Epistemic sentence adverbs, epistemic complement-taking predicates and epistemic pragmatic markers

Abstract

This study presents a formal and functional data-driven characterization of sentence adverbs. We define epistemic sentence adverbs as semantic predicates that validate the truth value of their scopes and are macrosyntactically dependent on them. We distinguish epistemic sentence adverbs on the one hand from epistemic complement-taking predicates – i. e., semantic predicates that validate the truth value of their scopes and govern them microsyntactically – and on the other hand from epistemic pragmatic markers – i. e., semantic predicates that validate the truth value of their scopes and that are syntactically independent of them. We also hypothesize that epistemic sentence adverbs have a specific functional role. Unlike (most) epistemic complement taking predicates, they express a non-addressable epistemic evaluation of the scope; unlike pragmatic markers they serve to qualify, rather than negotiate, the epistemic evaluation of the scope. We show that such a distinction is not necessarily inscribed at the lexical level: even though some words invariably behave as sentence adverbs, other words can be classified as epistemic sentence adverbs in some syntactic contexts, and as other epistemic markers in other syntactic contexts.