лицо получило подобающее удовлетворение. Подобное эмоциональное состояние – это скорее уверенность в себе и сопутствующая ей доброжелательность, нежели простое спокойствие.

---

[29] Compare M. Heath, "Aristotle and the Pleasures of Tragedy", in: O. Andersen, J. Haarberg (edd.), *Making Sense of Aristotle: Essays in Poetics* (London 2001) 7–23, who offers an Aristotelian explanation of why the painful emotions of tragedy yield pleasure, although he concedes that it may not be Aristotle's own.

[30] I am grateful to William Fortenbaugh, who read this paper in an earlier draft and provided much-needed encouragement.

QUELLENANGABEN UND NAMENSZITATE IN DER PLINIANISCHEN GEOGRAPHIE

Die Arbeiten an der Vorbereitung von *FGrHist* V lassen mich zu Studien zurückkehren, die fast vierzig Jahre zurückliegen. Das reichlich dorniges Gebiet der plinianischen Quellenkritik, in der Zwischenzeit auch kaum betreten,[1] geschweige denn ertragreich beackert, knüpft nahtlos an mein Buch von 1971 an,[2] und ich behaupte nicht, endlich den Durchbruch geschafft oder auch nur entscheidend neue Erkenntnisse gewonnen zu haben. Hier geht es vor allem um die Frage, wie man in einer quellenkritisch unsicheren Situation mit Zitaten umgehen sollte und wie eventuelle Schlussfolgerungen zu bewerten sind.

1. LEITQUELLENFRAGE UND NAMENZITATE BEI MELA UND PLINIUS

Wer nach römischen Geographen sucht, findet in der Zeit der Republik nichts,[3] in der frühen Kaiserzeit wenig,[4] in der Spätantike endlich einiges, allerdings von dürftiger Qualität und Quantität.[5] Gewiss, die Römer waren keine Wissenschaftler und ließen sich höchst selten zu Großwerken wie *De*

---

[1] An neueren Arbeiten ist nur zu nennen Fil. Capponi, "Plinio e i suoi auctores di geografia", *GIF* 44 (1992) 29–33 (sehr knapp); T. A. Лапина, "Некоторые источниковедческие проблемы географических книг Плиния Старшего" (T. A. Lapina, "Les sources des livres géographiques de Pline l'Ancien. Quelques aspects du problème"), *VDI* 1987: 2, 130–138; zu den indices auctorum im Zusammenhang mit Strabo: R. Nicolai, "Il cosidetto canone dei geografi", *MD* 17 (1986) 9–24.

[2] K. G. Sallmann, *Die Geographie des Älteren Plinius in ihrem Verhältnis zu Varro: Versuch einer Quellenanalyse* (Berlin 1971; weiterhin zitiert als 'Sallmann 1971').

[3] Das geht aus Ciceros Versuch hervor (s.u. S. 344). Er hatte keine lateinischen Vorgänger. Die sog. geographischen Exkurse der römischen Historiker, die es auch schon bei den Annalisten gegeben haben mag, oder genealogisch orientierte Werke wie Catos *Origines* zählen nicht als taugliche Vorlage.

[4] Außer auf Pomponius Mela (unter Tiberius) kann auf die geographischen Einschübe bei den Historikern seit dem Ende der Republik hingewiesen werden; die *Bella* Caesars, Sallust und Livius liefern eindrucksvolle Beispiele. Zu diesem Themenkomplex jetzt A. Dihle, "Plinius und die geographische Wissenschaft in der römischen Kaiserzeit", in: *Tecnologia, economia e società nel mondo romano: Atti conv. Como 1979* (Como 1980) 121–137.

[5] Es handelt sich um Elaborate wie die *Divisio orbis*, *Dimensuratio provinciarum*, den sog. *Aethicus*, die *Cosmographia Iulii Caesaris*; s. A. Riese, *Geographi Latini Minores* (Heilbronn 1878 [Hildesheim 1964]); K. Sallmann, "Geographie", in: *Neues Handb. der Literaturwissenschaft* (*NHL*) IV (1997) 210–214.

architectura (Vitruvius) oder *De re rustica* (Columella) herbei; – von Redekunst und Jurisprudenz, praktischen Staatswissenschaften abgesehen. Immerhin stoßen wir in claudischer Zeit auf die *Chorographie* des Pomponius Mela. Das ist ein schmales Bändchen mit 3 Büchern und insgesamt 349 meist kurzen Paragraphen, in schlichtem, aber rhetorisch nicht unprofiliertem Stil (was seltsamer Weise oft bestritten wird) verfasst und durchaus anregend, ja unterhaltsam zu lesen. Mela folgt dem von der griechischen Geographie eingeführten Schema des Periplus,[6] d. h. er beschreibt die Erdteile den Küsten entlang, ohne wirklich eine Seefahrt zu suggerieren:[7] Von den Säulen des Herakles aus gegen den Uhrzeigersinn um das Mittelmeer herum zum Ausgangspunkt zurück, dann im Uhrzeigersinn um die Oikumene außen herum wieder bis Gibraltar, so dass er als Finale die Wunder (Paradoxa) Afrikas präsentieren kann. Wer Mela, am besten mit den Augen seiner Zeitgenossen, gelesen hat, bekommt tatsächlich eine solide Vorstellung der Erde im damaligen Wissensstand. Da aber Mela weder Streckenmaße (Anametrie) noch Städte (politische Geographie) – immerhin aber ethnographische Völkerlisten und aitiologische Notizen – einbringt, bleibt es bei einer ziemlich vagen, etwas theoretischen, sozusagen unanschaulichen Anschauung. Seine Quelle bzw. Quellen nennt Mela nicht. Zwar werden Hannos Fahrt an Afrikas Westküste und Eudoxos' Fahrt an Afrikas Ostküste erwähnt (3, 90) sowie Cornelius Nepos' Anekdote von den sog. Indern, die der gallische Prokonsul Q. Metellus Celer von den germanischen Boiiern als Schiffbrüchige des Nordmeeres zum Geschenk erhielt (3, 45): alle drei Autoren sollten ein und dasselbe bezeugen: die Umschiffbarkeit der Oikumene und des äußeren Ozeans, und dieser Beweis stammt, wie Mela selbst angibt, aus Nepos, der Hanno und Eudoxos zitierte. Eine – sicher wichtige – Spezialfrage zum Weltbild; nur, wem Mela in der Gesamtdarstellung nun eigentlich folgt, bleibt ungesagt. Zwar hat M. Varro in seiner *Geometria* (B. 6 der *Disciplinae*) offenbar die Maße der alten drei Erdteile angegeben, aber Zahlen, trockene Sachlichkeit, hat Mela nun gerade in seiner manchmal lyrisch ausholenden Umfahrt gemieden. Und selbst wenn Nepos eine *Chorographie* geschrieben haben sollte,[8] so zeigt seine namentliche Anführung an, dass er nicht Leitautor, sondern Spezialzeuge ist. Wir haben die Melakritik nicht weiter

---

[6] Beispiele in graphischer Darstellung bei Sallmann 1971, 104. Sehr instruktiv F. Gisinger, "Periplus", *RE* 18, 2 (1937) 841–850.

[7] A. K. Brodersen, *Pomponius Mela, Kreuzfahrt durch die Alte Welt* (Darmstadt 1994) 5.

[8] Mehr über diese von R. Hansen ("Die Chorographie des Cornelius Nepos", *Jbb. f. Cl. Ph.* 117 [1878] 595–612) aufgestellte Theorie bei Sallmann 1971, 122 ff. mit Anm. 88. 90–94.

zu betreiben, aber einiges spricht dafür, dass er einer griechischen Geographie folgt, z. B. Poseidonios oder Alexander von Ephesos (wie Cicero) oder gar einem aktualisierten Eratosthenes.

Damit steht man bereits mitten im Dilemma der Quellenkritik. Für den Ausdruck "Es spricht vieles dafür, dass...", darf man sich nicht viel kaufen. Im Gegenteil, es ist gefährlich. Denn der nächste Rezipient, spätestens der übernächste, nimmt die Vermutung für eine Erkenntnis, die Spekulation für ein Faktum und "entnimmt" der Literatur, Erathosthenes (z. B.)[9] sei Melas Haupt- und/oder Leitquelle gewesen. Auf diese Weise nistete sich Ende des 19. und Anfang des 20. Jh. die communis opinio ein, für die plinianische Geographie sei Varro die Haupt- bzw. Leitquelle, für diesen wiederum Poseidonios, entsprechend dem vor gut hundert Jahren modischen Pamposidonianismus und Panvarronianismus.[10] Und weil eine Geographie des im übrigen gut dokumentierten Varro nicht nachweisbar ist, wurde flugs eine *Chorographia Varroniana* und *Varro-sallustiana* kreiert,[11] wie es dann nach Plinius eine *Chorographia Pliniana* gegeben habe, aus der z. B. Solinus gearbeitet habe.[12]

Nun, die Zeit solcher Phantome ist vorbei. Sie sind Folgen einer im Grunde naiven Quellenkritik, welche die vom Kompilator geleistete Arbeit lieber einer fiktiven Vorlage zuschreibt. Denn nach Mela oder schon mit ihm beginnt die Zeit der großen römischen Gesamtlehrwerke: die Enzyklopädie des Celsus, die Naturkunde des Plinius, die Literatursammlung des Gellius bis hin – nach langer Pause – zu Cassiodor und den *Origines* des Isidorus Hispalensis. Diese Großkompilationen sind keine Phantome (wenn von Celsus auch nur die Medizin erhalten blieb), und hier quellenkritische Differenzierungen zu treffen, ist weitaus schwieriger als die Suche nach der sprichwörtlichen Nadel im Heuhaufen, weil es um eine unbestimmt große Anzahl von "Nadeln" und die Zuordnung zu ihren Besitzern geht. Im Falle

---

[9] Zur Quellenkritik Melas Sallmann 1971, 119–126; Brodersen, *op. cit.*, 5 f. Eratosthenes gilt als griechischer Hauptautor bei F. Dannemann, *Plinius und seine Naturgeschichte in ihrer Bedeutung für die Gegenwart* (Jena 1921) 40; der lateinische Hauptautor solle Mela sein.

[10] Ausführlich Sallmann 1971, 139–150.

[11] Die Konzeption eines varronischen Periplus wurde nachdrücklich vertreten von D. Detlefsen, "Vermutungen über Varros Schrift *De ora maritima*", *Hermes* 21 (1886) 240–265. Die *corografia varro-sallustiana* ist eine Erfindung von G. M. Columba, "La questione soliniana e la letteratura geografica dei Romani", *Atti Reale acc. di sc. et lett. e belle arti di Palermo*, III ser. 1917/19 (1920): 11, 1–132; und schon vorher id., "La tradizione geografica dell'etá romana", in: *Atti II congr. Italiano: Roma 1895* (Roma 1896) 511–537.

[12] So Th. Mommsen in der Praefatio zu seiner Edition der *Collectanea* des Solinus, (Berlin ^{2}1895) I–XXIV.

Solins, einem Kompilator des 3. oder 4. Jh., der seine *Memorabilien* in 2. Teil seiner Schrift periplusartig aufreiht und sich auf Plinius stützt, nachgewiesen werden, dass als Quelle ein kommentierter Pliniustext genügt[13]

Im Falle des Plinius liegt die Quellenlage nur scheinbar einfacher: Er nennt nicht nur (anders als Mela) im Text zahlreiche Autoren, aus denen er zitiert, sondern listet auch in der vorangestellten Inhaltsübersicht (*NH* 1: Indices) seine Quellenautoren auf, säuberlich getrennt die römischen und die griechischen (*externi*). Ein Paradies für Quellenforscher, sollte man meinen, in Wahrheit die Versuchung zur hemmungslosen Spekulation.

Hier kurz der statistische Befund, um bei dem zu bleiben, was ist, nicht nur sein k ö n n t e (*Tabellen I a und I b*): In den sog. vier geographischen Büchern der *Naturalis historia* nennt Plinius 77 griechiche und 36 römische

T a b e l l e Ia

Griechische Autoren in den geographischen Büchern der *Naturalis historia* des Plinius

Nr.	Autorname	III ind	III txt	IV ind	IV txt	V ind	V txt	VI ind	VI txt
1.	Agathokles			♦		♦		♦	
2.	Aglaosthenes			♦					
3.	Alexandros Megas							♦	3
4.	Alexandros Polyhistor	♦	1	♦		♦		♦	
5.	Amometos							♦	1
6.	Anaximandros			♦	1				
7.	Antigenes					♦			
8.	Antikleides			♦	1	♦			
9.	Apollodoros			♦				♦	
10.	Aristarchos					♦			
11.	Aristeides			♦	2				
12.	Aristokreon					♦	1	♦	2
13.	Aristokritos			♦		♦	1		
14.	Aristoteles				3	♦	1		
15.	Artemidoros	♦		♦	2	♦	4	♦	7
16.	Astynomos			♦		♦	1		
17.	Baiton					♦		♦	2
18.	Basilis							♦	1
19.	Bion							♦	5
20.	Dalion							♦	2
21.	Damastes			♦		♦		♦	
22.	Demodamas (*mss* Demonas)							♦	1
23.	Dikaiarchos			♦		♦		♦	
24.	Diodoros Syrakosios	♦				♦			
25.	Diognetos							♦	1
26.	Dionysios			♦	1	♦	1		2*
27.	Dosiades			♦	1				
28.	Ephoros			♦	2	♦	1	♦	2
29.	Eratosthenes		1	♦		♦	6	♦	9
30.	Eudoxos			♦		♦		♦	

[13] H. Walter, "C. Iulius Solinus und seine Vorlagen", *C&M* 24 (1963) 86–157.

Tabelle Ia (*Fortsetzung*)

Nr.	Autorname	III ind	III txt	IV ind	IV txt	V ind	V txt	VI ind	VI txt
31.	Hanno					♦	1		1
32.	Hekataios			♦	1	♦		♦	1
33.	Hellanikos			♦		♦		♦	
34.	Herakleides			♦	1				
35.	Herodotos					♦	2		
36.	Himilkon					♦			
37.	Hipparchos					♦		♦	
38.	Homeros		2		4		5		
39.	Isidoros	♦		♦	3	♦	11	♦	
40.	Iuba rex (II)					♦	2	♦	16
41.	Kallidemos			♦	1				
42.	Kallikrates	♦				♦			
43.	Kallimachos		2	♦	5	♦	1	♦	
44.	Kalliphanes	♦				♦			
45.	Kleitarchos		1					♦	2
46.	Kleobulos			♦		♦	1		
47.	Krates grammatikos			♦	1				
48.	Megasthenes					♦		♦	3
49.	Menaichmos			♦	1				
50.	Metrodoros Skepsios	♦	1	♦		♦	1	♦	
51.	Myrsilos		1	♦	1	♦			
52.	Nearchos							♦	
53.	Nymphodoros	♦				♦			
54.	Onesikritos							♦	5
55.	Panaitios					♦		♦	
56.	Patrokles							♦	1
57.	Philemon			♦	1				
58.	Philisteides Mallotes			♦	2				
59.	Philonides			♦		♦	1		
60.	Polybios		1	♦	4	♦	3	♦	2
61.	Poseidonios (qui periplum...)			♦		♦		♦	1
62.	Pyrrandros					♦			
63.	Pytheas			♦	2				
64.	Serapion Antiochenos			♦		♦			
65.	Silenos				1				
66.	Simonides (minor)							♦	1
67.	Sotades					♦			
68.	Staphylos			♦		♦	1		
69.	Theophrastos	♦	1						
70.	Theopompos	♦	2		1				
71.	Thukydides	♦		♦					
72.	Timagenes	♦	1						
73.	Timaios mathematikos					♦	1		
74.	Timaios Sikelos		3	♦	2			♦	
75.	Timosthenes			♦		♦	4	♦	4
76.	Xenagoras			♦		♦	1		
77.	Xenophon (Lampsakenos)	♦		♦	1	♦		♦	1

*) *NH* 6, 141 (Charax) scheint Dionysios mit Isidoros verwechselt zu sein.

Griechische Hauptquellen: Eratosthenes (16), Timosthenes (7), Polybios (9), Artemidor (12), Isidor aus Charax (14).

Tabelle Ib

Römische Autoren in den geographischen Büchern der *Naturalis historia* des Plinius

Nr.	Autorname	III ind	III txt	IV ind	IV txt	V ind	V txt	VI ind	VI txt
1.	*Acta triumphalia*					♦		♦	
2.	Aelius Gallus								1
3.	Agrippa, M.	♦	9	♦	10	♦	4	♦	9
4.	Annius Plocamus								1
5.	Antias, Valerius	♦	1						
6.	Arruntius	♦				♦		♦	
7.	Ateius Capito					♦			
8.	Ateius philologus, L.	♦		♦					
9.	Augustus Caesar imp.	♦	4	♦					
10.	Aufidius (Bassus)								1
11.	Cato censorius, M.	♦	10	♦					
12.	Claudius imp.					♦	1	♦	3
13.	Coelius Antipater	♦	1						
14.	Curio pater	♦							
15.	Domitius Corbulo					♦	1	♦	
16.	Fabricius Tuscus	♦		♦					
17.	Gellianus	♦	1						
18.	Inscriptio tropaei Alpium		1						
19.	Hyginus	♦		♦		♦		♦	
20.	Livius, T.	♦	2						
21.	Livius filius					♦		♦	
22.	Mela, Pomponius	♦		♦		♦		♦	
23.	Mucianus, Licinius							♦	
24.	Nepos, Cornelius	♦	4	♦	1	♦	4	♦	
25.	Neronis exploratores							♦	1
26.	Nigidius			♦		♦		♦	
27.	Petronius, P.							♦	1
28.	Piso, L.	♦	1					♦	
29.	Seneca							♦	1
30.	Statius Sebosus	♦				♦		♦	3
31.	Suetonius Paulinus					♦	1		
32.	Verrius Flaccus	♦							
33.	Valerianus	♦	1						
34.	Varro, M.	♦	5	♦	6	♦		♦	3
35.	Varro Atacinus	♦		♦		♦		♦	
36.	Vetus, L.	♦		♦		♦		♦	
37.	Sunt qui, multi, alii, Grai etc.		7		21		10		38

Romische Hauptquellen: Agrippa/Augustus (32), Varro (14), Nepos (9).

Namen von Quellenautoren.[14] Daneben gibt es anonyme Hinweise auf weitere Quellen, wie *sunt qui...*, *alii...*, *tradunt...*, *Grai...* etc. Die römischen Autoren sind jedenfalls stark in der Minderzahl, werden aber in den Indices zuerst genannt und haben, wie dann die Textzitate zeigen, ein stärkeres

[14] Eine gewisse Unschärfe dieser Zahlen erklärt sich dadurch, dass manche Namen sowohl Autoren wie Zeugen bezeichnen (z. B. Domitius Corbulo) und dass es Ermessenssache ist, Sachquellen wie "Autoren" gelten zu lassen (z. B. *Acta triumphalia*).

Benutzungspotential. Die relative Kongruenz zwischen den Nennungen in den Indices und im Text werden später untersucht.[15] Zunächst nur dieser Hinweis: M. Vipsanius Agrippa, Verfasser einer offenbar umfangreichen *Discriptio imperii (Romani)*, die nach seinem Tode zur Konzeption einer Weltkarte an der Innenwand der Porticus Pollae führte und die Plinius gesehen hat (*NH* 3, 17), dieser Agrippa erscheint in allen vier Indices und zudem 32 Mal im Text. Hingegen ist der meist genannte (18 Mal) griechisch schreibende Autor überraschenderweise der in Rom schriftstellernde König Iuba II von Mauretanien, Spezialautor für Nord- und Westafrika und den näheren Orient (Arabien), nicht etwa Eratosthenes, der nur 16 Mal vorkommt, immerhin in allen vier Büchern. Der Spezialist Iuba erscheint sinnvollerweise nur in den Indices 5 und 6 und dort auch im Text und hat seine häufige Nennung seiner einmaligen Kenntnis der Besonderheit der SW-Oikumene zu verdanken. Agrippa figuriert aber fast gleichmäßig bei allen vier Büchern in Text und den Indices. Er darf schon deshalb als eine 'Hauptquelle' des Plinius beansprucht werden, die immer wieder konsultiert worden ist. Aber nicht als 'Leitquelle' in dem Sinne, dass Plinius ihm in Anordnung und Textfortschritt gefolgt wäre; dies folgt aus der Natur der Zitate, die Distanzen im großen und mittleren Maßstab betreffen, und schon Otto Cuntz hat 1890 Agrippas Werk eher als 'Reichsstatistik' denn als Geographie verstanden.[16]

Ein Wort zur Terminologie: Ohne die Quellen-Metapher kommt die Quellenkritik kaum aus. Einleuchtend sind Termini wie Haupt- und Nebenquelle, oft auch Primär- und Sekundärquelle genannt. Im metonymischen Sinn wird man auch Leit- und Detail-(oder Neben-)Quelle tolerieren. Bedenklich wird es bei der Zwischen-(oder Mittel-)Quelle, die ja eben keine Quellen meinen. Termini wie Vermittler, Zwischenträger, Zwischenautor klingen zwar nicht schön, treffen aber die Sache. Hier wird der Ausdruck 'Hauptquelle' quantita-

---

[15] Das nach H. Brunn (*De auctorum indicibus Plinianis disputatio isagogica. Natalicia Fred. Guil. III univ. Guil. Rhenan.* [Bonnae 1856]) benannte 'Gesetz', nach dem die Reihenfolge der Autoren in den Indices die Abfolge der Quellenbenutzung im Text beachte, ungeachtet nicht seltener störender Texteinschübe nachträglicher Überarbeitung, kann nach den Arbeiten von A. Klotz ("Die Arbeitsweise des Älteren Plinius und die indices auctorum", *Hermes* 42 [1907] 323–329) und R. Rabenhorst ("Die indices auctorum und die wirklichen Quellen der naturalis historia des Plinius", *Philologus* 65 [1906] 567–603) nicht mehr gelten; ein System der Autorennennungen in den Indices hat sich bisher nicht erschießen lassen.

[16] O. Cuntz, "Agrippa und Augustus als Quellenschriftsteller des Plinius", *Jbb. f. Cl. Phil.* Suppl. 17 (1890) 475–526. Abschließend A. Klotz, "Die geographischen Commentarii des Agrippa und ihre Überreste", *Klio* 24 (1931) 475–526; M. Reinhold, *M. Agrippa, a Biograph* (Rom ^{2}1965 [^{1}1933]) 142–148.

tiv verwendet für einen Autor, der einen überwiegenden Teil des Materials beigetragen hat. 'Leitquelle' bezieht sich hingegen auf den Quellenautor, dem die Struktur oder das Gesamtkonzept des vorliegenden Werkes folgt. Eine Leitquelle vorauszusetzen, ist freilich bereits in aller Regel schon Hypothese, deren Richtigkeit nur der Gesamtbefund beweisen kann.

Agrippa ist also eine Hauptquelle des Plinius, aber nicht Leitquelle. Ist dies vielleicht Varro, bei dem der Befund ähnlich liegt? Er ist 14 Mal angeführt, auch in allen Indices, obwohl er im Text von B. 5 fehlt. Die Frage bedarf einer besonderen Untersuchung.[17] Bei den Griechen steht an zweiter Stelle Eratosthenes – 16 Zitate – mit der Merkwürdigkeit, dass er in B. 3 zitiert wird, aber im Index 3 fehlt, dafür in B. 4 nur im Index figuriert. Es folgt Isidor von Charax, wieder ein Augusteer, mit 14 Zitaten; für B. 3 und 6 fällt er allerdings im Text, nicht in den Indices, aus. Er wird dicht gefolgt von Artemidor mit zwölf Anführungen; aber in B. 3 ist sein Name auf den Index beschränkt. Solche Unregelmäßigkeiten müssen dringend vor einer allzu schematischen Auslegung der Quellenbenutzung aufgrund der Namensanführungen warnen. Sie sind, z. T. wenigstens, mehr oder minder zufällig. Und doch ist der Interpret auf sie angewiesen.

Alle andere Griechen sind auctores minores von der Nennung her, und auch auf der Römerseite ist nur noch Nepos bemerkenswert mit neun Nennungen, der zu B. 6 nur im Index figuriert. Man wird also die Einträge in die Indices nicht überbewerten; hier können dem Autor Plinius selbst oder einem Helfer, der sie möglicherweise nachträglich gefertigt hat, Versehen unterlaufen sein. Jedenfalls ist die dezente Priorität der Römer, gerade derer der augusteischen Zeit, nicht zu übersehen. Damit ist indes nichts darüber ausgesagt, wem Plinius generell und stillschweigend folgt – wenn er denn überhaupt eine 'Leitquelle' brauchte und benutzte.

2. QUELLENSCHRIFTSTELLER UND GEOGRAPHEN

Um der Rolle der griechischen Quellenautoren näher zu kommen, wird nun unsere Statistik in der Weise gelesen, dass den Namen entsprechende Werke zugeordnet werden, soweit dies möglich ist (*Tabelle II a*). Oft sind Werktitel nicht bekannt, sehr oft die Genera Kosmologie / Geographie / Ethnographie / Historie nicht sauber zu trennen. Mit Namen wie Agathokles, Aglaosthenes, Aristeides, Dosiades, Philisteides Mallotes, Sotades können wir (noch?) nichts oder fast nichts anfangen. Es bleiben dann von den insgesamt 77 noch 71 Namen. Zehn sind ausgesprochene Historiker, die

[17] Forschungsansätze hierzu bei Sallmann 1971, 237–268.

Tabelle IIa

Griechische Autoren in den geographischen Büchern der *Naturalis historia* des Plinius

Nr.	Autorname	Zeit	Genos und Werk	
1.	Agathokles	??	HIST	Hist. u. geogr. Hypomnemata?
2.	Aglaosthenes	??	PARAD	Naxiaka? (schol. Lykophr. 704.1021)
3.	Alexandros Megas	356–323 v		
4.	Alexandros Polyhistor	110–40 v	GRAM: PHILS: ETHN	25 Titel b. Steph. Byz.
5.	Amometos	s. 3^1 v	GEOGR	*Anaplus e Memphi*; Indica (Roman?)
6.	Anaximandros	s. 6 v	NATPHILS	De natura (Kosmologie)
7.	Antigenes	s. 3^1 v?	AL-HIST	(auch bei Plutarch u. Herodian)
8.	Antikleides	? 300 v	AL-HIST; ANT	*De Alexandro. Deliaca. Nostoi*
9.	Apollodoros (Athen)	180–100 v	HIST	*Chronika* (Basis: Eratosthenes)
10.	Aristarchos (Samos)	? 280 v	ASTR	*Über Größe u. Entfernung von Sonne und Mond*
11.	Aristeides	??	(HIST?)	(Metonomasien der Bosporusregion)
12.	Aristokreon	s. 4/3 v	GEOGR	Aithiopika?
13.	Aristokritos	s. 2 v	HIST	Geschichte von Milet?
14.	Aristoteles	384–322 v	NATPHILS	*De caelo* u. a.
15.	**Artemidoros** (Ephesos)	s. 1 v	GEOGR	*Geographumena. Ionica hypomnemata*
16.	Astynomos	s. 2 v?	ANT	(Metonomasien von Inselnamen)
17.	Baiton	s. 4^2 v	GEOGR	Alexanders Wegvermesser wie Diognetos
18.	Basilis	s. 3 v	GEOGR	*Indika* (auch b. Agatharch. u. Athenaios)
19.	Bion (Soloi)	??	GEOGR: AGR	(autopt.) *Aithiopika*
20.	Dalion	s. 3^1 v	GEOGR	(südl. Nilgebiete: Quelle des Eratosthenes)
21.	Damastes	s. 5 v	GEOGR: HIST	(Schüler des Hellanikos)
22.	Demodamas (*mss* Demonas)	s. 3 v	(HIST)	Berichte über Indien zu. NW-Asien
23.	Dikaiarchos	? 375 v	ANT	*Bios Hellados*. Math. Geogr.

Tabelle IIa (*Fortsetzung*)

Nr.	Autorname	Zeit	Genos und Werk	
24.	Diodoros (Syrakus)	s. 1 v	HIST: ANT	*Bibliotheke*
25.	Diognetos	s. 4^2 v	GEOGR	Alexanders Wegvermesser wie Baiton
26.	Dionysios (fil. Calliphontis?)	s. 1^1 v	GEOGR	*Anagraphe tes Hellados* (Lehrgedicht)
27.	Dosiades	??	HIST	*Kretika* (auch bei Diodor)
28.	Ephoros (Kyme)	400–330 v	HIST	*Historiae* (B. 4–5 Geogr. d. Oikumene)
29.	**Eratosthenes**	276–203 v	GEOGR: GRAM	*Geographika. Anametria tes ges*
30.	Eudoxos (Knidos)	391–337 v	ASTR: MATH	*Ges periodos*. Math. Geogr. Perieg.
31.	Hanno	s. 5^1 v	GEOGR	*Periplus* (Africae). Seit 3. Jh. griech. Übs.
32.	Hekataios (Teos/Abdera)	s. 4^2 v	ANT	*De Hyperboreis.*
33.	Hellanikos (Mytilene)	? 480 v?	ETHN	*Lydiaka* u. a. (auch Mythologie)
34.	Herakleides (Kreta)	s. 3 v	GEOGR	*Peri ton en tei Helladi poleon*
35.	Herodotos	484–424 v	HIST	*Historiai*
36.	Himilkon	s. 5^1 v?	GEOGR	Periplus? (bes. NW-Europa)
37.	**Hipparchos** (Nikaia)	s. 2^2 v	ASTR: GEOGR	*Peri ton Eratosthenus geographikon*
38	Homeros	s. 7 v?	ANT	*Ilias. Odysseia* (heroische Epen)
39.	Isidoros (Charax)	s. 1^2 v	GEOGR	*Anametria oikumenes. Stathmoi Parthikoi*
40.	Iuba rex (II)	25 v–23 n	ETHN	Descriptio Africae, Assyriae, Arabiae
41.	Kallidemos	??	HIST?	(Metonomasie Euboia)
42.	Kallikrates	s. 2 v?	GEOGR	*De Athenis*
43.	Kallimachos (Kyrene)	320–248 v	GRAM: GEOGR	(Werkliste in Suda)
44.	Kalliphanes	??	PARAD (?)	
45.	Kleitarchos	? 300 v	AL-HIST	Historia Alexandri Magni (*NH* 3, 57!)
46.	Kleobulos (*mss* Nikobulos)	??	GEOGR?ANT?	(Metonomasie Chios)
47.	Krates grammatikos	s. 2^1 v	GRAM: KOSMOL	(Astronom. u. geogr. Frgg.)
48.	Megasthenes	350–290 v	HIST	Indika (ethnogr.-geogr.)
49.	Menaichmos (Sikyon)	s. 4^2 v	AL-HIST: ANT	*Pythikos. Historia Alexandri*
50.	Metrodoros Skepsios	??	MED? ANT?	(Metonomasie zu Chios; s. Kleobulos)

Tabelle IIa (*Fortsetzung*)

Nr.	Autorname	Zeit	Genos und Werk	
51.	Myrsilos (Methymna)	? 250 v	HIST	*Historia paradoxa. Lesbiaka*
52.	Nearchos	s. 4^2 v	AL-HIST	Periplus Indus → Mesopotamien
53.	Nymphodoros	s. 3^2 v	AL-HIST	Periplus Asiae. Europae (romanhaft)
54.	Onesikritos	380–300 v	AL-HIST	*Quomodo Alexander educatus sit*
55.	Panaitios (Rhodos)	185–109 v	PHILS	u. a. geogr. Frgg.
56.	Patrokles	? 300 v	GEOGR	Anaplus Innerasiens (Oxosgebiet)
57.	Philemon	s. 1^1 v	GEOGR ?	*Periplus maris externi*
58.	Philisteides Mallotes	??	GEOGR ?	(griech. Inselnamen)
59.	Philonides (Identität unsicher)	? 300 v	MATH	Komm. zu Epikur *peri physeos*
60.	Polybios	200–140 v	HIST	*Historiae. Hist.*34 : Periegese der Oikumene
61.	Poseidonios (qui periplum...)	135–51 v	NATPHILS	*Peri okeanou.* Ethn. u. math. Geogr.
62.	Pyrrhandros	??	HIST	*Peloponnesiaka*
63.	Pytheas (Massilia)	s.4^2 v	GEOGR	*Peri okeanou* (NW-Europa)
64.	Serapion Antiochenos	s. 1 v	GEOGR	*Geographika.* Plin.: 'gnomonicus'
65.	Silenos (Kaleakte)	s.3^2 v	HIST	*Sikelika* (Hannibal-Geschichte)
66.	Simonides minor	s.2/1 v	GEOGR	Aithiopika? (durch Isid. Char. vermittelt?)
67.	Sotades	??	??	unbekannt
68.	Staphylos	s.1^1 v?	HIST	*Thettalika.* De Athenis; Arcadibus; Aeolis
69.	Theophrastos	371–287 v	NATPHILS	*Physika. Peri physeos* u. a.
70.	Theopompos (Chios)	378–320 v	HIST	*Hellenika. Philippika*
71.	Thukydides	460–400 v	HIST	De bello Peloponnesiaco
72.	Timagenes (Alexandria)	s. 1 v	HIST	(mehrere histor. Monographien)
73.	Timaios math.	s. 1 v?	ASTROL: KOSMOL	
74.	Timaios (Tauromenion)	350–260 v	HIST	*Sikelikai historiai*
75.	Timosthenes (Rhodos)	s. 3^1 v	GEOGR	*Peri limenon* (Periplus Africae)
76.	Xenagoras	s. 3 v	HIST: GEOGR	*Chronoi. Peri neson*
77.	Xenophon Lampsacenus	s. 3 v	GEOGR	*Periplus. Anametresis oron*

wichtige, z. B. topographische Details liefern können, aber keine geographische Systematik – mit Ausnahme des Polybios, dessen 34. Buch der *Historiae* eine Beschreibung der Oikumene bot. Acht weitere Autoren sind Informanten für Historica und Geographica, wie z. B. die Alexanderhistoriker, von denen Onesikritos und Kleitarchos hervorzuheben sind.[18] Drei Namen stehen für Antiquarisches, besonders für poetische Metonomasien von Ortsnamen (Homer und Kallimachos), und vier weitere Autoren gehören anderen Genera an, (Natur-)Philosophie, Astronomie, Paradoxographie usw, wobei allerdings Poseidonios als Verfasser von *Περὶ Ὠκεανοῦ* besondere Beachtung fordert. Insgesamt sind dies wieder 25 Namen, so dass 46 verbleiben. Von diesen werden aber 20 nur einmal genannt (darunter eben Poseidonios, aber auch Geographen wie Alexander Polyhistor, Patrokles, Philemon und Xenagoras), m. a. W. sie sind für Spezialnachrichten ihrer Heimatgebiete herangezogen, z. B. Xenagoras für die Inselwelt oder Philemon für den äußeren Ozean. Fünf kommen nur zweimal vor, wieder Spezialisten wie Hanno (Westafrika) und Pytheas (NW-Europa), und 13 beschränken sich überhaupt nur auf die Indices, darunter Hipparchos aus Nikaia, Dikaiarch und Hellanikos, Nearchos und der auch von Cicero beachtete Serapion. Es bleiben nun also acht Kanditaten für ausgedehntere Anwendung bei Plinius, in erster Linie Artemidoros, Eratosthenes, Isidoros und Timosthenes; denn Aristokreon, Bion und Iuba sind wieder als Sonderautoren für Aithiopia und Afrika einzustufen, und Dionysios und Isidoros von Charax sind offensichtlich dieselbe Person (s. u. Anm. 34). Von diesen vier Namen ist Eratosthenes der berühmteste; die jüngsten und aktuellsten Autoren sind Artemidoros (1. Jh. v.) und Isidor aus Charax (augusteisch), die das alte "Hafenbuch" (*Περὶ λιμένων*) des Timosthenes überholt erscheinen ließen. Bei diesem Ergebnis, es sei noch einmal an Polybios 34 erinnert, müssen wir es vorerst belassen.

Auf der römischen Seite (Tabelle II b) sind von 36 bzw. 33 Autoren, wenn man den unbekannten Fabricius Tuscus, die Inschrift von La Turbie und die *Acta triumphalia* abzieht, neun reine Historiker, von denen Kaiser Claudius viermal – ehrenhalber? – genannt ist. Ebenfalls neun Autoren gehören zu Nachbarfächern wie Biographie (Nepos)[19] oder sind Berichterstatter von Reisen und Expeditionen (Mucianus, Petronius), sieben sind Antiquare wie

---

[18] Seltsam, dass Kallisthenes' (*historiarum scriptor*, 36, 36) *Ἀλεξάνδρου πράξεις* und *Periplus Ponti Euxini* hier fehlen. Auch Ktesias' *Indica* und *Persica* sind nur in späteren Teilen der *Naturalis historia* zitiert.

[19] Als Geograph wird Nepos in der plinianischen Geographie gerade nicht bemüht, – wenn er denn überhaupt als solcher bekannt war; s. P. L. Schmidt, "Hyginus C. Iulius", *DNP* 5 (1998) 778.

M. Varro (der aber auch echte Geographica liefert)[20] und Cato maior (der allein zehnmal zitiert wird), wozu zwei philosophisch Gebildete kommen (Nigidius Figulus und der Redner Scribonius Curio pater), zusammen 27. Von den verbliebenen sechs kommen drei nur in den Indices vor, darunter erstaulicherweise Pomponius Mela sowie Livius filius, vielleicht Verfasser einer mathematischen Geographie;[21] Seneca wird nur einmal zitiert. Übrig geblieben ist allein Agrippa mit Weltkarte und *Commentarii*, und eng verwandt, identisch, wie manche meinen, Kaiser Augustus' "Reichskursbuch".[22] Ob dieses periegetisch oder, was praktischer wäre, systematisch nach den Regionen Italiens und den Provinzen, intern rohalphabetisch geordnet war, wie viele der plinianischen Städtelisten, ist nicht zu bestimmen, auch nicht für die *Commentarii* des Agrippa. Die Anordnung als Periplus ließe sich aber mit Sicherheit anhand der Weltkarte Agrippas durch einfaches Ablesen erreichen, sei es direkt durch das Studium der Portikuswand oder mittels kleiner Kopien auf Papyrus.[23] Die Fokussierung auf Agrippa–Augustus, M. Varro (*De geometria;* die *Antiquaria* sind nicht gemeint) und – hartnäckig immer wieder – Cornelius Nepos mit seine mutmaßlichen Chorographie, die sonst freilich nirgends bezeugt ist, aber von Mela verdrängt sein könnte, ist nicht neu, und auch hier müssen wir diesen Stand der Erkenntnis als vorläufiges Ergebnis festhalten.

Solche Zahlenspiele und die Listen von *nuda nomina* sind leider unumgänglich; auch Plinius konnte sie seinen Lesern nicht vorenthalten, wofür er sich artig entschuldigte (*NH* 3, 2). Es wird auch nicht behauptet, dass schon die quellenkritisch bedeutendsten Namen herausgefiltert seien; das wäre erst möglich, wenn die Arbeits- und Zitierweise des Plinius bekannt und berücksichtigt wäre. Ich vertrete aber die Ansicht, dass statistische Analyse das sicherste Mittel ist, Spekulationen zu vermeiden, natürlich auch geniale Einfälle zu verhindern.

Wenn man nun die literarischen Genera der römischen Autoren betrachtet (*Tabelle II b*), stellt sich heraus, dass nur die wenigsten wirkliche Geographen sind. Das ist dem Plinius nicht als Fehler anzurechnen. Sein Werk ist eine

---

[20] Sallmann 1971, 245–268.

[21] Dieser sonst nirgends bezeugte Livius filius wird in der Forschung meist mit dem Historiker gleichgesetzt; so von F. Münzer, *Beiträge zur Quellenkritik der Naturgeschichte des Plinius* (Berlin 1897) 127. Anders A. Klotz, "Livius 10", *RE* 13 (1927) 852 f.

[22] Zur nicht zu klärenden Differenzierung zwischen Agrippas *Commentarii*, seiner Weltkarte (*orbis*) und Augustus' *Discriptio Italiae* s. Sallmann 1971, 95–107.

[23] Solche sind uns in anderem Zusammenhang bezeugt, s. W. Kubitschek, "Karten", *RE* 10, 2 (1919) 2100–2113 (römische Weltkarten), bes. 2106. Seltsam, dass diese hervorragende Studie so selten konsultiert wird.

umfassende *Naturalis historia*, kein Fachbuch der Geographie. Diese fügt sich in ein Gesamtkonzept der Naturbeschreibung ein, das mit der Kosmologie beginnt (B. 2), dann mit der Erde fortgesetzt wird (B. 3–6), gefolgt von der Menschenkunde, der Tierkunde, Pflanzenkunde, Heilmittelkunde, Metall- und Gesteinskunde, immer vom Größeren zum Kleineren fortschreitend, vom Weltall bis zum Edelstein.[24] Die "Erdkunde" ist also systematisch in eine Natur-Enzyklopädie eingebettet und muss daher viel mehr leisten als eine traditionelle Geographie; so nennt Plinius sie auch nicht. B. 3 beginnt so:

> Hactenus de situ et miraculis terrae aquarumque et siderum ac ratione universitatis atque mensurae (B. 2). Nunc de partibus, quamquam infinitum id quoque existimatur nec temere sine aliqua reprehensione tractatum, haud ullo in genere venia iustiore, si modo minime mirum est hominem genitum non omnia humana novisse (*NH* 3, 1 a).

Mit dem, was Plinius beschreibt, den *partes universitatis* ('Erd-Teilen'), soll nach seiner Meinung, der praktisch gebildete Römer vertraut sein; schließlich war der Militär und Verwaltungsfachmann (mit mehrfachen Prokuratien) Plinius ein bewährter Pädagoge, Rhetor, Grammatiker und Historiker.[25] Schon dieses Ziel muss ihn von den griechischen Fachgeographen, aber auch von Mela unterscheiden. Dass er alles, was er über die bewohnte Oikumene mitteilen möchte, in die Form eines Periplus bringt, der erst die Nord-, dann die Süd-Oikumene jeweils im Uhrzeigersinn umfährt, bedeutet geschickt zwar den Einschluss der Geographie, aber ermöglicht auch das Eingehen auf die Besiedlung, auf historische, ethnographische, ja literarische Details; deswegen der Hinweis auf die Unendlichkeit des Stoffes und auf die berechtigte Nachsicht für die Endlichkeit des Wissens.

3. ARBEITSMETHODEN DES PLINIUS

Früher wurde viel über die Arbeitsweise des Kompilators geforscht.[26] Er selbst macht einige Angaben, sein Neffe (der jüngere Plinius) ebenfalls, und

---

[24] Richtig erkannt von Dannemann (s. o. Anm. 9) 38 f., der allerdings die unsystematische Äußerlichkeit der plinianischen Kategorien tadelt. K. Sallmann, *DNP* 9, 1139.

[25] Eine gute Studie über Plinius' "Bildungsideal" fehlt; wäre sein *Studiosus* erhalten, hätte er einen festen Platz in den Darstellungen der römischen Pädagogik wie Cicero und Quintilian. Einiges bei Th. Köves-Zulauf, "Die Vorrede der plinianischen Naturgeschichte", *WS*.N.F. 7 (1973) 143–184.

[26] A. Klotz (s. o. Anm. 15); F. Della Corte, "La genesi della Naturalis Historia", in: *Quad. del lic. cl. Plin. Sen. di Castellammare di Stabia* 12 (Napoli 1990); V. Naas, "Réflexions sur la méthode de travail de Pline l'Ancien", *RPh* 70 (1996): 2, 305–332.

die Werkstrukur bietet sich zur Analyse an. Aber vergegenwärtigen wir uns zunächst kurz Ciceros Versuch, eine Geographie zu verfassen. Als dieser im Frühjahr des sog. 1. Triumvirats, aber noch vor Clodius' Wahl zum Volkstribunen sich auf seine Villen in Formiae und Antium zurückgezogen hatte, schrieb er im April 59 an Atticus, er plane ein Opus und denke dabei an *geographica* (*Ad Att.* 2, 6, 1). Freilich sei die Sache schwierig; wenn man die Kritik lese, die Serapion (dessen *Geographia* ihm Atticus geschickt hatte, *ib.* 2, 4, 1) und Hipparch an Eratosthenes geübt hätten. Vor allem aber biete der trockene Stoff kaum Gelegenheit zur stilistischen Ausschmückung

Tabelle IIb

Römische Autoren in den geographischen Büchern der *Naturalis historia* des Plinius

Nr.	Autorname	Zeit	Genos und Werk	
1.	*Acta triumphalia*		(HIST)	(Senats-Archiv)
2.	Aelius Gallus (C.)	s. 1^2 v	(HIST)	Commentarii? (praef. Aeg. 27–24)
3.	Agrippa, M. (Vipsanius)	64–12 v	(GEOGR)	Weltkarte; commentarii
4.	Annius Plocamus	s.1^1 v	(HIST)	Reisebericht; sonst unbekannt
5.	Antias, Valerius	s.1^1 v	HIST	Annales a. u. c.
6.	Arruntius (L.)	cos 22 v	HIST	Historiae belli Punici
7.	Ateius Capito	+ 22 n	IUR: ANT	Antiquarisches (b. Festus)
8.	Ateius philologus, L.	ca 70 v	GRAM: HIST	(Quelle Sallusts)
9.	Augustus Caesar imp.	63 v–14 n	(Archiv)	"Reichsstatistik"(Census)
10.	Aufidius (Bassus)	s.1^1 n	HIST	hist. bell. civ.; hist. bell. Germ.
11.	Cato censorius, M.	234–149	ANT	*Origines*
12.	Claudius imp.	10 v–54 n	HIST	*Hist. urbis; Etrusc.; Carthag.* (Gr.)
13.	Coelius Antipater	s.2^2 v	HIST	*De bello Punico secundo*
14.	Curio pater (C. Scribonius)	cos 76 v	ORAT	Orationes (Bezug unerklärt)
15.	Domitius Corbulo (Cn.)	+ 67 n	(HIST)	Commentarii? (Feldherr)
16.	Fabricius Tuscus	?	?	unbekannt
17.	Gellianus	s.1 n	(HIST)	68 n diplomatische Mission
18.	Inscriptio tropaei Alpium		(INSCR)	
19.	Hyginus (Iulius)	s.1^2 v	POLYHIST	Genealogie; Mythographie
20.	Livius, T.	59 v–17 n	HIST	*Ab urbe condita*
21.	Livius filius	s.1^1 n	GEOGR?	Math. Geographie?
22.	Mela, Pomponius	s.1^1 n	GEOGR	*De chorographia*
23.	Mucianus, Licinius (C.)	+ 75 n	(HIST)	Epistulae; commentarii?
24.	Nepos, Cornelius	100–24 v	HIST-BIOGR	*Exempla; chronica*
25.	Neronis exploratores	54/68 n	(HIST)	Relationes?
26.	Nigidius (Figulus)	100–45 v	NATPHLS	*Sphaera Graecanica*
27.	Petronius, P. (praef. Aegypti)	s.1^2 v	(HIST)	Commentarii?
28.	Piso, L. (Frugi)	s.1^1 v	HIST	*Annales*
29.	Seneca (L. Annaeus)	4–65 n	GEOGR	*De India*
30.	Statius Sebosus	s.1 v/n?	PARAD	*De insulis Fortunatis*
31.	Suetonius Paulinus	* 11 n	(HIST)	Commentarii? (NW-Europa)
32.	Valerianus (Q. Cornelius)	s. 1 v	ANT	??
33.	Varro, M. (Terentius)	116–27 v	ANT	*Antiqui. rer. hum.; Disciplinae*
34.	Varro Atacinus (P.)	s. 1 v	GEOGR	Chorographia (Lehrgedicht)
35.	Verrius Flaccus	60 v–14 n	ANT	*Res memoria dignae*
36.	Vetus, L. (Antistius)	cos 65 n	HIST	Commentarii? (Identität unsicher)
37.	Sunt qui, multi, alii, Grai etc.			

Tabelle IIIa

Anzahl der griechischen und römischen Autoren in *NH* B. III – VI

NH	Graeci ind.	Graeci txt	Romani ind.	Romani txt	anonymi
III	12	12	21	12	7
IV	41	25	12	21	21
V	47	22	16	5	10
VI	37	25	19	10	38
III-VI	137*	84*	68*	58*	76
III-VI	221*	126*	76		

*) Darin sind Mehrfachnennungen enthalten

(ἀνθηρογραφεῖσθαι). Man sieht: Eratosthenes gilt als der geographische "Klassiker", aber Cicero las nicht ihn, sondern die damals neueste einschlägige Publikation, Serapion (den ja auch Plinius kennt, Indices 2. 4. 5), dessen Kritik an Eratosthenes sich offenbar auf den großen Hipparchos stützte: *a Serapione et ab Hipparcho* bedeutet zweifellos "Serapio und bei diesem auch Hipparch" (denn weitere Literatur hatte sich Cicero zunächst nicht kommen lassen). Die Geographie ist in der Tat ein schwieriges Sujet, denn Ende April bekennt Cicero (*ib.* 2, 7, 1): *de geographia etiam atque etiam deliberabimus.* Die Lektüre blieb natürlich nicht bei Serapio. Im August urteilt er über Alexander aus Ephesos ("Lychnos"), einem Lehrdichter, den auch Strabo heranzog,[27] ziemlich negativ: *neglegentis hominis et non boni poetae, sed tamen non inutilis* (*ib.* 2, 22, 7; cf. 2, 22, 6). Danach hört man nichts mehr von dem Projekt. Ob es ein Lehrgedicht werden sollte (im Vorjahr hatte er *De consulatu suo* gedichtet) oder ein Prosasachbuch, bleibt ungewiss; nicht ungewiss ist aber, dass sich ein solches Werk, wenn es denn literarischen Ansprüchen genügen sollte, offenbar schwerer zu schreiben ist als eine Astronomie, wie Ciceros *Aratea* belegen.

Dem Vorgang lässt sich entnehmen:

1. die literarische Undankbarkeit des Stoffes; Plinius als Grammatiker und Rhetor hatte sicher auch an das *genus tenue* seine Ansprüche, wie die rhetorisch-moralischen Exkurse der *Naturalis historia* an vielen Stellen bezeugen und wie Plinius es praef. 14 auch ausdrücklich formuliert;

2. dass die Bearbeitung der Thematik ohne größere Quellenstudien nicht möglich ist, und dass diese Quellen griechisch waren und sich auf Eratosthenes konzentrierten (59 v. Chr. gab es noch keine Geographie auf Latein!);

---

[27] Zu diesder schillernden Gestalt s.: W. Burkert, "Pseudopythagorica", *Philologus* 105 (1961) 32–43. Strabo nennt ihn als astronomischen und geographischen Lehrdichter (14, 1, 25), der vielleicht in die 1. H. des 1. Jh. v. Chr. in Mode kam, sich freilich nicht mit Sicherheit datieren lässt. Für Plinius spielt er keine Rolle.

3. dass sich Cicero an junge Autoren hielt (zu denen der nicht datierbare Alexander Lychnos wohl auch gehörte). Das ist keine Frage der Sprachkenntnis, sondern eher der Verfügbarkeit älterer Bücher, – Eratosthenes lag fast 200 Jahre zurück. Vielleicht hatte Atticus ihn nicht in seiner Bibliothek, wohl aber den neuen Serapion;

4. leider erfahren wir nicht, welche äußere Form sich Cicero für seine Darstellung der Oikumene ausgedacht hatte, ob Periplus wie Artemidor oder Periegese in der Art der strabonischen *Geographika* oder – viel später – der Periegese des Pausanias. Mela lehrt, dass nur die erstere Form stilistische Möglichkeiten bot, z. B. in der dramatischen Schilderung der Linienbewegung der Küsten oder des dynamischen Anaplus eines Flusses.

Wie ging Plinius vor? Von seinem Neffen hören wir, wie unverdrossen und hartnäckig der procurator doctus an seinen Notaten arbeitete, selbst im Reisewagen und im Bad, *subsicivis temporibus, id est nocturnis.* Er glaubte, selbst in schlechten Büchern noch etwas wissenswertes zu finden: *nihil enim legit, quod non excerperet* (*epist.* 3, 5, 10). Es las sicher oft *cursim,* wie es Wissenschaftler manchmal tun müssen. Das Ergebnis war eine gigantische Datenbank. Praef. 17 zählt er 20000 Exzerpte aus 2000 Büchern (*ex exquisitis auctoribus*) für die *Naturalis Historia.* Dem Neffen vererbte er 160 Commentarii-Bände, klein und jedes Blatt beidseitig beschrieben, ein Thesaurus, für den ihm einst Larcius Licinus in Spanien 400000 HS geboten habe (*ib.* 3, 5, 15). Man wüsste gern, wie diese Materialmasse geordnet war, um jeweils an der richtigen Stelle dem Schreiber verfügbar zu sein. Am ehesten noch nach "Sachgruppen" (mot-clés);[28] für die Geographie also (in Unterordnern?) z. B. Erdteil incl. Maße. Periplus – Küstenformen und Inseln – Städtenamen incl. Metonomasien und Gründungssagen – Censuslisten usw.; ich verweise auf die von mir früher vorgeschlagene 'Stratographie'.[29] Schliesslich sollte nicht übersehen werden, dass Plinius stolz darauf ist, sein Material für die *Naturalis historia* aus hundert Autoren entnommen zu haben. Nun nennen die Indices allein schon für die Geographie 111 Autoren, für das ganze Werk etwa 426 (ohne Sachquellen und Sammelbezeichnungen).[30] D. h., wenn man die Autorenzahlen in den Indices ernst nimmt, von gut vier

---

[28] Naas (s. o. Anm. 26) 319; 316 spricht sie von 'fiches'. Der 'Zettelkasten' (die Kartei) des Plinius hat neue Aktualität erhalten durch A. Locher u. R. C. A. Rottlaender, "Überlegungen zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Naturalis Historia des älteren Plinius und die Schrifttäfelchen von Vindolanda", in: *Festschrift H. Vetter* (Wien 1985) 140–147.

[29] Sallmann 1971, 191–236.

[30] Dannemann (s. o. Anm. 9) 30 zählt sogar 473 Namen: 146 Römer und 327 Griechen.

Autoren sind mindestens drei nur indirekt verarbeitet oder ehrenhalber genannt, was für die zahlreichen und oft zeitlich zurückliegenden Griechen in weit höherem Maße der Fall sein muss als bei den relativ wenigen Römern.

Was trug nun Plinius selbst redaktionell in seinen Text ein? Folgende Beobachtungen scheinen mir bemerkenswert:

1. Er bemüht sich redlich um einen Quellenvergleich, wo er widersprüchliche Angaben über dieselbe Sache vorfand. So über die Völker jenseits der Skythen (NO-Oikumene): *nec in alia parte maior auctorum inconstantia, credo propter innumeras vagasque gentes* (6, 61). Auch zu Ostasien stellt er resignierend fest (6, 59): *nec tamen est diligentiae locus: adeo diversa et incredibilia traduntur.* Nachdem er über Indien zunächst die seleukidischen Autoren Patrokles, Megasthenes und Dionysios bemüht hatte, dann *Alexandri comites,* schliesslich Senecas Jugendschrift *De situ Indiae,* besteht Grund zu der Annahme, dass er die zusammenfassende Kritik dem jüngsten Autor, nämlich Seneca, entnommen hat, obwohl er Seneca sonst kaum benutzt und würdigt. Aber Kritik, gerade im paradoxographischen Gebiet der Randoikumene, war ihm wichtig.

2. Dazu passt, das er unglaubwürdige Daten klar abweist. So z. B. das, was er über die dem Indus vorgelagerten Inseln Chryse und Argyre las (6, 80): *nam quod aliqui tradidere, aureum argenteumque his solum esse, haud facile crediderim.* Im Falle der sog. Portae Caucasiae konstatiert er einen *magnus error* (6, 30), vorgefunden offenbar in der geographischen Vulgata,[31] da er keinen Verantwortlichen nennt. Dem Cornelius Nepos wirft er Leichtgläubigkeit vor, da dieser in Mauretanien die alten Mythen von den Äpfeln der Hesperiden real ansiedelte (5, 4): *quaeque alia Cornelius Nepos avidissime credidit.* Sein Römerstolz hatte also durchaus Grenzen. *Fabulositas* wird nicht immer negativ bewertet; für Griechenland ist sie neben der Wissenschaft im Sinne des Mythenreichtums eine kulturelle Errungenschaft (4, 1). Aber in ein geographisches Fachbuch gehört sie nicht, wie er umgekehrt oft genug die masslose Eitelkeit der Griechen tadelt, z. B. deren Glauben an Bernsteininseln (*Electrides*) in der Nordadria, *vanitatis Graecae certissimum documentum* (3, 152; 37, 32). Merkwürdigerweise fehlt im Ab-

---

[31] Darunter wird kein (verlorenes) Werk verstanden, sondern der Rekurs auf anonyme Nachschlagewerke, Stadiasmen, Miliasmen, praktische Reise- und Segelhandbücher unterhalb der eigentlichen Literatur. Im technischen Bereich muss es derartiges gegeben haben, wenn es auch nicht möglich ist, Beweise zu liefern oder genauere Vorstellungen zu geben. Aber die pauschalen und anonymen Zitate erlauben diesen Schluss.

schnitt über Griechenland (4, 1–49) und in dem über Kleinasien (5, 68–172) nahezu jedes Namenszitat; entweder gab es dort keine Datenkontroversen oder Plinius hielt sich hier, wenigstens streckenweise, einseitig an einen Leitautor, freilich ohne Verzicht auf die üblichen Städtelisten usw.

3. Wo starke Datendiskrepanzen auftreten, stellt Plinius die Doxai nebeneinander, was gelegentlich zu kleinen Doxographien auswachsen kann, ohne dass eine Entscheidung getroffen wird. Für die Südküste Indiens bemerkt er (6, 72): *mensuram, ut invenio, ponam generatim, quamquam inter se nullae congruunt.* Aber 4, 77 gibt er die Maße des Pontos nach Varro, Nepos, Artemidor, Agrippa und Mucian. Hat letzterer als jüngster die früheren Daten überliefert und Artemidors Stadien in m. p. (*milia passuum*) umgerechnet? Kaum; ein Reisebericht ist kein Ort für kritische Vergleiche. Solche "Doxographien" gibt es auch für andere Daten, z. B. führt er für die Metonomasien der Insel Melos an (4, 70): Aristeides, Aristoteles, Kallimachos und Herakleides. Das klingt nach lexikalischem Handbuch, aber auf solche gibt es keinerlei Hinweise in der *Naturalis historia.* Wir sehen: Autorennamen fallen vorzugsweise bei kontroversen Daten an, und zwar stehen sie für Detail-Informationen; denn die evtl. Leitquelle zu nennen, besteht kein Anlass. Selbst dann nicht, wenn nur ein einzelner Autor Abweichendes berichtet. Den Berichten Corbulos über das Hinterland des östlichen Pontos stehen pauschal *veteres* gegenüber (6, 32), eben die geographische Vulgata.

4. Und doch spricht Plinius, selten genug zwar, von bevorzugten Autoren. Gleich zu Beginn (3, 1) bekennt er sich zum Prinzip der autoptischen Zuständigkeit: *auctorem neminem unum sequar,* sondern je nach der Vertrautheit eines Autors mit einer Region müsse der Grad der Zuverlässigkeit am größten sein: *sed ut quemque verissimum in quaque parte arbitrabor, quoniam commune ferme omnibus fuit, ut eos quisque diligentissime situs diceret, in quibus ipse prodebat.* So traut er den Angaben des Demodamas (mss *Demonas*)[32] über den Iaxartes (Syr-Darja) mehr als denen von Alexanders Soldaten (6, 49): *Demodamas, Seleuci et Antiochi regum dux, quem maxime sequimur in his.* Der Mauretanier Iuba ist Plinius' Gewährsmann für Arabien in Verbindung mit den Erkenntnissen der römischer Militärexpedition, die der Augustussohn C. Caesar 1 n. Chr. unternommen hatte (6, 141): *in hac tamen parte arma Romana sequi placet*

[32] Die mss haben neben *Demonas* auch *Demonax, Daemona* u. ä. Die Wiederherstellung *Demodamas* (Mayhoff) aufgrund des Index 6 (diese Form auch bei Solinus und Martianus Capella) ist evident.

nobis Iubamque regem, ad eundem Gaium Caesarem scriptis voluminibus de eadem expeditione Arabica. Hier kommt das herodoteische Autopsieprinzip zum Zuge, das auch auf Dritte übertragen werden kann. Für den Ort der Euphratquelle beruft er sich auf Licinius Mucianus und auf Domitius Corbulo, beide rezente Zeitzeugen (5, 83): *ut prodidere ex iis, qui proxime viderunt*; unglücklicherweise nennen sie jeweils verschiedene Lokalitäten, und Plinius wagt selbst kein Urteil. Typisch aber, dass er sich für die Geographie Sri Lankas (Taprobane) auf den relativ neuen Bericht des Annius Plocamus bezieht (6, 85–91), den er vorsichtshalber in oratio obliqua zitiert. Wir müssen also hinnehmen, dass Plinius auch dann, wenn er sich Vorzugsquellen anschliesst, eine evtl. Leit- oder Hauptquelle nicht offenbart, weil dies in den antiken Sachbüchern in der Regel auch nicht üblich war.

Namentlich angeführt werden also die Spezialisten, vor allem für ihre Heimatgebiete. Amometos (6, 55) ist Spezialautor für die *Attacori* in Fernost (*de iis privatim condidit volumen*), Hekataios für die *Hyperborei* (*sicut Hecataeus de Hyperboreis, ibid.*). Und selbst dort gibt es Überlieferungsdifferenzen, z. B. 6, 63 heißt es betreffs der vorgefundenen Distanz Hypasis-Sydrus-Iomanes: *aliqua exemplaria adiciunt V m. p.* Las Plinius verschiedenen Fassungen des (wohl auf Seleukos Nikator zurückgehenden) Berichts? Das wäre erstaunlich, aber nicht unmöglich.

So komme ich zu dem Schluss: Plinius legte überhaupt keinen literarischen Periplus als Leitquelle zugrunde, da er keinen nötig hatte. Mag sein, dass er streckenweise Leitautoren folgte. Die Vorstellung von den vier *sinus Europae* (die sich wie Halbinseln nach Süden ins Meer erstrecken) z. B. gilt in der Forschung als varronisch.[33] Ist dies richtig, hat Varro – und mit ihm, etwas unorganisch, auch Plinius – "kontinental", nicht "periplusmäßig" gedacht. Die inneren und äußeren Festlandsgrenzen konnte Plinius anschaulich an jeder Weltkarte ablesen, und damit werden wir zu Agrippa zurückgeführt, dem er (3, 17) höchste Autorität zuerkennt: *Agrippam quidem in tanta viri diligentia praeterque in hoc opere cura, cum orbem terrarum orbi spectandum propositurus esset, errasse quis credat, et cum eo Divum Augustum?* Gewiss steckt darin auch eine Hommage an den Begründer des Imperiums, was auch noch zur Zeit der Flavier aus dem Mund des loyalen Berufsprokurators angebracht war, eines Mannes, der

[33] Zuerst bei G. Öhmichen, *De M. Varrone et Isidoro Characeno C. Plini in libris geographicis auctoribus primariis* (Lipsiae 1873), dann Detlefsen (s. o. Anm. 11). Differenzierter bei B. Biliński, "De Graeciae in Pliniana descriptione (*nat.* 4, 1–32) sinibus quaestiones", *Eos* 41 (1940/46) 123–155.

selbst allen Problemen mit dem schwierigen Nero aus dem Weg zu gehen verstand. Der Hinweis auf die unter Augustus vollendete Weltkarte an der Porticus Pollae ist unüberhörbar; keinem Griechen wird eine solche Hervorhebung zuteil, nicht einmal Eratosthenes, am ehesten noch Isidor[34] aus Charax anlässlich der periegetischen Erwähnung am Euphrat-Tigris-Delta. Isidor wird aber als Beauftragter des Augustus, also "funktional" als römisch deklariert (6, 141): *Hoc in loco genitum esse Dionysium* [Isidorum!], *terrarum orbis situs recentissimum auctorem, quem ad commentanda omnia in orientem praemiserit Divus Augustus ituro in Armeniam ad Parthicas Arabicasque res maiore filio (sc. C. Caesare) non me praeterit nec sum oblitus sui quemque situs diligentissimum auctorem visum nobis introitu operis. In hac tamen parte arma Romana sequi placet...* Damit ist trotz aller Anerkennung des Isidor klargestellt, dass dieser gerade nicht Leitautor ist, entgegen dem 3, 1 aufgestellten Grundsatz. Und die vorangehende Bemerkung (6, 139), das Charax in der Agrippakarte noch Küstenstadt ist (*maritimum etiam Vipsania porticus habet*), obwohl es nach Iuba inzwischen 50 m. p., nach zeitgenössischen Berichten sogar 120 m. p. von der Küste entfernt ist, zeigt zum eine die Präzision der Weltkarte im Detail, zum andern deren wenigstens z. T. veraltete Quellen (Eratosthenes?), vor allem aber, dass Plinius sie offenbar für seine perigetischen Partien vor Augen hatte.

Wir bleiben also bei dem Ergebnis, dass Plinius, seinem Zettelkastenprinzip gemäß, weder eine griechische noch eine römische Geographie als ständigen Leitfaden benutzte, sondern systematisch aus seinen (meist augusteischen) Hauptquellen kompilierte und vornehmlich in kontroversen Punkten, aber auch bei seltenen, seltsamen, befremdlichen, bezweifelten Details die jeweiligen Verantwortlichen namentlich nennt. Dass dabei auch im Rucksackverfahren vorgegangen wurde, d. h. ältere Zitate aus jüngeren Autoren mit übernommen wurden, ist nicht nur nicht auszuschließen, sondern zumindest in einigen Fällen auch nachweisbar. Warum fehlt Strabo? Dass Plinius sein Grosswerk nicht gekannt haben sollte, würde schlecht in das Bild des unermüdlichen Lesers und Exzerptors passen.[35] Aber es könnte sein, dass der römische Patriot dort griechische Quellen nicht gelten liess, wo bereits wichtige römische existierten. Dasselbe Schicksal scheint auch Dionysius aus Halikarnass erlitten zu haben, der neben den Römer Varro getreten war.

---

[34] Alle mss überliefern *NH* 6, 141 *Dionysium*. Die Korrektur gelang G. Bernhardy in seiner Ausgabe des Dionysius Periegeta, s. Mayhoffs app. z. d. St.

[35] Dies vermutete Dannemann (s. o. Anm. 9) 42.

4. DIE RÖMISCHEN UND GRIECHISCHEN HAUPTQUELLEN DES PLINIUS

Nach Ausscheiden aller Gelegenheitszitate griechischer Geographen, die z. T. allerdings kaum bekannt und zweifelhaft sind – Textvergleiche sind ja in der Regel nicht möglich – waren als beachtliche Quellenautoren nur fünf übrig geblieben: Eratosthenes, Timosthenes, Polybios, Artemidoros und Isidoros. Sie alle werden punktuell herangezogen. Nur ein Blick auf die Fragmente kann Aufschluss über Wert und Ziel der Benutzung geben. Die römischen Quellen seien hier nur knapp berührt. Über Agrippa/Augustus als Anschauungsautorität wurde schon gesprochen. Varro ist, der Vielfalt seiner Werke gemäß, auch in verschiedenen Strukturschichten punktuell, aber gern herangezogen, nie Leitquelle. Als einziger ist noch Nepos im Spiel. Von seinen 14 Nennungen betreffen vier Distanzzahlen (Alpenlänge, Pontosumfang, Strecke Pontos–Kaspi, Breite der Straße von Gibraltar), eine weitere die Lage der Insel Kerne. Das könnte alles einer Chorographie, kaum einem Periplus entnommen sein, ergibt aber in der Benutzung durch Plinius keinen Zusammenhang (wie es bei den Agrippazitaten der Fall ist) im Sinne einer Leitquelle. Die restlichen Fragmente betreffen ebenfalls Lokalitäten, müssen aber nicht einem geographischen Buch entstammen: Verbindungsweg zwischen Hister (Donau) und Histria (Adria); Zerstörung der Transpadanerstadt Melpum; Bedeutung der Mauretanerstadt Lixus, Herkunft der *Veneti* von den *Eneti*. Da diese Zitate teils ohne Alternativangaben, teils doxographisch auftreten, ist davon auszugehen, dass Nepos, mit welcher Schrift auch immer, sporadisch und gezielt herangezogen wurde, zumal er, wie aus Mela zu erkennen war, als Vermittler älterer Literatur, z. B. von Hannos Westafrika-Paraplus, diente.

Damit ist nach Varro, dessen Nutzung vielfältig und aus verschiedenen Werken erfolgte, und nach Agrippa, wenn er denn für die Weltkarte steht, auch Nepos als durchgehende Leitquelle, nicht schon als Hauptquelle, ausgeschieden, – kein gutes Omen für die Rolle der griechischen geographischen Hauptquellen, über die Folgendes zu sagen ist:

1. Die 16 Anführungen des Eratosthenes, der neben Polybios als besonders zuverlässig eingestuft wird (5, 40: *Polybius et Eratosthenes diligentissimi existimati*), gelten 12 Mal Großdistanzen und sollten den *Γεωγραφικά* entnommen sein. Obwohl sie nur selten direkt zusammenhängen, lassen sie sich leicht auf eine Anametrie der Oikumene zurückführen.[36] Zwei Fragmente nennen Sondernamen: für das westliche Mittelmeer und eine Insel; eines zählt die untergegangenen Städte am Hellespont auf; das letzte beschreibt Erato-

[36] Man vergleiche die (unbedingt erneuerungsbedürftige) Sammlung von H. Berger, *Die geographischen Fragmente des Eratosthenes* (Leipzig 1880).

sthenes' Erdumfangsmessung, ist also, genauer gesagt, ein Testimonium. Auch diese Stellen passen zu den *Γεωγραφικά*, obschon sie einigermaßen disparat exzerpiert sind. Doch ergibt das Benutzungsprofil bei Plinius eine zwar häufige, wenn auch nicht durchgängige Heranziehung für Details der Anametrie. Für direkte Lektüre durch Plinius spricht die Entdeckung ungewohnter Sondernamen wie *mare Sardoum* oder *Lotophagitis* (statt *Meninx*).

2. Ähnliches gilt für Eratosthenes' Zeitgenossen, den Seefahrer Timosthenes, der sieben Mal zitiert wird, oft in Verbindung mit jenem, gelegentlich auch mit Isidor oder Artemidor. Da er aber auch allein (ohne Verbindung mit älteren Autoren) genannt wird, ist direkte Einsichtnahme nicht auszuschließen. Fünf der sieben Zitate enthalten Distanz- bzw. Umfangszahlen und betreffen alle Erdteile. Hinzu tritt eine Nachricht über Inseln im äthiopischen Meer mit Berufung auf Ephoros und Eudoxos und eine seltene Information über die Bedeutung der Stadt Dioskurias am Ost-Pontos: wichtige Details aus einer als wichtig angesehenen Quelle.

3. Polybios, *annalium conditor* (5, 9), ist ausschließlich für *Γεωγραφικά* beansprucht, die sich im erhaltenen Teil der *Historiae* nicht wiederfinden; dies verweist wieder auf das verlorene B. 34 seiner *Historien*. Acht von neun Zitierungen teilen Großdistanzen mit, und zwar aus verschiedenen Regionen der Oikumene. Nur ein Fragment gibt ein Detail polybianischer Nomenklatur: *Ausonium mare*. Mit zwei Ausnahmen stehen alle diese Daten isoliert und dürften direkt exzerpiert sein. Auch Polybios ist eine bedeutende Quelle für Details. Die Fokussierung auf die Maßzahlen liegt, wie ja auch bei Eratosthenes und Timosthenes, einmal an der empirischen Unsicherheit der Großstrecken, die natürlich von besonderem strategischen und imperialen Interesse waren, weiterhin an Umrechnungsvarianten (m. p. aus Stadien verschiedener Parameter), sicher auch an der bekannten Überlieferungsproblematik von Zahlen.

4. Nun zu Artemidors *Γεωγραφούμενα* aus dem 1. Jh. v. Chr., die Cicero offenbar noch nicht kennt. Vielleicht hätte er eine ideale Leitquelle abgegeben, aber auch hier zeigen die Fragmente eher auf das Profil einer, wenn auch wichtigen, Detailquelle. Schon in der Kosmologie (B. 2) hat ihn Plinius reichlich für die Welt- und Erdmaße konsultiert, und die zwölf geographischen Fragmente beziehen sich bis auf eines auf Distanz- und Umfangszahlen, meist auf die Süd-Oikumene, einmal aber auch auf Europa, Kaspiregion und Mittelmeer. Artemidors Daten stehen gern neben solchen des Eratosthenes und Timosthenes, aber auch neben denen Isidors, Iubas, sogar neben denen der Römer Agrippa, Statius Sebosus und sonstiger *nostri*. Ein Fragment informiert über Artemidors Sondernamen für den Golf von Akaba (*sinus Aelaniticus*). Mag sein, dass er als Vermittler seiner Vorgänger in Frage kommt; gelesen hat ihn Plinius selbst: Artemidor konnte noch nicht übersetzt, kaum verarbeitet sein.

5. Allenfalls Isidor aus Charax ist noch jünger, aber zeitlich so dicht an Artemidor, dass eher an ein Parallelwerk als an ein Nachfolgewerk zu denken ist. Plinius zitiert ihn kaum häufiger als den Artemidor, 14 Mal, und zwar wieder in derselben Weise: 13 Stellen geben Großdistanzen wieder, davon betreffen sieben (Halb-)Insel-Umfänge – Spezialgebiet Isidors? –, nur eine Stelle gilt einer Städteliste (5, 127 mit Eratosthenes: untergegangene Orte in Kleinasien). Fast alle Angaben sind im Vergleich zu anderen gegeben, neben Eratosthenes, Artemidor, Pytheas, Mucianus, *veteres*, anonymen Alternativen, isoliert nur der Umfang des Peloponnes (4, 9) und die Strecke Sigeion-Bosporus. Da es sich immer um Seeweg-Strecken handelt, darf man folgern, dass Isidor entweder ein Segelhandbuch schrieb oder Plinius hat den Periplus nur mit diesem Profil gelesen hat. Die Benutzung ist ausgedehnt, gleichwohl akzessorisch.

Folgendes (in Einzelheiten sicher anfechtbare) Facit ist zu ziehen:

Wenn Plinius, wie ich folgere, keine literarische Leitquelle für den Periplus benutzte, sondern eine Landkarte, muss die Heranziehung geographischer Fachbücher immer punktuell sein, sei es für eine Region, in der ein Autor z. B. durch seine Herkunft besonders ausgewiesen war, sei es für ein spezielles Stratum wie die Anametrie, für die ein Reihe bewährter Autoren (wie Eratosthenes, Timosthenes und Polybios) und rezenter Publikationen (wie Artemidor und Isidor, aber auch römischer Reisender wie Mucianus und Domitius Corbulo) sich anboten. Bei den aufgeführten Hauptquellen plädiere ich in den meisten (aber nicht allen) Fällen für direkte Benutzung. Die große Masse anderer Zitate ist dabei indirekt mit exzerpiert, ohne dass dies immer kenntlich gemacht wäre. In die Indices sind auch derartige Vermittler-Namen mit aufgenommen, da es sich hier weniger um einen Quellennachweis als um eine Art Bibliographie handelt. Bei den Antiquaria, Ethnographica, Mythologica u. ä. haben die römischen Autoren natürlich eine große Bedeutung. Die Berücksichtigung der Griechen für die eigentlichen Geographica zeigt aber, dass deren Autorität auf diesem Gebiet (und im Grunde allen wissenschaftlichen Fächern) unangefochten und anerkannt war. Plinius' Exzerpiermethode und "Datenbank-System" war eine angemessene Antwort auf diesen Befund. Die modernen Rekonstrukteure der plinianischen Quellen hat die Punktualität der Zitate, die sich oft genug nur auf eine einzige Zahl oder Bemerkung beziehen, allerdings vor eine schwierige Aufgabe gestellt.

Klaus Sallmann
Mainz

В статье применен статистический подход к неоднократно обсуждавшемуся, но не получившему удовлетворительного решения вопросу об источниках географических книг (III–VI) "Естественной истории" Плиния. Можно говорить о пяти греческих (Эратосфен, Тимосфен, Полибий, Артемидор, Исидор) и трех римских (Варрон, Агриппа, Корнелий Непот) главных источниках – подразумевая под ними относительно часто используемых авторов. Вполне возможно, что из них Тимосфен был доступен Плинию через посредство Артемидора и Исидора, но нет причин сомневаться в прямом обращении к другим названным авторам. Как правило, они использовались для определенной специфической информации (например, данные о расстояниях или о регионах, с которыми тот или иной автор был тесно связан биографически). При обращении к римским авторам – особенно Августу, Агриппе, Варрону, Катону Старшему – играли роль и патриотические чувства. В композиционном отношении Плиний, по-видимому, не следовал какому-либо литературному источнику – структура его повествования для этого слишком непоследовательна. Перипл он мог заимствовать из карты мира Агриппы, используя ее портативную копию.

ZUR ÜBERLIEFERUNG DER *ANNALEN* UND *HISTORIEN* DES TACITUS

Prof. Franz Römer zum 60. Geburtstag

Seit dem Erscheinen des letzten Forschungsberichtes von Prof. F. Römer [1] sind schon mehrere Jahre vergangen. Mein Name fand schon damals Erwähnung, aber nur in einer Anmerkung [2] aufgrund meiner russischen Publikation von 1981 und – nicht zuletzt – dank mehrerer Briefe, die wir gewechselt hatten. Inzwischen habe ich von meinem österreichischen Kollegen alle Mikrofilme der *recentiores* für die *Historien* erhalten und darüber hinaus Wien viermal – nicht ohne seine Hilfe – besuchen können. Von einer regen Arbeit in der von mir vorgenommenen Richtung zu sprechen, wäre jedoch verfrüht. Dafür gab es mehrere Gründe: Es fehlten mir zunächst Dissertanten, die humanistische Handschriften kollationieren konnten (ich selbst fühlte mich dazu außerstande), zudem war ich wie üblich mit anderen Aufgaben überlastet, und letztlich sah ich, daß ich ohne gründlicheres Studium der Orthographie und Grammatik des Med. I nie imstande sein würde, etwas von Tacitus zu edieren (*Hist.* I und III – V harren immernoch einer Bearbeitung). Nachdem ich also meine bisherigen Ergebnisse zur humanistischen Überlieferung im ersten Bande des frisch gegründeten *Hyperboreus* resümiert hatte,[3] machte ich mich an die "Prolegomena zu den *Annalen* I–VI des Tacitus". Es sind derzeit I – XIV veröffentlicht worden, und ein Ende ist noch nicht in Sicht. Vielleicht wird das ganze Unternehmen hiermit ins stocken geraten, aber, indem ich die Schreibungen verschiedener Personen-, Länder- und Völkernamen (*Thracia, Syria, ... Canninefates, Veleda* usw.) studierte, griff ich – aus blosser Neugierde – zu den bei mir vorhandenen Mikrofilmen der humanistischen Handschriften und bekam plötzlich überraschende Resultate. Da dies alles in russischer Sprache, also für viele Fachkollegen nicht leicht erfaßbar, erschienen ist, werde ich hier der Reihenfolge nach davon berichten.

---

[1] F. Römer, "Kritischer Problem- und Forschungsbericht zur Überlieferung der taciteischen Schriften", *ANRW* II 33, 3 (1991) 2299 – 2339 (im folgenden: Bericht...).

[2] *Ibid.*, 2321 Anm. 93.

[3] А. Б. Черняк, "Рукописная традиция второго массива 'Анналов' и 'Историй' Тацита" (A. Tschernjak, "Die handschriftliche Überlieferung von Tacitus' *Ann.* XI – XVI und *Historien*"), *Hyperboreus* 1 (1994): 1, 138 – 150.

I. MEIN AUFSATZ VON 1994: IST DER CODEX BARBARO ALS ARCHETYP EINZUSCHÄTZEN?

Die wichtigste Idee dieses Beitrages, die Präliminarien ausgenommen, besteht darin, daß wir die Entstehungsgeschichte der *recentiores* bloß nach äußerlichen Kriterien, und zwar aus denen Textumfang, also ohne mühesame Kollationen, erklären können. Die erste (I) und zugleich die umfangreichste (17) Gruppe endet wie **M** mit *Hist.* V, 26, 2 *Flavianus in Pannonia*, die zweite (II) mit V, 23, 2 *potiorem* (es sind 10, genauer 9 + *ed. princ.*), die dritte (III) mit V, 13, 1 *evenerant* (es sind 7). Es ist allgemein bekannt[4] und versteht sich von selbst, daß es sich hier um einen alten Archetyp handelt, von welchem sich die letzten Blätter allmählich lösten. Weniger bekannt ist die Tatsache, daß es eine Handschrift gibt, die immer zur dritten Gruppe gerechnet wird, obgleich sie mit *Hist.* II, 69 endet und erst später von zweiter Hand bis zum Ende des zweiten Buches fortgeführt wurde (**A** – Laurentianus 68, 4). Merkwürdigerweise weist eine Handschrift der ersten Gruppe, **Y03**, den Schreiberwechsel an derselben Stelle auf.[5] Diesmal kam niemandem der Gedanke, die beiden Handschriften mit dem Verfall des Archetyps zu verbinden und sie in eine neue Gruppe, die vierte (IV), auszugliedern. Aber dafür gibt es einen gewichtigen Grund: Die Gruppe III hat eine große Lücke, *Hist.* IV, 15, 3 *segnem numerum* – 62, 4 *moenia trevirorum,* aber zwei Fragmente davon, 20, 3 – 25, 4 und 43, 2 – 53, 4, werden am Ende nach V, 13, 1 *evenerant* mit einem kleinen Intervall stets abgeschrieben.[6] Der Archetyp hat also auch einen beträchtlichen Teil des vierten Buches eingebüßt, und diese geretteten Fragmente wurden wahrscheinlich am Ende der Handschrift angefügt. Die frischgebackene Gruppe IV stellt also die letzte für uns erschließbare Stufe des Verfalls des Archetyps dar, danach verliert sich die Spur der alten Handschrift.

Man wird sicherlich sofort danach fragen, warum eine so naheliegende Hypothese nicht schon früher aufgetaucht ist? 60 Jahre darauf zu warten sei wohl zuviel gewesen! Aber auch dies findet seine Erklärung. Im Jahre 1939, als Mendell diese Nachrichten mitteilte, war er schon mit dem Leidensis

---

[4] Vgl. Cornelius Tacitus II, I. *Historiae*. Ed. K Wellesley (Leipzig [Teubner] 1989) XXI – XXII. Auch andere Editionen, z. B. G. Budés, Loebs usw., pflegen die Handschriftenliste anzugeben, obwohl die *recentiores* im Apparat nur ausnahmsweise erscheinen.

[5] Siehe *P. Cornelii Taciti Annalium libri XV–XVI*. Hrsg. von F. Römer. Wiener Studien Beiheft 6 (Wien 1976) XV und XVIII, Anm. 18 und 29 (im folgenden: *Ann. 15 – 16*); idem, Bericht, 2307 – 2308, Anm. 17 und 28.

[6] Über die Lücke und die zwei Exzerpte siehe C. W. Mendell, "Manuscripts of Tacitus XI – XXI", *YCS* 6 (1939) 39 – 72 (im folgenden: The Manuscripts), besonders 56 – 57 und idem, *Tacitus. The Man and his Work* (Yale Univ. Press 1957) 337 ff.

beschäftigt (er versuchte, den Codex Agricolae aus den Anmerkungen von Theodor Ryck zu rekonstruieren!).[7] Später, als die Handschrift selbst entdeckt wurde, beherrschte sie die Geister einer ganzen Gelehrtengeneration und noch 1991 beginnt Römer seine Darlegung des Problemkreises um diesen Überlieferungszweig mit dem Codex Leidensis. 1976 hatte er mit der Ausgabe von *Ann.* XV–XVI zu viel zu tun. Das von ihm ausgearbeitete Stemma[8] (hier nur eine sehr vereinfachte Variante) ist m. E. gerade deswegen kaum stichhaltig:



Der linke Zweig vertritt laut Römer den sogenannten "Codex Barbaro", eine Kopie von **M**, die Andrea de' Bussi 1449 in Genua zur Verfügung gestanden sein könnte. Der rechte Zweig stellt den Codex Boccaccios dar, der sich 1451 laut einem Katalog im Kloster S. Spirito befand. Daß er den Florentiner Humanisten leicht zugänglich war, ist wohl sehr wahrscheinlich, aber das war auch **M**, der 1444 aus dem Nachlaß Niccolis in die Bibliothek des Klosters S. Marco kam. Ich selbst konnte nie begreifen, wie unter solchen Umständen eine humanistische Abschrift mit den losgerissenen Blättern zum Archetyp für 16 *recentiores* geworden wäre. War Boccaccio ein so ausgezeichneter Latinist? Das glaube ich kaum. War **M** eine so schlechte und unlesbare Handschrift? Nein, und ich konnte mich selbst davon überzeugen, als ich sie im Juli 2002 nach einem verzweifelten Kampf mit den Kustodinnen für einige Minuten zu Gesicht bekam.[9] Ich komme zu dem Schluß, daß unser Archetyp, von mir **X** genannt, eine sehr alte und beson-

---

[7] Mendell, The Manuscripts, 41 ff.

[8] Römer, Bericht, 2310.

[9] Auch diesen kurzfristigen Aufenthalt bei der Rückkehr vom 7. Internationalen Okzitanistenkongreß in Reggio di Calabria und Messina nach Wien hat größtenteils mein Wiener Kollege großzügig ermöglicht.

ders geschätzte Handschrift sein mußte (s. unten meinen eigenen stemmatologischen Versuch):



Es gibt nichts Neues unter der Sonne, und die klassische Philologie bestätigt oft, wenn nicht sogar regelmäßig, diese biblische Weisheit. Das hier vorliegende Stemma wurde schon 1834 von G. A. Ruperti vorhergesagt:

> Omnes enim ex uno eodemque fonte archetypoque, nec tamen ex ipso illo Ms. Florentino sive Langobardico, sed una cum illo ex alio et antiquissimo fluxerunt, quod tam ex multitudine earundem corruptelarum (v. *Ann.* 11, 4. 22. 23. 12, 46. 54. 13, 9. 13. 15. 26. 14, 7) et glossarum (v. ad *Ann.* 14, 8. H. 2, 98. 3, 20), quam potissimum ex eadem longiorum locorum integrarumque paginarum transpositione (v. ad *H.* 3, 5. 65 et 4, 46) colligi potest. Hinc vero intelligitur comparatione omnium, quos commemoravi, plurimumque codicum nihil quidem aliud effici posse, quam ut indagetur, quid in uno illo archetypo fuerit, eam tamen hanc ipsam ob causam multum valere ad veritatem integritatemque scripturae investigandam et restituendam, dummodo in hac re magis dignitas et praestantia, quam multitudo MSS. respiciatur.[10]

[10] *C. Corn. Taciti Opera.* Rec. G. A. Ruperti. I (Hannoveri 1834) CIV–CV. Er hatte natürlich Vorläufer, zunächst Ernesti, vgl. seine bekannte Phrase *non audeam affirmare* (wir führen den ganzen Satz an: "Ceterum ex hoc codice [*sc.* M. – *A. Tsch.*] omnia alia scripta Taciti exemplaria fluxisse, ut I. Gronovius videtur credidisse, non audeam pro

Aber Rupertis Standpunkt fand wenig Zustimmung [11] und geriet mit der Zeit in Vergessenheit.[12]

Diese kleine forschungsgeschichtliche Skizze sollte m. E. noch einmal die allgemein bekannte Wahrheit hervorheben: Wichtig sind nicht nur die Ideen selbst, sondern auch und sogar vorwiegend die Argumente, die Beweisführungen. Fast immer und gewöhnlich nachdem ich die ganze Arbeit bereits getan habe, finde ich meine Ideen in irgendeiner verschollenen Publikation oder Ausgabe aus dem 19. Jh. "Les grands bataillons ont toujours raison" – sagte einmal Napoléon und wir dürften keine Mühe scheuen, um unsere Beweise, sogar die auf den ersten Blick unwichtigsten, aufzulisten. Ruperti hatte die nahe Verwandtschaft von **M** und **X** wohl ausreichend begründet, aber die Existenz des letzteren schwebt immerhin in der Luft. Außer dem Stemma selbst stehen uns noch folgende Argumente zur Verfügung:

1. Abwertung von **M**

Ein Blick auf das von mir vorgelegte Stemma zeigt deutlich, daß diese Handschrift keine große Rolle in der Überlieferung des taciteischen Geschichtswerkes gespielt haben dürfte. Nach der Anfertigung einer Kopie durch Coluccio Salutati (oder Boccaccio, s. unten III) und trotz einer sorgfältigen Restaurierung durch Niccolò Niccoli (zweifelsohne war er es, der sich um die Konservierung der verwitterten Blätter gekümmert hatte), lag sie in Florenz beinahe bar jeder Aufmerksamkeit (die heutigen Kustodinnen werden sicherlich schockiert sein, wenn sie diese Zeilen zu lesen bekämen). 1427 wur-

---

certo affirmare, etsi consensus omnium in transpositionibus, ut *Hist.* III, 5. 65 credibile facit", *C. Corn. Taciti Opera.* Iterum rec. Io. Aug. Ernesti [Lipsiae 1772] 9).

[11] Vgl. Orelli: "Mihi contra vera ex antiquitate unus codex Langobardicus ad nos pervenisse videtur, ex quo ceteri omnes expressi sint... Atque eo dumtaxat nomine inter se differunt, quod unus minimum, fortasse aliquot descripti sunt ex Langobardico ipso, alii ex huius ἐκτύποις lectu utique multo facilioribus, ac promptioribus inventu iis, quibus Florentiam adire non vacabat. Porro in his atque aliis... manifesto sunt aliquot scripti non ab operariis mercede conductis, sed a viris critico sensu praeditis, quorum correctiones consulto factae interdum saltem, quamvis raro, probabiles dici possunt" (*C. Corn. Taciti Opera.* Rec. Io. Gaspar Orellius. I [Turici 1846] XIX). Orellis Meinung war damals maßgebend, und es ist nicht verwunderlich, daß sich auch Ritter ihm sofort anschloß: "...ceteri (sc. MSS. – *A. Tsch.*) in consilium ita vocandi ut utimur coniecturis proprio iudicio repertis" (*C. Corn. Taciti Opera...* ed. F. Ritter I [Cantabrigae 1848] LII).

[12] Bereits Furneaux schreibt Rupertis Hypothese H. Walther zu, siehe: *The Annals of Tacitus.* Ed. H. Furneaux. I (Oxford 1888) 3–4. Mendell zitiert stets Ernestis *non audeam affirmare*, nennt sonst jedoch durchwegs keine Namen (The Manuscripts, 47, 67).

de sie möglicherweise noch vor der Restaurierung an Poggio nach Rom verliehen und sofort zurückerstattet.[13] Symptomatisch ist m. E. auch die Tatsache, daß sie die Wirren von Savonarolas Zeiten ruhig überdauert hat, während mehrere Codices, die neben ihr gestanden waren, gerade damals verschwanden.[14] Die Kopie wurde weiter verbreitet, was man aus den Schriften von Biondo und L. B. Alberti, wie auch aus dem humanistischen Briefwechsel erschließen kann,[15] aber es erscheint mir überraschend, daß wir keine datierte Handschrift vor 1449 besitzen, und diese Handschrift ist **V58** von Bussi.

2. Bussi in Genua

Der plötzliche Aufschwung des Interesses an Tacitus um 1450, der aus den vorhandenen Handschriftendaten ersichtlich ist, steht sicherlich in Verbindung mit der Tätigkeit des Andrea de' Bussi in Genua. Ich habe den Eindruck, daß er nicht zufälligerweise dorthin kam und sofort, nach der Anfertigung seiner Kopie, des späteren **V58,** die Stadt verließ.[16] Es scheint, als ob er gerade dafür und nicht des Unterrichts wegen eingeladen worden wäre. Vielleicht vermochte ein reicher Liebhaber (Gottardo da Sarzano?) eine alte Handschrift von dem venezianischen Senator Francesco Barbaro für einige Zeit zu entlehnen [17] (gewöhnlichen Humanisten war dies nicht immer möglich), dann beschaffte er auch eine Abschrift von **M** (d. h. von Sal.), fand aber seine Aufgabe zu schwierig und rief Bussi zu Hilfe. Als Resultat erhielt er eine Kopie von **V58** (das verschollene Exemplar von **BO5**, das Genua 1463 datiert ist?). Barbaros Handschrift (**X**) ging weiter ihres Weges, wie man meinem Stemma entnehmen kann (Ferrara – Florenz – Rom? – Florenz). Sie büßte dabei allmählich ihre letzten Blätter ein, bis sie endgültig verloren ging.

3. Aufwertung von **X**: **V63** und Ib (**Hol B L24 Z + U**)

Trotz des schlechten Zustandes der Handschrift wurde sie wieder und wieder herangezogen und mit der größten Sorgfalt kollationiert. Das auffäl-

---

[13] Römer, Bericht, 2305; F. Römer, H. Heubner, "Leidensis redivivus?", *WSt* N. F. 12 (1978) 160.

[14] B. L. Ullman, Ph. A. Stadter, *The Public Library of Renaissance Florence. Niccolò Niccoli, Cosimo de' Medici and the Library of San Marco*, Medioevo e umanesimo 10 (Padova 1972) 100.

[15] Vgl. R. Sabbadini, *Storia e critica di testi latini* (Catania 1914 = anast. Padova 1971) 251 – 253.

[16] Siehe: R. W. Ulery, Jr., *The Contribution of the "Genoese"* recentiores *to the Establishment of a Text of Tacitus, Annals 11 – 16* (Yale 1971) 140 – 142.

[17] Sabbadini, *Storia*, 251, der die betreffende Stelle aus einem Brief Barbaros' an Sarzano von 1440 zitiert.

ligste Beispiel dafür wird uns von **V63** dargestellt: "Im Text ist öfters Platz für Worte freigelassen, die der Schreiber in seiner Vorlage (**X.** – *A. Tsch.*) offenbar nicht entziffern konnte, die aber fast immer von zweiter Hand nachgetragen wurden".[18]

Die Gruppe Ib ist wohl zu spät entstanden, als aus der alten Handschrift nicht mehr viel zu entnehmen war. Man benützte jüngere Abschriften, vielleicht auch **M** selbst. Nichtsdestoweniger stehen die Fragmente von Buch IV (s. oben) am Ende, obgleich der Text keine Lücke IV 15, 3 – 62, 4 aufweist.[19] Also stand **X** immer noch zur Verfügung.

4. Paläographische Datierungen: Die Gruppe IV und wiederum **V63**

Mein Stemma, nach Römers Beispiel, enthält eine Zeittafel, die alle humanistischen Handschriften in den Zeitraum zwischen 1450–1480 setzt (s. oben). Und dies wird gerade von einigen zu frühen Datierungen Römers in Frage gestellt, die er in Oxford von Albinia de la Mare bekommen hat,[20] z. B. **V63** – "vielleicht schon um 1430 geschrieben";[21] **A** – "kaum viel später als 1430, möglicherweise sogar früher";[22] **Y03** – "nicht viel jünger ... als **A**".[23] Diese Datierungen, alle mit dem Kennzeichen (M) = A. de la Mare versehen, bedürfen natürlich einer besonderen Betrachtung.

Glücklicherweise kommt mir R. G. M. Nisbet zu Hilfe mit seiner Beschreibung einer Handschrift von Ciceros *in Pisonem*: "**V**, i. e. cod. **H25** in the Archive of St. Peter's (in the Vatican library). This unusual manuscript was written in the ninth century... It contains three columns to the page; this feature is most unexpected at this date, and suggests that **V** was copied from an ancient original. The part containing the *in Pisonem* is written in uncials, another striking sign of archaism; apparently the writer wished to add dignity to his ms. by imitating the script of his exemplar. However the other speeches in the book are written normally

---

[18] Römer, *Ann. 15–16*, XV, vgl. den Befund S. XXXV; Römer, Heubner (o. Anm. 13) 167.

[19] Mendell, The Manuscripts, 56–57; idem, *Tacitus*, 341 (außer **Hol Z**, die ihm unzugänglich waren). Den ersten Bericht davon gab schon 1846 Orelli ([o. Anm. 11] XII–XIII, **BL24**), wohl nach einer Mitteilung von Baiter, der für ihn die Florentiner Handschriften kollationierte.

[20] Römer, *Ann. 15–16*, VIII und XI.

[21] *Ibid.* XV Anm. 19.

[22] *Ibid.* XVIII Anm. 29.

[23] *Ibid.* XV Anm. 18.

in Caroline minuscules, though the writer of both parts may have been the same".[24]

"Es kommen viele seltsame Dinge in der Welt vor, mein Freund Horazio". Im Wunderland der Paläographie auch. Warum hätten die Schreiber von **V63, A** und **Y03** die Schrift ihrer Vorlage, **X** = Codex Barbaro, nicht nachahmen können, um ihren Kopien mehr Würde zu verleihen? War also **X** in karolingischer Minuskel geschrieben? Das wird nur eine spezielle Untersuchung zeigen, die ich leider anderen und begabteren Forschern überlassen möchte. Die Frage bleibt also offen.

So sieht m. E. die äußere Seite unseres Problems aus. Aber der Schwerpunkt liegt im Text selbst. Was könnten wir daraus für den Text oder zumindest für den Apparat gewinnen oder, mit Rupertis Worten, *quid in uno illo archetypo fuerit*? Die Antwort dafür werden uns nur einzelne Textstellen und/oder Schreibungen geben.

II. TEXTOLOGISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN

Die ersten Erfahrungen machte ich schon am Anfang meiner Forschungsarbeit auf diesem Feld, und sie wurden natürlich in den Aufsatz von 1994 aufgenommen.

1. *Hist.* II, 77, 2 *tuos exercitus rege*

Am Ende seiner Rede gibt Mucian dem frischgebackenen Kaiser einen wertvollen Ratschlag: II, 77, 2 *immo, ut melius est, tuos exercitus rege, mihi bellum et proeliorum incerta trade*, d. h. Vespasian solle im Osten bleiben, nach Italien wird er, Mucian, ziehen. Der Plan wurde angenommen und war von Erfolg gekrönt, aber die Philologen zerbrachen sich den Kopf über dem hier wohl unpassenden Ausdruck: *tuos exercitus rege*: Die Kriegshandlungen in Judäa waren damals unterbrochen und wurden später Titus anvertraut. Die allgemein angenommene Konjektur Kießlings <*tu*> *tuos* befriedigt allein die Grammatik, der Sinn blieb derselbe. Aber mir stand schon 1975[25] die Ausgabe des zweiten Buches der *Historien* von I. Schinzel (und W. Hensellek) zur Verfügung, die im Apparat z. St. eine seltsame Angabe brachte: *tu hos* **V58 B05.** Daraus konjizierte ich, daß im Archetyp *tu os* stand, d. h. *tu ōs* = *tu omnes*: die sehr seltene Kontraktion, *ōs* statt *ōms*, ist von Rostagno in

---

[24] *M. Tulli Ciceronis in L. Calpurnium Pisonem oratio.* Ed. R. G. M. Nisbet (Oxford 1961) XXI–XXII.

[25] A. B. Černjak, "Quelques problèmes de critique textuelle chez Tacite", *Quaderni dell'Istituto di filologia latina. Università di Padova* 1976: 4, 111 ff.

M *Ann.* XI, 4, 3 *putate me idem dicere quod omnes* entdeckt worden. Diese Lesung ergibt einen brauchbaren Sinn: Mucian schlägt nun dem Kaiser vor, das Oberkommando über alle Heere zu sichern, was jener in der Tat leistete.[26]

Im Archetyp stand also *tu ōs*; das Kontraktionszeichen ~ war infolge eines Schmutzflecks oder anderer Beschädigung vielleicht schon seit dem 11. Jh. kaum zu lesen. Der Schreiber von **M** fügte einfach die beiden Worte zusammen; Bussi war vorsichtiger, traf aber nicht das Richtige. Warum aber bemerkten die anderen Humanisten nicht, daß es in **X** zwischen *tu* und *os* einen merklichen Abstand gab? Dies weckt den Verdacht, daß *tu hos* tatsächlich eine Konjektur Bussis aufgrund von *tuos* aus **M** sei.

2. Der Tod des Claudius (*Ann.* XII, 67, 1)

Man liest in **M** und fast allen *recentiores*: XII, 67, 1 *infusum delectabili cibo leto* (al. *laeto*) *venenum*. Nur **V58** und vier andere *Gen* bieten *cibo boletorum venenum*. Daß Claudius durch einen vergifteten Pilz (*boletus*) umgebracht wurde, ist wohl aus Suetonius, Martial und Iuvenal bekannt; eine Glosse aus Iuv. 5, 147 – 148 *boletos... amplius edit* steht am Rande vieler Genueser Abschriften, außer **V58, B05** und **G**; hier wurde sie wohl später hinzugefügt.[27]

Also noch eine weitere Konjektur Bussis? Dies wird allgemein angenommen, ich aber habe zwei Einwände:

1) In einem beneventanischen Glossar aus dem 11. Jh. steht eine bisher übersehene Glosse: V, 493, 5 *boletos delectabiles*.[28] Sie rührt zweifelsohne von unserer Tacitusstelle her, aber sicherlich nicht aus **M**. Es bleibt uns nur **X** übrig: Bussi konnte wohl seine *boleti* gerade darin gefunden haben. Es folgt daraus, daß sich auch **X** einmal in Monte Cassino befand. Von wem wurde sie dann nach Venedig gebracht? Der Name von Paulinus Venetus (ca 1280 – 1344), dem Bischof von Pozzuoli, kommt sofort in den Sinn: Er hat auch in **M** seine Spur hinterlassen.[29] Dies reicht natürlich bloß für eine erste Vermutung aus.

---

[26] Nur K. Wellesley, der außer Tacitus nichts im Leben wissen wollte, nahm meine Konjektur begeistert an (ed. *Hist.* [Leipzig 1989] 75). H. Heubner lehnte sie stillschweigend ab (ed. *Hist.* [Stuttgart 1978] 91; übrigens führt die *Praefatio* kein Abfassungsdatum an), während H. Le Bonniec und J. Hellegouarc'h mich einer Erwähnung würdigten (ed. *Hist.* t. II [Paris 1989] 222 ad II, 77, 7).

[27] Ulery (o. Anm. 16) 30 (f).

[28] *ThLL* II (1906) 2066, 65 ff. s. v. *boletus*.

[29] H. J. Heilig, "Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Mediceus II des Tacitus", *WSt* 53 (1935) 95 – 110.

2) Die Endung *-rum* in *boletorum* gehört wahrscheinlich Bussi selbst: seit Wurm schreibt man gewöhnlich *cibo <bo>leto venenum.*[30] Und dies erklärt einigermaßen die seltsame Stellung der Ferrara-Gruppe: Diese Abschriften behalten die Iuvenal-Glosse bei, schreiben aber *leto* gemäß **M** anstatt Bussis *boletorum*! Es waren doch gewissenhafte Gelehrte, diese Humanisten von Ferrara: Sie sahen nicht die geringste Spur von *-rum*, die Bussi des Kontextes wegen hinzugefügt hatte, und konnten den Anfang von *boleto* nicht mehr lesen: ich glaube, daß Bussi sich in schwierigen Fällen nicht scheute, Reaktive zu verwenden, und dadurch den wertvollen Text beschädigte. Im Sommer 2002 bestätigten meine italienischen Kollegen diese meine Vermutung nicht (ich bedanke mich bei Prof. Silvia Rizzo und Prof. Tullio Di Mauro für die freundliche Aufnahme), aber ich beharre weiterhin darauf.

3. *Veleda*[31]

Der Name dieser germanischen Seherin, die beim Aufstand der Bataver in den Jahren 69/70 eine so wichtige Rolle gespielt hatte (und deshalb in den *Historien* IV–V siebenmal erwähnt wird),[32] weist viele Varianten auf: *Velaed-* (genauer *velęd-* **MII**); *Velled-* (Gen.); *Veled-* (Ibc, II–III, Tac. *Germ.* 8, 2); *Veld-* (Stat. *Silv.* I, 4, 90 ms. **P**, *alias* (öfters) M(atritensis) s. XV[1]), vgl. Βελήδαν (*SEG* XVI, 592, siehe auch G. Walser, "Veleda", *RE* 8 A1 [1955] 617–621), Οὐελήδαν (Var. Βελήδαν [Cass. Dio LXVII, 5, 3]).

Auch die Textgeschichte ist merkwürdig. Seit Puteolanus (1473) schrieb man überall (sogar *Germ.* 8, 2!) *Velled-*. Erst Th. Ryck (1686) entschied sich für *Veled-*. Er stützte sich dabei auf: 1) **M**, was falsch war; 2) den Codex Agricolae, der tatsächlich überall *Veled-* aufweist, und 3) Stat. *Silv.* I,

---

[30] Auch dies befriedigt nicht, siehe K. Wellesley, *Ann.* XI–XVI (Leipzig 1986): *Appendices criticae* 149. Meine eigene Lösung war, mit F. Ritter *delectabili cibo* als eine Glosse zu tilgen, siehe "Тацит о смерти Клавдия" ("Tacitus über den Tod des Claudius"), *VDI* 1981: 3, 161–168.

[31] Siehe meinen Aufsatz: "*Veleda* или *Velaeda*?" ("*Veleda* oder *Velaeda*?"), *Язык и культура кельтов. Материалы IX коллоквиума* (СПб. 2003) 143–153.

[32] Nach einer Kombination von Stat. *Silv.* I, 4, 89–90 und *ILS* 9052 wurde sie erst 77/78 gefangen genommen und nach Rom gebracht, siehe R. Syme, "Rhine and Danube legions under Domitian", *JRS* 18 (1928) 41–54, bes. 42; *Corn. Taciti De origine et situ Germanorum*, ed. by J. G. C. Anderson (Oxford 1938) 78 *ad loc.*; Corn. Tacitus, *Die Historien. 4. Buch*. Komm. von H. Heubner (Heidelberg 1976) 143 *ad loc.*; G. E. F. Chilver, G. B. Townend, *A Historical Commentary on Tacitus' Histories* II (Oxford 1985) 71.

4, 90 *captivaeque preces Veledae*. Auch der letzte Beweis ist fehlerhaft: Die Schreibung *Veledae* erscheint erst in jüngeren Handschriften und ist m. E. als ein Produkt der philologischen Betätigung der Humanisten zu betrachten, d. h. als eine Verbesserung der Lesart von **P** (= **M**) *Veldae* aufgrund von humanistischen Abschriften der *Historien* und der *Germania*.[33] Die Schreibung von **M** wurde erst im 19. Jh. festgestellt und nur für kurze Zeit beibehalten, denn die keltische Etymologie des Namens brauchte ein kurzes *-e-*.[34] Auch Statius' Vers hat dabei eine nicht unwichtige Rolle gespielt.

Die Beschäftigung mit den Handschriften, d. h. genauer den Mikrofilmen der *recentiores*, ergibt interessante Resultate. Besondere Beachtung gebührt dabei m. E. **V63**, dem Archetyp der Gruppe II: *Hist.* IV, 61, 2 *łede, vel ełde* 65, 3 *velėdam* 4 *łdam* (s. l. *veledam*), *velėdam*.

Zwei Punkte scheinen mir erörterungswert:

1. *ł* = *vel* (wie übrigens *ł*) wird gewöhnlich ins 8. Jh. datiert.[35] Dieselbe Abkürzung kommt auch in **P** (61, 2 *łede* 65, 4 *Tdm*) **N22** (61, 2 *łede*) **Vin** (61, 2 *łedae*) **Stuttg** (61, 2 *lede* **Stuttg**^{2} *velede*) und **N23** (61, 2 *ł de*, 65, 4 *łdam*) vor; ein weiteres Beispiel verbirgt sich möglicherweise hinter der Auslassung *Ann.* XVI, 2, 1 (3) *velut* im **V63**.[36]

2. IV, 65, 3 und 4 *velėdam* wird von **N23** (65, 3, 4), **N22 Ven** (65, 3; 4 *velidam*) vervielfacht, während **Y03 V64 K** die Schreibung mit *-e-*, aber **Vin** (65, 3 – 4) **C V65 N21 O48 Orat O22** diese mit *-i-* verallgemeinert haben; eine chaotische Änderung zu *e/i* zeigen **Ven N22** (65, 4 *veledam Velidam*) auf.

Zu erwähnen ist auch der Digraph *-ae-* in **Ven** (61, 2 *vel aede velaede*) und **Vin** (61, 2 *ledae, vel aede*).

Es ergibt sich daraus, daß **X** (Codex Barbaro) eine reiche *varia lectio* aufweisen sollte, d. h. *ł* = *vel, ė* (keine Verbesserung, sondern Resultat einer

---

[33] Bereits W. Heraeus war dieser Meinung, s. *Jahresbericht für klassische Philologie* 33 (1916) 786. Über die Textgeschichte der *Silvae* im 15. Jh. s. M. D. Reeve, "Statius' *Silvae* in 15-th Century", *CQ* 71(1977) 202 – 225.

[34] *Die Germania des Tacitus*. Erl. von R. Much. 3. Aufl. hrsg. v. W. Lange (Heidelberg 1967) 169 ad *Germ.* 8, 2: "Die Quantität der Vokale ergibt sich aus Statius, *Silvae* I, 4, 90 *captivaeque preces Veledae*. Der Name stimmt als germanische lautverschobene Form genau zu ir. *fili* aus **velētī-* 'Dichter', eig. 'Seher', das zu mcymr. *gwelet*, jetzt *gweled* 'sehen' gehört und selbst innerhalb des Paradigmas ursprünglich mit einer Stammform *vĕlĕt-* gewechselt haben wird. *Veleda* bedeutet also 'Seherin' und ist somit ein Beiname".

[35] A. Capelli, *Dizionario di abbreviature latine ed italiane* (Milano [U. Hoepli] ^{6}1993) 198 b.

[36] Römer, *Ann. 15 – 16*, XXXV.

[karolingischen?] Kollationierung)[37] und *-ae-*. Aber nicht einmal diese Vermutung ist imstande, alle Fragen aufzuheben. Wie konnte der Schreiber (Redaktor) von **M** eine so konsequente Verallgemeinerung durchführen? Wie ist Bussis Schreibung *Velled-* zu erklären? Dieses Problem bleibt einigermaßen ungelöst.

4. *Canninefates*[38]

Dieses kleine germanische Volk begegnet uns in beiden Annalenüberlieferungen; nur die *Germania*, wo es zwischen seinen Nachbarn, den Batavern (c. 29 – sie teilten friedlich die *insula Batavorum*), und den Frisiern (c. 34), verschollen ist, erwähnt es nicht. Tacitus charakterisiert es kurz und bündig: *Hist.* IV, 15, 1 *origine, lingua, virtute par Batavis; numero superantur.* Der Name weist viele Varianten auf: **MI** hat *Ann.* IV, 73, 2 *Canninef-*; **MII** schwankt zwischen *Caninef-* (*Ann.* XI, 18, 1; *Hist.* IV, 15, 1; 2); *Canninef-* (*Hist.* IV, 16, 1; 2; 19, 1) und *Cannenef-* (*Hist.* IV, 32, 3; 56, 2; 79, 3; 85, 2).

Alle diese Schreibungen sind inschriftlich oder in Militärdiplomen bezeugt. In den Handschriften von Plinius' *Naturalis historia* IV, 101 findet man auch *Canninef-* und *Can(n)enef-*. Vell. II, 105, 1 und eine Erwähnung in der späten *Cosmographia Iulii Honorii* (s. A. Riese [ed.], *Geographi Latini Minores* [Lipsiae 1873] 32) sind hoffnungslos verdorben. Zu diesem schon lange bekannten Material hat die Ausgabe von *Ann.* XI–XII von H. Weiskopf ([Wien 1973] 21) die Erkenntnis beigesteuert, daß manche Handschriften der zweiten Gruppe (**V63 P N23 Ven Stuttg N21** und **Y02** aus der Gruppe Ic) in *Ann.* XI, 18, 1 *Canninef-* hatten. Das zweite *n* konnte ja aus Plinius oder aus dem vierten Buch der *Historien* ergänzt worden sein, obgleich mir solch eine Annahme nur theoretisch möglich erscheint. Im Falle von *Cananef-* **Y03** in *Hist.* IV, 19, 1, das uns die Ausgabe von K. Wellesley (1989) gebracht hat, entbehren wir auch diese letzte, wohl bloß scheinbare, Erklärung. Denn diese Variante mit *a* in der zweiten Silbe ist nur inschriftlich bezeugt und erscheint in keinem antiken (dem Mittelalter waren die Kanninefaten unbekannt) literarischen Text.[39]

Die Hinwendung zu den Handschriften der zweiten und dritten Gruppe, die in der Ausgabe von Wellesley nicht berücksichtigt wurden, erweist, daß

---

[37] Ich verdanke diese wichtige Bemerkung Michaela Zelzer (Wien).

[38] Siehe А. Б. Черняк, "Prolegomena к 'Анналам' I–VI Тацита. XIV *Canninefates – Cannenefates – Can(n)anefates*" ("Prolegomena zu Tacitus' *Ann.* I–VI"), *Colloquia classica et indoeuropaeica* III (СПб. 2003) 447–460.

[39] Vgl. H. Reichert, *Lexikon der altgermanischen Namen.* Th. I. *Text* (Wien 1987) 168–169 s. v.

z. B. schon die *editio princeps* (**Stuttg**) in *Hist.* IV, 19, 1 *Cananef-* aufwies, was übrigens für die Philologen keine Überraschung ist, denen bekannt ist, daß sich der Text der taciteischen *Vulgata* auf Puteolanus' Ausgabe (Mailand 1473) stützt, also auf Bussis **V58**, in der die Form *Caninef-* verallgemeinert wird. Dieselbe Variante mit *-a-* kommt auch in manchen anderen *deteriores*, nämlich **V63 N23 P Vin Pap C** vor. Es folgt daraus, daß **X** in IV, 19, 1 (**Y03 Stuttg V63 N23 Vin P Pap**), 32, 3 (**Y03 V63 N23 Pap**) und 56, 2 (**N23 Pap**) die Variante *Cananef-*, in 79, 3 (**Pap C**) und 85, 2 (**Pap**) aber die Variante *Cannanef-* aufwies. Diese wertvollen Marginalia, die wohl von den Philologen des 2. und 3. Jh. u. Z. stammen, wurden weder von dem Schreiber von **M** noch von Bussi berücksichtigt.

III. BOCCACCIOS TACITUS.

Über die Benützung von Tacitus' *Annalen* und *Historien* durch Giovanni Boccaccio (nämlich in *De mulieribus claris, De viris illustribus* und *De genealogia deorum gentilium*) hat man schon öfters geschrieben und eine rezente und mit neuen Argumenten versehene Studie von Ricarda Müller[40] darf in meinem Forschungsbericht auf keinen Fall unberücksichtigt bleiben. Ich begrüße den Mut einer Spezialistin für Boccaccio, sich mit einem so schwierigen Problem auseinanderzusetzen, muß aber gestehen, daß ich vom ersten Augenblick an dieses Unternehmen für verfrüht und hoffnungslos hielt. Sollte man sich um eine indirekte Tradition kümmern, wenn es mit der direkten Überlieferung noch so viel zu tun gibt?[41] Von manchen unvermeidlichen und wohl verständlichen technischen Fehlern abgesehen,[42] enthält der zu besprechende Aufsatz:

---

[40] "Boccaccios Tacitus: Rekonstruktion einer Humanistenhandschrift", *RhM* 136 (1993): 2, 164–180.

[41] Römer (Bericht, 2302–2322) erwähnt dieses Problem überhaupt nicht.

[42] S. 166 Z. 11 von oben: *ne laborem meum frust<r>averis*; Z. 15 ff.: *Quaternum* im bekannten Brief Boccaccios an Abt Niccolo da Montefalcone ist kein Beweis dafür, daß es sich hier um eine humanistische Handschrift handelt, s. S. Rizzo, *Il lessico filologico degli umanisti* (Roma 1984 [1973]) 42 ff. und W. Wattenbach, *Das Schriftwesen im Mittelalter* (Leipzig 1896) 177 ff.; A. 9: neben L. D. Reynolds (Hrsg.), *Texts and Transmissions etc.* (Oxford 1983) muß unbedingt der Verfasser des entsprechenden Aufsatzes, R. J. Tarrant, zitiert werden; S. 168: Hinter den *litteris antiquis* aus dem Brief Poggios an Niccoli von 1427 verbirgt sich nicht unbedingt ein karolingischer Codex aus den 9.–12. Jh., s. Rizzo, a. O., 119–120, wo gerade dieser Passus besprochen ist, und Römer, Heubner (o. Anm. 13) 160–161; auch die stemmatische Anordnung dieses vermeintlich alten Codex (S. 180 und Anm. 60) als Nachkömmling von **M** mit zwei Zwischengliedern ist ganz und gar phantastisch.

I. Eine kurze Darlegung der Bekanntschaft Boccaccios mit Tacitus (die von Poggio erwähnte Handschrift *litteris antiquis* wird als ein karolingischer Codex aus den 9.–12. Jh. präsentiert, aber immer im Rahmen der von **M** abhängigen Überlieferung, s. S. 168 und Anm. 19).

II. 7 Textstellen aus Boccaccios Schriften, in denen Müller Spuren einer taciteischen Handschrift, die der Gruppe III (Γ nach Römer) gehörte, zu finden glaubt (S. 170–176).

Danach folgen unter III und IV andere Beobachtungen, die die Stellung und das Datum (vor 1361) dieser Handschrift zu präzisieren versuchen (S. 176–179). Der Aufsatz endet mit einer korrigierten Variante des Stemmas von Römer.

Nicht alle von der Verfasserin angeführten Übereinstimmungen verdienen m. E. hier erwähnt zu werden, zumal schon 1978 Römer in seiner Erwiderung auf den thematisch ähnlichen Aufsatz R. P. Olivers[43] das wichtigste Gegenargument gestellt hat, und zwar, Spontanparallelen.[44] Man kann weiter hinzufügen:

1) Boccaccios Bemühungen um den Tacitustext blieben offensichtlich für die folgende Generation nicht verloren; seine (leider mißlungenen) Lösungen könnten durch Sal. in meinem Stemma (= Poggios Codex *litteris antiquis*) den Weg in die humanistische Überlieferumg finden, und

2) es ist nicht ausgeschlossen, daß ihm auch **X**, d. h. Barbaros Codex, zur Verfügung stand.

Diese drei Erklärungen gelten z. B. für die wichtigste von Ricarda Müller (und schon früher von Oliver) herangezogene Textstelle, *Hist.* II, 3, 1 *a cinyra rece* **M** Ib **V63**[1] *cinara* Bocc. Ia II III IV.[45] Die Änderung *Cinyra* zu *Cinara* könnte schon von Boccaccio stammen, da die letztere Form kommt bei Horaz und Properz vor (übrigens nur als Mädchenname). In diesem Fall (1) kann man es für eine Übereinstimmung halten, (2) die Konjektur Boccaccios könnte durch Salutatis Kopie in die Überlieferung gelangt sein, (3) *Cinara* kann eine Variante von **X** sein (s. oben II, 3 und 4). Weitere Erklärungen im Stil der von Müller und Oliver (unabhängige Tradition) vorgelegten scheinen mir überflüssig.

---

[43] R. P. Oliver, "The Second Medicean Ms. and the Text of Tacitis", *Illinois Classical Studies* 1 (1976) 190–225.

[44] Römer, Heubner (o. Anm. 13) 159–167, besonders 164 und 166 Anm. 31: "...oft ändern beide [*Gen* und Γ, aber das gilt auch für Boccaccio. – *A. Tsch.*] an Stellen, wo eine Änderung naheliegt, und dabei kommen sie auch gelegentlich zu demselben Ergebnis".

[45] Ich habe den handschriftlichen Befund sehr vereinfacht, siehe Römer, Heubner (o. Anm. 13) 164 Anm. 23.

Die Ergebnisse meiner hier resümierten Forschungen werden vielleicht von manchen Kollegen nicht nur gern gesehen werden. Der Codex Barbaro (**X**) ist jetzt kein Gespenst mehr, und die Rekonstruktion seiner manchmal sehr üppigen *varia lectio* wird zu einer zwar schwierigen, aber immerhin unentbehrlichen Aufgabe für den künftigen Herausgeber der *Annalen* XI–XVI und der *Historien* I–V. Daß die vorhandenen Ausgaben nicht mehr genügen, versteht sich von selbst. Dem nüchternen Verstand des klugen und vorsichtigen Heinz Heubner (trotz wohl sachkundiger Empfehlung von Josef Delz[46]) ist der kritische Apparat, wenn auch nur auf die erste Gruppe (Iabc) beschränkt, von Kenneth Wellesley (Leipzig 1986 und 1989) vorzuziehen. Als eine vorläufige und unvermeidliche Etappe ist die Vorbereitung der Studienausgaben der *Historien* I und III–V zu betrachten[47] (was die Ausgabe des zweiten Buches durch I. Schinzel und W. Hensellek [Wien 1971] betrifft, so sind die Lesungen von **V63** von neuem zu überprüfen).

Der Wegfall der frühen Datierungen von **A**, **Y02** und **V63** (nicht allein der der Albinia de la Mare gehörenden!) ist auch bemerkenswert. Es erweist sich fast unmöglich, eine humanistische Handschrift genau zu datieren, wenn der Schreiber seinen (vor)karolingischen Archetyp treu widerzugeben versucht. Aber das gibt uns die Chance, die Schreibart dieses Archetyps festzustellen, eine jedoch praktisch kaum erfüllbare Aufgabe.[48]

Ein netter Gewinn ist das stets wachsende Ansehen der zweiten Gruppe. Es ist klar, daß ihr Grundtext, **V63**, eine selbständige Revision der *Annalen* XI–XXI darstellt,[49] mit einem ausgeprägten Nachdruck auf den in **X** enthaltenen Varianten. Das Fehlen des letzten Folios, *Hist.* V, 23, 2 – 26, 3, wurde dabei von den Kopisten bzw. Besitzern nicht als Nachteil empfunden. Cobets scharfer Ausspruch, *comburendi, non conferendi*,[50] gilt für sie sicherlich nicht. Es ist zu unterstreichen, daß **Pap**, eine neugefundene und noch wenig erforschte Handschrift, sich als eine der interessantesten erweist (s. oben II, 4).

---

[46] J. Delz, "Textkritik und Editionstechnik", F. Graf (Hrsg.), *Einleitung in die lateinische Philologie* (Stuttgart–Leipzig 1997) 73. Ich bedanke mich bei dem Verfasser für die Zusendung eines Abdrucks

[47] Siehe oben, S. 355.

[48] Mein Versuch, einer meiner Schülerinnen, einer artistisch sehr begabten Person, dies als Diplomarbeitsthema aufzuzwingen, wurde leider kategorisch abgelehnt.

[49] Bereits 1976 versuchte ich, Licht auf diese Gruppe zu werfen, s. Černjak (o. Anm. 25) 110.

[50] Siehe Delz (o. Anm. 46) 56. C. G. Cobet (1813 – 1887) dachte an die *codices descripti*.

Auch die Gruppen III und IV sind als spätere Revisionen des sich konstant verschlechternden Textes von **X** zu betrachten. Wenn nicht durch ihre Lesungen und Lösungen, sind einige von diesen Handschriften durch ihre Schreibart, die die des alten Codex anscheinend wiedergibt, bemerkenswert.

Also, Respekt vor den Humanisten! Angelo Poliziano und Pietro Vettori hatten viele ehrwürdige namenlose Vorläufer. Den Tagesanforderungen zufolge muß jede textologische Untersuchung der *Annalen* XI–XVI und der *Historien* I–V mit einer sorgfältigen Überdenkung des vorhandenen handschriftlichen Befunds beginnen.*

Alexandr Tschernjak
Institut für Sprachforschung
an der Russischen Akademie der Wissenschaften

Настоящая статья подводит итог почти тридцатилетним исследованиям автора в области тацитовской текстологии. Гипотеза о независимой традиции гуманистических списков *Ann.* XI–XVI и *Hist.* I–V была высказана уже в 1834 г., однако решающие доказательства удалось найти лишь совсем недавно, при анализе написаний имени каннинефатов, маленького германского народа, активно поддержавшего восставших батавов в 69 – 70 гг. и поэтому часто упоминающегося в 4-й и 5-й книгах "Историй". Исчезнувший архетип был написан, по-видимому, каролингским минускулом и принадлежал венецианскому сенатору Франческо Барбаро; он содержал любопытные варианты на полях и между строк.

* Dieser Text ist im April–Mai 2003 in Wien dank eines Stipendiums von dem Kircheninstitut "Ianineum" geschrieben worden. Der Verfasser und die Redaktion bedanken sich aufrichtig bei Dr. Sonya Schreiner (Wien) wie auch Frau Luise Petschmann (Berlin) für die sprachliche Korrektur dieses Beitrags.

Hyperboreus Vol.9 (2003) Fasc.2

"LITTERAE UNCIALES" BEFORE AND AFTER JEROME
An essay in the semantic history of the term

Olgae Likhachev
in memoriam

The subject of the paper is the history of a palaeographical *terminus technicus* 'uncial'.[1] Numerous discussions of its origin[2] generated alongside with reasonable hypotheses[3] a range of whimsical solutions.[4] As to the early history of the term, we have to keep in mind that its original meaning might have developed (as often is the case)[5] in a context quite different from its later environment.

---

[1] E. M. Thompson, *A Handbook of Greek and Latin Palaeography* (London 1901, repr. Chicago 1975) 118 ff. (papyri), 149 ff. (*uncials* in Greek palaeography), 190 ff. (Latin *uncials*). Thompson's definition of 'uncial' is "the alphabet of curved forms", more recently: J.-O. Tjäder, "Der Ursprung der Unzialschrift", *Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 74 = *Festgabe Albert Bruckner zum 70. Geburtstag* (Basel 1974) 9–40.

[2] The linguistic history of the term 'uncial' is outlined in N. Barone, *Intorno alla voce* Onciale *attributo di scrittura* (Sarno s. a. [1916]) and P. Sigillo, "Intorno all' effettivo valore della voce *Onciale*, attributo di scrittura (Una nova ipotesi)", *Atti della R. Accademia Peloritana* (Messina 36 [1934]) 399–421 (an attempt to demonstrate that 'uncials' originally meant minuscules, namely the script called 'half-uncial' today). Often cited are E. T. Merrill, "The 'Uncial' in Jerome and Lupus", *ClPh* 11 (1916) 452–457; W. H. P. Hatch, "The Origin and Meaning of the Term 'Uncial' ", *ClPh* 30 (1935) 247–252.

[3] During later stages of my work on this paper I took knowledge of an analysis of *litterae unciales* in Jerome's passage, which handles the subject in a way similar to mine: P. Mayvaert, " 'Uncial Letters': Jerome's Meaning of the Term", *The Journal of Theological Studies*, n. s. 34 (Oxford 1983) 185–188. Further I will signal main points of consent and dissension.

[4] Bold explanations for 'uncial' as originating from *uncus*, *unguis* or even *ungula* were proposed or referred to by G. Brugnoli, "Littera uncialis", *Rivista di cultura classica e medioevale* 3 (1961) 411 f. D. F. Bright, *The Origins of the Latin Uncial Script*, Diss. (University of Cincinnati 1967), whom I can only quote from the paper of Tjäder (n. 1) 11 n. 7, explained lat. *uncialis* from gr. ὀγκόω with the meaning 'large, round, pompous scripts'.

[5] English *ounce* as well as *inch* came from the Latin *uncia* via French and Italian, but it would be hopeless to ponder over weights and measures in the search for the origin of the French '*once*' meaning the animal (related to a rare English 'ounce' or German 'Unze' in the sense of 'medium-sized feline beast'), as this term came into European languages from the Latin *lynx*, restructured because of the similarity of its first

1. *UNCIALES LITTERAE* IN JEROME

The history of the word '*uncial*' begins for us with a famous passage from Jerome's *Praefat. in Iob*[6] (textus receptus):[7]

> habeant qui volunt veteres libros vel in membranis purpureis auro argentoque descriptos, vel *uncialibus*,[8] ut vulgo aiunt, *litteris*[9] onera magis exarata quam codices, dum[10] mihi meisque permittant pauperes habere scedulas et non tam pulchros codices quam emendatos.

The passage has been cited so frequently that it has served as a cause of semantic processes in many languages. I will start with some points of textual criticism and with analysis of the syntactic structure of the passage. On the basis of *initialibus* as var. lect. of *uncialibus*, some scholars sustained the view[11] that *inicialibus* (or *initialibus*) is correct and was falsely read as *uncialibus* (or *untialibus*), *ini-* being similar to *un-*, as both sequences of letters have four vertical strokes. If the reading *inicialibus* were true, Jerome must have referred to extremely large letters, a kind of 'inch-script'.

---

consonant with the Romance definite article: *lynx* > *l'once* (a similar restructuring may be observed in such pairs as mlat. 'lazurium', Russ. 'лазурь', and Ital. 'l'azurro', Fr. 'l'azur' from Pers. *lazhward*).

[6] Since 383, Jerome returned several times to his work on the *Book of Job*, first, when he was editing the *vetus Latina*, later, when he was defending his own translation from Greek (*MPL* 29, col. 59–114; also with a *praefatio*, col. 61 sq.) and, at last, in 392–393, when he was translating this difficult text from the Hebrew original (*MPL* 28, col. 1079). It is the *Preface* Jerome's to the latter which concerns us here. The date is inferred from Jerome's letter to Pammachius 52 (*epist.* XLVIII [XLIX] Hilberg), sent 394 CE: *transtuli nuper Iob in linguam nostram.*

[7] In *MPL* ed. of Jerome's translation of Job from Hebrew (vol. 28, col. 1083 sq.) the 2nd ed. of Vallarsi(us) ([1]1734–1742) is taken over. Two modern authoritative editions are *Biblia sacra, iuxta Latinam Vulgatam versionem*, IX (Romae 1951) 73 sq. and the *Biblia sacra iuxta vulgatam versionem*, ed. R. Weber O.S.B., I (Stuttgart [2]1975) 731 f., l. 48–51, the former with more substantial apparatus criticus. I am grateful to Michael von Albrecht who in the early 80s sent me the necessary pages.

[8] Unlike in the 1951 edition, the variant *initialibus* to *uncialibus* is not mentioned in Weber's *Biblia sacra*. This variant will be of some importance for our analysis.

[9] Some editors put a comma after *litteris;* see below (p. 373).

[10] There is a var. lect. *dummodo* in some manuscripts, but it seems to have no impact on the meaning.

[11] C. Nordenfalk, *Die spätantiken Zierbuchstaben* (Stockholm 1970) 96, remarks that the confusing similarity of the letters could have been "erst mit der Minuskelschrift möglich und immer verständlicher, je mehr wir uns der gotischen Schrift nähern".

The choice is not difficult here. The only manuscript out of the 29 cited in the 1951 *Biblia sacra* which gives *initialibus* is Paris. lat. 15467 = cod. Universitatis seu Sorbonicus (Ω^s), a. 1270.[12] All other manuscripts (including at least four earlier than the 9th century, and fourteen of the same period as Paris. lat. 15467) attest '*uncialibus*'. Both terms were in use from the 9th century onwards, but corruption of unclear *uncialibus* into far more perspicuous *initialibus* is certainly more probable than the correction in the opposite direction. It is thus not surprising that Merrill took the var. lect. *initialibus* for a "purely palaeographical error",[13] which occurred during transliteration into minuscules, "though just conceivably helped on by the Medieval confusion about the meaning of *uncialis* and the fact that capital letters were still employed in that period as headings and initials".

A further conjecture casts doubt on the authenticity of 'unciales' in our passage: *uncialibus* could have derived from an imaginary *uncinalibus*, an 'angular' or 'hooked script'.[14] This is inconclusive both from a conservative and palaeographical point of view, since there is no sign that this script was used in the luxurious codices of the Latin Bible. Moreover, *uncinalis* does not occur in Latin literature: the closest approximation is a hapax *uncinatus* (Cic. *Luc.* 121).

The structure of Jerome's phrase is marked with *vel ... vel.*[15] How and what do they coordinate? This leads us to the question of how to punctuate after *litteris*. Some scholars[16] put a comma before *onera*, which makes the words coming after *litteris* an apposition (for example, Merrill, who surrounds the clause *onera – codices* in dashes); others do not put any sign before *onera.*[17]

---

[12] Ed. Parisina of St. Jerome I (1693 – 1706) col. 798 by J. Martianay mentioned "duo aut tres" manuscripts that show *initialibus* instead of prevailing *untialibus* (see *MPL* 28, col. 1083). Already Hatch (n. 2) was unable to identify these "two or three" MSS. According to the critical apparatus of the edition of the *Biblia sacra* (1951), there is indeed *one* MS giving *initialibus* in our passage, that is Ω^s. Cf. below, p. 385 (Ω^j) and p. 384 (initials).

[13] Merrill (n. 2) 455.

[14] S. Allen, "Uncial or Uncinal?", *CIR* 17 (1903) 387; F. Madan, "Uncial or Uncinal", *CIR* 18 (1904) 165.

[15] Jerome's voluble style is marked by these and other serial conjunctions, e. g. next to two series of *vel – vel – vel* and two of *vel – vel* there are *nunc – nunc – nunc* and *aut – aut – aut* in the same brief *Preface to Job*. Cf. a long 'vel' series discussed by Mayvaert (n. 3) 187 n. 11.

[16] *MPL* 28, 1083 sq.; W. Wattenbach, *Das Schriftwesen im Mittelalter* (Leipzig ^{3}1896) 126 f., 133; H. Foerster, *Abriß der lateinischen Paläographie* (Stuttgart 1963) 126 f. n. 40.

[17] No punctuation before *onera* found in the 1951 Benedictine *Biblia sacra*.

Each version has consequences for the style and for the meaning of the passage.[18] On the one hand, the pause before *onera* smoothes the flow of speech within the context: both *vel... vel...* are in this case coordinated, with a chiasmus, around *descriptos*. The sequence *onera ... codices* becomes then a separate clause, parallel to *libros ... descriptos* in the first half of the sentence. On the other hand, if we combine the first *vel* with *descriptos* and the second with *exarata*, then the *unciales litterae* link immediately with *onera exarata*. Observing Jerome's stylistic and rhythmic usage,[19] one could speak about his slight predilection for double-centred *vel... vel*: each part receives its own verbal counterpart and the whole becomes harmoniously balanced.[20] As an implication of such double-centred structure, sumptuous purple-dyed parchment and gilded decoration of the Biblical codices are outshined by preciousness, on the one hand, and the price of the script, on the other.

Some words are to be said about '*descriptos*'. Two meanings of *describo* are known since Cicero. Forcellini mentions "*describo* latiore sensu" as "verbum proprium tum pictorum, tum librariorum, qui penicillo aut stilo aliquid repraesentant", that is (1) '(bare) writing', as well as (2) 'covering with ornaments' (in the sense of *depingere* or *delineare*).[21] The second meaning suits the situation with the two *vel* clauses and may support the idea that the first *vel* clause, built up around *descriptos,* suggests activities not of a scribe, but rather of an illuminator and bookbinder,

---

[18] Attention to the punctuation in Jerome is not only due to his rich and orderly style, but also to his own conscious consideration of *cola* and *commata* when editing the Bible (cf. Cassiodor. *Inst. Div. lect.* 1, *praef.* 9).

[19] See B. Bischoff, *Latin Palaeography. Antiquity and the Middle Ages.* Translated by Dáibhí ó Cróinín and D. Ganz (Cambridge 1990) 184 n. 27: "...Jerome says that books are written (*exarata*) with them [i. e. *uncialibus litteris – A. G.*]".

[20] Some examples of such well-proportioned *vel – vel* clauses in Jerome's correspondence: LII, 5 (bis); CVII, 4: "vel alterius supposita manu teneri *regantur* digiti, vel in tabella *sculpantur* elementa"; CXVII, 1: "vel praeterita *plangam* vitia vel vitare *nitar* praesentia"; cf. *MPL* 29, col. 527 (*Praef. in Quattuor Evangelia*): "...cur non ad Graecam originem revertentes ea quae vel a vitiosis interpretibus male *edita*, vel a praesumptoribus imperitis *emendata* perversius, vel a librariis dormitantibus *addita* sunt, aut *mutata*, corrigimus?" et sim. (if not indicated otherwise, cited from the Loeb ed. of F. A. Wright [*Select Letters of St. Jerome*], whose numeration coincides with that of I. Hilbergs).

[21] The same can be found in *OLD*, s. v. *describo*; cf. Plaut. *Asin.* 402; Quintil. 10, 2, 6: *quidam pictores in id solum student, ut describere tabulas mensuris et lineis sciant.* An example of the third meaning of *describo*, which is not directly involved here, is in *Hermeneumata Einsidl(i)ensia*: περιγράφω πρὸς τὸν ὑπογραμμόν with '*describo ad exemplar*' as Latin equivalent.

while the second one (around *exarata*) refers specifically to the writing.[22]

This structure finds its counterpart in two parallel pairs at the end of the passage: *pauperes sc(h)edulae*,[23] but *emendati codices*: St. Jerome the Ciceronian knows to produce a climax. Similar dichotomy can be inferred from the passage in Jerome's *epist.* CVII, 12: *...divinos codices amet, in quibus non auri et pellis Babylonicae vermiculata pictura, sed ad fidem placeat emendata et erudita distinctio.* The contraposition of external richness and internal poverty of the book, the latter patent through the carelessness of the text, is here the same as in the *Pref. to Job.*

2. SIZE-RELATED INTERPRETATIONS OF *LITTERAE UNCIALES*

There have been three main explanations of *uncia* in Jerome's '*uncialis*' as a measure of size.[24]

(a) Guil. Budaeus (*De asse et partibus eius libri quinque* I [Coloniae 1528] 10): "(scil. litterae) pollice crassitudine exaratae". Budé's interpretation was followed by Mabillon[25] and some other scholars: *uncia* as well as *ounce* and *inch* is one-twelfth of the foot.[26] In this case, *unciales litterae* are 'inch-letters' (cf. German 'Zollschrift') with respect to the real size (width or height[27]) of each letter. Since letters of such size are rare in actual manuscripts, there is not enough evidence for

---

[22] In other words, the meanings of *pictor* and *describo* develop in opposite directions. See the letter of Lupus of Ferrière discussed below (p. 382 and n. 71).

[23] The place of *schedulae* in Jerome's work process is described by E. Arns, *La technique du livre d'après Saint-Jerôme* (Paris 1958) 18 f.: "les *schedae* reçoivent la transcription de notes du tachygraphe et seront soumises à la correction avant de constituer le manuscrit définitif".

[24] Big size theory is also supported by B. Bischoff, "Die alten Namen der lateinischen Schriftarten", in: idem, *Mittelalterliche Studien. Ausgewählte Aufsätze zur Schriftkunde und Literaturgeschichte* I (Stuttgart 1966) 4 (corrected and augmented version of his article in *Philologus* 89 [1934] 461 ff.): "Schrift von grossen Proportionen, 'zollgrosse Buchstaben' gemeint sind"; cf. idem, *loc. cit.* above (n. 19); very near to him Tjäder ([n. 1] 11): "Hieronymus spricht also nur von dem Format der Schrift, von übergrossen Buchstaben...". At the same time Bischoff states convincingly that with these (hypothetical – *A. G.*) 'inch-letters' Jerome could not have meant initials, because he referred to the whole books written in them.

[25] J. Mabillon, *De re diplomatica libri sex* I (Neapoli ³1789) cap. 11, § 4, p. 48 B (on the uncial writing). Cf. below n. 41.

[26] In Russian 'дюймовка' (from a Dutch analogue of English 'thumb' or German 'Daumen') means 'an inch-plank'.

[27] Cf. an expression *altitudo uncialis* (scil. herbarum) in Plin. *NH* 18, 146.

this theory.[28] Even if we found a letter inch-wide or inch-high, it would not be prudent to generalize its occasional size.

(b) A variation of the above is the hyperbolic interpretation of *litterae unciales* in the manner of *litterae sesquipedales* (cf. Hor. *AP* 97).[29] We will see later an argument against hyperbolizing force of *uncia*, especially in the direction of something big: an *uncia* is costly, but rather small.[30]

(c) Hatch accepts too confidently the meaning of 'uncia' as 'one-twelfth of whatever unit' (the same, for example, *OLD*, s. v. *uncia*) and assumes that *uncia* in the expression *unciales litterae* denotes one letter of a twelve letter line. My objections to this are following. First, there are indeed some tendencies[31] to generalize the arithmetic use of *uncia* in Latin, but no evidence that it means 'one-twelfth part of absolutely everything' (one does not call so single months nor apostles).[32] Second, the author himself – an expert of Latin MSS – was unable to find *any* manuscript whose lines would count consistently 12 letters.

> In some manuscripts the length of each line in a column varies between 10 and 14 letters, but it would be strange to name a script on the basis of an *average* number. Indeed, it is doubtful whether there are any examples of consistent use of *dodekagrammatism* that would presuppose MSS based on the principle of *stoichedon* in the codices of late antiquity. Besides, would not it be linguistically more natural, in the situation postulated by Hatch, to define a line per number of letters rather than a letter per line?

Finally, a stylistic objection: *unciales litterae* in a spatial sense (as well as var. lect. *initiales* mentioned above)[33] do not anticipate the metaphor of *onera*; whereas *unciales*, if it hints at the weight,[34] continues and develops the mention

---

[28] Bischoff ([n. 19] 184 n. 27) cites the *Psalterium Lugdunense* (*Cod. Lat. Ant.* VI, 772: Psalterium romanum et Gallicanum mixtum in Lyons, saec. V–VI) as a manuscript which "may give an idea" of such "inch-high" letters.

[29] Cf. Cat. 97, 5; Mart. 7, 14, 10 (examples from *OLD*, s. v.); (litterae) *cubitales* of Mabillon come from a Plautian hyperbole for large letters (*Rud.* 1294): *cubitum hercle longis litteris signabo*).

[30] See below n. 37.

[31] Latin *ex uncia heres* inherits the twelfth part of the heritage (cf. *heres ex asse*), but the latter can be evaluated in money, so we deal here within the system of weights.

[32] It is significant that the polysemy of Latin *uncia* was somewhat too much for English, which split the Latin word into two, ounce and inch.

[33] The idea that *initiales litterae*, indicating huge letters, would naturally lead Jerome and his readers to the idea of their weight, sounds surrealistic.

[34] So already V. Gardthausen (*Griechische Palaeographie* II [Leipzig ²1913] 89); so Merrill (n. 2), who comes from an 'inch', that is 1/12, of a foot, to an 'ounce', 1/12, of a pound; a recent interpreter Mayvaert (n. 3) is also distinctly conscious of this relationship.

of *auro argentoque*, and introduces the *onera* as aptly as we can expect from such a master of well elaborated and context-bound metaphor as Jerome.[35]

We can therefore discard the proposed spatial interpretation of (*littera*) *uncialis* as inappropriate and proceed not with inches, but with ounces.

3. WEIGHING EXPENSIVE THINGS *UNCIATIM*

Hatch considers the possibility that 'uncia' in *unciales* (*litterae*) hints at the weight and therefore was used by Jerome hyperbolically, to indicate that each letter either (a) weighed or (b) cost an *uncia* of gold or silver. Theoretically, that would amount to tons, or to enormous price in large manuscripts, thus suiting the sarcastic *onera* of Jerome in principle, but indulging in a rather Swiftian exaggeration.[36] Hatch himself finds the first solution more appropriate: "letters weighing an ounce apiece – not literally of course but in appearance".

A further argument against *uncialibus litteris* as an indication of the enormous weight and / or price derives from the fact that symbolically, that is in its generalized and, as it were, figurative sense, *uncia* was associated in Roman linguistic consciousness with small quantities. Therefore precisely as a phraseological element, *unciales* would sound rather timid in Jerome's context, despite an exorbitant arithmetic value alluded at; *uncia* is, in other words, too big for each letter, but a modest measure for myriads of them.[37]

Paul Mayvaert not only highlights that *uncialibus*, taken in its weight value, aptly anticipates Jerome's *onera*, but draws remarkable conclusions from this fact. He brings up as parallel *vitis uncialis*, which hinting at

---

[35] The inventiveness of a richly elaborated series of metaphors is characteristic of Jerome's literary art. Here some examples from his letters: *epist.* LX, 1 (*desiderii sui* [scil. – of the deceased] *iaculo vulneratos intolerabili dolore confecit*); CVII, 5 (*habeat alias margaritas quibus postea venditis emptura est pretiosissimum margaritum*); *ibid.*, 7 (*templum – iter saeculi – adytum Scripturarum*); *ibid.*, 10 (*virgo et monachus sic in quadragesima suos emittant equos, ut sibi meminerint semper esse currendum*); LII, 10 (*multi aedificant parietes et columnas ecclesiae subtrahunt: marmora nitent, auro splendent lacunaria, gemmis altare distinguitur et ministrorum Christi nulla electio est*) et sim.

[36] In his article Hatch (n. 2) spoke of "heavy-looking" manuscripts, not denying that such explanation supposes "fanciful" style, which may seem an understatement to an admirer of Jerome's stylistic elegance.

[37] Forcellini, s. v.: *de minima quantitate*. *OLD* gives indeed some examples of the meaning of uncia as 'trifling amount' (Mart. I, 206, 3: *raram diluti bibis unciam Falerni*); cf. '*unciatim*' in the sense of 'paulatim' (Ter. *Phorm.* I, 1, 9 = v. 43 sqq.); demin. *unciola* and the like. This usage is inherited e.g. by an English phrase: "An ounce of practice is worth a pound of theory".

the weight of grapes lacks litteral accuracy in its turn. But how to weigh the *litterae*? More to the point is another Mayvaert's parallel (noticed, however, already by Budé) with the invective against both indecent and dull luxury, traditional for Roman moralists,[38] and omnipresent in Jerome.[39] The similarity of our main passage with the following is indeed striking (*epist.* XXII, 32): *Inficitur membrana colore purpureo, aurum liquescit in litteras, gemmis codices vestiuntur, et nudus ante fores earum*[40] *Christus emoritur.* Mayvaert comments: "Gold is melted for lettering" – metal was larded thickly to form the letters of sumptuous books – that is what the populace (the vulgus) had in mind when they spoke, in derogatory tones, of the rich with their books full of 'uncial letters'.

I agree with the starting point and some elements of Mayvaert's conclusion:[41] on the one hand, the idea of weight in *uncialibus* (without pressing it too far) suits the context better than the spatial explanation. On the other hand, I find that the application of Mayvaert's understanding to the context (*litterae unciales* reprimanded by Jerome consisted materially, even if virtually, of gold) would produce abstruse hyperbole, inappropriate for the stylistic virtuosity of Jerome.

4. JEROME'S POLEMICS

The atmosphere, in which Jerome's translations were made, was under no circumstances a model of mutual courtesy. There was a strong resistance to his innovative version of the Latin Bible, as attested in Jerome's correspondence with St. Augustine.[42] No wonder that Jerome is ubiqui-

---

[38] Jerome cites willingly Roman satirists (Lucilius, Horace, Persius, Juvenal) who criticized self-interest, luxury, and vanity.

[39] *Aurum* and *gemmae* are principal enemies of Jerome the moralist: XLV, 4 (*Numquid me vestes sericae, nitentes gemmae, picta facies, auri rapit ambitio?*); CVII, 5 (*...ne collum margaritis et auro premas, ne caput gemmis oneres*) et sim. Cf. n. 44.

[40] E. M. Thompson: "i. e. wealthy ladies". I think '*membranarum*' is intended: Christ resides in the Bible, but sumptuous binding becomes for him a rich, and, due to the poor quality of the sacred text within it, a spiritually inhospitable house.

[41] Mabillion, when speaking about ancient chrysography ([n. 25] 44), cites both passages in full, but he does not apply this *Wahlverwandtschaft* to the explanation of the term 'uncial' (p. 48). It becomes clear that in our main passage only *auro argentoque descriptos* referred to chrysography to him.

[42] H. Lietzmann, "Hieronymus", *RE* 8 (1913) 1569. Augustine writes to Jerome about the latter's two translations of *Job* (August. *epist.* 28, II, 2 Goldbacher): *Unde si quisquam veteri falsitati contentiosus faverit prolatis collatisque codicibus vel docetur facillime, vel refellitur*, cf. Hieron. *epist.* LVI, CIV, CIX–CXII.

tously polemical,[43] and in addition to his caustic attitude towards luxury,[44] his first and foremost weapon is pointed at people who pride themselves on possessing old *de luxe* codices of the *Vetus Latina*,[45] but oppose Jerome's advanced philological methods and literary talent.[46] In the *Praef. in Iob*, translated from the Greek (*MPL* 29, col. 40), Jerome continues in the same vein: *tanta est enim vetustatis consuetudo ut etiam confessa plerisque vitia placeant, dum magis pulchros habere malunt codices quam emendatos.*

Other circumstance to be considered is Jerome's remark *ut vulgo aiunt*,[47] which shows that *unciales litterae* was not his own expression, and there was no reason for him to fake this detail. Some scholars seem to take it too literally as an indication of *vulgar* provenience of the expression.[48] The careful investigations of this point[49] show, however, that one should be cautious with the stylistic evaluation of such remarks. They do not necessarily indicate a vulgarism, as the usage of Jerome's phrases containing *vulgus*[50] or his explanations of many philological[51]

---

[43] Hieron. *epist.* XLIII, 3: *Habeat sibi Roma suos tumultus... nobis adhaerere Deo bonum est*, a cadence strikingly similar to that of our main passage.

[44] To the examples cited in n. 39 many other could be added, so Hieron. *Vit. Paulin. Eremit.* 17 (*Cur mortuos vestros auratis obvolvitis vestibus?*); cf. idem, *epist.* XLV, 3 (*Numquid me ... auri rapuit ambitio?*); CVII, 1 (*auratum squalet Capitolium*); 6 (*ne bibat de aureo calice Babylonis*); CXVII, 6 (*absque scandalo tuo in aliis sericas vestes auratasque miraberis*). Obviously we see here one of the leading themes of the period; cf. a passage in Isid. *Orig.* VI, 11. The motif was present in classical authors, e. g. Seneca, *Dial.* 9, 9, 4: *plerisque ignaris etiam puerilium litterarum libri non studiorum instrumenta sed cenationum ornamenta sunt.*

[45] On the bibliophile tastes of the Church Fathers, see recently M. Vinzent: " 'Philobiblie' im frühen Christentum", *Altertum* 45 (1999) 115–143.

[46] Cf. Jerome's words (*MPL* 29, 61): *...quia volo antiquam divinorum voluminum viam sentibus virgultisque purgare, mihi genuinus infigitur: corrector vitiorum falsarius vocor, et errores non auferre, sed serere.*

[47] Jerome makes several such remarks: VII, 5 *iuxta tritum populi proverbium* (about an authentic proverb); CXVII, 1 *tritum vulgi sermone proverbium* (some unclear saying or parable) etc. Cf. n. 52 below.

[48] For Mayvaert ([n. 3] 188) *unciales litterae* is an expression of the 'populace'.

[49] There is rich literature on the usage of *vulgo* in Jerome and his contemporaries, due to understandable interests of Romance philology. The most important papers on this topic are referred to and evaluated by G. J. M. Bartelink, "Les observations de Jerome sur les termes de la langue courante et parlée", *Latomus* 38 (1979) 193–222, esp. 215 f., 220 f. n. 27 and 221 f.

[50] Bartelink (*ibid.*, 193 f.) shows that *vulgo* can be mentioned to imply vulgar, colloquial, or frequent use (as a synonym of *passim*); therefore each case should be studied individually (*ibid.*, 222).

[51] Hieron. *epist.* VII, 2: *...unde pergamenarum nomen servatum est.*

or other[52] terms abundantly demonstrate. It seems more plausible that *unciales litterae* was before Jerome an everyday expression of the bibliophile public.

At the same time, one may think that Jerome borrows from the common usage not the whole expression *litterae unciales*, but a popular and to a certain degree figurative use of *uncialis*, when taken on its own. This is reasonable. We can say for certain that Jerome, as fine observer of the spoken language, noticed in the sphere of book production the use of *uncialis* that fits his invective. I would not exclude that *litterae* was not the only possible match for *uncialis*; it is even probable that *uncialis* in the same sense could be adapted to such words as *scriptura* or *liber*. Subjecting the evident etymology of the word *uncialis* to doub t should be estimated as a sort of *sacrificium intellectus*.[53]

I have cited above Jerome's *epist.* CVII, where external sumptuousness and philological quality of sacred texts are skillfully opposed. Speaking of *de luxe* MSS Jerome says: *aurum liquescit in litteras*, echoing *litteras unciales* of the *Preface to Job*. In other words, I share the view that the term *litterae unciales* originated in commercial sphere[54] and has neither a vulgar nor exquisitely technical, but a matter-of-fact ring to it. The word *uncialis* could hint at the payment "in ounces", but a fee of an artisan who produces books has nothing specific and thus can hardly be used to describe any special kind of book production. That is why something more specific about 'ounces' must be found for the pertinent explanation of the popular expression *litterae unciales*.

Modifying the "commercial" idea I call attention to the circumstance that precious books needed precious metals as well as ivory[55] and purple,[56] which were all traditionally *weighed* by ounces, *unciatim*.[57] According to e.g. Dioscorides (V, 182 [183] = I, p. 827 Sprenger), the ingredients for preparing even simple inks were weighed in ounces (οὐγγίαι). Chrysography,[58]

---

[52] Cf. *ut vulgo soletis dicere* in the *epist.* CXVII, 4 concerning an expression *saecularis mater*, where Jerome alludes to the speaking habits of young snobs. A long list of such turns in Jerome is given by Bartelink, *op. cit.*, 221.

[53] Although some skeptics preferred to give up both the obvious etymology and the search for another etymon for '*uncialis*', e.g. Brugnoli (n. 4).

[54] Brugnoli (*ibid.*) despite his guess about 'uncials' as "termine tecnico di mercato", ruined this idea by assuming that this semantic motivation established itself as a popular etymology only (see n. 5).

[55] Juv. 11, 131: *nulla uncia est nobis eboris*.

[56] Suet. *Nero* 32, 3: *qui pauculas uncias* (scil.: Tyrii coloris) *venderet*.

[57] *OLD*, s.v. *uncia, unciatim*. Cf. use of *unciatim* in medicine (Plin. *NH* 28, 9, 37 [139 Detlefsen]).

[58] Ch. Graux, "Chrysographia", *DAGR* I, 2 (1887) 1138–1140 (with numerous references to both pagan and Christian books written in gold); Bischoff (n. 19) 16 ff.

i. e. writing with 'golden' ink, was used already by Jews (Aristeas § 176). In the Christian culture, there were books either written entirely in golden letters (*codices aurei*) or containing gilded elements (e. g. an opening page).[59] Such writing was often called '*ex (de) auro* (scribere et sim.)'.[60] Ink recipes[61] for such *aureae litterae* are preserved in some documents, of which probably the most famous are papyri of Leyden.[62] It is worth mentioning that in the versified recipes for preparing golden ink the ingredients are measured in ounces: *Tres sint vitrioli, vix una sit uncia gummi, / Gallarum quinque...* etc.[63]

Summing up: It seems to me not a desperate guess that the name *unciales* (*libri, litterae* vel sim.) were, for some, a naturally motivated expression for golden script in sumptuous manuscripts of the Bible. This use of *uncialis* is taken by Jerome from the everyday language, with its obvious inner form skillfully adapted to the image of *onera* instead of books. It hints not at the value and price as such, but at the measurement of the materials needed for *de luxe* book production.[64]

If *locus classicus* from Jerome with his *uncialibus litteris* is indeed to be explained in the way proposed above (I would call it 'techno-commercial'), palaeography was the least of Jerome's concerns here; it was the gratuitous luxury in the sphere of spiritual texts he was so angry with. Golden-lettered Bible manuscripts of the 3rd – early 4th centuries were written in various types of majuscules. For Bischoff the (denotatative) meaning of Jerome's 'litterae unciales' seems to have been some "large

---

[59] *Ibid.*, 27 n. 60.

[60] A passage from the 9th century Chronicle of the Abbacy (with bibliophile Ansegis as abbot) is cited in D. De Bruyne, "Scriptura Romana", *Mélanges d'Histoire offerts à Charles Moeller.* I: *Antiquité et Moyen âge* (Louvain–Paris 1914) 323: "Quattuor Evangelia in membrano purpureo *ex auro* scribere iussit (scil. Ansegis) Romana littera..."; cf. the text of St. Boniface cited by Thompson ([n. 1] 52 n. 2): "deprecor ... ut mihi *cum auro* conscribas epistolas ... Pauli apostoli" et sim.

[61] Golden ink in general, see: G. Herzog-Hauser, "Tinte", *RE* Suppl. 7 (1940) 1577 f.; Wattenbach (n. 16) 240; a brief modern overview can be found in: M. Zerdoun Bat-Yehouda, *Les encres noires au moyen âge (jusqu'à 1600)* (Paris 1983) 91–95 ('encre chrysographique').

[62] *Papyri Graeci Musei Antiquarii Publici Lugduno-Batavi* II (Lugduni Batavorum. 1885) 199 sqq.: 'alchemic' recipes from a Theban papyrus of the 3rd–4th century (pap. X).

[63] This and other similar texts are cited by Gardthausen (n. 34).

[64] In Russian one could call this type of script 'весовое', 'золотниковое', or, with an ironical overtone, which seems to have been present in Jerome's passage, 'валютное (письмо)'.

ornamental script".[65] At the same time Lowe has shown that each of the oldest still extant Latin manuscripts with golden script (he enumerates six such items from 5th–6th century) contains pre-Hieronymian Biblical texts written in a book-hand called 'uncial' today.[66] So we cannot exclude,[67] that once asked about it, Jerome would associate the script of the manuscripts that he reprimanded with the 'uncial' in the modern sense of the term[68] rather than with any other bookhand.

5. *LITTERAE UNCIALES* AND SERVATUS LUPUS

Scarcity of evidence makes it probable that an expression *unciales litterae* was used less frequently than such terms like *litterae Romanae*.[69]

The next occurrence of the expression *unciales litterae* is found in Servatus Lupus (Loup de Ferrières), himself an elegant Latin writer († after 862) and one of the main protagonists in the manuscript production. He is writing to Einhard, the favorite and biographer of Charlemagne (*epist.* 5 *ad Eginhardum* in *MPL* 119, 448 C = *epist.* 5 Marshall):

> Praeterea scriptor regius Bertcaudus dicitur antiquarum litterarum, dumtaxat earum quae maximae sunt et *unciales* a quibusdam vocari existimantur, habere mensuram descriptam. Itaque si penes vos est,[70] mittite mihi eam per hunc quaeso pictorem cum redierit, schedula tamen diligentissime sigillo munita.

The letter[71] is usually dated before 840. Bischoff even conjectures that the reaction upon the letter of Lupus by Einhard is documented in

---

[65] Bischoff (n. 19) 60 f., 184 n. 27; cf. Gardthausen (n. 34) II, 119 ff.

[66] E. A. Lowe, *Palaeographic Papers 1907–1965* II (Oxford 1972) 400.

[67] L. Traube (*Vorlesungen und Abhandlungen* III: *Kleine Schriften*. Hrsg. von S. Brandt [München 1920; ²1965] 116–119) believed that Jerome referred to the uncial script in the sense of modern palaeography. I share this view in part: the main target of Jerome's criticism was luxury in the form of chrysography, the precise type of script was facultative. Tjäder ([n. 1] 11 and 36 f.) is close to the same idea: "Es ist natürlich *möglich*, dass die *unciales litterae* des Hieronymus wirklich das waren, was wir jetzt mit Unzialschrift meinen...".

[68] As to a plausible name for 'uncial' in the late antiquity, if there was one, this role seems to have been played in Greek by στρογγύλος χαρακτήρ (hence Syrian script 'estrangelo').

[69] De Bruyne (n. 60) tries to identify *litterae Romanae* of Medieval and later authors with what is called uncial script today.

[70] *mensura* rather than *Bertcaudus* is meant.

[71] I am not able to decide who was the painter (*pictor*) sent to Einhard by Lupus of Ferrières and how clear-cut was the difference between *pictor* and *scriptor* in this case. Cf. above n. 22.

the form of the tables that exhibit the model of the script (namely the inscriptional *capitalis* or *capitalis quadrata*), sent by Einhard upon Lupus' request.[72]

It is only natural that Lupus knew Jerome's *Preface to Job*, as Jerome was the classic in the literary hierarchy of the period. There are further signs attesting his acquaintance with the *Preface*: the rare expression *unciales litterae* is accompanied by a specification *a quibusdam vocari existimantur* (cf. *ut vulgo aiunt* in Jerome). It is possible that an attribute *maximae* in the letter of Lupus has to be evaluated as a consequence of the hyperbolic *onera* in Jerome, even if there is evidence that the idea of *uncials* as big letters was attested also in other texts.

Lupus evidently understands *uncials* as dignified *Buch-* and *Großschrift* in general, which could seem especially matter-of-course in the time of Carolingian nostalgia and transliteration of the old manuscripts into minuscules. On the other hand, does Lupus have in mind something associated with ink recipes? Does *mensura* in his letter mean proportions of letters, and, as it were, a model for reproduction of a grand old script? Or is it a recipe for gold and silver ink? I am not able to decide this. One could think here of *Prunkunziale* along with its later developments, or of reintroducing elegant initials in an awesome ancient style.

6. REMIGIUS OF AUXERRES AND THE BIBLE GLOSSES

More substantial for the semantic history of the expression (*litterae*) *unciales* is a series of comments on ancient script terminology preserved in the *Commentum in Donati Artem maiorem* (italics are mine):[73]

> Genera etiam litterarum diversa sunt. Quedam enim *unciales* dicuntur, quae et maximae sunt et in *initiis* librorum scribuntur. *Dictae autem unciales eo quod olim uncia auri a divitibus appenderetur.*

Traube investigated this text, acknowledged probable the authorship of Remigius of Auxerre (ca 841 – ca 908), and proposed Sedulius Scotus as Remiguis' source.[74] Later Bischoff published a similar text in the form of the Bible glosses, transmitted in three codices dated to the 11th–13th centuries. He supported Traube's suggestion for the author of these glosses.

---

[72] This is the most intriguing observation made by Bischoff (n. 24) 4 Anm. 10: Bischoff meant cod. Bern 250, fol. 11v; cf. idem (n. 19) 60 n. 56.

[73] I cite the texts of Remigius and of the Glosses in this paragraph after Bischoff (n. 24) 1 – 2. More details on the textual basis of the *Commentum* see in: L. Holtz, *Donat et la tradition de l'enseignement grammatical. Étude sur l'*Ars *Donati et sa diffusion (IVe – IXe siècle) et édition critique* (Paris 1981) 440 f.

[74] Traube (n. 67).

> Untiales sunt littere magne quae in initiis librorum ad ornatum fiunt ut in antiphonariis (-phoriariis MS). Dictae autem untiales quod untiam auri (corr. from aurum) dependant.

A parallel to the words *quae et maximae sunt* from the *Commentum* of Remigius can be found in the gloss from the *Glossarium Amplonianum secundum*, s. IX (in: *CGL* V 399, 23 Goetz): *uncialibus longis*, which was first brought into this context by Brugnoli. The first word (*uncialibus*), which was presumably taken directly from Jerome's *praef. in Iob*, is explained by the second (*longis*).[75] We shall also note the words *in initiis librorum*: both in the *Commentum* and the gloss uncials are thought to be letters used as initials for ornamental purposes.[76] Popular etymology, evidently due to the phonetic similarity and probably prompted by the false reading *initialibus* (we have seen one example in a manuscript of Jerome's *Preface to Job*), is both natural and ingenious, albeit false.[77]

Notwithstanding the fact that not everything is true in these comments and glosses, I cannot agree with Hatch who dismisses the assertion about *unciales litterae* in the commentary on the *Ars major of Donatus* as "a mere idle tale".[78] On the contrary, I find it wonderful that this brief historical outline (*dicuntur... dictae*) combines contemporary medieval usage with the (presumably) right historical understanding of Jerome's *litterae unciales*. Yet, while the explanations cited hint at the payment received by artisans, I favour, as I have argued, the explanation that it was gold (along with other precious materials) that was measured in ounces, first of all for the preparation of 'golden' ink. The payment to the artisan is an overall principle, while the extra price for golden ink et sim. is a specific case, which inspires a creative speaker to coin a new word.

At this point I am happy to add to the explanations cited the third one, which was advanced by the editors of the Latin Bible a long ago, but

---

[75] Brugnoli (n. 4) 411; cf. indication of the Benedictine fathers (*MPL* 28, 1083, adn. C): "Unciales quas vocat Hieronymus litteras Glossa in codice Vat. 135 exponit *longas*".

[76] Uncials for initials in the Carolingian period and earlier: Foerster (n. 16) 101; Bischoff (n. 19) 59: "From the fifth century on, capitalis, in combination with uncial, became a distinguishing script...".

[77] Almost everybody speaking of the 'miniatures' thinks of some 'mini-pictures', not of Lat. 'minium', which is known only to specialists. (Similarly, an 'apéritif' in the parlance of Russian drunkards receives sometimes an activist interpretation and becomes 'operative'.)

[78] It is worth mentioning that Budé (p. 375) knew of this scholion, but favoured his size-related interpretation, which later enjoyed such an (undeserved) success.

seems to have escaped the attention of scholars studying the history of the word *uncial*. The explanation, which I call 'techno-commercial' and which I fully agree with, was proposed first in the biblical gloss in the correctory Ω^j (= Correctorium S. Jacobi = Parisinus lat. 16, 720, s. XIII), where *inicialibus* of Ω^s is corrected in *uncialibus* and commented upon thus:[79]

> uncia est pars ponderis ad quod res preciosae ponderantur ut aurum, unde litteras unciales dicit sumptuosas vel auratas.

Of course here Jerome's passage is interpreted by a scholar from the Dominican convent of St. Jacques in Paris, but I cannot help finding comforting this hermeneutic coincidence with a 13th century colleague.

7. OTHER MEDIEVAL AND MODERN AUTHORS

Only a brief outline can be given here of the evidence for the understanding of the word *uncial* in the late Middle Ages.[80]

The old association of *litterae unciales* with *de luxe* manuscripts can be observed in Leo Marsicanus (Ostiensis) of the 2nd half of the 11th century, *Chronicon Casinense* G (*MPL* 173, col. 635): *obtulit* (scil. imperator)... *textum Evangelii de foris quidem ex uno latere adopertum auro purissimo ac gemmis valde pretiosis, ab intus vero uncialibus litteris atque figuris aureis mirifice decoratum*...[81] Similar interpretation, i.e. that of an ambitious and expensive script, is found in Willelmus of Jumiège (Gemeticensis), surnamed Calculus (flor. ca 1070), in his *Historiae Northmannorum libri VIII* (*MPL* 149, col. 897): *Nec supprimendum illud est silentio, im<m>o, ut ita dicatur, uncialibus, ut aiunt, litteris exaratum saeculo venturo transmittendum*... The concern here was the will of queen Matilda, which the author evidently wanted to look perennial.

Even if these passages (not diligently studied by scholars with exception of De Bruyne) do not contain anything overwhelmingly new, they

---

[79] The gloss is cited after *Biblia sacra* (1951) p. 73.

[80] Thanks to Excerpta CLCLT-3-Cetedoc, Lovanii Novi, vols. I and II, copyright Sign Chadwyck-Healey Inc. 1995. I owe the following references to the staff of the *MGH* at Munich and to Dr Natalie Tchernetska. The search gives more for the history of the terms *(litterae) unciales* and / or *Romanae* in the modern times, since the learned prefaces to the Fathers of the Church are searched throughout, e.g. *MPL* 142, col. 1097, which reproduces a phrase from the *Monitum* of a modern editor.

[81] The same text is found in an auctor incertus, dated to the beginning of the 11th century (*MPL* 139, col. 1636).

add nonetheless substance to our meager evidence for the Middle Ages. One observes that the phrase *uncialibus litteris exarare* even became an idiom to denote something which has 'to be perpetuated and inscribed into history', while implying first of all a Latin script made of letters of bigger size, well-shaped, richly presented, and distinguished in each respect.

Antiquarian interests became predominant with scholars of the Renaissance and of the modern times. I have cited G. Budé with his 'inch-letters', which is a variation of the Medieval large size theory. Others, such as Blaise de Vigenère [82] or J. Mabillon,[83] moved along the same lines. Step by step the diplomatic investigations led, however, to the emergence of palaeography as a discipline. In the *Nouveau Traité* of Toustain et Tassin we read a definition which opens new prospects in the study of 'uncial': "Par écriture onciale nous entendons la majuscule de forme ronde et distinguée de la capitale par certains éléments".[84] From this point onwards, the problem lies in the shape and ductus of the letters that meet this definition: "...having the large rounded forms (not joined to each other) characteristic of early Greek and Roman MSS; also (in looser use), of large size, capital".[85] New scholarly issues have come into consideration: how did different uncial, half-uncial, and cognate scripts develop, what were Latin and Greek names for all these varieties, etc. In this usage, the word *uncial* becomes a disputed palaeographical *terminus technicus* rather than a word of the spoken language.

SOME RESULTS OF OUR SEMASIOLOGIC INQUIRY

(A) Chrysography, as well as other kinds of ornamentation, was a technique used in the pagan world. Thus, the expression of the type *litterae unciales*, not associated with any strict palaeographical content, may have existed one or two centuries before Jerome's time, and origi-

---

[82] Blaise de Vigenère, *Traicté des chiffres* (Paris 1586/1587; anast. Madrid 1996). Now this passage is regarded as the first evidence for the term 'onciale' in a French scholarly text.

[83] Mabillon (n. 25) 47 (I, cap. 11, 4, 2): the opposite of uncials are *minores litterae*.

[84] [R.-P.] Tassin et [C.] Toustain, *Nouveau Traité de diplomatique* II (Paris 1765) cap. X, 506 (the passage generally taken for the first differentiation of *capitalis* and *uncialis*).

[85] *The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary* II (Oxford 1971) s. v. 'uncial'.

nally may not have been used exclusively in Christian circles. At the same time Jerome, presumably, had in mind Latin parchment codices of the *Vetus Latina*, copied in the 3rd – early 4th centuries CE, otherwise he would not have referred to their *vetustas* at the end of the 4th century. The terms *uncialis* (*littera*, *scriptura*, *codex* et sim.) were used in the 'commercial' sense within the sphere of manuscript production, meaning any luxurious bookhand, which by contingency frequently was of imposing size. The inner form of the word was evident at this time, its reference was perceived without any effort. Jerome used polemically the more or less neutral word. Its palaeographic reference seems to have been a large calligraphic script of *de luxe* Bible MSS with golden letters, which, *accidentally*, might have been the uncial in the modern sense of the term.

(B) In the late antiquity and in the Carolingian period, the usage of *litterae unciales* lost its original precision and became (a) first of all a subject of pragmatic interest in the sphere of elegant book production and (b) an object of Patristic and Biblical hermeneutics. The development of minuscules strengthened the idea that the *litterae unciales* of previous Christian centuries denoted majuscule writing in general: most Medieval scholars associated 'uncials' (as well as *litterae Romanae*) with letters of the largest size (*maximae, longae*). An additional phonetic association with *initialis*, provoked by the semantic uncertainty, helped to consolidate the notion of a large and well-proportioned script, with a residual element of a representative style. At the same time, some medieval scholars demonstrated that they were able to see the true origin of the expression in its authentic sense that can be conjectured through the passage of Jerome. The old *Sitz im Leben*, namely, book production, remained in the centre of Medieval preoccupation with 'uncials', even if the reference to luxury became replaced by more vague aesthetic idea of some antique (of course Latin) script.

(C) In early modern times, the size-related interpretation of 'uncials' as inch-high or inch-wide letters was gradually replaced by a new interpretation, which followed the logic of systematisation prevailing in the scientific age. Interest in the history and development of writing became predominant with the creation of diplomatics and palaeography. The text of Jerome's *Preface* continued playing a consolidating role for the semantic continuity of the set phrase *litterae unciales*: Jerome's passage was not only a testimony, it was a testament for centuries to come. However, Jerome's concern about *unciales litterae* seemed now to be akin to that of palaeographers'. According to the modern point of view, *unciales*

litterae became the name for a variety of majuscule script with many subvariants, in Latin and (for many scholars also) in Greek, irrespective of its size and material, and each possessing a history of its own.[86]

Alexander Gavrilov
St. Petersburg Institute for History
at the Russian Academy of Sciences;
Bibliotheca classica Petropolitana

В известном пассаже из *praef. in Iob* бл. Иеронима увязаны *aurum / argentum*, *unciales litterae* и *onera*. Это подтверждает представление, что (а) традиция надежна (*initialibus* – порча текста под влиянием ложных ассоциаций); (б) Иеронимом актуализована именно "весовая" семантика *uncialis*. При этом *uncialibus litteris* не гиперболизирует вес роскошных кодексов (эту функцию выполняет *onera*), а опирается на деловой термин (*ut vulgo aiunt* может подразумевать и это), намекавший, по-видимому, на приобретение – *unciatim* – драгметаллов для чернил переписчика-хрисографа. Речь шла, таким образом, о "золотниковом" и, можно сказать, "валютном" письме. Главное для Иеронима – осуждение роскошных, но в филологическом и богословском отношении убогих книг. Подхваченное Иеронимом употребление *uncialis* в приложении к *litterae*, *scriptura*, *libri*, подразумевая прежде всего кодексы с (доиеронимовскими) изданиями латинской Библии, имело в виду не частную разновидность письма, а библейский маюскул III – нач. IV в.; другое дело, что среди роскошных библейских кодексов унциальные (в современном смысле слова) по всей видимости преобладали.

В поздней античности и раннем средневековье сочетание *litterae unciales*, наверное, забылось бы, если бы *Предисловия (Прологи)* Иеронима к библейским текстам не попали в издания Библии, где их глоссировали наряду с биб-

---

[86] Irina (Nickolaevna) Lebedeva (in the good old days of the MS Department of the Library of the Academy of Sciences in St Petersburg) introduced me to the elements of Greek palaeography. I worked on the subject in the late 70s and presented a paper at the Institute of Linguistic Study in Leningrad in 1978, at a conference dedicated to the memory of Josef Tronskij (1897 – 1970). My colleagues Alexander Tschernjak and Vladimir Mazhuga showed much interest in my investigations and were ever willing to give their expert advice. In May 2001, I was invited by Prof. Patricia Easterling to give a talk on the topic at the Transmission Seminar at the Classics Faculty in Cambridge. I profited from the discussion there, and later from readers (well known to me) of the editorial board of the *Hyperboreus*. During the preparation of the written version Olga Budaragina gave me linguistic, and Natalie Tchernetska more than linguistic help.

лейскими текстами. Теперь смысл выражения *litterae unciales* становится предметом толкования; его ассоциируют с самым крупным шрифтом, взятым из старинного письма (*litterae maximae*, иногда соседствующие с *litterae Romanae*). Автор заново рассматривает свидетельства Сервата Лупа (*MPL* 119, 448 C, *epist.* 5) и возводимые к Реми(гию) из Оксерр пояснения о различных видах письма в *Commentum in Donati artem maiorem*. К этим толкованиям примыкают *Библейские глоссы*, изученные Б. Бишоффом, из коих одна содержит "технико-коммерческое" понимание смысла выражения *uncialis* у Иеронима; в особенно точной форме это толкование содержится в маргиналии Парижской рукописи (Ω^j – правленый доминиканцами экземпляр середины XIII в.).

В Новое время в связи с развитием научного подхода и всестороннего изучения позднеантичных и средневековых рукописей в рамках дипломатики выражение *litterae unciales* начинает восприниматься как эмоционально нейтральный палеографический термин, относящийся не к материалу или величине, а к форме букв (выражение применяется и к греческому письму). Главным теперь становится описание и объяснение разновидностей унциального письма в рамках комплексного изучения античной книжности, а не более простая, по существу, история слова, первоначальная мотивировка которого оказалась оттеснена и забыта. Несмотря на перемены в содержании и коннотативной сфере, некоторая преемственность в выражении "унциал" объясняется связующей ролью пассажа из Иеронимовых *Прологов*.